Technology for civilian self-protection

Abstract

From alerting communities at risk to connecting local responders to those in need, information and communication technologies (ICTs) are transforming local protective responses in contexts of armed conflict. While scholars have analysed how state and non-state armed groups' use of social media and ICTs shapes conflict dynamics, the protective application of technology by communities themselves to avoid harm remains underexplored and undertheorized. This article maps the range of existing and emerging technologies that individuals and communities harness for their own protection—for ‘civilian self-protection’. It develops a theory and identifies the causal mechanisms through which ICTs may augment civilians' capacities for self-protection. The analysis finds that civilians' use of technology is vast, and ICTs are being adapted for protection in novel ways. These technologies and mechanisms are explored through two case-studies based on original interviews, relating to the non-violent civilian movements of the Indigenous Guard in Colombia and the White Helmets in Syria. The cases indicate that certain ICTs can amplify existing (low-tech) non-violent protective actions, such as by increasing the effectiveness of community coordination, ‘naming and shaming’ and early warning systems. ICTs also enable new actions and approaches that are simply not possible without the technology in hand, such as countering disinformation. While new technologies may strengthen local/international protection partnerships and bolster the agency of vulnerable groups, technology can also exacerbate existing protection challenges and create new ones.

We are non-violent activists. We can't fight Daesh [Islamic State] with weapons. We can only fight them with words. To defeat us, they would have to shut down the internet. And they can't do that because all of them use the internet.

—Abu Mohammed, activist, Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently¹

Attention: The air alert is over. May the Force be with you.

—Mark Hamill, AirAlert app²

The explosive growth of information and communications technologies (ICTs) is transforming armed conflict, from Sudan and Ukraine to Iraq and Colombia. In 2023 the International Telecommunication Union estimated that 5.4 billion people—67 per cent of the world's population—were online, with connectivity rising in conflict-affected states.³ While recent research has analysed how state and non-state armed groups' use of ICTs shapes conflict dynamics, the protective application of technology by communities themselves to avoid harm in armed conflict remains underexplored. Understanding these approaches is crucial, as they offer opportunities to enhance protection capabilities and influence broader patterns of conflict.

This article opens a research agenda on how civilian self-protection is shaped by advances in ICTs. We develop a theory of technology for protection that posits a set of interactions between the various possible strategic uses of technology and key factors such as aspects of community organization, specific non-violent self-protection strategies and the relative capabilities of actors to account for protection outcomes. Effective organization empowers communities to implement protection strategies and gives them the capacity to sustainably use technologies in powerful ways. Technologies are only useful for protection when applied effectively (strategically) in concert with self-protection strategies. Indeed, the same technologies can be used for protection in diverse ways and with varied outcomes.

We map existing and future ICTs and identify the causal mechanisms through which these technologies may augment civilians' capacities for self-protection. Our analysis primarily focuses on the internet, mobile phone networks, social media and digital platforms such as Facebook and X (formerly Twitter), as well as geographic information system (GIS) technologies and digital mapping. In addition, technologies such as SpaceX's Starlink have been used in conflicts—such as the Russia–Ukraine war—to maintain internet connectivity and enable real-time communication in areas where infrastructure has been destroyed. We focus on these ICTs since they are distinct from older one-way, top-down technologies like television and radio, given ‘their low barriers to entry and reliance on user-generated content’ (although in past conflicts analogue technologies were also sometimes effectively used for protection).⁴ Moreover, these ICTs facilitate the horizontal flow of information, enabling fast and relatively cost-effective mass communication.⁵ In some contexts, civilians combine these tools with more advanced technologies used by militaries, such as remote sensing and drones.

The article also empirically documents mainstream, well-known approaches to protection such as early warning systems and newer, lesser-known approaches such as managing safe flight to escape violence and counter-messaging to fight stigma and defend organizational reputations. We conducted a structured review of the academic literature, policy reports and local and international media coverage of contemporary conflicts, and we incorporate use-case examples and original interviews. Documenting these strategies and the attendant risks contributes to assessing whether, how and when different technologies should be supported and disseminated to bolster civilian self-protection. External actors—ranging from humanitarian organizations to human rights advocates, to peacekeepers and peacebuilders—increasingly seek to support civilian protective agency, recognizing the limitations of direct intervention.⁶

Our analysis generates several key findings about the use of ICTs for protection by civilian communities. First and foremost, civilians' use of technology is widespread, with multiple different uses of technology being adopted in a wide variety of contexts and by a wide variety of civilian actors around the globe. ICTs are also being adapted for protection in ways that previously were neither apparent to observers nor well catalogued. Moreover, the introduction of certain technologies can amplify existing (low-tech) non-violent protective actions, such as enhancing the effectiveness of ‘naming and shaming’, while also enabling new actions and approaches that are simply not possible without the technology in hand. Some of these strategies are highly effective under certain conditions and may be replicable across different contexts, suggesting optimism for their potential.

