Performance of financially distressed airlines after the Safe Harbor Reform Act of 2005
Dependent . | Passenger . | Firm ops. . | Ops. . | Tobin’s . | log(No. . | log(No. . | log(No. . | log(No. . | log(Avg. . | log(Capital . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
variables: . | revenue/ . | revenue/ . | income/ . | q . | of . | of . | of . | of . | num. of . | expenditures) . |
. | assets . | industry- . | sales . | . | passengers) . | routes) . | flights) . | aircraft) . | seats) . | . |
. | . | ops. revenue . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . |
. | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . | (7) . | (8) . | (9) . | (10) . |
Fin. distress | 0.034*** | 0.056** | 0.062** | 0.317** | 0.093*** | 0.134 | 0.183 | 0.769*** | 0.042** | 0.546*** |
|$\quad$||$\times $|Post-2005 | (0.009) | (0.021) | (0.023) | (0.147) | (0.030) | (0.163) | (0.164) | (0.239) | (0.021) | (0.174) |
Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year fixed | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
|$\quad$| effects | ||||||||||
Firm fixed | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
|$\quad$| effects | ||||||||||
Obs. | 87 | 97 | 97 | 96 | 85 | 74 | 74 | 58 | 77 | 97 |
No. of firms | 18 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 18 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 17 | 20 |
|$R^{2}$| (within) | .608 | .390 | .750 | .705 | .789 | .707 | .642 | .375 | .291 | .341 |
Dependent . | Passenger . | Firm ops. . | Ops. . | Tobin’s . | log(No. . | log(No. . | log(No. . | log(No. . | log(Avg. . | log(Capital . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
variables: . | revenue/ . | revenue/ . | income/ . | q . | of . | of . | of . | of . | num. of . | expenditures) . |
. | assets . | industry- . | sales . | . | passengers) . | routes) . | flights) . | aircraft) . | seats) . | . |
. | . | ops. revenue . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . |
. | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . | (7) . | (8) . | (9) . | (10) . |
Fin. distress | 0.034*** | 0.056** | 0.062** | 0.317** | 0.093*** | 0.134 | 0.183 | 0.769*** | 0.042** | 0.546*** |
|$\quad$||$\times $|Post-2005 | (0.009) | (0.021) | (0.023) | (0.147) | (0.030) | (0.163) | (0.164) | (0.239) | (0.021) | (0.174) |
Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year fixed | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
|$\quad$| effects | ||||||||||
Firm fixed | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
|$\quad$| effects | ||||||||||
Obs. | 87 | 97 | 97 | 96 | 85 | 74 | 74 | 58 | 77 | 97 |
No. of firms | 18 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 18 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 17 | 20 |
|$R^{2}$| (within) | .608 | .390 | .750 | .705 | .789 | .707 | .642 | .375 | .291 | .341 |
This table presents estimations from firm-fixed effect regressions. The sample includes all firms with SIC 4512 (scheduled airlines) over the period 2003–2008. Fin. distress is an indicator equal to 1 if in 2005 the Altman’s (1968) z-score for a firm is less than 1.81, and zero otherwise. Post-2005 is an indicator equal to 1 for the years 2006–2008, and zero for the years 2003–2005. Control variables include size, fuel expenses, cash, tangibility, and net worth. Refer to Table I.B.2 for detailed variable definitions. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the airline level. *|$p < .1$|; **|$p < .05$|; ***|$p < .01$|.
Performance of financially distressed airlines after the Safe Harbor Reform Act of 2005
Dependent . | Passenger . | Firm ops. . | Ops. . | Tobin’s . | log(No. . | log(No. . | log(No. . | log(No. . | log(Avg. . | log(Capital . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
variables: . | revenue/ . | revenue/ . | income/ . | q . | of . | of . | of . | of . | num. of . | expenditures) . |
. | assets . | industry- . | sales . | . | passengers) . | routes) . | flights) . | aircraft) . | seats) . | . |
. | . | ops. revenue . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . |
. | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . | (7) . | (8) . | (9) . | (10) . |
Fin. distress | 0.034*** | 0.056** | 0.062** | 0.317** | 0.093*** | 0.134 | 0.183 | 0.769*** | 0.042** | 0.546*** |
|$\quad$||$\times $|Post-2005 | (0.009) | (0.021) | (0.023) | (0.147) | (0.030) | (0.163) | (0.164) | (0.239) | (0.021) | (0.174) |
Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year fixed | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
|$\quad$| effects | ||||||||||
Firm fixed | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
|$\quad$| effects | ||||||||||
Obs. | 87 | 97 | 97 | 96 | 85 | 74 | 74 | 58 | 77 | 97 |
No. of firms | 18 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 18 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 17 | 20 |
|$R^{2}$| (within) | .608 | .390 | .750 | .705 | .789 | .707 | .642 | .375 | .291 | .341 |
Dependent . | Passenger . | Firm ops. . | Ops. . | Tobin’s . | log(No. . | log(No. . | log(No. . | log(No. . | log(Avg. . | log(Capital . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
variables: . | revenue/ . | revenue/ . | income/ . | q . | of . | of . | of . | of . | num. of . | expenditures) . |
. | assets . | industry- . | sales . | . | passengers) . | routes) . | flights) . | aircraft) . | seats) . | . |
. | . | ops. revenue . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . |
. | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . | (7) . | (8) . | (9) . | (10) . |
Fin. distress | 0.034*** | 0.056** | 0.062** | 0.317** | 0.093*** | 0.134 | 0.183 | 0.769*** | 0.042** | 0.546*** |
|$\quad$||$\times $|Post-2005 | (0.009) | (0.021) | (0.023) | (0.147) | (0.030) | (0.163) | (0.164) | (0.239) | (0.021) | (0.174) |
Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year fixed | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
|$\quad$| effects | ||||||||||
Firm fixed | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
|$\quad$| effects | ||||||||||
Obs. | 87 | 97 | 97 | 96 | 85 | 74 | 74 | 58 | 77 | 97 |
No. of firms | 18 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 18 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 17 | 20 |
|$R^{2}$| (within) | .608 | .390 | .750 | .705 | .789 | .707 | .642 | .375 | .291 | .341 |
This table presents estimations from firm-fixed effect regressions. The sample includes all firms with SIC 4512 (scheduled airlines) over the period 2003–2008. Fin. distress is an indicator equal to 1 if in 2005 the Altman’s (1968) z-score for a firm is less than 1.81, and zero otherwise. Post-2005 is an indicator equal to 1 for the years 2006–2008, and zero for the years 2003–2005. Control variables include size, fuel expenses, cash, tangibility, and net worth. Refer to Table I.B.2 for detailed variable definitions. Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the airline level. *|$p < .1$|; **|$p < .05$|; ***|$p < .01$|.
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