Assessing legitimacy of informal intergovernmental organizations in the context of changing multilateralism

Abstract

This article seeks to contribute to the literature by investigating the legitimacy of informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) based on the six identified criteria and by understanding the impact of 94 active IIGOs on diverse issue areas within the realm of multilateralism. It introduces an innovative framework grounded in six specified legitimacy criteria derived from six hypotheses: 1) IIGOs' selected policy areas (economic, political, security or social affairs); 2) bureaucratic structure; 3) economic development level of member states; 4) geographical distribution of members between the global North and the global South; 5) pursuance of proactive diplomacy within formal intergovernmental organizations; and 6) the capacity of IIGOs for norm creation and diffusion. In our study, we aim to uncover the extent to which IIGOs exhibit high, moderate or low levels of legitimacy based on the six legitimacy criteria. Contrary to the prevailing belief that IIGOs, owing to their informal and flexible nature, do not require strong bureaucracies, our research unveils that more than 40 per cent of the IIGOs assessed exhibit a high level of institutionalization. Our research reveals that the robust bureaucratic structures of IIGOs positively influence their legitimacy scores, and that the overall legitimacy of an IIGO necessitates a high level of both sociological legitimacy and normative legitimacy.

As global affairs expand in scope and intricacy, incorporating new actors, issues and domains, scholarly attention has shifted beyond the confines of the state to encompass a variety of entities. Among these, international institutions stand out prominently. In the twenty-first century informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs), distinguished by their absence of a permanent secretariat and founding treaty, have emerged as consequential instruments for advancing multilateralism. The escalating influence of ‘rising powers’ on the global stage, coupled with the establishment of IIGOs such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)¹ and MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia), in 2006 and 2013 respectively, has underscored the heightened significance of IIGOs. The global financial crisis that began in 2008 heightened the visibility of IIGOs while enabling rising powers to assert their points of view against established powers within formal intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs) in a global governance context.² IIGOs, by furnishing a cooperative platform, facilitated the addressing of global challenges without disrupting the existing governance framework.

IIGOs are characterized by their adaptable structure, cost-effectiveness and expeditious decision-making processes, all of which render them appealing to states seeking to safeguard their sovereignty, exert stringent control over information, diminish bureaucracy and transaction costs, and navigate uncertainties during crises.³ Consequently, both developed and developing nations have increasingly turned to IIGOs to devise responses to emerging challenges within the realm of global governance. Despite significant advancements in the study of IIGOs and FIGOs in recent years, there remains considerable unexplored terrain in this field. While considerable attention has been devoted to these organizations' roles in international politics, there has been relatively limited examination of them as independent entities with distinctive autonomy.⁴ Although numerous studies have delved into understanding these organizations and the factors influencing states' preferences for one type of institution over another, a continued exploration of this topic is crucial for a more comprehensive grasp of IIGOs' position in international relations and their impact on global governance. It is imperative to evaluate these organizations on the basis of their practical functioning, rather than merely conceptualizing them within a broader theoretical framework. The majority of studies on IIGOs have been shaped by rationalist institutionalism, concentrating on efficiency and self-interest.⁵ These studies, primarily grounded in a statist perspective, are insufficient for elucidating the ascent of IIGOs and their influence across multiple sectors of multilateralism. Indeed, existing literature tends to intimately associate IIGOs with states, overlooking the agencies of IIGOs and their capacity to engender legitimacy, social norms and identity in the arena of global governance. This gap forms the basis of our investigation, aiming to assess the level of legitimacy exhibited by IIGOs that participate actively in global governance.

This study acknowledges the perspectives of Barnett and Finnemore on international organizations (IOs), asserting that IOs are not merely passive entities shaped by their external environment but are active agents capable of shaping the social world through norm production.⁶ According to Barnett and Finnemore, IOs evolve into structures influenced not only by efficiency and self-interest but also by considerations of legitimacy, encompassing institutional culture and norms. While realist and neo-liberal debates surrounding IOs predominantly centre on their material and informational power, the true influence of IOs lies in their capacity to guide actions and mould social reality.

Given this background, the primary objective of this study is to address a gap in the existing literature by scrutinizing the legitimacy of IIGOs and by challenging conventional perspectives on IIGOs, which have been predominantly constrained by a realist and neo-liberal institutionalist focus. In addition, it aims to provide a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding of these organizations as active participants in global governance. This article endeavours to investigate the factors, distinguishing features and policy areas that influence how IIGOs with different levels of bureaucratic structures can establish legitimacy. The study proposes an innovative framework grounded in six specified legitimacy criteria (hereafter LC), derived from our six hypotheses: 1) selected policy areas (economic, political, security or social affairs); 2) bureaucratic structure; 3) economic development level of members (developed or developing); 4) geographical distribution of members between the global North and the global South; 5) pursuance of proactive diplomacy within FIGOs; and 6) the norm creation and diffusion capacity of IIGOs. By testing our six hypotheses, we aim to explore the factors under which these IIGOs manifest high, moderate or low levels of legitimacy across the six LC. In essence, this article seeks to contribute to the literature by investigating the legitimacy of IIGOs based on the identified six criteria and by understanding the impact of 94 active IIGOs on diverse issue areas within the realm of multilateralism.