However, our findings reveal that the balance of the technological arms race tends to be tilted towards belligerent actors. As a result, civilians are relatively disadvantaged. Furthermore, while technologies can bolster the agency of vulnerable groups, they have limitations. In some instances they exacerbate existing protection challenges or create new ones. The low barriers to entry of contemporary ICTs mean that more people have access to information, yet adequate fact-checking is necessary to avoid misinformation and disinformation.⁷ Similarly, horizontal information flows may enhance coordination and possibilities for collective action, but can also be used nefariously for surveillance and oppression.

Theorizing technology for civilian self-protection

Research on civilian agency and self-protection has grown significantly over the past two decades. Scholars have documented and explained civilians' survival strategies, theorizing the conditions under which different strategies are adopted and assessing their effects.⁸ Some studies describe basic ways in which civilians use communication tools ranging from phones to local networks to report incidents, denounce enemy collaborators, monitor ceasefires and push for restraint among combatants.⁹ However, these works only peripherally address how such strategies interact with and are shaped or enhanced by technology, particularly digital technology. Yet, across contemporary conflicts civilians are putting ICTs to use to protect themselves.

Civilian self-protection refers to the strategies adopted by individuals and communities to ‘avoid, mitigate or thwart violence by armed groups’.¹⁰ This concept encompasses a more specific set of actions and strategies than the broader notion of civilian agency. While violence can sometimes serve as a means of civilian self-protection,¹¹ our analysis centres on non-violent approaches. We further focus on physical threats to civilians within the context of armed conflicts involving state and non-state armed actors (although similar technologies can aid coordination and information-sharing during natural disaster relief). While both individuals and organizations may use technologies for protection, our emphasis is on organizations, since individual protection efforts tend to be riskier and organizations can more sustainably adopt and deploy more complex technological tools. We build on the literature to advance three claims about the effects of ICTs on civilians' self-protection capabilities.

First, information plays a critical role in supporting civilian agency and shaping conflict dynamics more generally, and technology can boost information flows. Information is the basis for how individuals and communities understand threats and potential harms, the protective strategies available to them—and when and how to pursue them. As Kaplan describes, civilians' selection of strategies is ‘[s]ubject to the constraints of available ideas and imperfect information about levels of danger’.¹² For example, civilians unaware of local civilian institutions and international support systems will be impeded from using these options (for example, when coping with threats of denunciations of enemy collaboration and targeted violence).¹³ As Jose and Medie write, civilians need the know-how to ‘successfully execute the selected strategy’.¹⁴

When there are impending threats or atrocities time is of the essence, and ICTs dramatically reduce the costs and increase the speed of communication and information flows, especially to hard-to-reach areas.¹⁵ Providing early warning using Short Message Service (SMS) reporting systems and social media platforms helps communities coordinate self-protection strategies. Civilian reports can also be aggregated and analysed over time to identify patterns of insecurity and monitor ongoing incidents of violence.¹⁶ Communication via mobile phones and apps can also substitute for traditional media where news sources are unavailable, suppressed or censored, or politically biased.¹⁷

Second, ICTs can strengthen protection by helping overcome collective action problems related to creating the community organizations and civilian institutions necessary to provide the public good of protection from violence (which is often under-provided due to risks and fear). Scholars have shown that civilian institutions play a critical role in enabling collective self-protection actions.¹⁸ While forms of collective action may predate the adoption of ICTs, the introduction of digital tools may further enhance these efforts by more efficiently promoting norms of non-violence and civilian protection and by facilitating communication to reinforce collective values, share experiences and mobilize support.¹⁹

The accessibility of ICTs can also help communities and organizations to counter their being stigmatized as associated with armed groups and to enable the rejection of violent strategies within communities. By increasing organizational capacity, community trust and reciprocity, ICTs can equip local civilian institutions with the tools needed to overcome fear and implement cohesive protection strategies. Such protection efforts are more likely to succeed if the institutions are representative and inclusive, as well as having the ability to monitor contextual information and maintain collective decision-making procedures. Additionally, their role as community figureheads and interlocutors with external actors strengthens their overall effectiveness.²⁰

The establishment of civilian institutions for protection is far from a certainty, however. Several factors, including geographic and demographic characteristics, can aid in their development and functioning. Political entrepreneurs in particular play key roles in mobilizing local norms and ideologies to encourage cooperation and motivate ‘free riders’.²¹ ICTs can help to overcome collective action challenges by strengthening such networks—to persuade reluctant participants and build trust, awareness and a sense of shared identity and experiences. Network linkages can also be leveraged to encourage cooperative behaviours through rewarding participants and shaming free riders.²²

Third, there is a relational aspect of ICTs for self-protection, as technologies are also employed by civilian organizations to engage and influence outside actors, including armed actors and humanitarian groups. Organizations can share their messages with humanitarians or the public to seek external assistance and obtain more backing from outside actors. They can also use their amplified communication abilities to impose reputational costs on outside actors. They can name and shame hostile armed groups by invoking their reputations in messaging or by coordinating protests. Additionally, to protect their own images civilian organizations can engage in counter-messaging against harmful disinformation relating to them.

