| Components (weight in the index) . | Variables (weight in the component) . | Score . | Descriptors . |
|---|---|---|---|
| Personnel independence (0.20) | 1. Term of office of CEO (0.25) | 1 | Equal or more than 8 years |
| 0.75 | 6 years or more but less than 8 years | ||
| 0.50 | Equal to 5 years | ||
| 0.25 | Equal to 4 years | ||
| 0 | Less than 4 years | ||
| 2. Who appoints the CEO (0.25) | 1 | The Central Bank Board | |
| 0.75 | Council composed by executive and legislative branch and Central Bank Board | ||
| 0.50 | By legislative branch | ||
| 0.25 | By executive branch | ||
| 0 | By one or two members of executive branch | ||
| 3. Provisions for dismissal of CEO (0.25) | 1 | No provision | |
| 0.83 | Only for non-policy reasons (e.g., incapability, or violation of law) | ||
| 0.67 | At a discretion of Central Bank Board | ||
| 0.50 | For policy reasons at legislative branch's discretion | ||
| 0.33 | At legislative branch's discretion | ||
| 0.17 | For policy reasons at executive branch's discretion | ||
| 0 | At executive branch's discretion | ||
| 4. CEO allowed to hold another office in government (0.25) | 1 | Prohibited by law | |
| 0.5 | Not allowed unless authorized by executive branch | ||
| 0 | No prohibition for holding another office | ||
| Central bank objectives (0.15) | 5. Central Bank objectives (1) | 1 | Price stability is the only or major goal, and in case of conflict with government, the Central Bank has final authority |
| 0.8 | Price stability is the only goal | ||
| 0.6 | Price stability along with other objectives that do not seem to conflict with the former | ||
| 0.4 | Price stability along with other objectives of potentially conflicting goals (e.g., full employment) | ||
| 0.2 | Central Bank charter does not contain any objective | ||
| 0 | Some goals appear in the charter, but price stability is not one of them | ||
| Policy formulation independence (0.15) | 6. Who formulates monetary policy (0.25) | 1 | Central Bank has the legal authority |
| 0.67 | Central Bank participates together with government | ||
| 0.33 | Central Bank in an advisory capacity | ||
| 0 | Government alone formulates monetary policy | ||
| 7. Government directives and resolution of conflicts (0.50) | 1 | Central Bank given final authority over issues defined in the law as objectives | |
| 0.8 | Government has final authority over issues not clearly defined as Central Bank goals | ||
| 0.6 | Final decision up to a council whose members are from the Central Bank, executive branch, and legislative branch | ||
| 0.4 | Legislative branch has final authority | ||
| 0.2 | Executive branch has final authority, but subject to due process and possible protest by Central Bank | ||
| 0 | Executive branch has unconditional authority over policy | ||
| 8. Central Bank given active role in formulation of government's budget (0.25) | 1 | Yes | |
| 0 | No | ||
| Limits on central bank lending to the government (0.50) | 9. Limitations on advances (0.30) | 1 | Advances to government prohibited |
| 0.67 | Permitted but subject to limits in terms of absolute cash amounts or relative limits (government revenues) | ||
| 0.33 | Permitted subject to relatively accommodative limits (more than 15 percent of government revenues) | ||
| 0 | No legal limitations on advances. Subject to negotiations with government | ||
| 10. Limitations on securitized lending (0.20) | The same as in 9 | ||
| 11. Who decides control of terms of lending to government (0.20) | 1 | Central bank controls terms and conditions | |
| 0.67 | Terms of lending specified in law, or Central Bank given legal authority to set conditions | ||
| 0.33 | Law leaves decision to negotiations between the Central Bank and government | ||
| 0 | Executive branch alone decides and imposes to the Central Bank | ||
| 12. Beneficiaries of Central Bank lending (0.10) | 1 | Only central government | |
| 0.67 | Central and state governments, as well as further political subdivisions | ||
| 0.33 | Public enterprises can also borrow | ||
| 0 | Central Bank can lend to all of the above and to the private sector | ||
