Artificial Wombs: Could They Deliver an Answer to the Problem of Frozen Embryos?

Abstract

I. INTRODUCTION

Any mention of artificial wombs typically stirs up images from sci-fi movies, such as The Matrix, where human beings are grown and harvested, like crops, for nefarious reasons. However, artificial wombs may soon no longer simply be the domain of sci-fi; they may become a reality. In 2017, researchers at the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia used a Biobag to enable eight fetal lambs to develop outside of a natural womb for up to 4 weeks. The researchers found that lambs on the system demonstrated normal bodily growth, including with their lungs and brains. Ultimately, they hope that the technology can be used to assist premature infants (Partridge et al., 2017).

While Catholic scholars generally have acknowledged the potential life-saving value of this new technology, they have also expressed serious concerns about how it could be misused (Fraga, 2019).¹ For example, in his article, “The Morality of Artificial Womb Technology,” David Reiber argues that “artificial womb technology (AWT) would not be intrinsically evil and could have limited ethical applications despite its vast potential for abuse and misuse” (2010, 516). Similarly, Rev. Nicanor Austriaco, O.P. insists that there is “nothing intrinsically wrong with using a womb-like NICU incubator,”² but that the “technology could be misused to industrialize the gestation of human beings” (qtd. in Fraga, 2019).³

Considering their tremendous potential, one lingering question in the debate over how to licitly use artificial wombs involves their ability to solve the tragedy of frozen embryos. While estimates vary, there are well over 400,000 frozen embryos in the United States, and many of them have been abandoned by their biological parents (Hoffman et al., 2003; Pflum, 2019).⁴ The instruction Dignitas personae, which was promulgated by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF), states, “All things considered, it needs to be recognized that the thousands of abandoned embryos represent a situation of injustice which in fact cannot be resolved” (2008, §19; italics in the original). Reiber questions whether this statement includes all possibilities, even future ones, or if it was simply responding to the options available at that time. He goes on to suggest that this statement would not pertain to emerging artificial wombs technology and that AWT could be a solution to frozen and abandoned embryos (Reiber, 2010). Conversely, others, such as Rev. Tad Pacholczyk, maintain that artificial wombs could be a continued assault on the dignity of the embryo that began with IVF (qtd. in Fraga, 2019).

Given this unresolved debate, this paper considers whether or not it is morally licit to use artificial wombs to develop frozen embryos.⁵ If artificial wombs are permissible for premature babies, then can they, likewise, be used to grow embryos in a cryogenic state? I argue that they cannot. I contend that Dignitas personae prohibits embryo adoption, and the development of AWT would not change this prohibition, because it would still involve the potential for scandal and cooperation in evil, given the widespread acceptance of IVF in our culture and the production, freezing, and destruction of embryos that it entails.⁶

This paper proceeds in three sections. The first section considers under what circumstances artificial wombs could be used, drawing a distinction between partial ectogenesis and complete ectogenesis. The second section examines the unique circumstances of embryo adoption, explores how it may differ from other types of complete ectogenesis, and presents a case for using artificial wombs in embryo adoption. The final section outlines the teachings of Dignitas personae concerning embryo adoption, considers how these teachings would apply to the use of artificial wombs, and articulates other concerns over embryo adoption using artificial wombs, particularly the possibility of scandal and cooperation in evil.

II. THE LICIT USE OF ARTIFICAL WOMBS

Before we examine whether artificial wombs can solve the problem of frozen embryos, it is important to consider the consensus among Catholic thinkers regarding the circumstances under which the use of artificial wombs would be morally permissible. In his work on artificial wombs, Christopher Kaczor draws an important distinction between complete ectogenesis and partial ectogenesis. He writes:

By complete ectogenesis, I mean the generation and development of a human being outside the womb from the beginning of the embryonic existence until the equivalent of forty weeks’ gestation. By partial ectogenesis, I mean the development of a human being during the typical gestational period outside of the maternal womb for part of (but not the entire) gestational period. (2007, 309)

One of the key differences between partial and complete ectogenesis concerns the role that in vitro fertilization (IVF) plays in the process. In the former, the embryo is created through the marital act and the complete self-giving of the spouses that it signifies.⁷ Regarding why procreation must take place within marriage, Donum vitae maintains, “[T]he procreation of a new person, whereby the man and the woman collaborate with the power of the Creator, must be the fruit and the sign of the mutual self-giving of the spouses, of their love and of their fidelity” (CDF, 1987, §II.A.1). Conversely, IVF replaces this mutual self-giving by moving procreation outside of marriage and into laboratories, thereby turning children into commodities, who are the result of a production process. Donum vitae states:

Homologous IVF and ET [embryo transfer] is brought about outside the bodies of the couple through actions of third parties whose competence and technical activity determine the success of the procedure. Such fertilization entrusts the life and identity of the embryo into the power of doctors and biologists and establishes the domination of technology over the origin and destiny of the human person. Such a relationship of domination is in itself contrary to the dignity and equality that must be common to parents and children. (CDF,1987, §II.B.5)

Donum vitae’s condemnation of IVF provides us with a lens through which to understand its concern about artificial wombs. The instruction asks, “What Judgment Should Be Made on Other Procedures of Manipulating Embryos Connected with the ‘Techniques of Human Reproduction’?” It responds:

Techniques of fertilization in vitro can open the way to other forms of biological and genetic manipulation of human embryos, such as attempts or plans for fertilization between human and animal gametes and the gestation of human embryos in the uterus of animals, or the hypothesis or project of constructing artificial uteruses for the human embryo. These procedures are contrary to the human dignity proper to the embryo, and at the same time they are contrary to the right of every person to be conceived and to be born within marriage and from marriage. (CDF, 1987, §I.6; emphasis in the original)

Notice that the critique of artificial uteruses here is in the context of a larger concern over artificial techniques involving the production of human beings in laboratories. IVF already allows human beings to be produced outside of the martial act, and complete ectogenesis in artificial wombs would simply be an extension of that production process, which is contrary to human dignity. Contrarily, partial ectogenesis is completely divorced from IVF; the embryo is created through the marital act and then is transferred out of the maternal womb for part of the gestational period.

The use of artificial wombs for partial ectogenesis also aligns with other Catholic principles regarding the body and health care. The body is good, and the aim of medicine is to assist the person, who is a unity of body and soul, to function better. While the person has an obligation to take ordinary means to care for his or her body, at times the person may also forgo certain medical interventions, because they are excessively burdensome or pose a disproportionate risk (United States Catholic Conference of Bishops [USCCB], 2018). Like other persons, the embryo should receive medical care that can enhance, improve, and extend life. As Donum vitae notes, morally licit procedures on embryos “respect the life and integrity of the embryo and do not involve disproportionate risks for it but are directed towards its healing, the improvement of its condition of health, or its individual survival” (CDF, 1987, §I.3). Given the numerous health difficulties associated with premature birth, including death, partial ectogenesis in artificial wombs would qualify as a licit procedure under these criteria, provided that the risk posed to the embryo is not disproportionate to the potential benefit. It would be similar to other life-saving measures at the beginning stages of life, including the NICU incubators (Fraga, 2019).

III. THE CASE FOR USING ARTIFICIAL WOMBS IN EMBRYO ADOPTION

How do we apply this distinction between partial and complete ectogenesis, as well as the moral analysis outlined above, to the issue of embryo adoption? While embryo adoption using artificial wombs clearly involves complete ectogenesis, some Catholic scholars, such as Reiber, argue that it would be morally permissible to use artificial wombs to rescue frozen embryos (2008, 526).⁸

The heart of this argument involves the equality and dignity of all persons from conception to natural death. Persons have worth and value, because they are created in the image and likeness of God, and not because they possess a certain degree of functionality. In this regard, the frozen embryo should be treated as a person, who, like other persons, deserves respect, possesses inherent dignity, and is entitled to the continuation of life (John Paul II, 1995; O’Rourke, 2006). Reiber summarizes the argument, writing:

Given that a human embryo is truly a human being, and therefore worthy of the dignity due the human person, it follows logically that the human embryo would be just as worthy of life support and “rescue” from its life-threatening condition as would the fetal or neonatal human being. Other than implantation in a woman’s uterus (that of either the genetic mother or a surrogate), there would be no other way yet imagined [other than artificial wombs] to bring these embryos to term—in other words, to save their lives. Given the lack of other available and morally licit solutions, the use of a technological solution that has been meticulously designed for the survival of a human being (a moral good) would be morally permissible and perhaps even laudable. (2010, 524)

I have argued elsewhere that embryo adoption, where a frozen embryo is adopted and then is implanted into a woman’s womb, should be seen in the context of the Church’s widespread and long-standing support for traditional adoption (Grabowski and Gross, 2010). At its most fundamental level, this case, like the one that Reiber makes, is also based on the dignity of the frozen embryo. The use of artificial wombs in the adoption process would not change this position. In fact, it would allow a woman who could not carry a baby naturally for medical reasons to still adopt an embryo.