The relational dynamics of civilians' ICT-enhanced protection are fluid and adaptive, with an iterative evolution of uses of technology by both civilians and armed actors. Civilians may find themselves in a technology arms race with armed actors—a kind of security dilemma.²³ Civilians may respond to real or perceived threats by adapting and increasing their own technological capabilities for greater safety. Yet as they become more effective at protecting themselves, this shift may prompt armed groups to also pursue technological capabilities, such that civilians may become less secure, not more. To stay ahead, civilians can adopt technology that addresses the increased threats. According to Patrick Meier, the director of crisis mapping for Ushahidi, a group of digital activists, ‘If it is a cat-and-mouse game by definition, the cat will adopt the mouse's technology, and vice versa.’²⁴

A key challenge with cyber power in this context is the indistinguishability of offensive and defensive actions. Capabilities used for defence, such as intrusion detection systems or firewalls, can also serve offensive purposes like cyber espionage or sabotage. This dual-use nature complicates attribution and escalation management, making it difficult to identify if cyber actions are preventative, retaliatory or aggressive. While strategic adaptation is common among armed actors, civilian communities using ICTs for protection face similar dilemmas in which their tools could be perceived as threatening. This ambiguity further intensifies the technological arms race, where civilians and armed actors continuously adapt and evolve their strategies, raising the stakes of technological applications in conflict.²⁵

Mapping civilians' protection uses of technology

We enumerate how ICTs bolster civilians' self-protection strategies through specific uses. Civilians may also face limitations based on context and available resources, such as internet connectivity. Thus, platforms and apps vary based on factors including local context and languages, demographics and needs, technology access and security.

A key cross-cutting technology for protection involves tools to maintain privacy and secure communications. Groups and individuals may select certain apps (for example Telegram, Signal or WhatsApp) for their end-to-end encryption, which may protect conversations from surveillance. For less sensitive interactions, other options include Facebook and the Messenger app (by Meta, Facebook's parent company), SMS messaging, iMessage, X, LINE, Zoom, WeChat, Kik, Slack, Viber and platforms like Reddit, or forums and message boards (and Skype was another option until it was retired in May 2025). These technologies face practical limitations, as most require smartphones and a data plan or Wi-Fi connection. Additionally, apps are constrained by the requirement that all group or cell members must be able to use and access the same app.²⁶

We describe nine primary ICT uses we have identified for civilian self-protection based on a wide-ranging and structured review of available cases, news reports, accounts from the academic literature and our own fieldwork experiences (table 1). These uses extend beyond the prominently analysed mechanism of early warning. We group them into three meta-categories: information management and environment monitoring; organizational capacity and collective action; and external engagement. Some uses are cross-cutting and encompass a mix of categories. For example, safe flight involves monitoring, organization and decision-making. Table 1 further describes the causal processes or mechanisms through which the technologies empower civilians—the increased protective capabilities they enable and how they enable them. It also identifies some of the effects these technological uses and protection strategies are likely to have on key outcomes of interest related to community security, processes of violence, and community (organizational) capacity. Finally, we provide examples of apps and platforms for each use.

Information management and environment monitoring

The first meta-category encompasses technologies that civilians can use to obtain and share high-quality information about contextual conditions during armed conflict. Although each of the mechanisms under this category relies on information management and monitoring, there is variation across them in terms of types of information, the effects on protective capabilities, and some of the technologies themselves.