| 13. Type of limits when they exist (0.05) | 1 | As an absolute cash amount | |
| 0.67 | As a percentage of Central Bank capital or other liabilities | ||
| 0.33 | As a percentage of government revenues | ||
| 0 | As a percentage of government expenditure | ||
| 14. Maturity of loans (0.05) | 1 | Limited to a maximum of 6 months | |
| 0.67 | Limited to a maximum of 1 year | ||
| 0.33 | Limited to a maximum of more than one year | ||
| 0 | No legal upper bounds | ||
| 15. Restrictions on interest rates (0.05) | 1 | Must be at market rate | |
| 0.75 | On loans to government cannot be lower than a certain floor | ||
| 0.50 | Interest rate on Central Bank loans cannot exceed a certain ceiling | ||
| 0.25 | No explicit legal provisions regarding interest rate in Central Bank loans | ||
| 0 | No interest rate charge on government's borrowing from Central Bank | ||
| 16. Prohibition on Central Bank lending in primary market to Government (0.05) | 1 | Prohibition from buying government securities in primary market | |
| 0 | No prohibition |
| Components (weight in the index) . | Variables (weight in the component) . | Score . | Descriptors . |
|---|---|---|---|
| Personnel independence (0.20) | 1. Term of office of CEO (0.25) | 1 | Equal or more than 8 years |
| 0.75 | 6 years or more but less than 8 years | ||
| 0.50 | Equal to 5 years | ||
| 0.25 | Equal to 4 years | ||
| 0 | Less than 4 years | ||
| 2. Who appoints the CEO (0.25) | 1 | The Central Bank Board | |
| 0.75 | Council composed by executive and legislative branch and Central Bank Board | ||
| 0.50 | By legislative branch | ||
| 0.25 | By executive branch | ||
| 0 | By one or two members of executive branch | ||
| 3. Provisions for dismissal of CEO (0.25) | 1 | No provision | |
| 0.83 | Only for non-policy reasons (e.g., incapability, or violation of law) | ||
| 0.67 | At a discretion of Central Bank Board | ||
| 0.50 | For policy reasons at legislative branch's discretion | ||
| 0.33 | At legislative branch's discretion | ||
| 0.17 | For policy reasons at executive branch's discretion | ||
| 0 | At executive branch's discretion | ||
| 4. CEO allowed to hold another office in government (0.25) | 1 | Prohibited by law | |
| 0.5 | Not allowed unless authorized by executive branch | ||
| 0 | No prohibition for holding another office | ||
| Central bank objectives (0.15) | 5. Central Bank objectives (1) | 1 | Price stability is the only or major goal, and in case of conflict with government, the Central Bank has final authority |
| 0.8 | Price stability is the only goal | ||
| 0.6 | Price stability along with other objectives that do not seem to conflict with the former | ||
| 0.4 | Price stability along with other objectives of potentially conflicting goals (e.g., full employment) | ||
| 0.2 | Central Bank charter does not contain any objective | ||
| 0 | Some goals appear in the charter, but price stability is not one of them | ||
| Policy formulation independence (0.15) | 6. Who formulates monetary policy (0.25) | 1 | Central Bank has the legal authority |
| 0.67 | Central Bank participates together with government | ||
| 0.33 | Central Bank in an advisory capacity | ||
| 0 | Government alone formulates monetary policy | ||
| 7. Government directives and resolution of conflicts (0.50) | 1 | Central Bank given final authority over issues defined in the law as objectives | |
| 0.8 | Government has final authority over issues not clearly defined as Central Bank goals | ||
| 0.6 | Final decision up to a council whose members are from the Central Bank, executive branch, and legislative branch | ||
| 0.4 | Legislative branch has final authority | ||
| 0.2 | Executive branch has final authority, but subject to due process and possible protest by Central Bank | ||
| 0 | Executive branch has unconditional authority over policy | ||
| 8. Central Bank given active role in formulation of government's budget (0.25) | 1 | Yes | |
| 0 | No | ||
| Limits on central bank lending to the government (0.50) | 9. Limitations on advances (0.30) | 1 | Advances to government prohibited |
| 0.67 | Permitted but subject to limits in terms of absolute cash amounts or relative limits (government revenues) | ||
