Popularization or occlusion of truth in the Platonic myths: Plutarch, Numenius, and Maximus of Tyre

Abstract

Why does Plato critique traditional myth so vehemently in the Republic, yet compose his own imagistic narratives in the very same dialogue? In this chapter, I examine the responses of Plutarch, Numenius, and Maximus of Tyre. Plutarch defends the use of myth on the grounds that it opens up philosophy for a wider audience, if taught carefully, while Numenius argues that it piously hides the truth from the uninitiated. Maximus draws on both lines of argument. Defending Plato’s corpus, particularly against Epicureans, led the Platonists of the early Empire to speculate on questions of hermeneutics and literary theory.

The prevalence of myth in Plato’s corpus presents a notorious paradox, especially in the Republic. That dialogue’s conclusion, Socrates’ imagistic narration of the journey of Er’s soul throughout the cosmos after death, can present an uneasy contrast to the vehement criticisms of traditional myths and poetry in books 2, 3, and 10. Not long after the dialogue was written, Colotes, a favourite student of Epicurus, disparages Plato on precisely these grounds:

καὶ ὅτι πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μαχομένως ἐν μέν γε προοιμίοις τῆσδε τῆς πραγματείας ἐλοιδόρησε τοὺς ποιητὰς ὡς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου φρικτὰ πλάσαντας καὶ θανάτου φόβον ἐντεκόντας τοῖς ἀκούουσιν, ἐπὶ τέλει δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς μεθήρμοσεν τὴν φιλόσοφον μοῦσαν εἰς τραγικὴν τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου πραγμάτων μυθολογίαν· τὸ γὰρ στόμιον τὸ μυκώμενον ἐκεῖ καὶ οἱ διάπυροι ἄγριοι τοῦ τυράννου δήμιοι καὶ ὁ Τάρταρος καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα τίνα, φησίν, τραγῳδιοποιοῖς ἀπολέλοιπεν ὑπερβολήν;

And (he charges) that he is fighting against himself: in the introductory books of this work he ridiculed the poets for crafting frightful things about what is in the house of Hades and implanting the fear of death in their hearers, but towards the end he changes his philosophical muse to tragic myth-telling—for does he not tell of the bellowing mouth there and the fiery executioners of the tyrant and Tartarus and so many things of this sort which surpass the excess of the tragic poets? (Procl. in R. 2.105.26–106.8)¹

Tales of underworld horrors, which Socrates warned earlier in the dialogue must not be heard by the guardians if they are to fight bravely, are particularly grating to Epicurean sensibilities. But according to Macrobius, Colotes extends his critique of Plato further to the form of myth by comparing the tragic stage: quaesita persona casusque excogitata novitas, et composita advocati scaena figmenti, ipsam quaerendi veri ianuam mendacio polluerunt (‘artificial character, affected novelty, and a stage set for a contrived fiction all stain with lies the very door of the truth being sought’).² While Colotes seizes upon this tension for polemical purposes, Socrates leaves his followers with the implicit task of reconciling the critique of myth with the apparently productive use of it elsewhere in the dialogue. Not only must lovers of poetry defend myth in prose to lift its exile, as Socrates famously challenges Glaucon, but the lovers of Plato must conciliate his critique of myth with his own practice thereof.³

