Plan Coup-de-Poing and Plan Paso-Doble: The OAS Dream of a Coup d’état in France

The Organisation armée secrète (OAS), founded in Madrid in January 1961, was well known for its zealous commitment to the defence of French Algeria.¹ For most of its existence, it carried out numerous acts of terror, bombings, targeted assassinations (famously that of Roger Gavoury, head of the Algiers Police, and multiple failed assassination attempts on President Charles de Gaulle), and other subversive actions emblematic of a revolutionary organization. What is less well known is that the OAS also planned to conduct a coup d’état against the de Gaulle regime. These imagined operations were intended to be undertaken when the fight against the Gaullist regime had reached the anticipated next stage in its development: one of open military confrontation, following the schemas of revolutionary war doctrine as outlined by Colonel Charles Lacheroy.² The two plans discussed here, code-named Coup-de-Poing and Paso-Doble, detailed how the OAS would paralyse the métropole and subsequently seize power.

The documents, dating from 25 December 1961, originated from the Organisation Renseignements Opérations [ORO] of the Délégation générale en métropole of the OAS (the OAS-Métro) and were written by Captain André. Both plans were attached as annexes or appendices to a document entitled Directive Générale d’Action, which studied the possibility of an OAS coup d’état in France. This document contains six annexes, the first four of which will be examined in the current paper: Annexe I: Plan Coup-de-Poing; Annexe II: Plan Paso-Doble; Annexe III: La Centaine ou Commando Urbain Temporaire; Annexe IV: Les Cinq Phases de la Révolution (ou Schéma de Trotsky).³ All of these were seized by French security forces and are preserved in the Archives Nationales in Paris.⁴ These plans were to be distributed to all zones of the metropolitan wing of the organization, including in Corsica. The documents demonstrate the degree to which the OAS-Métro leadership was disconnected from the reality faced by the organization in the métropole: almost constant police surveillance, arrests, and dwindling numbers and means. However, the Police took the threat posed by the OAS very seriously indeed and were well aware of the group’s potential to destabilize the country if given the opportunity.

Surprisingly, the OAS, an organization marked by its strong association with the Nationalist ideologies of the ‘Ultras’ of Algeria, the far-right of the métropole, and the army, based their revolutionary action on the precepts of Mao Zedong (quoted in the introductory document to both operations; DGA, 1) and ‘Trotsky’s schema’ (Annexe IV). This repurposing of communist methods by French Nationalists followed a well-worn path. Many pro-French Algeria political groups saw such tactics as highly effective and replicated them where they could.⁵ The transference of totalitarian methods across the extremes of the political spectrum is evidence in support of Horseshoe Theory, which is discussed further below.⁶

The OAS-Métro’s goals were stated unequivocally: ‘maintenir l’Algérie dans la souveraineté française, et pour ce faire, réaliser une rénovation totale des structures tant politiques que sociales et économiques’ (DGA, 1). Therefore, the strategy of the OAS-Métro was to carefully prepare the upcoming insurrection on the mainland and to avoid, at best, a new ‘Commune’ (if rural populations did not join them) or, at worst, a new ‘Guerre d’Espagne’ (if the countryside did join them and the army hesitated to throw its lot in with the ‘mouvements nationaux’ [DGA, 5]).⁷

Two scenarios were planned for. The first, Plan Coup-de-Poing, was based on the assumption of simultaneous uprisings in both Algeria and the métropole. The second, Paso-Doble, detailed a contingency plan in the event of the Algerian uprising being delayed or failing to take place. What emerges is a fascinating depiction of how the OAS-Métro envisaged taking power in France. This article will examine both OAS plans detailed in these archival documents.

Plan Coup-de-Poing

Plan Coup-de-Poing’s goal was to control ‘les points sensibles’ of both civilian and military command. This would be accomplished with the use of both regular army units (which the OAS believed would join their endeavour) and the OAS’s guerrilla forces, the Commandos Urbains Temporaires (CUT) (PCP, 1). Interestingly, the report outlined the failings of previous attempts to subvert the government during the Algerian War. The examples of 13 May 1958, 24 January 1960 (the semaine des barricades), and 22 April 1961 (the putsch des généraux) were evoked in the report, to demonstrate the importance of complementing any uprising in French Algeria with a concurrent action on the mainland (PCP, 1). The plan would have two phases: the first, military; the second, civilian.