| 0.33 | Permitted subject to relatively accommodative limits (more than 15 percent of government revenues) | ||
| 0 | No legal limitations on advances. Subject to negotiations with government | ||
| 10. Limitations on securitized lending (0.20) | The same as in 9 | ||
| 11. Who decides control of terms of lending to government (0.20) | 1 | Central bank controls terms and conditions | |
| 0.67 | Terms of lending specified in law, or Central Bank given legal authority to set conditions | ||
| 0.33 | Law leaves decision to negotiations between the Central Bank and government | ||
| 0 | Executive branch alone decides and imposes to the Central Bank | ||
| 12. Beneficiaries of Central Bank lending (0.10) | 1 | Only central government | |
| 0.67 | Central and state governments, as well as further political subdivisions | ||
| 0.33 | Public enterprises can also borrow | ||
| 0 | Central Bank can lend to all of the above and to the private sector | ||
| 13. Type of limits when they exist (0.05) | 1 | As an absolute cash amount | |
| 0.67 | As a percentage of Central Bank capital or other liabilities | ||
| 0.33 | As a percentage of government revenues | ||
| 0 | As a percentage of government expenditure | ||
| 14. Maturity of loans (0.05) | 1 | Limited to a maximum of 6 months | |
| 0.67 | Limited to a maximum of 1 year | ||
| 0.33 | Limited to a maximum of more than one year | ||
| 0 | No legal upper bounds | ||
| 15. Restrictions on interest rates (0.05) | 1 | Must be at market rate | |
| 0.75 | On loans to government cannot be lower than a certain floor | ||
| 0.50 | Interest rate on Central Bank loans cannot exceed a certain ceiling | ||
| 0.25 | No explicit legal provisions regarding interest rate in Central Bank loans | ||
| 0 | No interest rate charge on government's borrowing from Central Bank | ||
| 16. Prohibition on Central Bank lending in primary market to Government (0.05) | 1 | Prohibition from buying government securities in primary market | |
| 0 | No prohibition |
| Components (weight in the index) . | Variables (weight in the component) . | Score . | Descriptors . |
|---|---|---|---|
| Personnel independence (0.20) | 1. Term of office of CEO (0.25) | 1 | Equal or more than 8 years |
| 0.75 | 6 years or more but less than 8 years | ||
| 0.50 | Equal to 5 years | ||
| 0.25 | Equal to 4 years | ||
| 0 | Less than 4 years | ||
| 2. Who appoints the CEO (0.25) | 1 | The Central Bank Board | |
| 0.75 | Council composed by executive and legislative branch and Central Bank Board | ||
| 0.50 | By legislative branch | ||
| 0.25 | By executive branch | ||
| 0 | By one or two members of executive branch | ||
| 3. Provisions for dismissal of CEO (0.25) | 1 | No provision | |
| 0.83 | Only for non-policy reasons (e.g., incapability, or violation of law) | ||
| 0.67 | At a discretion of Central Bank Board | ||
| 0.50 | For policy reasons at legislative branch's discretion | ||
| 0.33 | At legislative branch's discretion | ||
| 0.17 | For policy reasons at executive branch's discretion | ||
| 0 | At executive branch's discretion | ||
| 4. CEO allowed to hold another office in government (0.25) | 1 | Prohibited by law | |
| 0.5 | Not allowed unless authorized by executive branch | ||
| 0 | No prohibition for holding another office | ||
| Central bank objectives (0.15) | 5. Central Bank objectives (1) | 1 | Price stability is the only or major goal, and in case of conflict with government, the Central Bank has final authority |
| 0.8 | Price stability is the only goal | ||
| 0.6 | Price stability along with other objectives that do not seem to conflict with the former | ||
| 0.4 | Price stability along with other objectives of potentially conflicting goals (e.g., full employment) | ||
| 0.2 | Central Bank charter does not contain any objective | ||
| 0 | Some goals appear in the charter, but price stability is not one of them | ||
| Policy formulation independence (0.15) | 6. Who formulates monetary policy (0.25) | 1 | Central Bank has the legal authority |
| 0.67 | Central Bank participates together with government | ||