How can we best understand the legitimacy of IIGOs?

The legitimacy of IOs plays a crucial role in shaping their activities, influencing their performance and determining their efficiency in the realm of global politics. According to Bernstein, political legitimacy for an organization is the right to make decisions that bind its members and influence political governance.⁷ Within this context, legitimacy emerges as a pivotal component of an IO's power. Existing literature often examines IOs through the lens of ‘normative legitimization’. Buchanan and Keohane, for instance, characterize a legitimate institution as one that is morally acclaimed and is justified to rule and govern actors by exercising legal authority.⁸ This definition is particularly applicable to entities such as the United Nations, the European Union and other FIGOs. However, it becomes evident that the bureaucratic power and membership composition of IIGOs are closely intertwined with their sociological legitimacy, rooted in the concept of ‘sociological legitimization’. Sociological legitimization refers to an institution's efforts to establish a system of authority and prestige that fosters compliance.⁹ Once an IIGO attains sociological legitimacy, it can progress towards becoming a normatively legitimate organization. As illustrated in figure 1, a two-step legitimation process comprising sociological and normative legitimation elucidates how an IIGO attains legitimacy over time.

Illustrating the legitimization process, the Budapest Process, an international platform fostering dialogue on migration issues, provides a good example. This entity has achieved a noteworthy level of sociological and normative legitimacy, rooted in its robust bureaucratization and diverse membership profile. Notably, the Budapest Process includes members from both advanced and developing economies, spanning the global South and North. Having attained a high level of sociological legitimization, the Budapest Process has transitioned to normative action by using migration as a foundation to establish norms and actively engage with other FIGOs. The accomplishments in this realm exemplify that successful legitimate authority in both sociological and normative terms contributes to heightened legitimacy. It's essential to note that this trajectory may not be universally applicable to other IIGOs, such as the Salzburg Forum and East Asian Summit, which exhibit a preference for a less normative role in global governance. The Salzburg Forum confines itself to representing the interests of a select group of EU member states, while the East Asian Summit remains primarily a regional dialogue platform. Similarly, the Climate Vulnerable Forum, formed by developing economies and global South states combating climate change, aspires to distribute climate change mitigation aid to its members.¹⁰ Recognizing the necessity of high legitimacy to affect global governance, it has established a robust bureaucracy, actively engaged with other FIGOs and sought to create norms in its core issue areas.

According to Tallberg and Zürn, legitimacy denotes the acknowledgement of an IO's authority by its member states.¹¹ In this context, bureaucracy emerges as a crucial facet of an IO's legitimacy, symbolizing the commitment of member states to the institution. Similar to FIGOs, legitimacy holds significance for IIGOs. For instance, the presence of a website serves as an indicator of an IIGO's bureaucratic power. Hurrelmann, Schneider and Steffek support this proposition by emphasizing the role of websites for IIGOs in disseminating their message to garner support and to foster interaction on a global scale.¹² The Budapest Process stands as an illustrative example, actively using its website for recognition and norm diffusion by providing timely information on how it addresses migration and mobility-related issues.¹³ Vabulas and Snidal contend that some IIGOs may become more formalized through increased bureaucracy when necessary, while others may dissolve over time. An example of an IIGO that transformed into a FIGO is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which later became the World Trade Organization (WTO). Another example is the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, which was later incorporated into the International Atomic Energy Agency. Although IIGOs can evolve into FIGOs or dissolve in the long run, this is not necessarily the case, as some IIGOs are established for their flexible nature and to support multilateralism.¹⁴ While bureaucracy can enhance the legitimacy of these IIGOs, some organizations, like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (known informally as the Quad—a grouping of Australia, India, Japan and the United States) may have weaker bureaucratic structures but still contribute to multilateralism through other significant factors such as norm creation and relationships with other FIGOs.

Scholars such as Brassett and Tsingou emphasize additional factors influencing the legitimacy of IOs, such as transparency.¹⁵ This factor holds particular significance for some IIGOs, such as the Climate Vulnerable Forum, which strives to establish a much more robust bureaucracy compared to other IIGOs, to adhere to transparency standards. Another aspect pertinent to IO legitimacy pertains to the democratic deficit and the geographical distribution of the organization's member states. Since the inception in 2000 of the UN's Millennium Development Goals, IOs have focused on fostering connections between aid donor governments, recipients, civil society, academic communities and the private sector.¹⁶ Recent examples of IIGOs also align with this trend of bridging developing and advanced economies. Tallberg and Zürn stress that a participatory narrative is a crucial component of organizational legitimacy, highlighting the importance of the participation and commitment of states directly affected by an International Organization's decisions in empowering institutions.¹⁷ Our research underscores that organizations incorporating both advanced and developing economies, as well as members from the global South and global North, attain higher legitimacy. This connection between inclusion and legitimacy aligns with the realities of global problems, emphasizing the need for global solutions and dialogue. For instance, the Human Security Network aims to bridge advanced and developing economies and global North and South countries to establish a shared framework for human security and to prevent or resolve conflicts.¹⁸ The loose structure of IIGOs allows non-aligned developing economies or other neutral states to join or collaborate with other IOs.

