Regression of bilateral goods trade and bilateral HOGS meetings on selected factors
| . | All dyads . | Dyads with ≥1 major power . | Dyads without a major power . | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | DV = bilateral goods trade . | DV = trips, A to B with HOGS meeting . | DV = bilateral goods trade . | DV = trips, A to B with HOGS meeting . | DV = bilateral goods trade . | DV = trips, A to B with HOGS meeting . |
| Independent variables . | Coefficient (SE) . | Coefficient (SE) . | Coefficient (SE) . | Coefficient (SE) . | Coefficient (SE) . | Coefficient (SE) . |
| GDP at MER, A (1-year lag) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000* (0.000) | −0.000 (0.000) |
| GDP at MER, B (1-year lag) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000* (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) |
| Power share, A (1-year lag) | −0.028 (0.069) | 0.058 (0.229) | 0.006 (0.098) | 0.679 (0.489) | −0.021 (0.052) | −0.133 (0.261) |
| Embassy, A in B (1-year lag) | 0.156** (0.021) | 0.139* (0.062) | 0.080* (0.037) | 0.187 (0.201) | 0.166** (0.021) | 0.123 (0.065) |
| Embassy, B in A (1-year lag) | 0.146** (0.021) | 0.157* (0.061) | 0.070 (0.028) | −0.051 (0.178) | 0.163** (0.021) | 0.165* (0.064) |
| Alliance (1-year lag) | 0.042 (0.024) | −0.042 (0.079) | 0.020 (0.028) | −0.106 (0.103) | 0.160** (0.024) | 0.095 (0.125) |
| Arms transfers, A to B | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | −0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.001 (0.001) |
| Regional trade agreement (1-year lag) | 0.161** (0.027) | −0.035 (0.092) | 0.287** (0.065) | 0.525** (0.171) | 0.063** (0.018) | −0.285** (0.107) |
| Polyarchy, A (1-year lag) | −0.352** (0.039) | 0.692** (0.146) | −0.340** (0.066) | −0.369 (0.311) | −0.321** (0.032) | 0.945** (0.172) |
| Polyarchy affinity (1-year lag) | −0.176** (0.029) | 0.564** (0.124) | −0.287** (0.050) | 1.470** (0.269) | −0.093** (0.026) | 0.375** (0.141) |
| UN General Assembly voting coincidence (1-year lag) | −0.163** (0.050) | 0.340 (0.221) | −0.114* (0.053) | −0.205 (0.329) | 0.494** (0.067) | 1.005** (0.312) |
| Conflict, A (1-year lag) | −0.031** (0.008) | 0.018 (0.036) | −0.028** (0.010) | 0.009 (0.061) | −0.024* (0.011) | 0.026 (0.044) |
| Conflict, B (1-year lag) | −0.029** (0.008) | 0.003 (0.034) | −0.026* (0.011) | 0.118* (0.057) | −0.025* (0.011) | −0.064 (0.043) |
| Foreign direct investment stocks, A in B (1-year lag) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000 (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) |
| Total goods trade, A with B (1-year lag) | 0.002** (0.000) | 0.003* (0.001) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.019** (0.001) | 0.018** (0.006) |
| Trips, A to B with HOGS meeting (1-year lag) | 0.013** (0.004) | −0.149** (0.019) | 0.012** (0.004) | −0.109** (0.026) | −0.010 (0.006) | −0.203** (0.027) |
| Trips, B to A with HOGS meeting (1-year lag) | 0.012** (0.004) | 0.229** (0.019) | 0.012** (0.004) | 0.129** (0.029) | −0.011 (0.006) | 0.278** (0.024) |
| Constant | 23.731** (0.081) | −2.777** (0.248) | 24.277** (0.116) | −2.023** (0.441) | 21.484** (0.074) | −3.466** (0.339) |
| Dyad fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Sample size | 478,382 | 98,584 | 40,390 | 22,090 | 437,992 | 76,494 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.991 | 0.136 | 0.990 | 0.173 | 0.982 | 0.116 |
