Paramilitarism: Mass Violence in the Shadow of the State. Uğur Ümit Üngör

The common theme of paramilitarism unites the three books under review here. This is hardly a coincidence, given that their authors collaborated on the joint Dutch Research Council project, “Paramilitarism, Organized Crime, and the State in the 1990s,” which funded these three books, and aimed (in the project’s own words) to “lift the fog of war” that surrounds “clandestine, irregular armed organizations that carry out illegal acts of violence against clearly defined civilian individuals or groups.”¹ Professor Uğur Ümit Üngör (University of Amsterdam), a prolific scholar with a sizable output in the area of mass violence studies, conceptualized the project as a combination of broad strokes and in-depth case studies, which were conducted by researchers Iva Vukušić (Assistant Professor in International History at Utrecht University) and Ayhan Işık (postdoctoral researcher at the International Institute of Social Studies at Erasmus University). The result is impressive—three well-integrated and illuminating studies about one of the most obscured aspects of contemporary warfare.

To be sure, these books are not entirely unprecedented. Mass violence has long captivated the attention of both academics and its executors: political police, irregular troops, specialized forces, and the like. A number of important studies already exist, from Anatomy of the SS State by Helmut Krausnick et al. (1967) to Rogelio Pardo-Mauree’s The Contras, 1980–1989: A Special Kind of Politics (1990) and Russian Security and Paramilitary Forces since 1991 by Mark Galeotti (2013). To these and other books that expand our knowledge on singular instances of institutionalization of mass violence we can now add Vukušić and Işık too, for they shed important light on the causes, manifestations, and consequences of the rise of 1990s paramilitarism in Serbia and Turkey, respectively. Üngör’s book, on the other hand, offers a successful comparative approach to this line of study, integrating a multitude of paramilitary contexts for thematic consideration.

Coming from the region they are investigating, Vukušić and Işık are well-positioned to wrestle with this delicate task. Prior to joining the faculty of Utrecht University, Vukušić was well acquainted with Yugoslav war crimes. She closely followed the trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), working for the SENSE News Agency. She also took part in the investigative work of the War Crimes Chamber in the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and was familiar with national war crimes prosecution efforts (and the lack thereof). Prior to defending his doctoral thesis at Utrecht University, Işık studied history at Istanbul Bilgi University, where he also co-authored the book The Unspoken Truth: Enforced Disappearances with the Truth Justice Memory Center. The authors’ “real life” experience, sharpened with their forensic approaches, offers reliable perspectives in a field sometimes populated by sensationalism. Both books build on an unprecedented amount of judicial evidence, extracted from numerous trials, both from the ICTY and from local courts, governmental commissions, and nongovernmental reports.

Instead of obsessing over definitions, Vukušić’s book focuses on both the structure of Serbian paramilitary groups and their wartime functions. As two defining characteristics of paramilitaries, she distinguishes their engagement in violence against civilians and their lasting, if clandestine, connection with state institutions. By investigating what paramilitaries actually do, she illuminates “complex and dynamic relationships that enabled paramilitaries to thrive,” a “paramilitary ecology” that created “diverse units which attacked civilians” (p. 5).

The first two chapters of the book deal with the emergence and function of paramilitary units within Serbian wartime efforts. Chapters 3 and 4 cover the transformation of paramilitary units and the overall role of paramilitary violence in the breakup of Yugoslavia. What follows is an excellent description of the emergence of Serbian paramilitarism and an account of their atrocious wartime record, as well as an impressive overview of its transformations and corrosive and lasting effects on postwar Serbia. Although Vukušić largely omits the phenomenon of paramilitarization on other sides of the Yugoslav conflict, her detailed account is a valuable addition to previous studies of this topic by Maria Vivod and Kate Fergusson. Vukušić builds on these studies by considering an astounding number of archival documents from international and national courts, integrating them carefully with other sources in order to avoid the traps posed by rich, albeit selective exhibits from the ICTY courtrooms. Vukušić’s final chapter graphically describes various instances of paramilitary violence. The author divides these into categories of “instrumental” and “expressive” violence, demonstrating how they unfolded differently among various paramilitary groups, including the Bijeljina and Sanski Most (Tigers), Zvornik (Yellow Wasps), and Trnovo (Scorpions). By describing the “life cycle” of these and other paramilitary units, Vukušić pinpoints impunity as the most important facilitator for their thriving.

