Voting in the council of the EU 2010–2021: ordinal logistic regression analysis (results of models 5 and 6)
. | (5) . | (6) . |
---|---|---|
Variables . | Odds ratio . | Odds ratio . |
Euclidean distance | 1.033*** | |
(0.00565) | ||
Domestic public opinion on the EU (distance) | 1.005*** | 1.005*** |
(0.00124) | (0.00124) | |
Voting power (distance) | 1.090*** | 1.091*** |
(0.00560) | (0.00561) | |
EU budget position | 0.831*** | 0.834*** |
(0.0339) | (0.0340) | |
Old/new member state position | 1.002 | 1.003 |
(0.0498) | (0.0497) | |
Left-right position (distance) | 1.008 | |
(0.00759) | ||
Liberty-authoritarian position (distance) | 1.006 | |
(0.00833) | ||
EU anti/pro position (distance) | 1.084*** | |
(0.00980) | ||
Observations | 340,904 | 340,904 |
Number of pairs | 376 | 376 |
. | (5) . | (6) . |
---|---|---|
Variables . | Odds ratio . | Odds ratio . |
Euclidean distance | 1.033*** | |
(0.00565) | ||
Domestic public opinion on the EU (distance) | 1.005*** | 1.005*** |
(0.00124) | (0.00124) | |
Voting power (distance) | 1.090*** | 1.091*** |
(0.00560) | (0.00561) | |
EU budget position | 0.831*** | 0.834*** |
(0.0339) | (0.0340) | |
Old/new member state position | 1.002 | 1.003 |
(0.0498) | (0.0497) | |
Left-right position (distance) | 1.008 | |
(0.00759) | ||
Liberty-authoritarian position (distance) | 1.006 | |
(0.00833) | ||
EU anti/pro position (distance) | 1.084*** | |
(0.00980) | ||
Observations | 340,904 | 340,904 |
Number of pairs | 376 | 376 |
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance:
p < 0.01,
p < 0.05,
p < 0.1. The EU budget position variable is binary and takes the value of one if the two governments in a dyad are both net contributors or both net beneficiaries of the EU budget; otherwise, it has a value of zero. The old/new member state position is a binary variable that has a value of one if the two governments in a dyad both joined the EU before the 2004 enlargement, or both joined the EU in or after 2004; otherwise, it has a value of zero.
Voting in the council of the EU 2010–2021: ordinal logistic regression analysis (results of models 5 and 6)
. | (5) . | (6) . |
---|---|---|
Variables . | Odds ratio . | Odds ratio . |
Euclidean distance | 1.033*** | |
(0.00565) | ||
Domestic public opinion on the EU (distance) | 1.005*** | 1.005*** |
(0.00124) | (0.00124) | |
Voting power (distance) | 1.090*** | 1.091*** |
(0.00560) | (0.00561) | |
EU budget position | 0.831*** | 0.834*** |
(0.0339) | (0.0340) | |
Old/new member state position | 1.002 | 1.003 |
(0.0498) | (0.0497) | |
Left-right position (distance) | 1.008 | |
(0.00759) | ||
Liberty-authoritarian position (distance) | 1.006 | |
(0.00833) | ||
EU anti/pro position (distance) | 1.084*** | |
(0.00980) | ||
Observations | 340,904 | 340,904 |
Number of pairs | 376 | 376 |
. | (5) . | (6) . |
---|---|---|
Variables . | Odds ratio . | Odds ratio . |
Euclidean distance | 1.033*** | |
(0.00565) | ||
Domestic public opinion on the EU (distance) | 1.005*** | 1.005*** |
(0.00124) | (0.00124) | |
Voting power (distance) | 1.090*** | 1.091*** |
(0.00560) | (0.00561) | |
EU budget position | 0.831*** | 0.834*** |
(0.0339) | (0.0340) | |
Old/new member state position | 1.002 | 1.003 |
(0.0498) | (0.0497) | |
Left-right position (distance) | 1.008 | |
(0.00759) | ||
Liberty-authoritarian position (distance) | 1.006 | |
(0.00833) | ||
EU anti/pro position (distance) | 1.084*** | |
(0.00980) | ||
Observations | 340,904 | 340,904 |
Number of pairs | 376 | 376 |
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance:
p < 0.01,
p < 0.05,
p < 0.1. The EU budget position variable is binary and takes the value of one if the two governments in a dyad are both net contributors or both net beneficiaries of the EU budget; otherwise, it has a value of zero. The old/new member state position is a binary variable that has a value of one if the two governments in a dyad both joined the EU before the 2004 enlargement, or both joined the EU in or after 2004; otherwise, it has a value of zero.
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