Traditional adoption involves the adoption of a person (e.g. an infant or adolescent) who is born. Embryo adoption using a natural womb or an artificial womb would involve the adoption of a human being at a different stage of development. As Kaczor notes, “It makes no important moral difference whether this adoption takes place later or earlier in the child’s life” (2007, 321). Likewise, Austriaco argues that “it is morally irrelevant whether the gestational age of the human placed in the incubator is one week or twenty-four weeks” (2006, 133).⁹ Furthermore, if an artificial womb could be used for partial ectogenesis to save the life of a fetus created through the marital act, it seems that it would also be morally permissible to use an artificial womb to develop a frozen embryo who has been adopted (Reiber, 2010).

Unlike complete ectogenesis where the artificial womb is used in concert with IVF and ET to manufacture children apart from the marital act, embryo adoption using artificial wombs would involve a distinct act and different intention, which would be to save a human person from remaining in a cryogenic state. One can perform this act of adoption, which recognizes the dignity of the embryo, without condoning IVF, just as one can adopt a child who is born outside of marriage without approving of premarital sex (Kaczor, 2007).¹⁰

However, using artificial wombs for embryo adoption gives rise to several concerns and objections. First, there is the issue of the continued depersonalization of the embryo that began with IVF. Pacholczyk argues:

Having been conceived in glassware, and having never been within the womb of a woman, there would be a sense in which the decision to gestate an IVF embryo inside an artificial womb would constitute a continuation of that same dynamic of depersonalization and objectification of that embryonic human which had begun with his or her creation in a laboratory petri dish. (qtd. in Fraga, 2019)

While Pacholczyk’s objection is certainly understandable, it seems to overlook the reality that the embryo has been left in a cryogenic state and stored in a tank with no regard for its well-being. This process is also a form of depersonalization and an attack on its dignity (CDF, 1987). If it is adopted out of love and allowed to develop, even through artificial means, it is difficult to see how this would lead to further depersonalization and objectification. Indeed, this acknowledges the dignity of the embryo, because it allows it to develop and be born (Kaczor, 2007).¹¹

In the debate over embryo adoption using natural wombs, some critics argue that transferring an embryo into an adoptive mother’s womb is a form of surrogacy, which the Church considers morally illicit (see, e.g. Pacholczyk, 2006). Does this critique apply to the use of artificial wombs to gestate frozen embryos? Is this simply a form of high-tech surrogacy?¹²Donum vitae defines two different kinds of surrogacy. In one instance, a woman could carry an embryo that is formed out of donor material and then transferred into her, and in the other instance, she could contribute her ovum while being inseminated with the sperm that comes from a man other than her husband (CDF, 1987). In both instances, “She carries the pregnancy with the pledge to surrender the child once it is born to the party who commissioned or made the agreement for the pregnancy” (CDF, 1987, §II.A.3).

Under the definition of surrogacy outlined in Donum vitae, using artificial wombs to gestate frozen embryos would not constitute a form of surrogacy. As Kaczor points out, “[A]rtifical wombs cannot pledge or agree to anything” (Kaczor, 2007, 319). In addition, artificial wombs cannot surrender children; only human surrogates can do that. Finally, artificial wombs avoid the exploitation of women that is present in surrogacy, where women are objectified and oftentimes paid for the use of their bodies.

While I have argued that using artificial wombs for embryo adoption does not involve further depersonalization of the embryo and is not a form of surrogacy, one can still raise serious objections to the practice. The next section details these objections. Even though embryo adoption using artificial wombs has the potential to save thousands of lives, I argue that the practice is still morally illicit, given the scandal that it would cause and the cooperation in evil that it would involve within our current cultural circumstances.