Işık’s Turkish Paramilitarism in Northern Kurdistan handles the same topic in the same temporal framework, yet in different political circumstances. It analyzes growing paramilitarization in the context of Turkish governmental efforts to crush the armed resistance in Kurdistan. Its starting point is also a legal affair—an infamous Susurluk incident, a car crash from 1996 whose unlikely victims (a drug lord, a high-ranking police official, a beauty queen, and a parliamentarian) prompted investigation into a shadowy network between security apparatuses and organized crime. The first chapter then takes us back in time to revisit layers of paramilitarization in the Turkish twentieth century. Although recognizing the importance of deep continuities within informal, repressive state networks and institutions, Işık particularly pinpoints the mid-1980s as a turning point (chapter 2). At that time, in order to suppress Kurdish resistance, the Turkish security apparatus was thoroughly reorganized, creating a landscape resembling Vukušić’s paramilitary ecology. Actually, it grew into an entire ecosystem: “After the outburst of the conflict and the imminence of an ‘internal threat,’ the Turkish state restructured its security policies. This comprised a major shift in the design of its military forces towards irregular warfare in which paramilitary forces, such as the JİTEM and the Village Guards, were assigned an important role” (p. 19).

Işık thoroughly explains the role of these new security systems, from their clashes with guerilla forces to targeted killings, disappearances, and the forced relocation of populations in line with Prime Minister Tansu Çiller’s policy of targeting villages suspected of harboring the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militants (p. 101). He details this process in chapter 3 and indicates its disastrous consequences in chapter 4. The last chapter is dedicated to a case study, which describes a cycle of violence in the town of Cizre on the Tigris River, near Turkey’s borders with Syria and Iraq. This case, although atypical for patterns of paramilitary deployment in the 1990s, is important because of the escalation of repression there in 2015 and 2016, which included some of the same persons and similar tactics (p. 215), pointing to the lasting effect of paramilitarization.

More than adding to our factual knowledge of a very important issue, these books, when read side by side, reveal striking parallels. Both authors delve into the past to excavate the prehistory of contemporary paramilitarism in relation to the collapse of the Ottoman power structure. Yet both studies also resist exaggerating this line of causation. On the contrary, they examine specific phases and stages, emphasizing the transformation of paramilitary units in Serbia (Vukušić, p. 105) and changes in the mutable structure of Turkish paramilitarism (Işık, p. 220). The reader may draw many parallels, especially in Vukušić’s descriptions of the Serbian campaign in Kosovo (pp. 109–25), which structurally resembles the goals and techniques deployed by Turkey in the fight against the PKK uprising. It would be fascinating to explore whether these methods were borrowed from a similar playbook or were simply an outcome of similar circumstances. It must have been tempting to explore these instances of post-Cold War paramilitarization comparatively, much like Robert Gerwarth and John Horne did in War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War (2012), but the authors are careful not to transform potential analogies into distinguishable and comparable patterns.²

Üngör’s Paramilitarism, on the other hand, actively examines different paramilitaries in relation to each other. His book is a transnational comparative history of “an umbrella concept that covers a broad continuum, distinguished by levels of state involvement. At the left end of this spectrum, there are spontaneous, bottom-up initiatives such as local vigilantes, lynch mobs, and self-defence groups, and on the other end of the continuum stand the much more organized, top-down, professional paramilitary units of the state” (p. 7). Such a wide definition obliged him to look into the phenomenon of paramilitary formations around the world over a lengthy duration.

