Table 3. Open in new tab First-Stage...

	Primary	Secondary
Government:
FPE	−.010 (.017)	.016 (.014)	.018 (.014)	.035 (.009)***	.024 (.007)***	.023 (.007)***
Head's Educ		.007 (.002)***	.007 (.002)***		.012 (.001)***	.012 (.001)***
Head's Educ × FPE		−.015 (.002)***	(.002)*** -.012		.003 (.002)*	.004 (.002)**
Log Food			.008 (.012)			.017 (.009)*
Log Food × FPE			−.044 (.017)***			−.025 (.009)***
Linear combinations, government:
$β_{F P E, g o v t, p r i m .} - β_{F P E, g o v t, s e c .}$	−.045 (.019)**	−.008 (.016)	−.005 (.016)
$\begin{array}{l} β_{e d u c} F P E, g o v t, p r i m . - β_{e d u c} \\ F P E, g o v t, s e c . \end{array}$		−.019 (.003)***	−.016 (.002)***
$β_{f o o d} F P E, g o v t, p r i m . - β_{f o o d} F P E, g o v t, s e c .$			−.019 (.021)
Private:
FPE	.070 (.015)***	.057 (.010)***	.054 (.010)***	.025 (.007)***	.018 (.004)***	.017 (.004)***
Head's Educ		.005 (.001)***	.004 (.001)***		.003 (.001)***	.003 (.001)***
Head's Educ × FPE		.012 (.002)***	.010 (.002)***		.003 (.001)***	.001 (.001)
Log Food			.016 (.005)***			−.0004 (.004)
Log Food × FPE			.034 (.010)***			.018 (.008)**
Linear combinations, private:
$β_{F P E, p r i v, p r i m .} - β_{F P E, p r i v, s e c .}$	.045 (.017)***	.039 (.011)***	.036 (.011)***
$\begin{array}{l} β_{e d u c} F P E, p r i v, p r i m . - β_{e d u c} \\ F P E, p r i v, s e c . \end{array}$		.010 (.002)***	.008 (.002)***
$\begin{array}{l} β_{f o o d} F P E, p r i v, p r i m . - β_{f o o d} \\ F P E, p r i v, s e c . \end{array}$			.016 (.012)
Linear combinations, both sectors:
$β_{F P E, g o v t} - β_{F P E, p r i v}$	−.080 (.028)***	−.041 (.022)**	−.036 (.022)*	.009 (.012)	.006 (.009)	.006 (.009)
District-sector-time fixed effects		X	X		X	X
Obs.	69513	69513	69513	40556	40556	40556

Primary

Secondary

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Government:

FPE

−.010 (.017)

.016 (.014)

.018 (.014)

.035 (.009)***

.024 (.007)***

.023 (.007)***

Head's Educ

.007 (.002)***

.012 (.001)***

Head's Educ × FPE

−.015 (.002)***

(.002)*** -.012

.003 (.002)*

.004 (.002)**

Log Food

.008 (.012)

.017 (.009)*

Log Food × FPE

−.044 (.017)***

−.025 (.009)***

Linear combinations, government:

β_{F P E, g o v t, p r i m .} - β_{F P E, g o v t, s e c .}

−.045 (.019)**

−.008 (.016)

−.005 (.016)

\begin{array}{l} β_{e d u c} F P E, g o v t, p r i m . - β_{e d u c} \\ F P E, g o v t, s e c . \end{array}

−.019 (.003)***

−.016 (.002)***

β_{f o o d} F P E, g o v t, p r i m . - β_{f o o d} F P E, g o v t, s e c .

−.019 (.021)

Private:

FPE

.070 (.015)***

.057 (.010)***

.054 (.010)***

.025 (.007)***

.018 (.004)***

.017 (.004)***

Head's Educ

.005 (.001)***

.004 (.001)***

.003 (.001)***

Head's Educ × FPE

.012 (.002)***

.010 (.002)***

.003 (.001)***

.001 (.001)

Log Food

.016 (.005)***

−.0004 (.004)

Log Food × FPE

.034 (.010)***

.018 (.008)**

Linear combinations, private:

β_{F P E, p r i v, p r i m .} - β_{F P E, p r i v, s e c .}

.045 (.017)***

.039 (.011)***

.036 (.011)***

\begin{array}{l} β_{e d u c} F P E, p r i v, p r i m . - β_{e d u c} \\ F P E, p r i v, s e c . \end{array}

.010 (.002)***

.008 (.002)***

\begin{array}{l} β_{f o o d} F P E, p r i v, p r i m . - β_{f o o d} \\ F P E, p r i v, s e c . \end{array}

.016 (.012)

Linear combinations, both sectors:

β_{F P E, g o v t} - β_{F P E, p r i v}

−.080 (.028)***

−.041 (.022)**

−.036 (.022)*

.009 (.012)

.006 (.009)

District-sector-time fixed effects

Obs.