| . | All dyads . | Dyads with ≥1 major power . | Dyads without a major power . | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | DV = bilateral goods trade . | DV = trips, A to B with HOGS meeting . | DV = bilateral goods trade . | DV = trips, A to B with HOGS meeting . | DV = bilateral goods trade . | DV = trips, A to B with HOGS meeting . |
| Independent variables . | Coefficient (SE) . | Coefficient (SE) . | Coefficient (SE) . | Coefficient (SE) . | Coefficient (SE) . | Coefficient (SE) . |
| GDP at MER, A (1-year lag) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000* (0.000) | −0.000 (0.000) |
| GDP at MER, B (1-year lag) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000* (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) |
| Power share, A (1-year lag) | −0.028 (0.069) | 0.058 (0.229) | 0.006 (0.098) | 0.679 (0.489) | −0.021 (0.052) | −0.133 (0.261) |
| Embassy, A in B (1-year lag) | 0.156** (0.021) | 0.139* (0.062) | 0.080* (0.037) | 0.187 (0.201) | 0.166** (0.021) | 0.123 (0.065) |
| Embassy, B in A (1-year lag) | 0.146** (0.021) | 0.157* (0.061) | 0.070 (0.028) | −0.051 (0.178) | 0.163** (0.021) | 0.165* (0.064) |
| Alliance (1-year lag) | 0.042 (0.024) | −0.042 (0.079) | 0.020 (0.028) | −0.106 (0.103) | 0.160** (0.024) | 0.095 (0.125) |
| Arms transfers, A to B | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | −0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.001 (0.001) |
| Regional trade agreement (1-year lag) | 0.161** (0.027) | −0.035 (0.092) | 0.287** (0.065) | 0.525** (0.171) | 0.063** (0.018) | −0.285** (0.107) |
| Polyarchy, A (1-year lag) | −0.352** (0.039) | 0.692** (0.146) | −0.340** (0.066) | −0.369 (0.311) | −0.321** (0.032) | 0.945** (0.172) |
| Polyarchy affinity (1-year lag) | −0.176** (0.029) | 0.564** (0.124) | −0.287** (0.050) | 1.470** (0.269) | −0.093** (0.026) | 0.375** (0.141) |
| UN General Assembly voting coincidence (1-year lag) | −0.163** (0.050) | 0.340 (0.221) | −0.114* (0.053) | −0.205 (0.329) | 0.494** (0.067) | 1.005** (0.312) |
| Conflict, A (1-year lag) | −0.031** (0.008) | 0.018 (0.036) | −0.028** (0.010) | 0.009 (0.061) | −0.024* (0.011) | 0.026 (0.044) |
| Conflict, B (1-year lag) | −0.029** (0.008) | 0.003 (0.034) | −0.026* (0.011) | 0.118* (0.057) | −0.025* (0.011) | −0.064 (0.043) |
| Foreign direct investment stocks, A in B (1-year lag) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000 (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) |
| Total goods trade, A with B (1-year lag) | 0.002** (0.000) | 0.003* (0.001) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.019** (0.001) | 0.018** (0.006) |
| Trips, A to B with HOGS meeting (1-year lag) | 0.013** (0.004) | −0.149** (0.019) | 0.012** (0.004) | −0.109** (0.026) | −0.010 (0.006) | −0.203** (0.027) |
| Trips, B to A with HOGS meeting (1-year lag) | 0.012** (0.004) | 0.229** (0.019) | 0.012** (0.004) | 0.129** (0.029) | −0.011 (0.006) | 0.278** (0.024) |
| Constant | 23.731** (0.081) | −2.777** (0.248) | 24.277** (0.116) | −2.023** (0.441) | 21.484** (0.074) | −3.466** (0.339) |
| Dyad fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Sample size | 478,382 | 98,584 | 40,390 | 22,090 | 437,992 | 76,494 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.991 | 0.136 | 0.990 | 0.173 | 0.982 | 0.116 |
Source: DV = Dependent Variable GDP = Gross Domestic Product MER = Market Exchange Rates SE = Standard Error UN = United Nations. * p < 0.05 (95% confidence); ** p < 0.01 (99% confidence).