What do we actually learn from Üngör's book? First of all, it reminds us that the term “paramilitary formations” is a product of the “long twentieth century,” while also addressing its rich prehistory. The first chapter races through half a millennium of European history, portraying Rembrandt’s famous “Night Watch” as a sort of forerunner to the “selfie” of a paramilitary formation, of rowdy, masculine groups of religiously exclusive thugs ominously brandishing weapons. Üngör recalls the early modern Italian condottiere and the Ottoman janissaries, who evolved from an elite force into a paramilitary group with political influence and ambitions. Paramilitarization was even greater at the periphery of empires, encouraged by their clashes. Just as the competition of Spain, Portugal, England, and France over naval routes gave impetus to piracy, imperial competition between the Romanovs, Ottomans, and Habsburgs catalyzed the development of irregular formations, from Cossacks, Freikors, and Krdzhalis to Uskoks, Klefts, and Hajduks.

For Üngör, the disintegration of dynastic empires serves as the definitive moments of transition from prehistory to paramilitary history. Some paramilitary groups in those moments strove to function as the final bastions of imperial ambitions, like the Schwarzkorps in Germany or the Ulster Volunteers; others fought to construct national states on imperial ruins, as in the cases of Serbian and Bulgarian comitadji in the Balkan Wars. In the interwar period, the non-European dimensions of this phenomenon also become more apparent through the leaders of the Chinese military factions, the Mexican revolutionaries, and the Argentine Civil Legion. A transnational aspect of paramilitarism became even more pronounced during the Second World War, both through the strengthening of the SS parastate in the framework of the Third Reich, as well as in the activities of the paramilitary groups that fought against Nazi Germany. Paramilitary forms of organization also played a huge role during the Cold War. In the Eastern Bloc, there were numerous crossovers between armed forces and the broadest layers of society, combined with a Soviet and Chinese sponsorship of guerrilla movements around the world. In the West, intelligence and operational support for anticommunist actions flourished, and so did paramilitarization. In fact, an important “hot” aspect of the Cold War was fought throughout the Global South between these formations, from Korea and Vietnam to Central Africa and South America.

The phenomenon of paramilitaries not only survived the Cold War but became especially widespread in its aftermath, from the war in the former Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh to the genocide in Rwanda and the suppression of the Kurdish and Chechen movement. Paramilitaries reached new heights in the twenty-first century, not only in combat actions in Syria and Darfur, but also in countries like the Philippines and India in peacetime periods. Currently we are witnessing a metastasis of this process, following the rise and fall of the Russian Wagner group. This book reminds us that the phenomenon of paramilitarization is neither historically isolated nor coincidental.

Given that crimes against civilian populations and the exploitation of resources are two common characteristics of most of these examples, Üngör devotes an entire second chapter to the relationship between the state, paramilitary formations, and organized crime. He also raises an important methodological point—even though the paramilitaries are usually in close connection to the state, their activity takes place “on the other side of the law.” They seldomly appear in newspapers or leave much of a paper trail behind them. Trials are also rare, given these groups’ special connection with the very state which is supposed to prosecute them. Therefore, sources of information tend to be confiscated archival materials, confessions of defectors and repentant members, accounts of victims, and rare trials. Nevertheless, even such selective material speaks volumes about the symbiotic relationship between organized crime, banditry, and paramilitary formations. It is well known that separatist and revolutionary movements have not avoided recruiting criminals. More disturbingly, states have repeatedly opened their jails, resorting to recruiting inmates; this has been true both for the Ottomans at the beginning of the Great War and for Putin’s Russia alike. This chapter also addresses more selective arrangements, such as America’s courting of Lucky Luciano during the Second World War, partnerships between the American mafia and the government’s intelligence community in a fight against Castro, and cooperation with mujahedeen against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

What is in the root of these troubling symbioses? Clear are the benefits for criminals, who earn a certain level of legitimacy, increased access to resources, and social reputation (some gain a police badge or even become folk heroes). But it is not so obvious what drives the state to build paramilitary structures through active cooperation with the criminal factor, gambling with its Weberian monopoly over legitimate violence in the process. To explain this paradox, Üngör brings into question the classical sociological theories of the state, which presume that organized crime resides in those sections of society that the state abandoned or is not controlling. “What if that is not the case?” asks Üngör. Even in “normal” times, Üngör detects at least six models of state arrangements with various mafia structures conducive to the development of paramilitaries. Among them, wars and transitions of power stand out in particular, as such sudden changes erode societal values and blur the line between legality and legitimacy. Üngör compares such moments to an eclipse—a situation in which the constellation of heavenly bodies (state officials, organized crime, and paramilitary factors) causes a shadow in which paramilitarization gains momentum.