Situational awareness and security monitoring Some communities use technology to identify events of concern, increase situational awareness and perform conflict pattern analysis.²⁷ This usually occurs on an ongoing basis, ahead of a proximate threat, to boost social cohesion and preparedness to take collective action against violence when threats arise. For example, during a period of widespread violence and unrest in Burundi, WhatsApp discussion groups allowed people of diverse groups to discuss the situation and plan courses of action when it became unsafe to meet physically.²⁸ In Colombia, AHERAMIGUA (the Association of Agro-Ecological and Mining Fraternities of Guamoco) aggregates information and warnings of threats from its constituent village councils for a broader regional information system.²⁹ Some systems are designed for real-time incident reporting and personal safety updates, often using SMS reporting systems and social media platforms (for example, the Facebook Safety Check feature allows the platform's users to notify their safety and well-being in the wake of an attack). The United Nations' Qatalog software platform uses machine learning to monitor radio and social media reports of unrest and to support community conflict prevention.³⁰

Early warning Early warning systems, implemented in various forms for decades if not centuries, are arguably the most studied use of technology for civilian protection.³¹ They provide communities with time to prepare for or avoid impending combat or violent incursions by armed actors. In contrast to the broader monitoring of security conditions, early warning is more closely linked to specific, proximate threats and feeds into communal response strategies, such as flight and resistance.

These systems have been implemented in different ways across different communities with different technologies, evolving from analogue practices like horns, sirens and other signals to digitally empowered approaches. For example, individuals with smartphones use WhatsApp for early warning and coordination, including forming group chats to connect leaders of neighbouring villages or towns.³² Kenya's community-based early warning system, the Uwiano Platform for Peace, was created prior to Kenya's 2010 constitutional referendum to provide a free text message service to report early signs of conflict such as hate speech and incitement.

Several other platforms and tools have been developed and used in a variety of contexts. The FrontlineSMS system provides a platform for civilians to report violent incidents via free-to-use text messaging and receive locally tailored security reports. The Ushahidi platform collates such geolocated and time-stamped messages and can trigger alerts for communities and humanitarians. Ushahidi is just one of several platforms that allow non-specialists to participate in creating a crisis map for early warning using GIS software. For example, Live Universal Awareness Map—Liveuamap—is interactive software based on Google Maps and open data that provides and maps event information in near-real time. First developed by a group of engineers and journalists in 2014 during the Euromaidan protests in Kyiv, Liveuamap now covers over 30 regions and has been used to map conflict dynamics in Syria, Libya and Afghanistan.

More sophisticated early-warning techniques use remote sensing, including satellite imagery and acoustic sensors. Hala Systems' Sentry app was developed to cope with the unique threats of the Syrian context. It combines acoustic sensors to identify the sound of military aircraft with artificial intelligence (AI)/machine learning to detect and predict attacks and air strikes.

Safe flight and migration Technology can assist civilians in making critical decisions about whether, when, where and how to flee to safety. Refugees and internally displaced people use ICTs and social networks online and offline to search for and gain access to relevant, real-time information before, during and after flight (for example, using GPS/Google Maps/Apple Maps to navigate).³³

Smartphones are a lifeline to refugees fleeing conflicts—they are ‘as important as water and food’.³⁴ In their study of Syrian and Iraqi refugees in Europe, Gillespie et al. identify the devices' three main purposes: mobility, locatability and safety.³⁵ Refugees can use smartphones to map travel routes and ‘send details of their location to coastguards, friends, or family members while on the move’.³⁶ Apps can also help ensure safe arrival, as ‘many access information on their smartphones before leaving Syria or Iraq and so are knowledgeable about claiming asylum in Europe’.³⁷ Examples include the Alarm Phone project, a self-organized hotline for refugees in distress in the Mediterranean Sea,³⁸ and MigApp, an app developed by the International Organization for Migration that provides information on migration risks, support services, visa requirements and location-sharing.³⁹ Refugees are also able to reduce their exposure to human traffickers and smugglers by using ICTs to receive alerts, seek assistance and independently navigate their own journeys.⁴⁰

Organizational capacity and collective action

The second meta-category involves ICT uses that strengthen organizational capacity and collective action. This function includes sharing preferences over risk and resistance and promoting pro-peace norms and beliefs among community members.

Coordination and cooperation Technology can be a helpful tool for civilian organizations in relation to such tasks as coordination, preference aggregation and ensuring inclusive membership. Improved communication capacity can support basic organizational infrastructure, such as building and maintaining membership networks. This can lay the groundwork to facilitate non-violent mobilization for protection. In Ukraine, for example, Telegram has been widely used to organize and strengthen groups at the local and regional levels to provide community security services and mutual aid.⁴¹ The Indigenous Guard in Colombia maintains its vast network of local guards and groups through WhatsApp, email and other technology tools (other organizations use the Signal and Telegram apps). This helps the Guard share information and coordinate its members to assemble en masse to protect communities or rescue kidnapping victims.

Norm promotion Civilians have organized and created their own networks of communication to promote non-violent and pacifist norms in support of local peacebuilding and protection initiatives.⁴²  narcocorrido songs promoting violence and narco-culture. These stations also broadcast community peace norms and meeting recordings via loudspeakers in public areas, thereby discouraging recruitment by armed groups and managing local disputes that risked escalating into violence.