Mattheis and Wunderlich assert that an IO's collaboration with another IO possessing high legitimacy contributes to the legitimacy of both entities, with a more pronounced impact on the less legitimate one.¹⁹ This viewpoint aligns with our argument that the legitimacy of an IIGO may experience enhancement through active engagement with FIGOs. Similarly, Keohane underscores the strong connection between an IIGO's legitimacy, its comparative advantage and its collaboration with other organizations or states.²⁰ One of the objectives of this article is to explore the extent to which the legitimacy of an IIGO depends on its active involvement with FIGOs. For example, the G5 Sahel and the Climate Vulnerable Forum are economically supported by the EU, while Forest Europe receives political support from the bloc. The fifth legitimacy criterion of this study's framework, proactive diplomacy within FIGOs, also evaluates the social and economic relations between IIGOs and FIGOs. For instance, the Montreux Document Forum, established to provide a normative contribution for regulating private military and security companies, successfully forged robust relations with other states and FIGOs such as the EU, NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. This exemplifies our hypothesis regarding the cooperation between IIGOs and FIGOs. In line with our argument, Vabulas and Snidal emphasize that IIGOs tend to collaborate or interact with other FIGOs to foster political cooperation and secure concessions for their members.²¹

According to Bexell, the substantive legitimacy of IOs holds significance in upholding the rule-based international order.²² Correspondingly, one of the hypotheses in our study suggests that states, in their pursuit of creating and disseminating norms, are inclined to convene under informal groupings. Vabulas and Snidal elucidate this phenomenon through the concept of ‘rational functionality’, particularly in the context of security-related issues compelling states to engage in informal groupings.²³ Rossiter and Cannon underscore that IIGOs contribute an innovative quality and institutional flexibility to the existing global order.²⁴ Consequently, we have adopted a nuanced approach to the legitimacy of IIGOs, recognizing norm creation and diffusion as a constitutive factor of their legitimacy.

In summary, the legitimacy of IIGOs yields numerous hypotheses concerning these highly diversified actors within the international order. Legitimacy emerges as a crucial component influencing the efficacy of an IIGO within the evolving liberal international order. However, as highlighted by Vabulas and Snidal, IIGOs may exhibit less legitimacy compared to FIGOs. This could be attributed to the inclination of IIGO members to maintain a lower level of autonomy and the absence of enforcement mechanisms, despite their advantages in terms of flexibility, speed and ambiguity.²⁵ Consequently, the legitimacy of IIGOs can be argued to be intricately linked to the commitment of their members to the institution and to the urgency and significance of their issue areas in safeguarding regional and global interests.

Methodology: introducing our legitimacy index for IIGOs (LI-IGOs)

The research employs a mixed-method approach, integrating qualitative and quantitative analyses to empirically assess the legitimacy of IIGOs. The qualitative component involves an in-depth examination of official documents sourced from online repositories of IIGOs. These documents include summit declarations, websites, thematic reports, statements, official declarations, joint statements by foreign ministers and press releases. Such qualitative sources provide valuable insights into the IIGOs' involvement across various issue areas in multilateralism, as well as into their approaches to global governance that transcend institutions, geographical locations and policy domains. During the qualitative analysis phase, the research seeks to comprehend the institutional behaviours, normative stances and social actorness of IIGOs. Additionally, it leverages secondary sources such as articles, books, policy briefs, reports and newspapers to complement the qualitative analysis and enhance the depth of understanding.

The quantitative phase of this research endeavours to construct a novel index for evaluating the legitimacy of IIGOs and their contributions to the multilateral order. This index aims to capture variations across policy sectors, institutions and geographical regions, as well as diversity of degree. The study focuses on 94 IIGOs identified as ‘continuing pure’ IIGOs in Vabulas and Snidal's IIGOs 2.0 dataset.²⁶ The legitimacy index exclusively covers the 94 IIGOs active (at the time of writing in 2024) in the international system that lack legalization through a treaty, possess no secretariat and have not been succeeded or replaced. This index evaluates each IIGO based on five of our listed six LC or factors, assigning individual scores to each and an overall score representing the cumulative assessment of these five factors. The 94 IIGOs are further categorized into four policy areas: economics, political, security and social affairs. For each criterion, scores ranging from 1 to 3 are assigned, with 1 denoting the lowest score and 3 indicating the highest. The cumulative score for an IIGO is computed by summing the scores for each of the five legitimacy factors, namely: bureaucratic structure; the economic development level of its members (developed or developing); the geographical distribution of members between the global North and the global South; proactive diplomacy within FIGOs; and norm creation and diffusion capacity. IIGOs achieving a score between 13 and 15 points are classified as highly legitimate, while those scoring between 9 and 13 fall within the category of moderately legitimate IIGOs. Within the moderately legitimate category, there are two subcategories: upper and lower. IIGOs with low legitimacy receive scores ranging between 0 and 8.