What incentivizes a state to allow paramilitarization? Above all is the incentive of mobilizing personnel ready to execute orders that the regular army or police might refuse. In paramilitary units a certain structure (say the secret police) or an individual (say the head of state) prepares a squad whose loyalty is personal (not institutional)—an expedient in unstable political situations, especially during war. Many means often used to achieve wartime objectives are illegal under international or national law. The more they deviate from the rules and customs of warfare, the more space emerges for unscrupulous criminal elements to thrive. Üngör illustrates this dynamic within the careers of well-known paramilitary leaders, including Anwar Congo (Indonesia), Jackie McMullan (Northern Ireland), Željko Ražnatović Arkan (Serbia), and Musa Hilal (Sudan). He describes bloody massacres committed by paramilitaries in Cizre (Turkey 1992), Trnovo (Bosnia 1995), Bahia Portete (Colombia 2004), and others. Numerous similarities between these examples indicate the deadly utility of paramilitary organizations and the scope of their activities.

According to Üngör, the key advantage for a state using paramilitary forces is avoidance of direct responsibility by obfuscating the chain of command, which allows the denial of direct involvement. Within this framework, the author draws on literature differentiating between the “dual state,” the “deep state,” the “hybrid state,” and the “parastate.” Üngör singles out several models of convergence, from the United States, Colombia, and Serbia to Turkey, Russia, and Sudan. Finally, the book points to the depth of the corrosiveness of paramilitary systems, which corrupt state systems in politically inscrutable ways and make violence a commonplace part of the political repertoire, including racketeering and the killing of political opponents.

Üngör’s final chapter details how the criminalization of an entire state and society may follow such processes. It dwells on examples in which entire regions become submerged in endless conflict (as in Libya and Syria), in which paramilitary elements overtake entire countries (as in Chechnya or Iraq), and in which paramilitaries murder those state leaders standing in their way (i.e., Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic and Turkish President Turgut Özal). The seemingly dangerous price of erasing the distinction between the criminal element and the state (i.e., between the military-police apparatus and the paramilitary) prevents most countries, whether “strong” or “weak,” from doing so. A depressing conclusion of this study is that paramilitary organization has become a global phenomenon that has not only a rich past, but also a future. The rise of the Wagner group is a case in point. A less depressing conclusion points to the instability of these systems and their propensity for in-group mutiny; for example, the Serbian Unit for Special Operations abandoned, and even arrested, their leader, Slobodan Milošević. The fall of the Wagner group is another case in point.

Due to these tensions and ambiguities, the three books reviewed here represent an excellent basis for further research. Whether through thick descriptions of singular cases or through bold comparisons, they open space for the exploration of a number of new questions. Paramilitarism is a global phenomenon, but it manifests in different ways in different historical, political, and cultural contexts. Why does a paramilitary organization flourish in some contexts while in others it is barely conceivable? Why are some systems less resilient to this phenomenon than others? Should answers be sought in external or internal factors, political culture, customs and traditions, or particular circumstances and personalities? Most pressingly, what can be done to confront these trends?

The books under review demonstrate that such research is not only badly needed but also methodologically possible, if somewhat unusual as a topic of scholarly inquiry. Under normal circumstances, such research belongs to the realm of police work. As impunity is at the heart of the phenomenon of state-sponsored violence, however, scholars of paramilitarism are forced into a position of para-policing. Without coercive powers, security protocols, or ethical codes, this is tricky indeed, but not impossible. The very existence of these studies demonstrates that the goal of paramilitarism—plausible deniability—remains only partially achievable. Though secretive in their covert methods, paramilitaries leave devastating traces that can be followed despite obstructions. Vukušić, Işık, and Üngör certainly lift some of the heavy fog of war under which horrific crimes are routinely committed in contemporary conflicts, making implausible the “plausible deniability” of their perpetrators.

Footnotes