Fundraising and money transfer Various technologies have been innovated to facilitate crowdfunding for non-violent community protection organizations and community-based aid. Vaki, similar to GoFundMe, emerged in Colombia, where in 2022 the Association of Indigenous Cabildos and Traditional Authorities of Puerto Leguízamo, alongside the Yauda Foundation, launched the ‘Let's Give a Hand to Puerto Leguízamo’ campaign, raising 15 million Colombian pesos (around US$5,000) to support families displaced by conflict with essentials like food, blankets and medicine.⁴³ Other affected families have also turned to Vaki for assistance.⁴⁴ In Myanmar, anti-government activists developed the War of Heroes video game in 2022, which raises funds via advertisements to support displaced individuals (as well as insurgent militias fighting against the military).⁴⁵ Many communities also receive remittances from abroad through money exchange platforms.

External engagement

The third meta-category includes technologies that enable communities to engage with external actors, enhancing their capacity to counter threats from armed groups.

Backstopping Mobile phones, apps like WhatsApp and other technologies have been deployed to ‘backstop’ (provide support for) communities involved in self-protection. Beyond early warning, ICTs allow community leaders in remote areas to connect with humanitarian organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or UN peacekeepers for additional support and mediation assistance when facing threats. For instance, some community leaders in El Bagre, northern Colombia, communicated with ICRC staff and requested assistance when they encountered risks from groups like the National Liberation Army (ELN) or neo-paramilitaries (AGC).⁴⁶ In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN peacekeepers provided mobile phones and mobile credit to community focal points and later established a hotline for communities to send security alerts to the UN's protection force.⁴⁷

Documentation, accountability, shaming and deterrence While armed groups have used threatening messages and visuals to intimidate populations, civilians have also leveraged technology to name and shame such groups. For example, in 2014, activists formed Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently (RBSS) to document and publicize the occupation of Raqqa by Islamic State (IS) and ensuing abuses, using a combination of ‘old’ and new technology.⁴⁸ Members of RBSS worked as ‘reporters’: witnesses on the ground called networks of activists at a base in Gaziantep, Turkey, who then shared and publicized dispatches through reports, videos and social media channels like Facebook and X.⁴⁹ Activists in Kafranbel, Syria, also became famous for sharing hand-painted posters on social media shaming both government forces and non-state armed groups, while in 2016 seven-year-old Bana al-Abed gained global attention by tweeting her personal accounts of the difficulties of war as she was trapped in Aleppo. These kinds of updates provided counter-narratives to messaging by IS and other actors in the Syrian conflict. In Mexico, citizens have used ‘narco-blogs’ and ‘narco-tweets’ to call out cartel violence, and the Tehuan platform has been used to more proactively ‘“out” suspected cartel members and known criminals’.⁵⁰

Recording and documenting information for accountability not only aids future justice processes but can also deter ongoing abuses. Such documentation supports post-conflict reconciliation and provides evidence for war crimes trials. While early examples include the smuggling of video footage of atrocities from Timor-Leste,⁵¹ apps like Truepic and eyeWitness now allow civilians to capture real-time evidence of abuses, secured via blockchain technology. Such apps also use advanced image forensics to verify authenticity and detect fraud at the point of capture. Ensuring content authenticity became essential for the Syria Civil Defence (White Helmets), as it was crucial for its counter-disinformation efforts.

Counter-messaging Civilian organizations in war zones often face disinformation, stigma and slander from belligerents, aimed at undermining their efforts in fostering peace and support for community protection. Armed actors frequently use or act on false accusations to target perceived enemy supporters.⁵² To sustain their self-protection activities, civilian organizations must build internal collective action capacity and secure external support. To counter threats of violence, they must also defend their reputations and combat stigmatization through counter-messaging.

Technology can aid these efforts by enabling organizations to create and share information that clarifies the facts about them and presents them in a positive light. For example, in Pakistan the women's rights and non-violent action non-governmental organization (NGO) Aware Girls has used social media platforms like X, Facebook and WhatsApp to counter negative portrayals from the government and the Taliban, highlighting their work as non-violent and aimed at peacebuilding.⁵³ The Sentinel Project's Hagiga Wahid (One Truth), an interactive ICT system in South Sudan, also helps civilians counter rumours and misinformation that could fuel intercommunal tensions and heighten threats faced by communities.⁵⁴

Case studies on technology for self-protection

Case selection and methods

We selected the Colombian Indigenous Guard and the Syrian White Helmets as illustrative cases of ICT usage by prominent civilian protection organizations. These cases allow for the comparison of protective capabilities before and after ICT introduction. They are in some ways quite different, as they are rooted in different contexts and cultures. Yet, both organizations have integrated technology into their operations to enhance their protection strategies and both have experienced increases in their capabilities to manage violence and safeguard civilians. Although the two organizations each came to rely on technology for security and to share some protection mechanisms, their technological applications vary. The cases also represent different levels of sophistication in terms of the technological tools used as well as their respective degrees of reliance on technology and rates of technological adoption (however, this is not to suggest any hierarchy of sophistication between the organizations). The cases are particularly illustrative for how the organizations adapted technologies to confront the challenge of disinformation campaigns that impugn their reputations and put them in great danger.