As illustrated in table 3 (see below, under ‘Findings’), the assessment of each IIGO's performance with regard to its legitimacy criteria is conducted individually. In this study, the initial step involves classifying IIGOs based on their areas of focus. All 94 IIGOs are categorized according to whether they are engaged in economic, political, social affairs and/or security affairs. This classification maps to the first legitimacy criterion in our framework, and serves as a foundational step to explore whether the specific issue areas addressed by these IIGOs exert any direct impact on their legitimacy.

The second of our LC, which assesses the bureaucratic capacity of IIGOs, involves an examination of whether these organizations possess secretariats, chairmanship, official documents or websites. For instance, IIGOs such as the Budapest Process and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, which have a chairmanship or secretariat along with websites and documents, are assigned a score of 3 for this factor, indicating IIGOs with a ‘strong bureaucracy’. Organizations possessing at least one of these bureaucratic features, like the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate and the Petersberg Climate Dialogue, are awarded a score of 2 and categorized as IIGOs with ‘average bureaucracy’. Lastly, IIGOs such as the Club de Berne and the Craiova Group (Craiova Four), which lack all these bureaucratic features, receive a score of 1 and are classified as IIGOs with ‘low bureaucracy’.

Abbott and Snidal defined the concept of soft law as political arrangements without legalization.²⁷ IIGOs are grounded upon soft law. Vabulas and Snidal distinguished between FIGOs and IIGOs by analysing their degree and type of bureaucracy and differences in their legal basis, such as whether they have a founding treaty. Some IIGOs have regular meetings, secretariats and a sherpa system.²⁸ However, compared to FIGOs, IIGO bureaucracies are much more flexible. They are neither permanent nor independent from their member states. Some IIGOs employ mechanisms such as official documents, member state assessments, declarations (joint statements, communiqués, websites, summit declarations, acts, guiding principles, charters, frameworks, goals, plans of action, programmes and resolutions), summit reports and memorandums of understanding, which contribute to their bureaucratic capacity.²⁹ In contrast, FIGOs have legally structured and established bureaucracies grounded upon a formal founding treaty.

Our third criterion assesses the level of economic development of the member states within IIGOs. We use the IMF's World Economic Outlook database, which classifies individual states as either ‘advanced economies’ or ‘developing economies’.³⁰ We assigned a score of 1 point to IIGOs if all their member states are developing economies. IIGOs such as the Group of 77 and China (G77) and the Africa–South America Summit, which are both solely comprised of developing economies, were categorized as such. IIGOs were assigned 2 points if they include states with both advanced and developing economies. For instance, the members of IIGOs like the Petersberg Climate Dialogue and the South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) Research and Training Centre are a mix of advanced and developing economies. Lastly, IIGOs with exclusively advanced economy members were given 3 points. Examples include the Nordic–Baltic Eight and the Club de Berne.

The fourth criterion in our framework examines whether the 94 IIGOs have members from the global South, global North or both.³¹ We relied on Worldometer's dataset to determine whether a state falls within the global South or global North categories. Worldometer classifies states based on their membership in the G77.³² IIGOs with membership exclusively in the global South were assigned a score of 1. Examples include the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel)³³ and the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZPCAS). IIGOs with members from both the global North and South received 2 points: organizations like the Central Mediterranean Contact Group and the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia represent such hybrid entities. Lastly, IIGOs that exclusively have members from the global North were assigned 3 points: entities falling into this category include the Executives' Meeting of East Asia–Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) and Forest Europe.

The fifth criterion evaluated the engagement of these 94 IIGOs within FIGOs such as the EU, the UN and the WTO. We assessed whether the IIGOs actively participate³⁴ in these organizations. IIGOs with substantial engagement with FIGOs received 3 points. For instance, the Petersberg Climate Dialogue plays an active role in the UN's planning of climate summits, and the Budapest Process has the EU as its observer. IIGOs with limited interactions with FIGOs were assigned 2 points. Examples include the Nordic–Baltic Eight and the Austerlitz Format, which have interactions within the EU but are more passive.³⁵ Lastly, IIGOs without interactions with FIGOs received 1 point. Organizations like EMEAP and the Nordic Defence Cooperation fall into this category, having no interactions with FIGOs.

The sixth and final criterion examined whether these IIGOs have goals aimed at shaping world politics through norm creation and diffusion. While all IIGOs strive to enhance processes (e.g. nuclear safety) and address issues (conflict, migration, etc.), those with narrower fields of work and a regional focus typically have a lesser impact on norm creation. We assigned 3 points to IIGOs actively involved in norm diffusion. Organizations like the Budapest Process and the Quad have worked diligently on creating efficient norms—on migration or on ensuring an open Indo-Pacific region, respectively—thereby succeeding in norm diffusion. IIGOs that create norms but do not actively diffuse them received 2 points. For instance, the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic aimed to declare the South Atlantic Ocean as a ‘nuclear-free zone’ but struggled to diffuse norms related to this initiative. Similarly, the North American Leaders' Summit endeavoured to create a norm for regulating migration and countering crimes, but faced challenges in diffusing it to other actors in global governance. Finally, IIGOs that did not engage in norm creation received 1 point. Here, partnerships like the Salzburg Forum focus on forming a single interest group to influence EU politics rather than creating global norms. Similarly, EMEAP concentrates on establishing a dialogue channel for Asian central banks to exchange information, rather than formulating solid norms.