Conversely, many took up the challenge of defending Plato against this line of attack, particularly among the Platonists of the early Empire. Already perhaps as early as the first century bc, we find evidence of interest in Platonic hermeneutics. A source in Stobaeus, often identified as the Neopythagorean Eudorus of Alexandria, treats Plato’s notion of the telos, the chief ethical aim of life, as an interpretative problem: Plato formulated the telos physically in the Timaeus, ethically in the Republic, and logically in the Theaetetus.⁴ The source justifies the move by arguing that Plato is πολύφωνον (‘of many voices’), not πολύδοξον (‘of many opinions’). Stobaeus’ passage betrays a concern to interpret not only the matter of Plato—and to bring it in line with Pythagoras—but also the manner of Plato’s signification. There are, however, two predominant threads that are well represented by Plutarch of Chaeronea and Numenius of Apamea. Plutarch, for one, discusses different forms of mythical exegesis, such as Plato’s mythic narratives and the traditional Egyptian myths in De Iside et Osiride. His emphasis in the former case is on their pleasurability and suitability for wide audiences, which allows even the young and philosophically uninclined revellers to grasp part of the truth. Numenius, on the other hand, justifies the form of myth by casting the fictive screen as a sort of pious covering, as in the mysteries. He argues that the truth ought to be hidden from the uninitiated and thus develops a sort of esotericism. In this chapter, I argue that Maximus of Tyre, an orator of the second century ad and popularizer of Platonism, includes each of these lines of arguments in his defences of the philosophical use of myth.⁵ After briefly surveying what I characterize as the Plutarchan and Numenian defences of the form of mythic narrative, I will discuss Maximus’ usage of each, particularly in the fourth of his Orations. Although strictly they are mutually exclusive, both apparently appealed to him as he crafted different explanations of the role of mythological narratives in Platonic philosophy. He, moreover, sets out to defend the coherence of the two sorts of myth he discusses most, those of Plato and those of Homer. Maximus, along with Numenius, thus partakes in the growing Imperial trend of systematizing ancient sources of knowledge from various genres of literature.⁶ This interest in the form literature takes, furthermore, reflects an increasing concern with hermeneutics among Platonists, which sets the foundation for the grand semiotic systems of later philosophers such as Proclus.⁷

1. PLUTARCH’S POPULARIZING AND NUMENIUS’ OCCLUSION

Plutarch emphasizes the appeal and suitability of Platonic myth for a broad audience. His treatise Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat particularly deals with the problem, laid out by Plato in the Republic, of the impact different sorts of works have upon their audience.⁸ Plutarch contrasts his approach with what he calls τὸ Ἐπικούρειον ἀκάτιον (‘the skiff of Epicurus’), stuffing up their ears like the crew of Odysseus to keep poetry out entirely. Rather, Plutarch suggests allowing the audience, and particularly the young, to enjoy poetry without incurring harm, like the hero secured to the mast with ears unblocked.⁹ His focus, however, is not narrowly on poetry, but on fantastical and imagistic literature generally: ‘They draw inspiration and pleasure not just when they read Aesop’s fables and poetic plots, but also Heracleides’ Abaris and Ariston’s Lycon and ideas about souls mixed with mythology.’¹⁰ He argues that philosophical myths in prose—probably including Plato’s myth of Er and the tale of the soul’s journey in the Republic and the Phaedo, respectively—are held to produce similar passions and pleasures in young readers as the more famously pleasurable sorts of writings. Unlike Aesop and prose summaries of tragedy, however, such myths, both in poetry and prose, can be blended with philosophy. This consideration of fiction in prose befits the era, which saw creative works such as the myth of Cupid and Psyche in Apuleius’ novel and Plutarch’s own Platonizing myths in some of his dialogues.¹¹ In his educational treatise, however, Plutarch argues that it is this quality of blending philosophy with fiction that makes poetry especially apt for philosophical training:

ὅθεν οὐ φευκτέον ἐστὶ τὰ ποιήματα τοῖς φιλοσοφεῖν μέλλουσιν, ἀλλὰ προφιλοσοφητέον τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἐθιζομένους ἐν τῷ τέρποντι τὸ χρήσιμον ζητεῖν καὶ ἀγαπᾶν.

For this reason, those intending to practise philosophy must not flee poems, but rather they must begin philosophy in poems by habituating themselves to seek out what is useful and embrace it with joy. (Plu. Mor. 15f–16a)

The primary topic of the treatise is teaching children how to read poetry without suffering the potential harm of which Plato warned in book 2 of the Republic, so Plutarch has less to say about the interpretation of prose myth. In the very beginning of the Convivales quaestiones, a collection of symposiastic vignettes, the character of the Chaeronean himself indicatively comments on the suitability of Diotima’s tale in Plato’s Symposium:¹²

ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὅτι καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Συμποσίῳ περὶ τέλους διαλεγόμενος καὶ τοῦ πρώτου ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ὅλως θεολογῶν οὐκ ἐντείνει τὴν ἀπόδειξιν οὐδ’ ὑποκονίεται, τὴν λαβὴν ὥσπερ εἴωθεν εὔτονον ποιῶν καὶ ἄφυκτον, ἀλλ’ ὑγροτέροις λήμμασι καὶ παραδείγμασι καὶ μυθολογίαις προσάγεται τοὺς ἄνδρας.