Our analysis is based on a small number of semi-structured interviews with key members of each organization selected for their broad knowledge of technology and protection.⁵⁵ These interviews received ethics clearance by the authors' respective institutional review boards and were guided by questions exploring organizational histories, technology adoption and self-protection strategies.⁵⁶ Interviewees were also encouraged to share personal reflections and direct the conversations towards their areas of knowledge and interest. This allowed us to follow new leads on topics that were not originally anticipated. Due to the restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, initial interviews were virtual, followed by some in-person discussions to review findings and clarify previous statements. We also consulted various secondary sources, including media articles, organization documents and external reports, to obtain additional perspectives. These sources include accounts from external partners and independent reporting on community technology usage. The sources provide valuable context, corroborating or contrasting the findings from our primary interviews.

Uses of technology by the Indigenous Guard in Colombia

The Indigenous Guard is the largest and most significant self-protection organization among Colombia's diverse Indigenous groups. The Guard has increasingly innovated new uses of ICT to enhance its non-violent protection efforts. Founded in 2001 in the department of Cauca by members of the Nasa Indigenous group and based on existing communal policing structures to protect their social and territorial autonomy, it now includes many other Indigenous groups across the country, with 70,000 members across 29 of Colombia's 32 departments, and has expanded to some Afro-Colombian communities, where it is known as the Cimarron Guard (Guardia Cimarrona).

The Indigenous Guard is a non-violent organization that follows Indigenous cosmovision, or cosmic world views.⁵⁷ Members are armed only with the bastón, a staff that symbolizes their social authority within their communities and on their lands. The Guard's effectiveness during conflict-related emergencies stems from its ability to rally large numbers of members to a single location, to interposition them between civilians and combatants and to pressure armed actors to yield. In recent years the Guard has had stunning successes in its dialogues with armed actors, rescuing kidnapping victims from guerrillas and even removing military forces from their lands.⁵⁸ The organization was recognized with Colombia's National Peace Prize in 2004. However, Colombia's difficult geography, combined with the Guard's size, presents coordination challenges at the local and national levels. The Guard's adoption of new technologies helped mitigate these challenges by connecting individuals across the organization. The technologies enhanced their existing non-violent approaches for community self-protection through several mechanisms, including coordination and planning, organizing protests and rescues, documenting and reporting abuses, and reputation management.

We interviewed Lucho Acosta, the national coordinator of the Indigenous Guard of the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia.⁵⁹ According to Acosta, the Indigenous Guard has increasingly used mobile phones for a variety of self-protection purposes and to help guard leaders stay connected.⁶⁰ His comments highlight the shift in their approaches before and after their uptake of technology. As he relates, with mobile phones it is no longer necessary to travel long distances just to communicate and coordinate:

Before, in an emergency, it would take a week to coordinate, now it happens in hours and there is a network among coordinators. We use WhatsApp and information flows quickly. Before we would use a horn as an alarm. Now the cell phone is our horns and bells. We send information and everyone rallies to point X much more quickly, in minutes.

Where there is poor mobile phone connectivity, guard members use CB (citizens' band) radios. Some subnational governments have helped equip the Guards with technological tools.⁶¹

News accounts of the Guard's activities confirm Acosta's description of communications technology helping to mobilize against threats. The technology is especially helpful for early warning and collective action:

When confrontations occur, the Guard activates the masses with a quick … alert that disseminates over the radio. … In February of 2018 … a group of armed dissidents [rearmed guerrillas] descended upon the town of Tacueyo to retrieve the weapons that the Guard had confiscated from them. At the first sign of danger, the patrolling guardia called for backup, and within minutes, hundreds of people surrounded the assailants.⁶²

The Guard also uses mobile phone cameras for documentation—to record and denounce human rights violations in isolated regions and promote accountability among armed actors. According to Acosta, ‘With a camera, an armed actor limits himself if he is being recorded, and it protects’. So, in addition to the traditional bastón, phones are a ‘civil defence instrument, a non-violent weapon of protection'. Acosta and the Guard implemented trainings on how to use X and other social media platforms to denounce human rights abuses they encounter.