Over the last five decades, the number of actors in global politics has significantly expanded. Former WTO director-general Pascal Lamy highlighted a shift from multilateralism to polylateralism, where non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also act, cooperate and critique traditional state-dominated multilateralism.³⁶ IIGOs, along with FIGOs and sovereign states, cooperate closely with non-state actors to enhance their legitimacy and influence in norm creation and diffusion. Our research also analysed IIGOs' cooperation with NGOs in the norm-making and dissemination process. For instance, the Budapest Process organizes multistakeholder platforms and technical seminars for migration governance.³⁷ Similarly, the Mekong–Ganga Cooperation organization facilitates various dialogues among companies, NGOs, universities and media organizations of its members.³⁸ Although the level of involvement remains limited, IIGOs help states engage and co-opt NGOs to participate more in informal governance.

In the final phase, the study categorizes IIGOs into four distinct legitimacy groups. Points are balanced across these categories: IIGOs with 5 to 8 points (inclusive) are classified as having low legitimacy; those with 9 to 12 points (inclusive) fall under the moderate legitimacy category; and those with more than 13 points are considered to be highly legitimate. To provide a more nuanced view within the moderate legitimacy category, it is further divided into upper-moderate and lower-moderate legitimacy organizations. Within each of these bands, IIGOs share similar characteristics and attributes.

This project is structured around six main hypotheses (H1–H6), which complement each other and which form the basis of our six legitimacy criteria:

• H1: IIGOs whose activities primarily focus on security and economics-related issue areas have more legitimacy than those acting in politics and social affairs.

• H2: The weakness of an IIGO's institutional structure (the absence of rational authority, i.e. of bureaucracy) does not adversely affect IIGOs' legitimacy and effectiveness.

• H3: IIGOs with a mixed membership profile, composed of both developed (advanced) and developing countries, have more legitimacy than those with a majority of either developed or developing countries.

• H4: IIGOs in which the majority of members are located in the global North are more legitimate than IIGOs located in the global South.

• H5: IIGOs with strong bureaucracy that pursue more active and effective diplomacy within FIGOs are more legitimate in global governance.

• H6: When IIGOs act as social actors in global governance and can create and circulate norms, they are more legitimate and effective.

Findings

In our analysis of IIGOs, we employed a multidimensional approach to assess their legitimacy across various parameters. Our research methodology for assessing the legitimacy of IIGOs involved a comprehensive approach drawing from various sources. First, we extensively reviewed the official websites of the IIGOs to gather information on their structures, objectives, activities and membership criteria. We then consulted briefs and reports published by member country foreign ministries, providing insights into internal dynamics and perspectives. Additionally, we monitored news coverage and media reports for real-time information on developments and reactions within the organizations. Furthermore, we analysed published documents such as joint declarations and official publications to understand the priorities, policies and norms promoted by the IIGOs. By integrating information from these diverse sources, including organization websites, member country briefs, news articles and published documents, our research methodology ensured a comprehensive and nuanced assessment of IIGOs' legitimacy, contributing to a deeper understanding of their role in the international arena.

We evaluated each organization based on factors such as the presence of a dedicated website, the existence of an active chairmanship, the production of annual documents, the composition of their membership in terms of development and geographical distribution, the roles they play within the broader international community, and the promotion of specific norms or values. By employing a comprehensive approach, we aimed to provide a nuanced understanding of each organization's degree of legitimacy and its contribution to global governance. Table 2 below provides examples of how we graded several organizations mentioned in this article. It is important to note that while we provide examples of our grading process for several organizations here, the full codebook detailing our assessment criteria and methodology is available on our project website,³⁹ as the constraints of a word limit prevent us from including every detail within this article.

The study centred on 94 ‘continuing pure’ IIGOs, as outlined by Vabulas and Snidal.⁴⁰ 17 of the 94 IIGOs we researched gained between 13 and 15 points and are deemed highly legitimate, constituting 18% of the total. Notably, more than half of the IIGOs in our list, evaluated against the six LC and scoring between 9 and 12 points, fall within the moderately legitimate category (55 out of 94, or 58.5% of the total number of IIGOs). Given this prevalence of moderate legitimacy, we further differentiated them into two subcategories: upper-moderate and lower-moderate. Consequently, 28 IIGOs (29.8% of the total) obtained upper-moderate status, while 27 IIGOs, scoring between 9–10, were classified as lower-moderate (28.7% of the total). 22 out of the 94 IIGOs, with scores ranging between 5 and 8 points, were categorized as being of low legitimacy, representing 23.4%. Examining the distribution of IIGOs across the four issue areas, 33% of IIGOs actively participate in the security field, followed by economics, political, and social affairs.