| 0.33 | Central Bank in an advisory capacity | ||
| 0 | Government alone formulates monetary policy | ||
| 7. Government directives and resolution of conflicts (0.50) | 1 | Central Bank given final authority over issues defined in the law as objectives | |
| 0.8 | Government has final authority over issues not clearly defined as Central Bank goals | ||
| 0.6 | Final decision up to a council whose members are from the Central Bank, executive branch, and legislative branch | ||
| 0.4 | Legislative branch has final authority | ||
| 0.2 | Executive branch has final authority, but subject to due process and possible protest by Central Bank | ||
| 0 | Executive branch has unconditional authority over policy | ||
| 8. Central Bank given active role in formulation of government's budget (0.25) | 1 | Yes | |
| 0 | No | ||
| Limits on central bank lending to the government (0.50) | 9. Limitations on advances (0.30) | 1 | Advances to government prohibited |
| 0.67 | Permitted but subject to limits in terms of absolute cash amounts or relative limits (government revenues) | ||
| 0.33 | Permitted subject to relatively accommodative limits (more than 15 percent of government revenues) | ||
| 0 | No legal limitations on advances. Subject to negotiations with government | ||
| 10. Limitations on securitized lending (0.20) | The same as in 9 | ||
| 11. Who decides control of terms of lending to government (0.20) | 1 | Central bank controls terms and conditions | |
| 0.67 | Terms of lending specified in law, or Central Bank given legal authority to set conditions | ||
| 0.33 | Law leaves decision to negotiations between the Central Bank and government | ||
| 0 | Executive branch alone decides and imposes to the Central Bank | ||
| 12. Beneficiaries of Central Bank lending (0.10) | 1 | Only central government | |
| 0.67 | Central and state governments, as well as further political subdivisions | ||
| 0.33 | Public enterprises can also borrow | ||
| 0 | Central Bank can lend to all of the above and to the private sector | ||
| 13. Type of limits when they exist (0.05) | 1 | As an absolute cash amount | |
| 0.67 | As a percentage of Central Bank capital or other liabilities | ||
| 0.33 | As a percentage of government revenues | ||
| 0 | As a percentage of government expenditure | ||
| 14. Maturity of loans (0.05) | 1 | Limited to a maximum of 6 months | |
| 0.67 | Limited to a maximum of 1 year | ||
| 0.33 | Limited to a maximum of more than one year | ||
| 0 | No legal upper bounds | ||
| 15. Restrictions on interest rates (0.05) | 1 | Must be at market rate | |
| 0.75 | On loans to government cannot be lower than a certain floor | ||
| 0.50 | Interest rate on Central Bank loans cannot exceed a certain ceiling | ||
| 0.25 | No explicit legal provisions regarding interest rate in Central Bank loans | ||
| 0 | No interest rate charge on government's borrowing from Central Bank | ||
| 16. Prohibition on Central Bank lending in primary market to Government (0.05) | 1 | Prohibition from buying government securities in primary market | |
| 0 | No prohibition |
| Components (weight in the index) . | Variables (weight in the component) . | Score . | Descriptors . |
|---|---|---|---|
| Personnel independence (0.20) | 1. Term of office of CEO (0.25) | 1 | Equal or more than 8 years |
| 0.75 | 6 years or more but less than 8 years | ||
| 0.50 | Equal to 5 years | ||
| 0.25 | Equal to 4 years | ||
| 0 | Less than 4 years | ||
| 2. Who appoints the CEO (0.25) | 1 | The Central Bank Board | |
| 0.75 | Council composed by executive and legislative branch and Central Bank Board | ||
| 0.50 | By legislative branch | ||
| 0.25 | By executive branch | ||
| 0 | By one or two members of executive branch | ||
| 3. Provisions for dismissal of CEO (0.25) | 1 | No provision | |
| 0.83 | Only for non-policy reasons (e.g., incapability, or violation of law) | ||
| 0.67 | At a discretion of Central Bank Board | ||
| 0.50 | For policy reasons at legislative branch's discretion | ||
| 0.33 | At legislative branch's discretion | ||
| 0.17 | For policy reasons at executive branch's discretion | ||
| 0 | At executive branch's discretion | ||