The military phase would involve OAS forces moving to convince regular army units to join their rebellion. Cpt. André noted how ‘la réalisation d’une telle opération n’exige pas un personnel nombreux, mais seulement du courage et de l’initiative’ (PCP, 1). The manner in which operations were to be carried out was then detailed: ‘On peut dire que, plus le coup porté sera rapide et brutal, moins il exigera de troupes. Au contraire, le déplacement de certains éléments venant des subdivisions pour s’emparer du siège de la R[égion] M[ilitaire] exige des effectifs plus nombreux’ (PCP, 1). The OAS’s lack of manpower meant that, to have any chance of success, any action would have to rely heavily on surprise, shock, and a rapid rallying of local military garrisons to their cause. The name of the operation (rough translation: ‘Knockout punch’) suggests this too. This military phase would be followed by a civilian one in which political action would build upon the efforts of the group’s militants (PCP, 2). Comités de Libération Nationale were to be established and given full civilian and military power. This choice of name was clearly meant to evoke memories of Second World War resistance; the loose alliance of the OAS with Georges Bidault’s Conseil national de la Résistance was another clear example of this. This was consistently supplemented by OAS propaganda identifying the organization with anti-German maquis and depictions of de Gaulle as a new Pétain: collaborating with the enemy (the Front de Libération Nationale) and agreeing to abandon national territory. The old Gaullist argument of ‘legality vs. legitimacy’ used to discredit the ‘legal’ Vichy regime and bolster the ‘legitimate’ Free French was repurposed to take aim at de Gaulle. Much like the Liberation of 1944, establishment figures who rallied to the cause, such as Préfets, could then be installed as the presidents of such local committees. The Comités de Libération Nationale also evoke memories of the Comités de Salut Public of 13 May 1958, fresh in the minds of the French populace. This May 1958 ‘revolution’ was a key date in pro-French Algeria mythology, and recapturing its optimism, energy, and ‘fraternisations’ was another key goal of OAS action psychologique and propaganda.

The armed forces were the primary target of the OAS, particularly for their weapons, but also because they were ‘à la pointe du combat pour la libération nationale’, and had ‘pris parti en Algérie, dans sa quasi-totalité, pour l’OAS’ (PCP, 2). The intervention of the army on the side of the OAS would thus be viewed as a sign of a re-found national unity.⁸ This is of course notwithstanding the huge political divisions and controversy caused prior to 1961 by the army’s various meddlings in politics. The report added, perhaps as a direct consequence of the failure of the putsch des généraux, that this action needed to be complemented with civilian activism throughout the operation. Indeed, it was even suggested that civilians should go into action alongside OAS militants and regular army units, and be provided with the necessary training, perhaps indicating that the OAS were planning for the eventuality of a prolonged struggle (PCP, 2).

The importance of securing local support, in the form of demonstrations by civilians in favour of the coup, was stressed. This was part of a psychological plan to coincide with the operation. Logistical and economic requirements were also anticipated, and ensuring the resupply of the country during the planned action clearly preoccupied the coup leaders (PCP, 3). Price fixing was to be punished severely and publicly (PCP, 3). Business owners were to continue paying their employees’ full wages for the duration of the coup. Factories and businesses were to remain open, by force if necessary, harking back to General Jacques Massu’s tactics of forcing Algerian business owners to keep their premises open during the 1957 battle of Algiers. Any agitators would be swiftly punished (PCP, 3). The document concluded by underlining that more detailed instructions would be given at a later date. There is sufficient evidence here to suggest that the OAS would have dealt brutally with any serious resistance among the civilian population. Again, this focus on civilian participation demonstrates the long-lasting psychological legacy of the experience of 13 May for the organization, and its impact on the framing of future similar endeavours.

Plan Paso-Doble

The second document, ‘Annexe II’, code-named Plan Paso-Doble, outlined the gameplan for a scenario in which the OAS in Algeria began operations before their comrades in the métropole were sufficiently readied. In its introduction, the document outlined how a repeat of the putsch des généraux in April 1961 must be avoided at all costs. This would be ensured through ‘opérations offensives’ and ‘publicitaires’ aiming to sabotage the de Gaulle regime and its allies psychologically (PPD, 4). The aim of Paso-Doble was to paralyse state power while keeping the subversive elements of the organization hidden. This would be achieved through the deployment of the CUTs and the Maquis Ruraux, trained by the OAS. Contrary to Plan Coup-de-Poing, this operation outlined a series of intermediate stages. These stages differed according to the situation on the ground within each individual region (PPD, 4). In an attempt to demonstrate the state’s inherent weakness, the plan envisaged a probing of the regime’s ‘possibilités répressives’, which would be complemented by inflicting material losses on the authorities and winning over the ‘complicité morale’ and support of the population. Indeed, the OAS aimed to position themselves as the defenders of the populace (PPD, 4).