For you see that even Plato in the Symposium discusses the telos and the first good and everything of theology, and he does not strain through a proof nor kick up a cloud of dust and make a vigorous and inescapable hold as he was accustomed; rather, he won over men through softer arguments, examples, and mythic tales. (Plu. Mor. 614c–d)

Tales such as Diotima’s can convey, Plutarch argues, the same lofty metaphysical insight as logic-chopping in a fitting way for a pleasant feast. Myth, in this conception, allows philosophers to open their ideas to a broader public, including to those most liable to be harmed, such as the young or uneducated laymen.

In Numenius’ estimation, however, the form of myths serves the opposite function: they piously obscure the philosophical truths from the masses while enigmatically communicating them to initiates. His exegetical discussions are mostly lost, but some are explicitly cited in the same sources that discuss Colotes’ polemic against the Republic discussed above—Proclus’ commentary on the Republic and Macrobius’ related defence of Cicero’s Dream of Scipio. Both accounts share a common basis in Heraclitus’ adage that φύσις … κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ (‘nature likes to hide herself’), and both construe such hiding as pious.¹³ Macrobius in particular associates this idea with Numenius, to such an extent that he relays a biographical note as an illustration:

Numenio denique inter philosophos occultorum curiosiori offensam numinum, quod Eleusinia sacra interpretando vulgaverit, somnia prodiderunt, viso sibi ipsas Eleusinias deas habitu meretricio ante apertum lupanar videre prostantes, admirantique et causas non convenientis numinibus turpitudinis consulenti respondisse iratas ab ipso se de adyto pudicitiae suae vi abstractas et passim adeuntibus prostitutas.

Indeed, dreams revealed to Numenius, marked for curiosity about secrets among the philosophers, that the gods were offended, because he divulged the Eleusinian mysteries with his exposition: appearing to him in harlot’s garb, the Eleusinian goddesses appeared selling themselves before a conspicuous brothel, and angrily responded to Numenius, who was marvelling and asking about the cause of their shame unfitting for divinities, that it was he who dragged them from their sanctuary of modesty by force, as prostitutes for whoever should approach. (Macr. Somn. 1.2.19)¹⁴

Just as hiding the truth in mythic wrappings is held as an act of piety, so too is philosophizing openly equivalent to profaning the mysteries. The presumption is that earlier thinkers that managed to find at least part of the truth, namely Plato but also inspired poets such as Homer, hid their philosophies piously with myths and images.¹⁵ This sort of occluded wisdom would thus require interpretation to be understood, and Porphyry attests to some of Numenius’ allegories in De Antro Nympharum, a short tract dedicated to the description of an odd cave in the Odyssey:¹⁶

οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ οἶμαι καὶ τοῖς περὶ Νουμήνιον ἐδόκει Ὀδυσσεὺς εἰκόνα φέρειν Ὁμήρῳ κατὰ τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν τοῦ διὰ τῆς ἐφεξῆς γενέσεως διερχομένου καὶ οὕτως ἀποκαθισταμένου εἰς τοὺς ἔξω παντὸς κλύδωνος καὶ θαλάσσης ἀπείρους· ‘εἰσόκε τοὺς ἀφίκηαι οἳ οὐκ ἴσασι θάλασσαν | ἀνέρες οὐδέ θ’ ἅλεσσι μεμιγμένον εἶδαρ ἔδουσι’. πόντος δὲ καὶ θάλασσα καὶ κλύδων καὶ παρὰ Πλάτωνι ἡ ὑλικὴ σύστασις.