How can our LI-IGOs be understood and analysed? By way of an illustration, the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GPWMD) possesses a dedicated website, uses a sherpa system (as described above) and disseminates various published documents. In this context, it received a rating of 3 points in the bureaucracy category. Owing to its inclusive membership, encompassing both advanced and developing economies, as well as representation from the global North and global South, the organization garnered a score of 2 points in terms of the geographical distribution of its members. Furthermore, the active engagement of GPWMD with FIGOs such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, the World Customs Organization and the World Health Organization prompted a rating of 3 points in this category. Importantly, the GPWMD is committed to formulating and disseminating norms related to the security and disposal of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials and agents, with a specific focus on fortifying UN Security Council Resolution 1540 against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.⁴¹

The six LC within our framework should be interpreted in conjunction with the corresponding six hypotheses. Each hypothesis was subjected to testing against one or more criteria. Upon comparing our study's findings with our hypotheses, it became evident that some hypotheses were affirmed and some were only partially validated, while others were not supported.

Discussion

The research revealed that among the 94 examined IIGOs, 43 achieved the highest rating of 3 points for bureaucratic structure, indicating a higher level of institutionalization with features like chairmanship, shared documents and an official website, constituting 44.7% of the total. Additionally, 35 IIGOs (37.2%) received 2 points in this category for showing compliance with some organizational criteria. 17 IIGOs (18.1%) scored only 1 point, indicating a lack of initiative in establishing bureaucracy. A clear trend emerged linking bureaucratization with legitimacy: 39.5% of IIGOs with robust bureaucracy (17 of 43 IIGOs) demonstrated high legitimacy and a further 37.21% (16 of 43) are upper-moderate, while 16.3% (7 of 43) showed lower-moderate and 7% (3 of 43) are low legitimacy. In contrast, IIGOs with a moderate degree of bureaucratization showed lower legitimacy, with only 2.9% (1 of 35) achieving high legitimacy, 34.3% (12 of 35) upper-moderate, 37.1% (13 of 35) lower-moderate and 25.7% (9 of 35) low legitimacy. Notably, those with weak bureaucratization had no instances of high legitimacy, 41.1% lower-moderate and 58.8% low legitimacy. These findings support the hypothesis that robust bureaucracy correlates with heightened institutionalization. Additionally, 77 (81.9%) of the 94 IIGOs undertook measures to establish at least one bureaucratic feature.

In contrast, insights gleaned from our table 3 indicate that the developmental status of member states exerts minimal influence on the bureaucratization process within IIGOs. Notably, IIGOs consisting exclusively of either advanced or developing economies did not demonstrate the establishment of a comprehensive and stable bureaucracy.⁴² In contrast, IIGOs with a heterogeneous composition of members from both advanced and developing economies exhibited a propensity for stronger bureaucratic structures. Similarly, the inclusion of members from both the global North and global South did not distinctly affect the robustness of an IIGO's bureaucracy. Contrary to the conventional understanding that bureaucracy aligns with the autonomy, independence and power of an IO,⁴³ this assumption does not consistently hold true for IIGOs. Vabulas and Snidal highlight that states predominantly leverage IIGOs to circumvent the allocation of substantial resources to a permanent bureaucracy.⁴⁴ This underscores the nuanced nature of bureaucratization within the context of IIGOs.

Moreover, the potency of an IIGO's bureaucracy exhibits a close correlation with its involvement in FIGOs. Among the 42 IIGOs characterized by a robust bureaucracy, 26 actively engage with FIGOs (62%), nine maintain a passive interaction (21.4%) and only seven demonstrate no interaction with FIGOs. In contrast, among the 17 IIGOs devoid of bureaucracy, eleven (64.7%) also lack any interaction with FIGOs. Within this subset, only four engage passively with FIGOs (23.5%) and a mere 2 IIGOs (11.8%) actively interact with FIGOs. Notably, while a robust bureaucracy corresponds to increased interactions with FIGOs, this does not necessarily translate into a more robust norm-making process.

Regarding the level of development of member states, among the 94 IIGOs, eight exclusively include members from advanced economies, constituting 8.5% of all organizations. Notably, only one of these IIGOs achieves high legitimacy, while four fall within the upper-moderate category. A significant majority, of 69 IIGOs, scored 2 points, indicating a mix of advanced and developing economies (73.4%). Within this category, 16 hybrid IIGOs achieve high legitimacy, 22 secure upper-moderate legitimacy, 19 obtain lower-moderate legitimacy, and twelve register as low-legitimacy IIGOs. Additionally, 17 IIGOs receive 1 point, denoting an exclusive membership of developing economies. None of these attain high legitimacy. Interestingly, the inclusion of advanced economy members does not guarantee high legitimacy; only the Salzburg Forum comprises solely advanced economy members among highly legitimate organizations. Conversely, most highly legitimate IIGOs are hybrids, enhancing overall legitimacy. For example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus, representing both global North and South states, attains ‘highly legitimate’ status. This underscores the contribution of hybrid organization structures to enhanced legitimacy.