IV. WHY WE CANNOT USE ARTIFICAL WOMBS TO SAVE FROZEN EMBRYOS

Despite what seems to be a compelling case in favor of using artificial wombs in embryo adoption, Dignatis personae broadly declares the practice of embryo adoption morally illicit without addressing the question of artificial wombs.¹³ It rejects embryo adoption within the larger question of what can be done with the frozen embryos already in existence. It begins by condemning the possibility of using these embryos for medical experimentation, and then, it rejects the idea that these embryos could be put at the disposal of infertile couples (CDF, 2008). Last, it takes up the issue of prenatal adoption as a third possibility. It states:

It has also been proposed, solely in order to allow human beings to be born who are otherwise condemned to destruction, that there could be a form of “prenatal adoption”. This proposal, praiseworthy with regard to the intention of respecting and defending human life, presents however various problems not dissimilar to those mentioned above. (CDF, 2008, §19; emphasis in the original)

After rejecting each of these possibilities, it goes on to conclude, as I noted in the beginning, that frozen embryos represent a “situation of injustice which in the fact cannot be resolved” (CDF, 2008, §19; emphasis in the original). While the instruction rejects these potential solutions for different reasons, its conclusion makes it clear that none of these options, including prenatal adoption, is a just way to resolve the problem of frozen embryos already in existence.

While it is unclear from the document what “various problems” it is referring to in its evaluation of prenatal adoption, identifying the nature of those problems is pivotal when evaluating whether artificial wombs can provide a solution to the problem of frozen embryos. For instance, if it is referring to moral problems stemming from the implantation of a frozen embryo into an adopting mother’s uterus, then artificial wombs may indeed provide a morally licit solution that can be pursued as soon as the technology is developed. If, however, those problems are unrelated to or broader than implantation, then artificial wombs do not present a viable solution to the crisis of frozen embryos.

What kind of problems does the instruction associate with embryo adoption? On the one hand, the instruction could be claiming that embryo adoption “is not ethically acceptable for the same reasons which make artificial heterologous procreation illicit as well as any form of surrogate motherhood” (CDF, 2008, §19). However, this interpretation is problematic for several reasons. First, embryo adoption is not a form of surrogacy for the reasons that I outlined above. The instruction seems to want to prohibit situations where an infertile couple would contract with a woman to gestate the child for them.

Similarly, it is difficult to see how embryo adoption is akin to artificial heterologous procreation. Drawing on Donum vitae, the instruction notes that heterologous procreation refers to “techniques used to obtain a human conception artificially by the use of gametes coming from at least one donor other than the spouses who are joined in marriage” (CDF, 1987, §II). In the case of embryo adoption, an embryo is not being created; it already exists (Grabowski and Gross, 2010).

Some opponents of embryo adoption, such as Irene Alexander (2018), argue that not only is artificial fertilization morally illicit, but artificial impregnation is as well. In other words, transferring an embryo into a woman is illicit under any circumstances, because it is opposed to the unity of marriage. Alexander contends that embryo transfer makes “an improper use of the reproductive faculty by transferring the agency of the act of impregnation to someone who ought not to be the agent, and in a manner outside of the order of God’s design: conjugal union” (Alexander, 2018, 76). Austriaco echoes this concern.¹⁴ He contends:

Embryo rescue, however, would rob the husband of the unique and privileged role he should play in establishing a pregnancy in his wife. Instead, his wife would become pregnant through the actions of a third individual, usually the physician who inserts the embryo into her womb. This undermines the exclusivity of marriage and is therefore unjust. Thus, embryo rescue is not good. (2011, 109)

If Dignitas personae is rejecting embryo adoption on these grounds, then embryo adoption using artificial wombs seems to alleviate this concern, because it does not involve the use of the woman’s reproductive organs at all. In fact, even though Reiber and Austriaco express objections to heterologous embryo transfer (HET), both argue that the use of artificial wombs to develop frozen embryos would be morally licit (Austriaco, 2006; Reiber, 2010).

The issue with this interpretation of Dignitas personae is that the CDF has repeatedly and unambiguously rejected heterologous fertilization and procreation (CDF, 1987; CDF, 2008). If its moral evaluation of embryo adoption flows out of its rejection of heterologous fertilization and procreation, it seems odd that this connection would not be made more explicitly in the instruction (Napier, 2009). It also seems strange that the instruction would not call embryo adoption “ethically unacceptable,” which is the language that it uses for the first two possible solutions that it considers (CDF, 2008, §19). Commenting on Dignitas personae, Stephen Napier points out, “If the Church clearly perceived that HET-res [embryo adoption as rescue] was an intrinsic evil, thus putting the health of our souls gravelly at stake, and that many faithful were considering HET-res for themselves, she would have been clearer with that teaching” (2009, 158).