69513

40556

	Primary	Secondary
Government:
FPE	−.010 (.017)	.016 (.014)	.018 (.014)	.035 (.009)***	.024 (.007)***	.023 (.007)***
Head's Educ		.007 (.002)***	.007 (.002)***		.012 (.001)***	.012 (.001)***
Head's Educ × FPE		−.015 (.002)***	(.002)*** -.012		.003 (.002)*	.004 (.002)**
Log Food			.008 (.012)			.017 (.009)*
Log Food × FPE			−.044 (.017)***			−.025 (.009)***
Linear combinations, government:
$β_{F P E, g o v t, p r i m .} - β_{F P E, g o v t, s e c .}$	−.045 (.019)**	−.008 (.016)	−.005 (.016)
$\begin{array}{l} β_{e d u c} F P E, g o v t, p r i m . - β_{e d u c} \\ F P E, g o v t, s e c . \end{array}$		−.019 (.003)***	−.016 (.002)***
$β_{f o o d} F P E, g o v t, p r i m . - β_{f o o d} F P E, g o v t, s e c .$			−.019 (.021)
Private:
FPE	.070 (.015)***	.057 (.010)***	.054 (.010)***	.025 (.007)***	.018 (.004)***	.017 (.004)***
Head's Educ		.005 (.001)***	.004 (.001)***		.003 (.001)***	.003 (.001)***
Head's Educ × FPE		.012 (.002)***	.010 (.002)***		.003 (.001)***	.001 (.001)
Log Food			.016 (.005)***			−.0004 (.004)
Log Food × FPE			.034 (.010)***			.018 (.008)**
Linear combinations, private:
$β_{F P E, p r i v, p r i m .} - β_{F P E, p r i v, s e c .}$	.045 (.017)***	.039 (.011)***	.036 (.011)***
$\begin{array}{l} β_{e d u c} F P E, p r i v, p r i m . - β_{e d u c} \\ F P E, p r i v, s e c . \end{array}$		.010 (.002)***	.008 (.002)***
$\begin{array}{l} β_{f o o d} F P E, p r i v, p r i m . - β_{f o o d} \\ F P E, p r i v, s e c . \end{array}$			.016 (.012)
Linear combinations, both sectors:
$β_{F P E, g o v t} - β_{F P E, p r i v}$	−.080 (.028)***	−.041 (.022)**	−.036 (.022)*	.009 (.012)	.006 (.009)	.006 (.009)
District-sector-time fixed effects		X	X		X	X
Obs.	69513	69513	69513	40556	40556	40556

Table 3.