Acosta asserts that the Guard members could still make greater use of mobile phones, as poverty and a lack of mobile phone towers limit their access. This is especially true in the realm of public relations, as information technology and social network platforms also help them to shine a light on their activities and to document and share their story. Promoting their own narratives and messages can limit smear campaigns and threats against the Guard, which is seen as essential to ‘help clear up stigma, accusations, and being framed’. Guard members have begun making films to spread a positive image.⁶³ In this sense, technology for external engagement and public relations supports another mode of generating protection.

For example, during the Minga protests in the city of Cali in May 2021, broad sectors of Colombian society—including the Indigenous Guard—united to oppose a proposed tax reform law. The Guard was stigmatized as disinformation about it spread on social networks and in the media, with reports suggesting it engaged in combat with police and received support from terrorist groups, putting its members in danger.⁶⁴ In response, the Guard developed a plan to increase the visibility and awareness of the group to reinforce its peaceful nature.⁶⁵ According to Acosta, additional proficiency with ICTs could increase the Guard's protective capacity even further: ‘Wars are fought with technology, but we want to learn how to use technology to our advantage for peace. We're short on technology and don't use it well (yet). We don't have media training.’ Acosta confessed he had not contemplated coordinating the adoption of technology for the Guard prior to our conversation, since nobody had ever directly approached him about it. In response, he floated the idea of the Guard forming a technology committee to more formally institutionalize technology training and partnerships. Such structures could also aid the uptake of technology by other communities.

The White Helmets (Syria Civil Defence)

Widely known as the White Helmets, the Syria Civil Defence is a local organization with a mission ‘to save the greatest number of lives in the shortest amount of time and to minimize further injury to people and damage to property’.⁶⁶ The organization has been at the forefront of technological innovations for civilian protection since its inception in 2012, when informal community teams emerged to rescue civilians from indiscriminate bombing and shelling by the regime of Bashar al-Assad. At the height of its operations, the organization had over 4,000 volunteers working in 100 communities across eight provinces.

We analyse the White Helmets' use of technology for self-protection by drawing on existing reporting and studies, as well as original interviews with individuals associated with the White Helmets⁶⁷ and a Syrian activist who oversaw research and data collection for Sentry, an early warning system developed by Hala Systems, a social enterprise, and adopted by the White Helmets in 2016.⁶⁸ Our analysis reveals that technology has become integral to the White Helmets' protection efforts through three self-protection mechanisms: search and rescue and the provision of emergency services; community safety-preparedness training and early warning; and documentation and reporting of abuses.

Since the White Helmets' inception, the organization's most visible role has been in search and rescue—extracting people trapped under the rubble of destroyed buildings and providing life-saving emergency services. The White Helmets initially relied on a network of human observers who would keep watch and send alerts about the projected flight paths of attacking aircraft via handheld radios. However, as one White Helmets staff member notes, the ‘process was spotty [and] unreliable’ and ground observers were exposed—many were ‘targeted, arrested, killed, and disappeared’.⁶⁹

With the development and implementation of the Sentry system, White Helmet volunteers gained access to more accurate information about the locations of attacks, allowing them to better prepare, coordinate and target rescue efforts. The Sentry system uses a combination of human observers, algorithms, big data, remote sensors and machine learning to predict air strikes and provide warnings to volunteers and the public via Meta's Messenger app. The system is self-improving: the accuracy of both its neural network (which automatically searches online for information to confirm the timing and location of an air strike) and Sentry's comparisons with past data improve with every iteration and new data point.⁷⁰

The Sentry system also transformed early warning and community safety training. Starting in 2016, communities had access to an app through which information could be shared about attacks. The White Helmets did extensive outreach and training on how to use the app and related safety measures. Because the volunteers are known and trusted within communities, people were willing to participate and submit information (even though, as one interviewee explained, there was widespread distrust of technology and fears of surveillance).⁷¹

Additionally, the Sentry system strengthened community self-protection through early warning mechanisms. Alerts give people in affected areas ‘time to take action … if they are outside they come inside, or hide in an entrance or go to a lower level. It gives them time to protect themselves’.⁷² For those without internet access, the White Helmets set up air raid sirens to broadcast alerts, triggering a network of actors on the ground, including opposition-affiliated radio stations. Available data suggests the protection benefits of the Sentry system have been significant, providing civilians with an additional eight minutes to find cover during air strikes.⁷³ In an analysis of multiple offensives in north-eastern Syria between 2016 and 2018, Sentry was correlated with a 20–27 per cent mean reduction in net casualty rates due to air strikes, with 52–63 per cent of air strikes being predicted. Over two million people were reportedly reached directly or indirectly, with an average of 140 warnings per day.⁷⁴

