Table 5 shows the average marginal...

Table 5 shows the average marginal effects computed from the probit regression of a WUG-level decision about manager appointment against no change. The original results are reported in the online appendix table S4. Again, a key finding is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the volumetric price and the choice of manager appointment, although the coefficients of the full sample model are weakly significant (p-values 13% for the level term and 12% for the squared term). The threshold value of the volumetric price for the maximum probability is 0.072 or 0.092.

	(1)	(2)
Volumetric price of reservoir water	7.482	15.26***
	(1.497)	(2.635)
Volumetric price of reservoir water squared	−52.16	−83.36*
	(−1.529)	(−1.876)
Group size
No. of parcels	0.000600	0.00198
	(0.525)	(1.246)
Homogeneity
Gini coefficient of parcel size	−0.0638	0.123
	(−0.165)	(0.225)
Infrastructure condition
Simplicity of water flow direction	0.980	3.570**
	(1.232)	(2.381)
Earth canal length	−0.00299	−0.0852
	(−0.0982)	(−1.558)
Exit options
No. of ponds per member (pre-reform)	−0.0477	0.564**
	(−0.433)	(2.266)
No. of pumps per member (pre-reform)	−0.0405	−0.138
	(−0.345)	(−0.723)
Threshold value: the price level that gives the max probability of the dependent variable	0.072	0.092
Observations	67	33

	(1)	(2)
Volumetric price of reservoir water	7.482	15.26***
	(1.497)	(2.635)
Volumetric price of reservoir water squared	−52.16	−83.36*
	(−1.529)	(−1.876)
Group size
No. of parcels	0.000600	0.00198
	(0.525)	(1.246)
Homogeneity
Gini coefficient of parcel size	−0.0638	0.123
	(−0.165)	(0.225)
Infrastructure condition
Simplicity of water flow direction	0.980	3.570**
	(1.232)	(2.381)
Earth canal length	−0.00299	−0.0852
	(−0.0982)	(−1.558)
Exit options
No. of ponds per member (pre-reform)	−0.0477	0.564**
	(−0.433)	(2.266)
No. of pumps per member (pre-reform)	−0.0405	−0.138
	(−0.345)	(−0.723)
Threshold value: the price level that gives the max probability of the dependent variable	0.072	0.092
Observations	67	33

Table 5

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The Average Marginal Effects from the Probit Regression of a WUG's Manager Appointment Model

	(1)	(2)
Variables	Full sample model	Sub-sample model
Volumetric price of reservoir water	7.482	15.26***
	(1.497)	(2.635)
Volumetric price of reservoir water squared	−52.16	−83.36*
	(−1.529)	(−1.876)
Group size
No. of parcels	0.000600	0.00198
	(0.525)	(1.246)
Homogeneity
Gini coefficient of parcel size	−0.0638	0.123
	(−0.165)	(0.225)
Infrastructure condition
Simplicity of water flow direction	0.980	3.570**
	(1.232)	(2.381)
Earth canal length	−0.00299	−0.0852
	(−0.0982)	(−1.558)
Exit options
No. of ponds per member (pre-reform)	−0.0477	0.564**
	(−0.433)	(2.266)
No. of pumps per member (pre-reform)	−0.0405	−0.138
	(−0.345)	(−0.723)
Threshold value: the price level that gives the max probability of the dependent variable	0.072	0.092
Observations	67	33

	(1)	(2)
Variables	Full sample model	Sub-sample model
Volumetric price of reservoir water	7.482	15.26***
	(1.497)	(2.635)
Volumetric price of reservoir water squared	−52.16	−83.36*
	(−1.529)	(−1.876)
Group size
No. of parcels	0.000600	0.00198
	(0.525)	(1.246)
Homogeneity
Gini coefficient of parcel size	−0.0638	0.123
	(−0.165)	(0.225)
Infrastructure condition
Simplicity of water flow direction	0.980	3.570**
	(1.232)	(2.381)
Earth canal length	−0.00299	−0.0852
	(−0.0982)	(−1.558)
Exit options
No. of ponds per member (pre-reform)	−0.0477	0.564**
	(−0.433)	(2.266)
No. of pumps per member (pre-reform)	−0.0405	−0.138
	(−0.345)	(−0.723)
Threshold value: the price level that gives the max probability of the dependent variable	0.072	0.092
Observations	67	33

Note: z-statistics are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.

Source: Authors’ analysis based on data sources discussed in the text.

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