Regression of bilateral goods trade and bilateral HOGS meetings on selected factors
| . | All dyads . | Dyads with ≥1 major power . | Dyads without a major power . | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | DV = bilateral goods trade . | DV = trips, A to B with HOGS meeting . | DV = bilateral goods trade . | DV = trips, A to B with HOGS meeting . | DV = bilateral goods trade . | DV = trips, A to B with HOGS meeting . |
| Independent variables . | Coefficient (SE) . | Coefficient (SE) . | Coefficient (SE) . | Coefficient (SE) . | Coefficient (SE) . | Coefficient (SE) . |
| GDP at MER, A (1-year lag) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000* (0.000) | −0.000 (0.000) |
| GDP at MER, B (1-year lag) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000* (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) |
| Power share, A (1-year lag) | −0.028 (0.069) | 0.058 (0.229) | 0.006 (0.098) | 0.679 (0.489) | −0.021 (0.052) | −0.133 (0.261) |
| Embassy, A in B (1-year lag) | 0.156** (0.021) | 0.139* (0.062) | 0.080* (0.037) | 0.187 (0.201) | 0.166** (0.021) | 0.123 (0.065) |
| Embassy, B in A (1-year lag) | 0.146** (0.021) | 0.157* (0.061) | 0.070 (0.028) | −0.051 (0.178) | 0.163** (0.021) | 0.165* (0.064) |
| Alliance (1-year lag) | 0.042 (0.024) | −0.042 (0.079) | 0.020 (0.028) | −0.106 (0.103) | 0.160** (0.024) | 0.095 (0.125) |
| Arms transfers, A to B | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | −0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.001 (0.001) |
| Regional trade agreement (1-year lag) | 0.161** (0.027) | −0.035 (0.092) | 0.287** (0.065) | 0.525** (0.171) | 0.063** (0.018) | −0.285** (0.107) |
| Polyarchy, A (1-year lag) | −0.352** (0.039) | 0.692** (0.146) | −0.340** (0.066) | −0.369 (0.311) | −0.321** (0.032) | 0.945** (0.172) |
| Polyarchy affinity (1-year lag) | −0.176** (0.029) | 0.564** (0.124) | −0.287** (0.050) | 1.470** (0.269) | −0.093** (0.026) | 0.375** (0.141) |
| UN General Assembly voting coincidence (1-year lag) | −0.163** (0.050) | 0.340 (0.221) | −0.114* (0.053) | −0.205 (0.329) | 0.494** (0.067) | 1.005** (0.312) |
| Conflict, A (1-year lag) | −0.031** (0.008) | 0.018 (0.036) | −0.028** (0.010) | 0.009 (0.061) | −0.024* (0.011) | 0.026 (0.044) |
| Conflict, B (1-year lag) | −0.029** (0.008) | 0.003 (0.034) | −0.026* (0.011) | 0.118* (0.057) | −0.025* (0.011) | −0.064 (0.043) |
| Foreign direct investment stocks, A in B (1-year lag) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000 (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) |
| Total goods trade, A with B (1-year lag) | 0.002** (0.000) | 0.003* (0.001) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.019** (0.001) | 0.018** (0.006) |
| Trips, A to B with HOGS meeting (1-year lag) | 0.013** (0.004) | −0.149** (0.019) | 0.012** (0.004) | −0.109** (0.026) | −0.010 (0.006) | −0.203** (0.027) |
| Trips, B to A with HOGS meeting (1-year lag) | 0.012** (0.004) | 0.229** (0.019) | 0.012** (0.004) | 0.129** (0.029) | −0.011 (0.006) | 0.278** (0.024) |
| Constant | 23.731** (0.081) | −2.777** (0.248) | 24.277** (0.116) | −2.023** (0.441) | 21.484** (0.074) | −3.466** (0.339) |
| Dyad fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Sample size | 478,382 | 98,584 | 40,390 | 22,090 | 437,992 | 76,494 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.991 | 0.136 | 0.990 | 0.173 | 0.982 | 0.116 |