Upon examining the ‘global North and global South’ criterion, among the 94 IIGOs in this study, 23 attained the maximum score of 3 points, constituting 24.5% of the total. These IIGOs consist exclusively of members from the global North. 54 IIGOs (57.4%) secured 2 points, reflecting a mix of global North and global South states. This highlights a preference for closer cooperation between global North and South states to address global challenges within IIGOs. 17 IIGOs (18.1% of the total) received 1 point, indicating exclusive membership from the global South. Interestingly, among the 23 IIGOs solely composed of global North states, six (26.1%) are highly legitimate, five (21.7%) are of upper-moderate legitimacy, ten (43.5%) are of lower-moderate legitimacy, and two (8.7%) are low-legitimacy organizations. This shows that exclusive membership from the global North is no guarantee in itself of higher legitimacy. Conversely, among the 54 IIGOs with hybrid global North/global South membership, eleven (20.4%) are highly legitimate, 22 (40.7%) are of upper-moderate legitimacy, eleven (20.4%) are of lower-moderate legitimacy, and ten (18.5%) are low-legitimacy organizations. Notably, therefore, 61% of hybrid organizations demonstrate high or upper-moderate legitimacy. Moreover, 94% (16 of 17 in total) of IIGOs exclusively comprising global South members either have lower-moderate or low legitimacy, underscoring the nuanced relationship between member composition and legitimacy levels.⁴⁵

An additional factor that we evaluated is the engagement of these IIGOs with FIGOs. Our analysis revealed that 40 out of the 94 IIGOs in our sample (42.6%) were awarded 3 points on this criterion, which classified them as ‘actively interacting with FIGOs’. Illustratively, the Budapest Process includes the EU and UN High Commission for Refugees as observer members.⁴⁶ Another example of such positive interaction is the Visegrad Group, which actively collaborates within the EU to enhance the effectiveness of the bloc's relationship with four Central European countries.⁴⁷ 23 IIGOs (24.5%) were awarded 2 points on this measure, classing them as ‘passively interacting with FIGOs’. Our findings thus underscore that, in total, 67% of all IIGOs either actively or passively engage with FIGOs. Lastly, 31 out of 94 IIGOs in the study (33%) exhibit neither active nor passive interactions with FIGOs and receive a score of 1 point. For instance, the Asian Cooperation Dialogue and SEACEN focus on a region lacking powerful FIGOs or concentrate on a single issue, thereby lacking interactions with FIGOs. Among the 40 IIGOs actively interacting with FIGOs, 17 are highly legitimate (42.5%), 16 show upper-moderate legitimacy (40%), six show lower-moderate legitimacy (15%), and only one is of low legitimacy (2.5%). This suggests that at least 80% of IIGOs actively engaging with FIGOs demonstrate higher degrees of legitimacy. In contrast, among the 23 IIGOs passively interacting with FIGOs, none achieve high legitimacy, ten have upper-moderate legitimacy (43.5%), seven lower-moderate legitimacy (30.4%), and six low legitimacy (26.1%). Lastly, among the 31 IIGOs with no interactions with FIGOs, none attain high legitimacy, and two (6.5%) have upper-moderate legitimacy, while 14 (45.2%) have lower-moderate legitimacy and 15 (48.4%) are low-legitimacy IIGOs. These findings affirm that more than 90% of IIGOs lacking interactions with FIGOs tend to exhibit lower degrees of legitimacy. In essence, the evidence substantiates that active engagement with FIGOs significantly contributes to the legitimacy of an IIGO.

Out of the 94 IIGOs, 29 (30.9% of the total) received 3 points for norm creation and diffusion. Among these, twelve achieved high legitimacy (41.4%), 14 (48.2%) upper-moderate legitimacy and three (10.3%) showed lower-moderate legitimacy. Notable examples include the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee, both of which oversee the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with high legitimacy. Additionally, 34 IIGOs (36.2%) scored 2 points, while 31 organizations (33%) did not contribute to norm creation. Among those IIGOs not engaged in norm creation, just one (3.2%) attained high legitimacy, while four (12.9%) achieved upper-moderate legitimacy, and 13 (41.9%) had lower-moderate legitimacy. These findings suggest that even IIGOs weak in creating norms may exhibit high legitimacy. However, overall, 79% of continuing IIGOs actively engaged in norm creation achieved high legitimacy—a significantly higher proportion than those not involved.

Among the 94 scrutinized IIGOs, 30 focused on security (31.9%), 26 on political issues (27.7%), 21 on economics (22.3%), and 17 on social affairs (18.1%). Among security-related organizations, eight were highly legitimate (26.7%), nine had upper-moderate legitimacy (30%), eight had lower-moderate legitimacy (26.7%), and five had low legitimacy (16.7%). In contrast, only two political IIGOs had high legitimacy (7.7%), against seven with upper-moderate legitimacy (26.9%), ten with lower-moderate legitimacy (38.5%), and seven with low legitimacy (26.9%). Economic IIGOs showed a more balanced distribution: three with high legitimacy (14.3%), seven with upper-moderate legitimacy (33.3%), five with lower-moderate legitimacy (23.8%), and six with low legitimacy (28.6%). Lastly, among social affairs IIGOs, four had high legitimacy (23.5%), five had upper-moderate legitimacy (29.4%), four had lower-moderate legitimacy (23.5%) and four had low legitimacy (23.5%).