On the other hand, the preceding paragraph also mentions “problems of a medical, psychological and legal nature” (CDF, 2008, §19). Thus, the instruction seems to be arguing that embryo adoption would lead to problems of a medical, psychological, and legal nature. Unfortunately, the instruction does not describe these problems in detail or explain further how embryo adoption gives rise to them. In part, the ambiguity here may be attributed to the reality that problems surrounding embryo freezing and adoption are still unfolding. As Naomi Johnson points out, “The growing practice of embryo adoption raises a host of new ethical, moral and legal dilemmas that have yet to be resolved” (2003, 854; Bankowski et al., 2005). However, we can see some of these problems emerging. For example, numerous legal battles have ensued in recent years over who should be making decisions regarding these frozen embryos (Lapook, 2015). Medically, we know the thawing process is dangerous for the embryos and that a significant number will not survive (The Hewitt Fertility Care Centre, n.d.).

It is difficult to see how embryo adoption using artificial wombs would alleviate these and other concerns regarding embryo adoption. Even if the CDF did not have embryo adoption using artificial wombs in mind when the document was written, as Reiber suggests, it does not seem as if this technological advancement would change the CDF’s moral evaluation of embryo adoption. In other words, even if artificial wombs were considered as a means for embryo adoption, the current situation in which hundreds of thousands of embryos have been frozen is unjust and an affront to human dignity, but it cannot be resolved licitly.

Yet, it should be noted that embryo adoption is not described as intrinsically illicit. The instruction does reiterate that other practices, such as IVF and cloning, are intrinsically illicit (CDF, 2008). These kinds of acts are “on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances” always and everywhere wrong (John Paul II, 1993, §80). However, the instruction does not declare embryo adoption to be intrinsically illicit, and it praises the intention of the couple wishing to adopt. Thus, its position on embryo adoption seems to be based on existing circumstances and current cultural conditions.

Many Catholic scholars have expressed concerns about issues involving the possibility of cooperation in evil in the debate over embryo adoption (Berg and Furton, 2006; Berkman and Carey, 2007; Grabowski and Gross, 2010; Reiber, 2010). These concerns arise from the reality that embryo adoption is intimately tied to the fertility industry. Medical professionals in that industry are producing, screening, destroying, implanting, and freezing embryos. At this point, it seems impossible to disconnect embryo adoption either using natural or artificial wombs from this production process. For example, the thawing and transfer of embryos, in cases of embryo adoption, may be performed by the same doctors and in the same facilities that perform IVF and freeze embryos (Grabowski and Gross, 2010). Furthermore, studies indicate that many couples undergoing IVF and freezing their embryos feel more comfortable with the process, knowing that adoption is an option (McMahon et al., 2003; Mohler-Kuo et al., 2009; Lyerly et al., 2010).¹⁵ Embryo adoption, through artificial or natural means, might be a “deciding factor for a couple resorting to IVF” (Grabowski and Gross, 2010, 324).

Embryo adoption also involves the risk of scandal. Rev. William Stempsey points out that HET may lead Catholics further away from the truth, even if the practice is considered morally licit. He writes, “[HET] might lead more Catholics down a slippery slope toward accepting IVF. If we allow part of ART [artificial reproductive technology], they might say, why not allow the rest?” (2007, 39).

Perhaps the risk of scandal could be offset through additional catechesis, but the permissive attitudes among Catholics concerning IVF and other morally illicit reproductive technologies and the pervasive lack of knowledge concerning the Church’s teaching on them seem to undercut reasons for hopefulness (Drake, 2004). Furthermore, the growing prevalence, success, popularity, and accessibility of these procedures would make catechesis distinguishing embryo adoption from morally illicit reproductive technologies even more challenging. Finally, given that the fertility industry will undoubtedly be using this technology in concert with IVF to manufacture life, the use of artificial wombs in embryo adoption would only heighten the possibility of scandal.