Open in new tab

First-Stage Enrollment Equation: Multinomial Logit for School Sector Choice

	Primary			Secondary
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government:
FPE	−.010 (.017)	.016 (.014)	.018 (.014)	.035 (.009)***	.024 (.007)***	.023 (.007)***
Head's Educ		.007 (.002)***	.007 (.002)***		.012 (.001)***	.012 (.001)***
Head's Educ × FPE		−.015 (.002)***	(.002)*** -.012		.003 (.002)*	.004 (.002)**
Log Food			.008 (.012)			.017 (.009)*
Log Food × FPE			−.044 (.017)***			−.025 (.009)***
Linear combinations, government:
$β_{F P E, g o v t, p r i m .} - β_{F P E, g o v t, s e c .}$	−.045 (.019)**	−.008 (.016)	−.005 (.016)
$\begin{array}{l} β_{e d u c} F P E, g o v t, p r i m . - β_{e d u c} \\ F P E, g o v t, s e c . \end{array}$		−.019 (.003)***	−.016 (.002)***
$β_{f o o d} F P E, g o v t, p r i m . - β_{f o o d} F P E, g o v t, s e c .$			−.019 (.021)
Private:
FPE	.070 (.015)***	.057 (.010)***	.054 (.010)***	.025 (.007)***	.018 (.004)***	.017 (.004)***
Head's Educ		.005 (.001)***	.004 (.001)***		.003 (.001)***	.003 (.001)***
Head's Educ × FPE		.012 (.002)***	.010 (.002)***		.003 (.001)***	.001 (.001)
Log Food			.016 (.005)***			−.0004 (.004)
Log Food × FPE			.034 (.010)***			.018 (.008)**
Linear combinations, private:
$β_{F P E, p r i v, p r i m .} - β_{F P E, p r i v, s e c .}$	.045 (.017)***	.039 (.011)***	.036 (.011)***
$\begin{array}{l} β_{e d u c} F P E, p r i v, p r i m . - β_{e d u c} \\ F P E, p r i v, s e c . \end{array}$		.010 (.002)***	.008 (.002)***
$\begin{array}{l} β_{f o o d} F P E, p r i v, p r i m . - β_{f o o d} \\ F P E, p r i v, s e c . \end{array}$			.016 (.012)
Linear combinations, both sectors:
$β_{F P E, g o v t} - β_{F P E, p r i v}$	−.080 (.028)***	−.041 (.022)**	−.036 (.022)*	.009 (.012)	.006 (.009)	.006 (.009)
District-sector-time fixed effects		X	X		X	X
Obs.	69513	69513	69513	40556	40556	40556

	Primary			Secondary
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government:
FPE	−.010 (.017)	.016 (.014)	.018 (.014)	.035 (.009)***	.024 (.007)***	.023 (.007)***
Head's Educ		.007 (.002)***	.007 (.002)***		.012 (.001)***	.012 (.001)***
Head's Educ × FPE		−.015 (.002)***	(.002)*** -.012		.003 (.002)*	.004 (.002)**
Log Food			.008 (.012)			.017 (.009)*
Log Food × FPE			−.044 (.017)***			−.025 (.009)***
Linear combinations, government:
$β_{F P E, g o v t, p r i m .} - β_{F P E, g o v t, s e c .}$	−.045 (.019)**	−.008 (.016)	−.005 (.016)
$\begin{array}{l} β_{e d u c} F P E, g o v t, p r i m . - β_{e d u c} \\ F P E, g o v t, s e c . \end{array}$		−.019 (.003)***	−.016 (.002)***
$β_{f o o d} F P E, g o v t, p r i m . - β_{f o o d} F P E, g o v t, s e c .$			−.019 (.021)
Private:
FPE	.070 (.015)***	.057 (.010)***	.054 (.010)***	.025 (.007)***	.018 (.004)***	.017 (.004)***
Head's Educ		.005 (.001)***	.004 (.001)***		.003 (.001)***	.003 (.001)***
Head's Educ × FPE		.012 (.002)***	.010 (.002)***		.003 (.001)***	.001 (.001)
Log Food			.016 (.005)***			−.0004 (.004)
Log Food × FPE			.034 (.010)***			.018 (.008)**
Linear combinations, private:
$β_{F P E, p r i v, p r i m .} - β_{F P E, p r i v, s e c .}$	.045 (.017)***	.039 (.011)***	.036 (.011)***
$\begin{array}{l} β_{e d u c} F P E, p r i v, p r i m . - β_{e d u c} \\ F P E, p r i v, s e c . \end{array}$		.010 (.002)***	.008 (.002)***
$\begin{array}{l} β_{f o o d} F P E, p r i v, p r i m . - β_{f o o d} \\ F P E, p r i v, s e c . \end{array}$			.016 (.012)
Linear combinations, both sectors:
$β_{F P E, g o v t} - β_{F P E, p r i v}$	−.080 (.028)***	−.041 (.022)**	−.036 (.022)*	.009 (.012)	.006 (.009)	.006 (.009)
District-sector-time fixed effects		X	X		X	X
Obs.	69513	69513	69513	40556	40556	40556

Source: Figures in the table are average marginal effects across all observations. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The three choice options are “not enrolled”, “government” and “private”. “Not enrolled” is the base-category. District-sector-time dummies are included but not shown. The marginal effects of the interaction terms from this discrete choice model are calculated using the procedures discussed in Norton04. All standard errors are bootstrapped and account for district level clustering.

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