| . | Communication vs Control Blocks . | Inspector vs Control Blocks . | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | . | . | . | . | . | . | Inspector . | Indirectly . |
| . | Sample . | Control . | Free Cost . | Communication . | Sample . | Control . | Assigned . | Inspected . |
| . | Size . | Mean . | Difference . | Difference . | Size . | Mean . | Difference . | Difference . |
| Trust state governor | 805 | 4.89 | −0.304 | −0.602** | 1,374 | 4.81 | −0.376* | −0.524** |
| (0.296) | (0.288) | (0.223) | (0.238) | |||||
| Trust state officials | 799 | 4.28 | −0.584** | −0.566* | 1,362 | 4.00 | 0.124 | −0.0686 |
| (0.297) | (0.300) | (0.229) | (0.218) | |||||
| Trust state and municipal inspectors | 793 | 4.43 | −0.263 | −0.585** | 1,360 | 4.23 | 0.0695 | −0.167 |
| (0.280) | (0.233) | (0.236) | (0.208) | |||||
| Believe people in govt. act in own interests | 733 | 0.77 | 0.106*** | 0.0848** | 1,238 | 0.80 | 0.0569** | 0.0400 |
| rather than interests of the people | (0.0355) | (0.0346) | (0.0282) | (0.0292) | ||||
| . | Communication vs Control Blocks . | Inspector vs Control Blocks . | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | . | . | . | . | . | . | Inspector . | Indirectly . |
| . | Sample . | Control . | Free Cost . | Communication . | Sample . | Control . | Assigned . | Inspected . |
| . | Size . | Mean . | Difference . | Difference . | Size . | Mean . | Difference . | Difference . |
| Trust state governor | 805 | 4.89 | −0.304 | −0.602** | 1,374 | 4.81 | −0.376* | −0.524** |
| (0.296) | (0.288) | (0.223) | (0.238) | |||||
| Trust state officials | 799 | 4.28 | −0.584** | −0.566* | 1,362 | 4.00 | 0.124 | −0.0686 |
| (0.297) | (0.300) | (0.229) | (0.218) | |||||
| Trust state and municipal inspectors | 793 | 4.43 | −0.263 | −0.585** | 1,360 | 4.23 | 0.0695 | −0.167 |
| (0.280) | (0.233) | (0.236) | (0.208) | |||||
| Believe people in govt. act in own interests | 733 | 0.77 | 0.106*** | 0.0848** | 1,238 | 0.80 | 0.0569** | 0.0400 |
| rather than interests of the people | (0.0355) | (0.0346) | (0.0282) | (0.0292) | ||||
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the block level. *, **, and *** indicate significantly different from control mean at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively, after controlling for randomization strata. Sampling weights are used for the Inspector vs Control blocks comparisons. Coefficients in bold remain significant applying the Benjamini-Hochberg (1995) procedure within a family of outcomes to control false discoveries.
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in text.
| . | Communication vs Control Blocks . | Inspector vs Control Blocks . | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | . | . | . | . | . | . | Inspector . | Indirectly . |
| . | Sample . | Control . | Free Cost . | Communication . | Sample . | Control . | Assigned . | Inspected . |
| . | Size . | Mean . | Difference . | Difference . | Size . | Mean . | Difference . | Difference . |
| Trust state governor | 805 | 4.89 | −0.304 | −0.602** | 1,374 | 4.81 | −0.376* | −0.524** |
| (0.296) | (0.288) | (0.223) | (0.238) | |||||
| Trust state officials | 799 | 4.28 | −0.584** | −0.566* | 1,362 | 4.00 | 0.124 | −0.0686 |
| (0.297) | (0.300) | (0.229) | (0.218) | |||||
| Trust state and municipal inspectors | 793 | 4.43 | −0.263 | −0.585** | 1,360 | 4.23 | 0.0695 | −0.167 |
| (0.280) | (0.233) | (0.236) | (0.208) | |||||
| Believe people in govt. act in own interests | 733 | 0.77 | 0.106*** | 0.0848** | 1,238 | 0.80 | 0.0569** | 0.0400 |
| rather than interests of the people | (0.0355) | (0.0346) | (0.0282) | (0.0292) | ||||
| . | Communication vs Control Blocks . | Inspector vs Control Blocks . | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | . | . | . | . | . | . | Inspector . | Indirectly . |
| . | Sample . | Control . | Free Cost . | Communication . | Sample . | Control . | Assigned . | Inspected . |
| . | Size . | Mean . | Difference . | Difference . | Size . | Mean . | Difference . | Difference . |
| Trust state governor | 805 | 4.89 | −0.304 | −0.602** | 1,374 | 4.81 | −0.376* | −0.524** |
| (0.296) | (0.288) | (0.223) | (0.238) | |||||
| Trust state officials | 799 | 4.28 | −0.584** | −0.566* | 1,362 | 4.00 | 0.124 | −0.0686 |
| (0.297) | (0.300) | (0.229) | (0.218) | |||||
| Trust state and municipal inspectors | 793 | 4.43 | −0.263 | −0.585** | 1,360 | 4.23 | 0.0695 | −0.167 |
| (0.280) | (0.233) | (0.236) | (0.208) | |||||
| Believe people in govt. act in own interests | 733 | 0.77 | 0.106*** | 0.0848** | 1,238 | 0.80 | 0.0569** | 0.0400 |
| rather than interests of the people | (0.0355) | (0.0346) | (0.0282) | (0.0292) | ||||
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the block level. *, **, and *** indicate significantly different from control mean at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively, after controlling for randomization strata. Sampling weights are used for the Inspector vs Control blocks comparisons. Coefficients in bold remain significant applying the Benjamini-Hochberg (1995) procedure within a family of outcomes to control false discoveries.
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in text.
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