Conclusion

Our research findings indicate that nearly 60% of the 94 ‘continuing pure’ IIGOs evaluated in our index have a moderate level of legitimacy, 18% are deemed highly legitimate and 23.4% exhibit low legitimacy. This study underscores that almost 80% of IIGOs demonstrate robust legitimacy in the primary issue areas of global governance. Such results signify a clear indication of the growing significance of IIGOs as pivotal actors necessitating adaptation within the evolving international system. Contrary to the prevailing belief that IIGOs, owing to their informal and flexible nature, do not require strong bureaucracies, our research unveils that almost half of the IIGOs assessed exhibit a high level of institutionalization. Additionally, it highlights that the robust bureaucratic structures of IIGOs positively influence their legitimacy scores. Moreover, our research affirms that IIGOs engage in sociological legitimization by fostering a shared understanding among their members regarding global challenges and by securing their commitment to institutional agency and authority. As suggested by this study, the strength of bureaucracy is intimately linked to IIGOs' activism within FIGOs. Among the 42 IIGOs characterized by a strong bureaucracy, 26 actively pursue diplomacy with FIGOs (62%), nine passively interact with FIGOs (21.4%) and only seven have no links with FIGOs. In contrast, among the 17 IIGOs without bureaucracy, eleven (64.7%) are not actively engaged within FIGOs. These outcomes collectively emphasize that bureaucratic strength empowers IIGOs.

The dataset we have compiled reveals a notable trend, with 73.4% of all IIGOs featuring a composition that includes members from both advanced and developing economies. This research affirms that IIGOs composed solely of developing economies tend to have lower legitimacy, with 94% of such organizations falling into the lower-moderate legitimacy or low legitimacy categories. A parallel observation is made for IIGOs predominantly composed of advanced economies. Specifically, our research demonstrates that 61% of hybrid organizations, characterized by a mix of members from both advanced and developing economies, exhibit high or upper-moderate legitimacy. This underscores the nuanced relationship between the composition of IIGO members and the resultant levels of legitimacy.

As emphasized by Keohane, IOs aspire to confer comparative benefits upon their members and enhance their own legitimacy.⁴⁸ In line with this objective, international IIGOs engage in collaboration with other states and FIGOs. A substantial 42.6% of the IIGOs in our index actively cooperate with FIGOs such as the UN, the EU and others. Our findings further reveal that 67% of all IIGOs either actively or passively interact with FIGOs. Notably, IIGOs that exhibit sociological legitimacy are more inclined to progress towards normative legitimization. Our index demonstrates that collaboration and interaction with FIGOs contribute positively to the legitimacy scores of IIGOs. The legitimacy index generated in our study indicates that over 80% of IIGOs lacking interactions with FIGOs tend to have lower legitimacy. This underscores the notion that IIGOs are not substitutes for FIGOs but rather function as complements to them, as proposed by Vabulas and Snidal.⁴⁹

Regarding the norm creation capacity of IIGOs, our research unveils that these entities actively engage in the creation and diffusion of norms to influence and address problems within their respective issue areas. While our findings indicate that an IIGO lacking norm creation capabilities could still achieve high legitimacy, overarching trends underscore that 79% of organizations actively involved in norm diffusion tend to exhibit higher legitimacy compared to those that do not create any norms. This correlation is closely tied to normative legitimacy, which typically succeeds in the attainment of sociological legitimacy. Our research further reveals that a slightly higher number of IIGOs (31.9%) are dedicated to addressing security issues, followed by those focused on political, economic, and social issues. As highlighted in the index, 56.7% of security-related IIGOs exhibit slightly higher legitimacy compared to those operating in the political, economic and social issue areas. Conversely, 65.4% of political IIGOs tend to have lower degrees of legitimacy. The legitimacy of economic and social IIGOs falls within the moderate range, with their legitimacy rates being context-specific.

Last but not least, the overall legitimacy of an IIGO necessitates a high level of both sociological legitimacy and normative legitimacy. Our research reveals that among the 17 IIGOs classified as highly legitimate, 16 possess full-scale bureaucratic power. Additionally, all of these 17 IIGOs have members from both developing and advanced economies, with eleven incorporating members from both the global North and South. This substantiates the assertion that IIGOs attaining high legitimacy concurrently demonstrate strong societal legitimacy. As illustrated in table 3, all IIGOs with high legitimacy are actively engaged with FIGOs. Notably, a majority of legitimate IIGOs actively contribute to the creation and diffusion of norms within global or regional orders. Echoing Keohane's perspective, the criteria relevant to legitimacy are dynamic; international organizations, including IIGOs, may experience fluctuations in their levels of legitimacy over time.⁵⁰ This is particularly applicable to IIGOs striving to enhance their standing and legitimacy within the international system. Furthermore, the extent to which members of IIGOs are committed to actively pursuing policies in their main issue areas plays an undeniable role in bolstering the legitimacy and authority of IIGOs over time. This commitment contributes to the ongoing evolution and reinforcement of IIGOs' legitimacy within the international landscape.

Footnotes

Author notes