In its discussion on the use of “biological material” of illicit origin, Dignitas personae raises similar concerns over the possibility of scandal and cooperation in evil. There are important parallels in its analysis with embryo adoption. The instruction considers whether it is morally licit for researchers to use “biological material” from embryos that have been discarded or aborted fetuses, even when they did not participate in the destruction of human life. The instruction maintains:

Therefore, it needs to be stated that there is a duty to refuse to use such “biological material” even when there is no close connection between the researcher and the actions of those who performed the artificial fertilization or the abortion, or when there was no prior agreement with the centers in which the artificial fertilization took place. This duty springs from the necessity to remove oneself, within the area of one’s own research, from a gravely unjust legal situation and to affirm with clarity the value of human life. (CDF, 2008, §35; emphasis in the original)

Explaining this section of the instruction, Austriaco outlines multiple reasons for this

prohibition. He writes:

First, the use of fetal tissues and cells for transplantation and research tends to legitimize abortion and to lead to future abortions. There is evidence that women who are about to have an abortion overwhelming approve of fetal research, possibly because they need an option that would alleviate the anxiety and guilt associated with their choice to end their pregnancy . . . It is clear that the possibility of using fetal tissue for therapeutic purposes would encourage women to choose abortion when they may not have done so. Next, the use of fetal tissues for transplantation and research would require collaboration with the abortion industry, which should be strenuously discouraged. (2011, 180–81)

While embryos certainly are not “biological material,” these same two objections can be applied to embryo adoption. On the one hand, as I noted above, if embryo adoption is an option for couples, it seems to alleviate the guilt associated with IVF and freezing embryos from some. On the other hand, it is clear that embryo adoption involves cooperation with the fertility industry, which is producing, screening, and freezing embryos. While there can be distance between the fertility industry and embryo adoption agencies, there must currently be collaboration between the two.

Some authors suggest that Catholics could address these concerns by undertaking various measures to distance themselves from the fertility industry, including establishing clinics for embryo adoption that would not perform IVF (Berg and Furton, 2006). Regarding the use of artificial wombs in embryo adoption, Reiber argues that “any use of complete ectogenesis would have to be very clearly separated from IVF practice and the IVF clinics, and a clear statement of repudiation would be required” (2010, 526). Considering the prevalence and growing popularity of the fertility industry in the United States, as well as the interconnectedness of any form of embryo adoption and IVF, it is difficult to see how these efforts would diminish the possibility for scandal or eliminate cooperation in evil.

What is needed for embryo adoption to become a morally licit solution to the tragedy of frozen embryos is a dramatic culture shift away from IVF and the rest of the fertility industry, which ignores the dignity and sanctity of life throughout the production process. The shift could come through legislation that outlaws the practice or through a cultural revelation concerning the immorality of IVF (Reiber, 2010, 327). Without this shift, embryo adoption, using either natural or artificial wombs, should not be considered morally licit.

Unfortunately, any moral prohibition against embryo adoption must be accompanied by the recognition that hundreds of thousands of embryos remain abandoned in a frozen state and will eventually die (Napier, 2009, 159). Napier contends that opposition to embryo adoption leaves us with the uncomfortable conclusion that “some embryos have a right to life and some do not. The ones that do not, do not in virtue of how they came in being (i.e. IVF) thus through no fault of their own” (2009, 159). While anyone who values human life should be sympathetic to Napier’s position, it does not sufficiently take into account how embryo adoption may further legitimize the fertility industry, lead more people to use IVF, and bring about the additional destruction of human life through the freezing and discarding of embryos.

V. CONCLUSION

As AWT becomes a reality, Catholic ethicists have to continue to grapple with how the technology can be used in a licit manner. In this article, I have sought to offer a moral evaluation of a few uses of AWT. I have argued that artificial wombs would be licit for partial ectogenesis. In these cases, AWT is form of medical intervention early in life, like NICU incubators, aimed at extending life and alleviating suffering. However, complete ectogenesis should be evaluated differently, even when AWT is used to save frozen embryos, who are abandoned and stuck in a cryogenic state. Unfortunately, the potential for scandal and cooperation in evil is too high in our current culture.

Inevitably, AWT will be abused in horrific ways without government regulation. These likely abuses do not mean that the technology cannot be employed in morally licit ways. However, they should cause us to proceed with caution. While it has life-saving potential, AWT also has the potential to further diminish how our culture views the sanctity of human life, the importance of marriage, and the value of motherhood through human pregnancy (Watt, 2017). Since it began in 1978, IVF has brought the destruction of an unfathomable number of human lives as well as the freezing of hundreds of thousands more; we should beware of what the fertility industry will do with AWT.

REFERENCES

Footnotes