For I do not think it is far off the mark from what those around Numenius think, that throughout the Odyssey, in Homer’s eyes, Odysseus bears the image of one passing through successive generations and being restored, and being returned to those beyond everything that have no knowledge of wave and sea: ‘until you arrive to those men who do not know the sea and do not eat food mixed with salt’. The sea and the wave are, according to Plato also, the substance of materiality. (Porph. Antr. 34 = Numen. fr. 33 des Places)¹⁷

Numenius detects the world of the divine in Tiresias’ instruction in book 11 of the Odyssey, but Homer has piously hidden it from the many. It must be found through an allegorical lens that takes the sea as signifying materiality and corruption. On this view, Plato has used his myths, such as the myth of Er in the Republic, to piously shield the sacred truth of the mysteries.¹⁸

Although Yvonne Vernière argues that Plutarch is a precursor to Numenius’ understanding of myth based on comparison to mystery cult—with the qualification ‘jamais le Chéronéen ne s’est laissé aller à de tels excès’¹⁹—their approaches are rather different. Plutarch emphasizes the accessibility and pleasurability of myths, and Numenius their intentional obscurity. This is not to say that Plutarch considers all of the myths easily comprehensible, since he spends extensive energy explaining the details of the ‘likely myth’ of the Timaeus.²⁰ Obscurity due to complexity and obscurity due to intentional occlusion, however, are distinct properties, and he betrays no sense that the myths are obscure in the latter sense.²¹ They also differ on the question of Homer: Numenius finds the same hidden metaphysical truth in the poet as in Plato, while Plutarch’s concern, especially in Quomodo, is fundamentally ethical.²² Maximus of Tyre, weaving together different arguments against Epicurean critique, makes arguments along both lines.

2. MAXIMUS OF TYRE’S TAPESTRY OF APPROACHES

The orator Maximus of Tyre appeals to myths as sources of authority, including Plato’s own imagistic compositions, at several points in his corpus. In the forty-first Oration, for instance, he quotes the famous proclamation of the prophet in the myth of Er: ἑλομένου αἰτία, θεὸς ἀναίτιος (‘the responsibility is the chooser’s, the god is blameless’).²³ He also extensively discusses Socrates’ challenge in the Republic for a lover of poetry to defend the beloved teacher of poets, Homer.²⁴ The seventeenth, for example, is entitled Whether Plato Rightly Ejected Homer from the Polity (Εἰ καλῶς Πλάτων Ὅμηρον τῆς πολιτείας παρῃτήσατο). It includes the argument that it is possible to both honour Plato and marvel at Homer, despite some opinions to the contrary.²⁵ In the course of this defence, Maximus ruminates on the power of marvel and pleasure. Another discourse, entitled Whether There Is a Homeric Sect (Εἰ ἔστιν καθ’ Ὅμηρον αἵρεσις), presents a more extensive consideration of the manner of poetry and the unity of Plato and Homer. The great poet, he reasons, was educated by the Muses and Apollo, and so has a claim to philosophy.²⁶ Indeed, he argues, Homer was the first philosopher, and Plato himself was a ‘nursling’ of Homeric song.²⁷ Maximus even goes so far as to suggest that Plato resembles Homer more than Socrates.²⁸

In the course of one of his treatments of the compatibility of poetry and philosophy, he addresses the more theoretical issue of the form of myth and advocates listening to both μῦθος and λόγος, as long as the speaker is telling the truth.²⁹ This is the fourth oration, entitled Who Theorized Better about the Gods, Poets or Philosophers? (Τίνες ἄμεινον περὶ θεῶν διέλαβον, ποιηταὶ ἢ φιλόσοφοι;), where in one memorable image he compares the shields of Achilles and Ajax to different sorts of discourse. One would deem both to be glorious warriors, even though the former has a shield made of finely worked gold and the latter a shield made of coarse oxhide. He instructs the reader: ‘liken meter and song to gold, bare discourse to the humbler material’ (4.7: εἴκαζε δὴ κἀνταῦθα τὰ μὲν μέτρα καὶ τὴν ᾠδὴν χρυσῷ, τὸν δὲ ψιλὸν λόγον ὕλῃ δημοτικῇ). There is an ἀρετή in both philosophical λόγος and poetic μῦθος, neither of which should be discounted—as long as it has the truth.³⁰

