Questions for Outsourcing Decisions . | Implications if the answer is “Yes” . |
---|---|
Does the function require the exercise of sovereign powers (e.g., representing the United States before an intergovernmental body, use of coercive authority to arrest a person)? | Violation of established principles in law and policy. |
Is there a lack of competition for the service? | No presumption of efficiency if outsourced. |
Will public values be jeopardized if services are outsourced? | May be a violation of democratic principles depending on the principle(s) violated and measures of citizens’ expectations regarding the function or service. |
Has the function been defined as “inherently governmental” by statute? | FAIR Act, 31 U.S.C. sec 502 prohibits outsourcing. |
Has the function been defined as “inherently governmental” by agency policy or practice? | Efficiency is not the most important goal. |
Is the function such that the contractor’s involvement is so extensive as to preempt government officials’ authority, decision-making process, or discretion? | Violation of established principles in law and policy, especially if agency oversight is considered a constitutional responsibility. |
Is the function critical to the agency’s function such that the function is necessary to the agency being able to effectively perform and maintain control of its mission and operations? | Outsourcing may be a risk to the agency’s ability to carry out a mission duly authorized by Congress. |
Is necessary oversight of the supplier extensive and costly? | No presumptive preference for outsourcing. |
Is oversight of the supplier constrained or limited? | Contractor is likely a “non-state actor” unregulated by Constitutional rule. Program participants are not protected and there is a need for independent accountability mechanisms. |
Is the service a public function as narrowly defined by State Action Doctrine? | Only traditionally and exclusively public functions fit category. The contractor is likely a “state actor” and regulated by Constitutional rule. |
Does the agency have sufficient internal capability to control its mission and operations and to ensure it is cost effective to contract out? | Violation of OMB A-76 Policy and possibly a violation of Constitution. |
Questions for Outsourcing Decisions . | Implications if the answer is “Yes” . |
---|---|
Does the function require the exercise of sovereign powers (e.g., representing the United States before an intergovernmental body, use of coercive authority to arrest a person)? | Violation of established principles in law and policy. |
Is there a lack of competition for the service? | No presumption of efficiency if outsourced. |
Will public values be jeopardized if services are outsourced? | May be a violation of democratic principles depending on the principle(s) violated and measures of citizens’ expectations regarding the function or service. |
Has the function been defined as “inherently governmental” by statute? | FAIR Act, 31 U.S.C. sec 502 prohibits outsourcing. |
Has the function been defined as “inherently governmental” by agency policy or practice? | Efficiency is not the most important goal. |
Is the function such that the contractor’s involvement is so extensive as to preempt government officials’ authority, decision-making process, or discretion? | Violation of established principles in law and policy, especially if agency oversight is considered a constitutional responsibility. |
Is the function critical to the agency’s function such that the function is necessary to the agency being able to effectively perform and maintain control of its mission and operations? | Outsourcing may be a risk to the agency’s ability to carry out a mission duly authorized by Congress. |
Is necessary oversight of the supplier extensive and costly? | No presumptive preference for outsourcing. |
Is oversight of the supplier constrained or limited? | Contractor is likely a “non-state actor” unregulated by Constitutional rule. Program participants are not protected and there is a need for independent accountability mechanisms. |
Is the service a public function as narrowly defined by State Action Doctrine? | Only traditionally and exclusively public functions fit category. The contractor is likely a “state actor” and regulated by Constitutional rule. |
Does the agency have sufficient internal capability to control its mission and operations and to ensure it is cost effective to contract out? | Violation of OMB A-76 Policy and possibly a violation of Constitution. |
Note: Bolded questions answered in the affirmative require insourcing.
Questions for Outsourcing Decisions . | Implications if the answer is “Yes” . |
---|---|
Does the function require the exercise of sovereign powers (e.g., representing the United States before an intergovernmental body, use of coercive authority to arrest a person)? | Violation of established principles in law and policy. |
Is there a lack of competition for the service? | No presumption of efficiency if outsourced. |
Will public values be jeopardized if services are outsourced? | May be a violation of democratic principles depending on the principle(s) violated and measures of citizens’ expectations regarding the function or service. |
Has the function been defined as “inherently governmental” by statute? | FAIR Act, 31 U.S.C. sec 502 prohibits outsourcing. |
Has the function been defined as “inherently governmental” by agency policy or practice? | Efficiency is not the most important goal. |
Is the function such that the contractor’s involvement is so extensive as to preempt government officials’ authority, decision-making process, or discretion? | Violation of established principles in law and policy, especially if agency oversight is considered a constitutional responsibility. |
Is the function critical to the agency’s function such that the function is necessary to the agency being able to effectively perform and maintain control of its mission and operations? | Outsourcing may be a risk to the agency’s ability to carry out a mission duly authorized by Congress. |
Is necessary oversight of the supplier extensive and costly? | No presumptive preference for outsourcing. |
Is oversight of the supplier constrained or limited? | Contractor is likely a “non-state actor” unregulated by Constitutional rule. Program participants are not protected and there is a need for independent accountability mechanisms. |
Is the service a public function as narrowly defined by State Action Doctrine? | Only traditionally and exclusively public functions fit category. The contractor is likely a “state actor” and regulated by Constitutional rule. |
Does the agency have sufficient internal capability to control its mission and operations and to ensure it is cost effective to contract out? | Violation of OMB A-76 Policy and possibly a violation of Constitution. |
Questions for Outsourcing Decisions . | Implications if the answer is “Yes” . |
---|---|
Does the function require the exercise of sovereign powers (e.g., representing the United States before an intergovernmental body, use of coercive authority to arrest a person)? | Violation of established principles in law and policy. |
Is there a lack of competition for the service? | No presumption of efficiency if outsourced. |
Will public values be jeopardized if services are outsourced? | May be a violation of democratic principles depending on the principle(s) violated and measures of citizens’ expectations regarding the function or service. |
Has the function been defined as “inherently governmental” by statute? | FAIR Act, 31 U.S.C. sec 502 prohibits outsourcing. |
Has the function been defined as “inherently governmental” by agency policy or practice? | Efficiency is not the most important goal. |
Is the function such that the contractor’s involvement is so extensive as to preempt government officials’ authority, decision-making process, or discretion? | Violation of established principles in law and policy, especially if agency oversight is considered a constitutional responsibility. |
Is the function critical to the agency’s function such that the function is necessary to the agency being able to effectively perform and maintain control of its mission and operations? | Outsourcing may be a risk to the agency’s ability to carry out a mission duly authorized by Congress. |
Is necessary oversight of the supplier extensive and costly? | No presumptive preference for outsourcing. |
Is oversight of the supplier constrained or limited? | Contractor is likely a “non-state actor” unregulated by Constitutional rule. Program participants are not protected and there is a need for independent accountability mechanisms. |
Is the service a public function as narrowly defined by State Action Doctrine? | Only traditionally and exclusively public functions fit category. The contractor is likely a “state actor” and regulated by Constitutional rule. |
Does the agency have sufficient internal capability to control its mission and operations and to ensure it is cost effective to contract out? | Violation of OMB A-76 Policy and possibly a violation of Constitution. |
Note: Bolded questions answered in the affirmative require insourcing.
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