Table 9: Open in new tab Placebo test...

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Guarantee $_{region, 09 - 10}$	0.901***	0.054	0.299***	0.112	0.511***	–0.074
	(0.205)	(0.055)	(0.061)	(0.067)	(0.080)	(0.111)
Department-pair FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Regional controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm-level controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Worker-level controls			Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	23,137	15,421	23,137	15,421	23,137	15,421
$R^{2}$	.067	.022	.044	.050	.080	.064
B. Reallocation
Take-up propensity			High	Low	High	Low
		Years employed $_{09, 15}$	Earnings $_{09, 15}$
			Other firm	Other firm
			Higher VA/Emp	Higher VA/Emp
Guarantee $_{region, 09 - 10}$			–0.534***	0.115	–0.429***	0.047
			(0.108)	(0.148)	(0.089)	(0.134)
Department-pair FE			Y	Y	Y	Y
Regional controls			Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm-level controls			Y	Y	Y	Y
Worker-level controls			Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations			23,137	15,421	23,137	15,421
$R^{2}$			.097	.053	.084	.051

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

A. Baseline

Take-up propensity

high

low

high

low

high

low

Guarantee

_{firm, 09 - 10}

Years employed

_{09, 15}

Earnings

_{09, 15}

Guarantee

_{region, 09 - 10}

0.901***

0.054

0.299***

0.112

0.511***

–0.074

(0.205)

(0.055)

(0.061)

(0.067)

(0.080)

(0.111)

Department-pair FE

Regional controls

Firm-level controls

Worker-level controls

Observations

23,137

15,421

23,137

15,421

23,137

15,421

R^{2}

.067

.022

.044

.050

.080

.064

B. Reallocation

Take-up propensity

High

Low

High

Low

Years employed

_{09, 15}

Earnings

_{09, 15}

Other firm

Higher VA/Emp

Guarantee

_{region, 09 - 10}

–0.534***

0.115

–0.429***

0.047

(0.108)

(0.148)

(0.089)

(0.134)

Department-pair FE

Regional controls

Firm-level controls

Worker-level controls

Observations

23,137

15,421

23,137

15,421

R^{2}

.097

.053

.084

.051

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Guarantee $_{region, 09 - 10}$	0.901***	0.054	0.299***	0.112	0.511***	–0.074
	(0.205)	(0.055)	(0.061)	(0.067)	(0.080)	(0.111)
Department-pair FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Regional controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm-level controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Worker-level controls			Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	23,137	15,421	23,137	15,421	23,137	15,421
$R^{2}$	.067	.022	.044	.050	.080	.064
B. Reallocation
Take-up propensity			High	Low	High	Low
		Years employed $_{09, 15}$	Earnings $_{09, 15}$
			Other firm	Other firm
			Higher VA/Emp	Higher VA/Emp
Guarantee $_{region, 09 - 10}$			–0.534***	0.115	–0.429***	0.047
			(0.108)	(0.148)	(0.089)	(0.134)
Department-pair FE			Y	Y	Y	Y
Regional controls			Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm-level controls			Y	Y	Y	Y
Worker-level controls			Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations			23,137	15,421	23,137	15,421
$R^{2}$			.097	.053	.084	.051

Table 9:

Open in new tab

Placebo test using firms with low take-up propensity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Baseline
Take-up propensity	high	low	high	low	high	low
	Guarantee $_{firm, 09 - 10}$		Years employed $_{09, 15}$		Earnings $_{09, 15}$
Guarantee $_{region, 09 - 10}$	0.901***	0.054	0.299***	0.112	0.511***	–0.074
	(0.205)	(0.055)	(0.061)	(0.067)	(0.080)	(0.111)
Department-pair FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Regional controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm-level controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Worker-level controls			Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	23,137	15,421	23,137	15,421	23,137	15,421
$R^{2}$	.067	.022	.044	.050	.080	.064
B. Reallocation
Take-up propensity			High	Low	High	Low
			Years employed $_{09, 15}$		Earnings $_{09, 15}$
			Other firm		Other firm
			Higher VA/Emp		Higher VA/Emp
Guarantee $_{region, 09 - 10}$			–0.534***	0.115	–0.429***	0.047
			(0.108)	(0.148)	(0.089)	(0.134)
Department-pair FE			Y	Y	Y	Y
Regional controls			Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm-level controls			Y	Y	Y	Y
Worker-level controls			Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations			23,137	15,421	23,137	15,421
$R^{2}$			.097	.053	.084	.051

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Baseline
Take-up propensity	high	low	high	low	high	low
	Guarantee $_{firm, 09 - 10}$		Years employed $_{09, 15}$		Earnings $_{09, 15}$
Guarantee $_{region, 09 - 10}$	0.901***	0.054	0.299***	0.112	0.511***	–0.074
	(0.205)	(0.055)	(0.061)	(0.067)	(0.080)	(0.111)
Department-pair FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Regional controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm-level controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Worker-level controls			Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	23,137	15,421	23,137	15,421	23,137	15,421
$R^{2}$	.067	.022	.044	.050	.080	.064
B. Reallocation
Take-up propensity			High	Low	High	Low
			Years employed $_{09, 15}$		Earnings $_{09, 15}$
			Other firm		Other firm
			Higher VA/Emp		Higher VA/Emp
Guarantee $_{region, 09 - 10}$			–0.534***	0.115	–0.429***	0.047
			(0.108)	(0.148)	(0.089)	(0.134)
Department-pair FE			Y	Y	Y	Y
Regional controls			Y	Y	Y	Y
Firm-level controls			Y	Y	Y	Y
Worker-level controls			Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations			23,137	15,421	23,137	15,421
$R^{2}$			.097	.053	.084	.051

This table reports the effect of loan guarantees on worker employment and earnings separately for firms with high and low guarantee take-up propensity. We first estimate take-up propensity using observable firm characteristics (log of assets, ROA, log of firm age, dividend/sales, PPE/assets, debt/assets, credit risk and two-digit industry fixed effects) measured in 2008. Columns 1, 3, and 5 show the effect for firms with high take-up propensity, while columns 2, 4, and 6 show the effect for firms with low take-up propensity. Panel A shows the baseline results (first stage and worker outcomes), while panel B shows the dampening of worker reallocation to more productive firms. The main explanatory variable is the regional intensity of the recovery plan, Guarantee $_{region, 09 - 10}$ ⁠, estimated across SMEs outside the border area. All regressions include department pair fixed effects, distance to the border, and changes in regional controls from 2008 to 2010 (public spending, local taxes, public equipment expenditures, public debt, state contribution, value-added of non-SMEs, and regional bank lending), and firm controls (log of assets, ROA, log of firm age, dividend/sales, PPE/assets, debt/assets, credit risk and two-digit industry fixed effects). Columns 3 to 6 add worker-level controls (worker age, gender, and occupation fixed effects). Firm- and worker-level controls are measured in 2008. Standard errors clustered by region are reported in parentheses.

$p < .1$ ⁠;

$p < .05$ ⁠;

***

$p < .01$ ⁠.

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