The roles of the CUTs and the Maquis Ruraux were outlined. Cpt. André imagined the enemy as taking the form of communist/socialist people’s militias and the Gaullist Union pour une Nouvelle République, rather than loyalist elements of the French armed forces, perhaps highlighting the Spanish Civil War fantasies of those within the OAS. Indeed, in a passage underlining the importance of a supreme leader for the insurrection, the author stated that ‘lors de l’insurrection espagnole, seuls ont vaincu les chefs qui sont passés à l’offensive dès le premier jour, en rejetant tout formalisme superflu’ (PPD, 5). This Spanish Civil War reference was no coincidence. The organization included many Francoist sympathizers among its ranks, and the Franco regime tolerated the presence of the OAS within its borders. This was until Franco, ever the crafty political operator, calculated that any ideological affinity that the regime had with General Raoul Salan’s organization was trumped by the considerations of Realpolitik and potential friendship with de Gaulle. As a result, the Franco regime decided to send many of the OAS’s Spanish cohort, including Colonel Antoine Argoud, to the Canaries.

The integrity of the enemy’s command and control formations was to be shattered, and new units were to be formed by the OAS and ‘toughened up’ (the verb employed in the document is ‘aguerrir’) (PPD, 4–5). These efforts were targeted mainly at professional soldiers, particularly those in the elite parachute regiments and the Foreign Legion, who were significantly over-represented in the organization. This stage of the conflict would persist until regular army units, which were to be liaised with closely, entered the fight. Again, the OAS assumed that the army would join them in their fight against de Gaulle, which had emphatically failed to happen during the 1961 putsch. The plan called for operations that were ‘spectaculaires et brutales’, and actions to be undertaken for the purpose of shock and awe (PPD, 5). Commandos would then spring into action, attacking all forms of state authority. This phase would be accompanied by increased propaganda (posters, leaflets, pirate radio broadcasts, pro-OAS graffiti) and ‘intoxification’ campaigns. The plan optimistically envisaged OAS successes, the resignation of key government figures, and even the endorsement of famous personalities (‘ralliement des hautes personalités’; PPD, 5). In considerable detail, the plan specified how each squad should be organized: the men were to be set up in ‘politico-military’ teams of five, under the command of a Sergeant.⁹ Politically, each member had a separate role: renseignement, sécurité, action, matériel, Agit-Prop (agitation and propaganda).

The Marxist-style terminology employed in the document is no accident. The OAS comprised many fervent followers of guerre révolutionnaire, who took major inspiration from the real and imagined functioning of the Viet Minh.¹⁰ The doctrine advocated the intervention of the army in politics, psychological warfare, political commissars, re-education, brainwashing, and many other Marxist techniques to be replicated by the French Army. Ironically, repurposing Marxist tactics was, for the OAS (a virulently anti-communist organization), ‘LE SEUL MOYEN DE PARADE ET DE RIPOSTE POSSIBLE FACE À LA POUSSÉE MARXISTE-LÉNINISTE’ (DGA, 1). Interestingly, as previously mentioned, Annexe IV was termed Schéma de Trotsky. Phase 1 of this schema involved setting up the structures that would spread propaganda, agitation, and intelligence. ‘L’idée’ (the group’s ideology) was to be spread, and the ‘internal contradictions’ (classic Marxist vocabulary) of the regime highlighted. In Phase 2, these organizations were to be strengthened and opponents intimidated and isolated. Strikes, riots, and sabotage begin. In Phase 3, ‘bandes’ begin forming who would undertake ‘coup[s] de main’, then melt away. Propaganda becomes more violent, and guerilla forces are recruited. The fourth phase witnesses the creation of ‘safe zones’ for the revolutionaries and the local populations organized and regimented by them. Regional units are created and intensify guerrilla operations. Regular army units also appear. In the fifth and final phase, a combination of classic and guerrilla warfare would culminate in an overthrow of the regime. Those who have studied guerre révolutionnaire doctrine will immediately note the similarities to Lacheroy’s 5-phase schema of revolutionary warfare, here repackaged as ‘Trotsky’s’. The influence of Mao in this schema is also clear; his discussion of ‘base areas’ defined by a population ready to support the revolutionaries was discussed in detail in Strategic Problems of China’s Revolutionary War.¹¹ Indeed, leading expert on the Indochina War Christopher Goscha asserted that Lacheroy’s principal theory of ‘hiérarchies parallèles’ was fundamentally an accurate depiction of Viet Minh population organization.¹²

