Table 3.

Coding scheme summary: dimensions and indicators

Cooperation gains at risk
  1. Size Size of the cooperation gains at risk for the institution and other relevant states if the referendum-endorsed request is not accommodated.

    • a) Depth of cooperation gains at risk: How much money or other benefits does the institution and other relevant states stand to lose or gain if cooperation collapses completely?

    • b) Impact on member states: How big is the impact on other state’s domestic economies?

    • c) Challenger importance: How powerful or important is the challenging state in the specific area or for the specific institution?

  2. Breadth The extent or range of issues, topics, or areas covered by the cooperative relationship.

    • How many issue areas are put at risk through non-accommodation?

  3. Time profile The temporal characteristics of potential losses incurred by the remaining member-states due to non-accommodation.

    • Do the potential losses for the remaining member-states accrue on a one-off basis or are they long-term or repeated losses?

Political contagion risk
  1. Attractiveness of the accommodative outcome The extent to which the challenging state is better off after an accommodated challenge compared with the status quo.

    • How does the challenging state’s utility compare with its status quo utility if its challenge is accommodated?

  2. Potential for politicization Presence of political actors who are likely to use the case as an example to push for similar challenges in the other member states.

    • Are there political actors among the other member states who would desire the same accommodative outcome and are likely to seize this response as an opportunity?

  3. Challenging state bargaining power The challenging states bargaining power compared to other states.

    • How does the challenging state’s bargaining power compare to the bargaining power of the other member states?

  4. Uniqueness Ease with which the accommodative response can be applied to other contexts and/or countries

    • How many other member states share similar grievances?

Cooperation gains at risk
  1. Size Size of the cooperation gains at risk for the institution and other relevant states if the referendum-endorsed request is not accommodated.

    • a) Depth of cooperation gains at risk: How much money or other benefits does the institution and other relevant states stand to lose or gain if cooperation collapses completely?

    • b) Impact on member states: How big is the impact on other state’s domestic economies?

    • c) Challenger importance: How powerful or important is the challenging state in the specific area or for the specific institution?

  2. Breadth The extent or range of issues, topics, or areas covered by the cooperative relationship.

    • How many issue areas are put at risk through non-accommodation?

  3. Time profile The temporal characteristics of potential losses incurred by the remaining member-states due to non-accommodation.

    • Do the potential losses for the remaining member-states accrue on a one-off basis or are they long-term or repeated losses?

Political contagion risk
  1. Attractiveness of the accommodative outcome The extent to which the challenging state is better off after an accommodated challenge compared with the status quo.

    • How does the challenging state’s utility compare with its status quo utility if its challenge is accommodated?

  2. Potential for politicization Presence of political actors who are likely to use the case as an example to push for similar challenges in the other member states.

    • Are there political actors among the other member states who would desire the same accommodative outcome and are likely to seize this response as an opportunity?

  3. Challenging state bargaining power The challenging states bargaining power compared to other states.

    • How does the challenging state’s bargaining power compare to the bargaining power of the other member states?

  4. Uniqueness Ease with which the accommodative response can be applied to other contexts and/or countries

    • How many other member states share similar grievances?

Table 3.

Coding scheme summary: dimensions and indicators

Cooperation gains at risk
  1. Size Size of the cooperation gains at risk for the institution and other relevant states if the referendum-endorsed request is not accommodated.

    • a) Depth of cooperation gains at risk: How much money or other benefits does the institution and other relevant states stand to lose or gain if cooperation collapses completely?

    • b) Impact on member states: How big is the impact on other state’s domestic economies?

    • c) Challenger importance: How powerful or important is the challenging state in the specific area or for the specific institution?

  2. Breadth The extent or range of issues, topics, or areas covered by the cooperative relationship.

    • How many issue areas are put at risk through non-accommodation?

  3. Time profile The temporal characteristics of potential losses incurred by the remaining member-states due to non-accommodation.

    • Do the potential losses for the remaining member-states accrue on a one-off basis or are they long-term or repeated losses?

Political contagion risk
  1. Attractiveness of the accommodative outcome The extent to which the challenging state is better off after an accommodated challenge compared with the status quo.

    • How does the challenging state’s utility compare with its status quo utility if its challenge is accommodated?

  2. Potential for politicization Presence of political actors who are likely to use the case as an example to push for similar challenges in the other member states.

    • Are there political actors among the other member states who would desire the same accommodative outcome and are likely to seize this response as an opportunity?

  3. Challenging state bargaining power The challenging states bargaining power compared to other states.

    • How does the challenging state’s bargaining power compare to the bargaining power of the other member states?

  4. Uniqueness Ease with which the accommodative response can be applied to other contexts and/or countries

    • How many other member states share similar grievances?

Cooperation gains at risk
  1. Size Size of the cooperation gains at risk for the institution and other relevant states if the referendum-endorsed request is not accommodated.

    • a) Depth of cooperation gains at risk: How much money or other benefits does the institution and other relevant states stand to lose or gain if cooperation collapses completely?

    • b) Impact on member states: How big is the impact on other state’s domestic economies?

    • c) Challenger importance: How powerful or important is the challenging state in the specific area or for the specific institution?

  2. Breadth The extent or range of issues, topics, or areas covered by the cooperative relationship.

    • How many issue areas are put at risk through non-accommodation?

  3. Time profile The temporal characteristics of potential losses incurred by the remaining member-states due to non-accommodation.

    • Do the potential losses for the remaining member-states accrue on a one-off basis or are they long-term or repeated losses?

Political contagion risk
  1. Attractiveness of the accommodative outcome The extent to which the challenging state is better off after an accommodated challenge compared with the status quo.

    • How does the challenging state’s utility compare with its status quo utility if its challenge is accommodated?

  2. Potential for politicization Presence of political actors who are likely to use the case as an example to push for similar challenges in the other member states.

    • Are there political actors among the other member states who would desire the same accommodative outcome and are likely to seize this response as an opportunity?

  3. Challenging state bargaining power The challenging states bargaining power compared to other states.

    • How does the challenging state’s bargaining power compare to the bargaining power of the other member states?

  4. Uniqueness Ease with which the accommodative response can be applied to other contexts and/or countries

    • How many other member states share similar grievances?

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