The lines between philosophical and poetic works, however, are not necessarily clear-cut for Maximus, particularly in the case of Plato. After rejecting literal interpretations of divine action in the Homeric poems—such as Apollo shooting arrows during the plague at the beginning of the Iliad—by comparing a literal interpretation of the myths of Plato, Maximus points out:

οὐδὲ γὰρ Πλάτωνα ἡγητέον ἐντετυχηκέναι τῷ Διὶ ἡνιοχοῦντι καὶ φερομένῳ ἐπὶ πτηνοῦ ἅρματος, <οὐδὲ> στρατιᾷ θεῶν κατὰ ἕνδεκα λόχους κεκοσμημένης, οὐδέ γε δαινυμένοις τοῖς θεοῖς ἐν Διὸς τοὺς Ἀφροδίτης γάμους, ὅτε Πόρος καὶ Πενία λαθόντε ξυνηλθέτην τε καὶ Ἔρωτα ἐξ ἑαυτών ἐγεννησάτην, οὐδέ γε θεατὴν γενέσθαι Πυριφλεγέθοντός τε καὶ Ἀχέροντος καὶ Κωκυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄνω καὶ κάτω ποταμῶν ῥεόντων ὕδατι καὶ πυρί, οὐδὲ τὴν Κλωθὼ ἰδεῖν καὶ τὴν Ἄτροπον, οὔτε ἐντετυχηκέναι ἑλιττομένῳ τῷ ἀτράκτῳ ἑπτὰ καὶ διαφόρους ἑλιγμούς.

Nor should it be thought that Plato encountered Zeus holding the reins of a winged chariot, nor among the host of the gods arrayed in eleven trains; nor that he encountered the gods feasting in the house of Zeus for the wedding of Aphrodite, when Plenty and Poverty furtively met and begot Eros from themselves; nor that he saw Pyriphlegethon, Acheron, Cocytus, and the rivers both up and down, flowing with water and fire; nor that he saw Clotho and Atropos, nor that he encountered the spindle turning seven unequal orbits. (Or. 4.4)³¹

These famous myths of Plato, although written in prose and unaccompanied by song, must be interpreted rather than taken literally, just as with the Homeric myths. Although Maximus does not explicitly address the concept of Platonic myth, he finds that objections to Homer’s depiction of the gods are similarly applicable to the images in Platonic narratives, which suggests an overlapping category.

His treatment, moreover, is bracketed by polemic against Epicurus, whose student Colotes had extensively attacked the use of myth in the Republic: ‘I remove Epicurus from the account both literary and philosophical …’ (4.4: Ἐπίκουρον δὲ ἐξαιρῶ λόγου καὶ ποιητικοῦ καὶ φιλοσόφου …). Maximus attacks other parts of Epicurus’ philosophy elsewhere, such as his theory of pleasure, but here the emphasis is on the form of argument. Without specifying a particular argument, he compares Epicurus’ accounts to myths on two occasions. Before giving an exposition of what Maximus takes to be Homer’s gods, he says derisively: ‘And indeed, Epicurus gives accounts, but they are stranger than myths’ (4.8: καὶ γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος λέγει μὲν λόγους, ἀλλὰ μύθων ἀτοπωτέρους). Later, Maximus specifies that he is comparing the absurdity, which Epicurus imputed to poetry, to the content of his ideas:

κἂν ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἴῃς, εὑρήσεις πάντα μεστὰ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς ποιηταῖς ὀνομάτων, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις λόγων. τὰ δὲ Ἐπικούρου τίνι μύθων εἰκάσω; τίς οὕτω ποιητὴς ἀργὸς καὶ ἐκλελυμένος καὶ θεῶν ἄπειρος;

If you examine the rest, you will discover in the poets everything full of names, in the philosophers full of arguments. To what myth, however, could I liken the works of Epicurus? What poet is so lazy, dissolute, and ignorant of the gods? (Or. 4.9)