Horseshoe Theory (mentioned above) posits that the political spectrum should be considered more like a horseshoe than a simple axis, with the far-right and far-left sharing methods and characteristics.¹³ Previously, thinkers such as Hannah Arendt had coined the idea of a common ‘totalitarianism’ to explain the advent of the totalizing fascist, Nazi, and communist regimes of the twentieth century. That an organization consisting of mainly Nationalist-right supporters of French Algeria should openly advocate the tactics and methods of the far left is more than a subtle indication of the utility of Horseshoe Theory, and evidence of a common appetite across the political extremes for totalitarian methods.¹⁴

Interestingly, the Plan Paso-Doble even captured in fascinating detail how OAS leaders expected their troops to dress. Uniforms were to be composed strictly of French camouflage fatigues. The trousers had to be elasticated on the calves, and black berets and brown boots were to be worn by all. A French tricolour flash embroidered with the letters ‘OAS’ was to be affixed on ‘Jour J’ on the left arm of the camouflaged shirt. Metallic ‘galons’, which designated senior NCOs and officers, were to be worn by the appropriate ranks. Custom camouflages were to be avoided at all costs. Maximum uniformity was the goal (PPD, 7). The reasoning behind this military discipline and attention to detail with regards to uniform was explained later in the document:

Se souvenir qu’un gardien de la paix, une CRS [Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité] ou même un gendarme mobile qui hésitera à s’opposer à un homme revêtu d’une tenue militaire, correctement porteur de galons de Lieutenant ou d’Adjudant, s’empressera, par contre, de faire ‘circuler’ ce même homme s’il se présente hétéroclite, et porteur d’un quelconque brassard type FFI [Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur]. (PPD, 7)

The OAS’s use of military uniforms and insignia was not purely theoretical. Indeed, a 2^e/3^e Bureau document from the same period noted that OAS members operated ‘en uniforme, le plus souvent en tenue de parachutiste. Mais on a vu des cas de faux C.R.S. (armes de la Douane près de Maison-Carrée) ou des faux agents de police’.¹⁵ Another military document relays how a commando of 15 men destroyed the TV tower at Cap Matifou while disguised in French army uniforms.¹⁶ Army intelligence reported the OAS even faking a vehicle breakdown in order to ambush the inspecting gendarmes.¹⁷

The OAS would never get their chance to execute these plans. The OAS-Métro networks were severely lacking in men and means, and desperately disunited, as several historians have pointed out, chief among them Olivier Dard.¹⁸ Indeed Louis Honorat de Condé, a veteran of the OAS-Métro and participant in the 22 August 1962 Petit-Clamart assassination attempt on de Gaulle, recalled, upon his return to France in 1961, that: ‘L’O.A.S. en métropole était insignifiant.’¹⁹ One estimate put their manpower at roughly 200 individuals, whereas the two operations outlined in this paper clearly assumed that many men would be required per department (DGA, 5). Due to the endless pursuit of the OAS in the métropole, such planned coups were never realistic. They were intended as rough plans of action, in a scenario where the political situation rapidly changed in the OAS’s favour and the ‘Gaullist regime’ found itself significantly weakened by events elsewhere. Furthermore, General Salan, the nominal head of the OAS, stated in Instruction no. 29 of February 1962 that: ‘Tout coup de force ponctuel ou “Putsch” est exclu.’²⁰

These primary documents’ detailing of the OAS’s plans for taking power, in a scenario where they were able to build sufficient revolutionary momentum to make this a possibility, are of evident historical significance. The fact that the OAS were prepared to drag France into a civil war, had they the means to do so (and despite their assertions as to the favourability of the sudden, sharp shock of a coup d’état), demonstrates the ‘jusqu’aubou-tisme’ of some within the organization’s hierarchy. Indeed, the French security apparatus was fully aware of the OAS’s dream of toppling the de Gaulle regime, and of the Algerian wing’s goal of creating a breakaway state, taking inspiration from the Congo and Israel.²¹ The communist provenance of their methods and open reference to Mao and Lenin not only highlight the influence of Marxist thinkers and guerre révolutionnaire on the OAS, but arguably offer evidence of Horseshoe Theory in action, demonstrating the facility with which the proponents of extremist ideologies can borrow totalitarian methods and theories of action.

As the war in Algeria came to a close, so did the chances of a revolutionary situation developing on either side of the Mediterranean. With the flight of over one million Pieds-Noirs back to the métropole in 1962 and the granting of Algerian independence, the OAS fever dream of toppling ‘le Grand Charles’ and his regime faded into the distance, as their attacks became increasingly motivated by vengeance rather than a desire to enact real political change.

Footnotes