| 4. CEO allowed to hold another office in government (0.25) | 1 | Prohibited by law | |
| 0.5 | Not allowed unless authorized by executive branch | ||
| 0 | No prohibition for holding another office | ||
| Central bank objectives (0.15) | 5. Central Bank objectives (1) | 1 | Price stability is the only or major goal, and in case of conflict with government, the Central Bank has final authority |
| 0.8 | Price stability is the only goal | ||
| 0.6 | Price stability along with other objectives that do not seem to conflict with the former | ||
| 0.4 | Price stability along with other objectives of potentially conflicting goals (e.g., full employment) | ||
| 0.2 | Central Bank charter does not contain any objective | ||
| 0 | Some goals appear in the charter, but price stability is not one of them | ||
| Policy formulation independence (0.15) | 6. Who formulates monetary policy (0.25) | 1 | Central Bank has the legal authority |
| 0.67 | Central Bank participates together with government | ||
| 0.33 | Central Bank in an advisory capacity | ||
| 0 | Government alone formulates monetary policy | ||
| 7. Government directives and resolution of conflicts (0.50) | 1 | Central Bank given final authority over issues defined in the law as objectives | |
| 0.8 | Government has final authority over issues not clearly defined as Central Bank goals | ||
| 0.6 | Final decision up to a council whose members are from the Central Bank, executive branch, and legislative branch | ||
| 0.4 | Legislative branch has final authority | ||
| 0.2 | Executive branch has final authority, but subject to due process and possible protest by Central Bank | ||
| 0 | Executive branch has unconditional authority over policy | ||
| 8. Central Bank given active role in formulation of government's budget (0.25) | 1 | Yes | |
| 0 | No | ||
| Limits on central bank lending to the government (0.50) | 9. Limitations on advances (0.30) | 1 | Advances to government prohibited |
| 0.67 | Permitted but subject to limits in terms of absolute cash amounts or relative limits (government revenues) | ||
| 0.33 | Permitted subject to relatively accommodative limits (more than 15 percent of government revenues) | ||
| 0 | No legal limitations on advances. Subject to negotiations with government | ||
| 10. Limitations on securitized lending (0.20) | The same as in 9 | ||
| 11. Who decides control of terms of lending to government (0.20) | 1 | Central bank controls terms and conditions | |
| 0.67 | Terms of lending specified in law, or Central Bank given legal authority to set conditions | ||
| 0.33 | Law leaves decision to negotiations between the Central Bank and government | ||
| 0 | Executive branch alone decides and imposes to the Central Bank | ||
| 12. Beneficiaries of Central Bank lending (0.10) | 1 | Only central government | |
| 0.67 | Central and state governments, as well as further political subdivisions | ||
| 0.33 | Public enterprises can also borrow | ||
| 0 | Central Bank can lend to all of the above and to the private sector | ||
| 13. Type of limits when they exist (0.05) | 1 | As an absolute cash amount | |
| 0.67 | As a percentage of Central Bank capital or other liabilities | ||
| 0.33 | As a percentage of government revenues | ||
| 0 | As a percentage of government expenditure | ||
| 14. Maturity of loans (0.05) | 1 | Limited to a maximum of 6 months | |
| 0.67 | Limited to a maximum of 1 year | ||
| 0.33 | Limited to a maximum of more than one year | ||
| 0 | No legal upper bounds | ||
| 15. Restrictions on interest rates (0.05) | 1 | Must be at market rate | |
| 0.75 | On loans to government cannot be lower than a certain floor | ||
| 0.50 | Interest rate on Central Bank loans cannot exceed a certain ceiling | ||
| 0.25 | No explicit legal provisions regarding interest rate in Central Bank loans | ||
| 0 | No interest rate charge on government's borrowing from Central Bank | ||
| 16. Prohibition on Central Bank lending in primary market to Government (0.05) | 1 | Prohibition from buying government securities in primary market | |
| 0 | No prohibition |
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