. | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
A. Firm level . | . | . | . | . | . | . |
. | Earnings . | Hiring difficulty . | Cognitive skill . | |||
. | High . | Low . | High . | Low . | High . | Low . |
Emp | 0.351** | 0.155 | 0.412*** | –0.045 | 0.517*** | –0.115 |
(0.130) | (0.100) | (0.091) | (0.098) | (0.125) | (0.070) | |
B. Worker level | ||||||
Earnings | Hiring difficulty | Cognitive skill | ||||
High | Low | High | Low | High | Low | |
Years employed at initial firm | 0.754*** | 0.344** | 0.631*** | 0.433*** | 0.690*** | 0.402*** |
(0.086) | (0.137) | (0.115) | (0.139) | (0.119) | (0.122) | |
Cumulative earnings at initial firm | 0.922*** | 0.275* | 0.673*** | 0.481*** | 0.740*** | 0.423*** |
(0.130) | (0.148) | (0.156) | (0.156) | (0.132) | (0.130) |
. | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
A. Firm level . | . | . | . | . | . | . |
. | Earnings . | Hiring difficulty . | Cognitive skill . | |||
. | High . | Low . | High . | Low . | High . | Low . |
Emp | 0.351** | 0.155 | 0.412*** | –0.045 | 0.517*** | –0.115 |
(0.130) | (0.100) | (0.091) | (0.098) | (0.125) | (0.070) | |
B. Worker level | ||||||
Earnings | Hiring difficulty | Cognitive skill | ||||
High | Low | High | Low | High | Low | |
Years employed at initial firm | 0.754*** | 0.344** | 0.631*** | 0.433*** | 0.690*** | 0.402*** |
(0.086) | (0.137) | (0.115) | (0.139) | (0.119) | (0.122) | |
Cumulative earnings at initial firm | 0.922*** | 0.275* | 0.673*** | 0.481*** | 0.740*** | 0.423*** |
(0.130) | (0.148) | (0.156) | (0.156) | (0.132) | (0.130) |
This table reports the effect of loan guarantees on firm and worker-level employment outcomes, splitting the sample by proxies for worker skill. Columns 1 and 2 split the sample by worker earnings capacity, columns 3 and 4 by hiring difficulty, and columns 5 and 6 by cognitive-analytical task content. For panel A, we first classify workers in the highest tertile of the distribution as high skill for each skill measure, utilizing the universe of all workers in 2008 from DADS Postes. Based on this classification, we compute the firm-level fraction of high-skilled workers for each measure. We then split the sample of firms at the median of the fraction of high-skilled workers. In panel B, we split the worker sample at the median of the respective skill measure. The main explanatory variable is the regional intensity of the recovery plan, Guarantee, estimated across SMEs outside the border area. All regressions include department pair fixed effects, distance to the border, and changes in regional controls from 2008 to 2010 (public spending, local taxes, public equipment expenditures, public debt, state contribution, value-added of non-SMEs, and regional bank lending), and firm (log of assets, ROA, log of firm age, dividend/sales, PPE/assets, debt/assets, credit risk and two-digit industry fixed effects). We add worker-level controls (worker age, gender, and occupation fixed effects) in panel B. Firm- and worker-level controls are measured in 2008. Standard errors clustered by region are reported in parentheses.
;
;
.
. | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
A. Firm level . | . | . | . | . | . | . |
. | Earnings . | Hiring difficulty . | Cognitive skill . | |||
. | High . | Low . | High . | Low . | High . | Low . |
Emp | 0.351** | 0.155 | 0.412*** | –0.045 | 0.517*** | –0.115 |
(0.130) | (0.100) | (0.091) | (0.098) | (0.125) | (0.070) | |
B. Worker level | ||||||
Earnings | Hiring difficulty | Cognitive skill | ||||
High | Low | High | Low | High | Low | |
Years employed at initial firm | 0.754*** | 0.344** | 0.631*** | 0.433*** | 0.690*** | 0.402*** |
(0.086) | (0.137) | (0.115) | (0.139) | (0.119) | (0.122) | |
Cumulative earnings at initial firm | 0.922*** | 0.275* | 0.673*** | 0.481*** | 0.740*** | 0.423*** |
(0.130) | (0.148) | (0.156) | (0.156) | (0.132) | (0.130) |
. | (1) . | (2) . | (3) . | (4) . | (5) . | (6) . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
A. Firm level . | . | . | . | . | . | . |
. | Earnings . | Hiring difficulty . | Cognitive skill . | |||
. | High . | Low . | High . | Low . | High . | Low . |
Emp | 0.351** | 0.155 | 0.412*** | –0.045 | 0.517*** | –0.115 |
(0.130) | (0.100) | (0.091) | (0.098) | (0.125) | (0.070) | |
B. Worker level | ||||||
Earnings | Hiring difficulty | Cognitive skill | ||||
High | Low | High | Low | High | Low | |
Years employed at initial firm | 0.754*** | 0.344** | 0.631*** | 0.433*** | 0.690*** | 0.402*** |
(0.086) | (0.137) | (0.115) | (0.139) | (0.119) | (0.122) | |
Cumulative earnings at initial firm | 0.922*** | 0.275* | 0.673*** | 0.481*** | 0.740*** | 0.423*** |
(0.130) | (0.148) | (0.156) | (0.156) | (0.132) | (0.130) |
This table reports the effect of loan guarantees on firm and worker-level employment outcomes, splitting the sample by proxies for worker skill. Columns 1 and 2 split the sample by worker earnings capacity, columns 3 and 4 by hiring difficulty, and columns 5 and 6 by cognitive-analytical task content. For panel A, we first classify workers in the highest tertile of the distribution as high skill for each skill measure, utilizing the universe of all workers in 2008 from DADS Postes. Based on this classification, we compute the firm-level fraction of high-skilled workers for each measure. We then split the sample of firms at the median of the fraction of high-skilled workers. In panel B, we split the worker sample at the median of the respective skill measure. The main explanatory variable is the regional intensity of the recovery plan, Guarantee, estimated across SMEs outside the border area. All regressions include department pair fixed effects, distance to the border, and changes in regional controls from 2008 to 2010 (public spending, local taxes, public equipment expenditures, public debt, state contribution, value-added of non-SMEs, and regional bank lending), and firm (log of assets, ROA, log of firm age, dividend/sales, PPE/assets, debt/assets, credit risk and two-digit industry fixed effects). We add worker-level controls (worker age, gender, and occupation fixed effects) in panel B. Firm- and worker-level controls are measured in 2008. Standard errors clustered by region are reported in parentheses.
;
;
.
This PDF is available to Subscribers Only
View Article Abstract & Purchase OptionsFor full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.