| . | All dyads . | Dyads with ≥1 major power . | Dyads without a major power . | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| . | DV = bilateral goods trade . | DV = trips, A to B with HOGS meeting . | DV = bilateral goods trade . | DV = trips, A to B with HOGS meeting . | DV = bilateral goods trade . | DV = trips, A to B with HOGS meeting . |
| Independent variables . | Coefficient (SE) . | Coefficient (SE) . | Coefficient (SE) . | Coefficient (SE) . | Coefficient (SE) . | Coefficient (SE) . |
| GDP at MER, A (1-year lag) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000* (0.000) | −0.000 (0.000) |
| GDP at MER, B (1-year lag) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000* (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) |
| Power share, A (1-year lag) | −0.028 (0.069) | 0.058 (0.229) | 0.006 (0.098) | 0.679 (0.489) | −0.021 (0.052) | −0.133 (0.261) |
| Embassy, A in B (1-year lag) | 0.156** (0.021) | 0.139* (0.062) | 0.080* (0.037) | 0.187 (0.201) | 0.166** (0.021) | 0.123 (0.065) |
| Embassy, B in A (1-year lag) | 0.146** (0.021) | 0.157* (0.061) | 0.070 (0.028) | −0.051 (0.178) | 0.163** (0.021) | 0.165* (0.064) |
| Alliance (1-year lag) | 0.042 (0.024) | −0.042 (0.079) | 0.020 (0.028) | −0.106 (0.103) | 0.160** (0.024) | 0.095 (0.125) |
| Arms transfers, A to B | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | −0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.001 (0.001) |
| Regional trade agreement (1-year lag) | 0.161** (0.027) | −0.035 (0.092) | 0.287** (0.065) | 0.525** (0.171) | 0.063** (0.018) | −0.285** (0.107) |
| Polyarchy, A (1-year lag) | −0.352** (0.039) | 0.692** (0.146) | −0.340** (0.066) | −0.369 (0.311) | −0.321** (0.032) | 0.945** (0.172) |
| Polyarchy affinity (1-year lag) | −0.176** (0.029) | 0.564** (0.124) | −0.287** (0.050) | 1.470** (0.269) | −0.093** (0.026) | 0.375** (0.141) |
| UN General Assembly voting coincidence (1-year lag) | −0.163** (0.050) | 0.340 (0.221) | −0.114* (0.053) | −0.205 (0.329) | 0.494** (0.067) | 1.005** (0.312) |
| Conflict, A (1-year lag) | −0.031** (0.008) | 0.018 (0.036) | −0.028** (0.010) | 0.009 (0.061) | −0.024* (0.011) | 0.026 (0.044) |
| Conflict, B (1-year lag) | −0.029** (0.008) | 0.003 (0.034) | −0.026* (0.011) | 0.118* (0.057) | −0.025* (0.011) | −0.064 (0.043) |
| Foreign direct investment stocks, A in B (1-year lag) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | −0.000 (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) |
| Total goods trade, A with B (1-year lag) | 0.002** (0.000) | 0.003* (0.001) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001 (0.002) | 0.019** (0.001) | 0.018** (0.006) |
| Trips, A to B with HOGS meeting (1-year lag) | 0.013** (0.004) | −0.149** (0.019) | 0.012** (0.004) | −0.109** (0.026) | −0.010 (0.006) | −0.203** (0.027) |
| Trips, B to A with HOGS meeting (1-year lag) | 0.012** (0.004) | 0.229** (0.019) | 0.012** (0.004) | 0.129** (0.029) | −0.011 (0.006) | 0.278** (0.024) |
| Constant | 23.731** (0.081) | −2.777** (0.248) | 24.277** (0.116) | −2.023** (0.441) | 21.484** (0.074) | −3.466** (0.339) |
| Dyad fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Sample size | 478,382 | 98,584 | 40,390 | 22,090 | 437,992 | 76,494 |
| Pseudo R-squared | 0.991 | 0.136 | 0.990 | 0.173 | 0.982 | 0.116 |
Source: DV = Dependent Variable GDP = Gross Domestic Product MER = Market Exchange Rates SE = Standard Error UN = United Nations. * p < 0.05 (95% confidence); ** p < 0.01 (99% confidence).
This PDF is available to Subscribers Only
View Article Abstract & Purchase OptionsFor full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.