Maximus frames the polemic context of his defence of myth around the form of myth and its purported quality of absurdity. He attacks a central ethical assumption of his atomist opponent, the very beginning of Epicurus’ Sententiae: τὸ ἀθάνατον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει, οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει (‘The divine has no suffering itself and causes it to no other’).³² Maximus rejects Epicurus’ conception of the divine outright because it precludes the possibility of providential guidance, but he concludes his criticism with mockery of what an absurd myth a hedonistic Zeus would make by comparing a notoriously extravagant king:³³ σοὶ δὲ ἡ Διὸς ἡδονὴ καὶ τῆς Σαρδαναπάλλου ἐκείνου ἀργοτέρα; ὢ μύθων ἀπίστων καὶ μηδεμιᾷ ποιητικῇ ἁρμονίᾳ πρεπόντων (‘Does the pleasure of Zeus seem lazier to you even than that of the famous Sardanapallus? What unbelievable myths are these, hardly appropriate for poetic harmony!’).³⁴ He mocks the atomistic conception of the divine, but he does so by painting it with the same quality that Epicurus and his followers had alleged of all myth, absurdity. Although the argument concerns the content of the Epicurean argument, the broader philosophical debate on the danger or utility of mythic forms of argument—whether its inherent absurdity impairs philosophical inquiry as Colotes claims or proves useful if used in a certain way—seems to motivate Maximus’ particular choice of disparagement.

In his defence of myth, Maximus similarly focuses on the form rather than the content, and particularly whether it is useful for the audience and whether it is suitable for the objects that myths enigmatically convey. Like Plutarch, he emphasizes the pleasurability of poetry: ‘A poet, however, is a dear and pretty thing for the people to hear—welcome for its pleasure, unknown for its virtue’ (4.6: ὁ δὲ ποιητὴς ἄκουσμα ἁβρὸν καὶ δήμῳ φίλον, ἀγαπώμενον μὲν καθ’ ἡδονήν, ἀγνοούμενον δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν).³⁵ This pleasurability gives myth a benefit over plain speech, in that it can entice the audience:

καθάπερ δὲ οἱ ἰατροὶ τοῖς κακοσίτοις τῶν καμνόντων τὰ πικρὰ τῶν φαρμάκων ἀναδεύσαντες προσηνεῖ τροφῇ ἀπέκρυψαν τὴν τοῦ ὠφελοῦντος ἀηδίαν, οὕτως καὶ ἡ παλαιὰ φιλοσοφία καταθεμένη τὴν αὑτῆς γνώμην εἰς μύθους καὶ μέτρα καὶ σχῆμα ᾠδῆς, ἔλαθεν τῇ περιβολῇ τῆς ψυχαγωγίας κεράσασα τὴν ἀηδίαν τῶν διδαγμάτων.

Just as doctors surreptitiously mixed the unpleasantness of the doctrines with a covering of entertainment to conceal the unpleasantness of the healing agent for the sick that are weak-stomached, so too did the philosophy of old entrust its intention to myths and the metred form of song—it escaped notice by covering itself in persuasion and mixing the unpleasantness of the doctrines. (Or. 4.6)³⁶

In contrast with contemporary philosophy, with its heavy and bare expositions in plain speech, the ancients used myths and metre to make it palatable to part of its audience. Although Maximus does not specify whether, for instance, this is particularly for the benefit of the young or those disinclined to philosophy of all ages, the comparison suggests that potential students of either sort are deficient in such a way that keeps them from realizing the value philosophy would have for their souls.³⁷ Myth, then, allows philosophy to reach a broader audience, and hence is not only appropriate for a philosophical education but in fact beneficial to all.

While this defence emphasizes the popularizing potential of myth, Maximus also defends myth on the grounds that it conceals the truth in a fitting way. The latter point is grounded in the assumption that the ancients, both the poets and the philosophers, spoke in allegories because of the condition of their age. Earlier people needed a simpler and more musical philosophy, and so used myths.³⁸ These enigmatic myths, however, require interpretation, of a sort that Maximus defends and utilizes himself at several points in his corpus, particularly in regard to Homer and Plato.³⁹ This makes the truth more difficult to access, but he argues, like Numenius, that this is in fact a benefit. The problem lies partly with our own limitations, but also with the loftiness of what we seek: ‘Myth, after all, is a more elegant interpreter for what human frailty will not allow us to grasp clearly’ (4.5: πραγμάτων γὰρ ὑπ’ ἀνθρωπίνης ἀσθενείας οὐ καθορωμένων σαφῶς εὐσχημονέστερος ἑρμηνεὺς ὁ μῦθος).⁴⁰ To employ a myth when setting out philosophy is a pious action, which he contrasts with the plain and clear style of more recent thinkers:

ἐγὼ δὲ, εἰ μέν τι πλέον ἐθεάσαντο τῶν προτέρων οἱ ἔπειτα, μακαρίζω τοὺς ἄνδρας τῆς θέας· εἰ δὲ μηδενὶ πλεονεκτοῦντες κατὰ τὴν γνῶσιν μετέβαλον αὐτῶν τὰ αἰνίγματα εἰς μύθους σαφεῖς, δέδια μή τις αὐτῶν ἐπιλάβηται ὡς ἐξαγορευόντων ἀπορρήτους λόγους. τί γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο εἴη μύθου χρεία <ἢ> λόγος περισκεπὴς ἑτέρῳ κόσμῳ, καθάπερ τὰ ἱδρύματα, οἷς περιέβαλλον οἱ τελεσταὶ χρυσὸν καὶ ἄργυρον καὶ πέπλους, [τὰ] ἀποσεμνύνοντες αὐτῶν τὴν προσδοκίαν.

I congratulate these more recent men for their insight, if they in fact saw something more than those that came before. But if they gain no understanding and only change riddles into clear myths, I fear someone may charge them for profaning secret doctrines. Indeed, what other purpose is there for myth than an account covered in another garb, like the statues that the priests of the mysteries dress with gold and silver and robes to glorify their appearance. (Or. 4.5)

Myth appropriately beautifies the philosophy around which it is wrapped, but it also conceals it, like the statues of the mysteries. His comparison is terse, but he nevertheless seems to think it an intrinsic good to prevent the kind of impiety he suggests of more recent philosophers. Ancient poets, however, paved a middle ground ἐν τοῖς θείοις λόγοις (‘in their accounts of the divine’), devising ‘myths less clear than an account, but clearer than a riddle, situated between knowledge and ignorance’ (4.6: μύθους λόγου μὲν ἀφανεστέρους, αἰνίγματος δὲ σαφεστέρους, διὰ μέσου ὄντας ἐπιστήμης πρὸς ἄγνοιαν). This middle path, it seems, is what allows the hearer to use allegorical interpretation to get at the deeper meaning. Maximus in fact draws out benefits of this requirement, such as the fondness one feels for what they have discovered through their own mental effort.⁴¹ Puzzling through the myth might be beneficial for some of its audience, but nothing is said of those that cannot. For them, the myth is effectively a screen that occludes the truth beneath.⁴² Although Maximus does not focus on this aspect to the extent that Numenius does, his defence of myth nevertheless entails it.

3. CONCLUSION

Maximus utilizes the content of myths for his orations, but, perhaps more surprisingly, he also includes more theoretical discussion of the form of myth—namely, how it is appropriate and beneficial to philosophical education—in similar ways to both Plutarch and Numenius. Maximus and Plutarch both position their defence of myth against Epicurus and his followers. He and Numenius, moreover, both show a great interest in harmonizing their dear philosopher, Plato, with their dear poet, Homer. Plutarch and Numenius diverge, however, on the relationship of myths to their audiences: Maximus testifies to the popularizing position that the form of myth is more delightful for its audiences, as well as the sort of esotericism that holds myth as a sort of pious covering for sacred truths. Maximus’ engagement with both stances testifies to his interest in the details of Platonic interpretation and what seems to be an increasingly prolific sort of literary theory. That all three not only engaged in defence of myth in philosophy, but also held opposing explanations of how myth contributes to philosophy, indicates that these questions of literary theory were live issues among the Platonists in the early Empire. It is unclear whether the three figures engaged specifically with each other, but at the least, the question of myth was, so to say, in the air. Eventually, among the Neoplatonists—as is particularly clear from Proclus—more complicated questions over hermeneutics and semiotics would rise, but it seems that debates and discussions over the role of literature, and particularly mythic literature, were already solidifying in the worlds of Plutarch, Numenius, and Maximus.

Footnotes