Sentry-collected data has also served as crucial evidence of alleged war crimes, creating what analysts claim is the most comprehensive dataset of Russian air strikes in Syria. ‘The idea of using the data for that purpose was there from the beginning, from the very first day’, as one interviewee explained.⁷⁵ In 2018 Hala reported that it had provided unique prima facie evidence of war crimes related to 80 specific events and had disseminated 300 reports on aircraft activity and ceasefire violations to governments, NGOs and the UN.⁷⁶ The White Helmets have also documented indiscriminate attacks and other violations of international humanitarian law using GoPro-style cameras affixed to their signature white helmets. These cameras can capture the aftermath of attacks during rescue missions. Initially used for training, such footage became an important source of evidence for groups like Amnesty International and the Syria Justice & Accountability Centre.⁷⁷

However, the increased visibility of White Helmets' protection work, particularly in terms of advocacy, has had negative unintended consequences. As one interviewee explains: ‘Data used for advocacy made the White Helmets more effective and increased support for the group, but it also made them more vulnerable and insecure.’⁷⁸ Hundreds of volunteers have lost their lives. The group has also been targeted by sophisticated disinformation campaigns on the part of Russia and the Assad regime aimed at discrediting the organization, weakening their international backing and denying accusations of attacks against civilians.⁷⁹

The public reputation of a group like the White Helmets may seem secondary to their life-saving work on the ground. Yet the disinformation campaign took a huge toll on the organization and key donors suspended funding. Still, Raed Al Saleh, the group's leader, maintains that technology—specifically the GoPro camera—is the ‘best way to fight Russian disinformation … Remain truthful. Report the reality on the ground … the facts.’⁸⁰ Technology is thus essential for the White Helmets' counter-messaging and reputation management, enabling them to document their activities and the ‘reality on the ground’ while providing platforms for global dissemination. To bolster efforts against disinformation, in 2020 the Sentry system upgraded its content authenticity by incorporating an AI system called Hedera, which validates information from multiple sources, ensuring tamper-proof provenance and traceability.

The example of the White Helmets illuminates several mechanisms through which access to ICTs can strengthen existing non-violent approaches for community self-protection and enable new ones. Despite the significant differences between the two cases, there are striking similarities in relation to several uses of ICTs. As with the Indigenous Guard, ICTs have assisted the White Helmets with situational awareness and community safety training, coordination of rescue response, early warning, abuse documentation, reputation management and counter-messaging. These cases underscore the iterative evolution of technology usage by both civilians and armed actors, as well as the relational dynamics and impacts of civilians' ICT-enhanced protection.

Conditions, limitations, constraints and risks

The national and local contexts of conflict settings can determine the prospects for the effective adoption of technology for protection. Context can shape who controls internet networks and questions of social, economic and infrastructure barriers to access, potentially imposing limitations on available civilian protection mechanisms. Technology vacuums according to types of countries, conflicts or localities may generate unequal effects and imply greater limitations for vulnerable or low-resource populations.⁸¹ Context can also influence the availability of funding, support and knowhow. ICT uses are far from uniform and are still a patchwork, with significant variation in how technologies are employed, and some applications are more common than others.

The effectiveness of ICT uses may also depend on armed actors' preferences and capabilities. Civilian protection strategies have greater odds of operating successfully against armed groups with greater ‘sensitivities’ to civilian pressure—mainly under conditions where actors care about reputations.⁸² This is likely true for protective uses of technology that are also premised on leveraging armed groups' reputations.

Emerging issues also can present limitations on using technology for protection and can even harm such efforts. For instance, surveillance and targeting can create new risks for exposing a community protection initiative that uses ICTs. In addition, misinformation and disinformation can impede effective uses of ICTs for coordination and communication. Finally, according to Culbertson et al., there is the problem of digital litter:

[A] criticism of … technology developed specifically for refugees is that much of it has been launched but not maintained, leading to the prevalence of digital litter—a trail of outdated information; broken links; and false impressions of rich, available digital tools.⁸³

This proliferation of tools can create confusion for local actors about which platforms are functional or best to use.

Future research and policy on technology and self-protection

There are diverse, widespread and growing uses of technology for civilian self-protection during armed conflict, alongside associated risks. These technologies enhance existing non-violent protection mechanisms or generate new ones, addressing the overlooked civilian aspect of the technological arms race in warfare. Furthermore, there is evidence that ICTs for civilian protection have reduced civilian casualties and help counter the rising problem of disinformation in contemporary conflicts.

Our two illustrative case-studies, the Indigenous Guard and the White Helmets, show how highly organized communities can leverage technology to strengthen non-violent protection organizations and strategies. While both use technology for information management, networking and early warning, the White Helmets approach is more sophisticated and resource-intensive. Technologies also interact differently with each organizations' respective goals and strategies—enabling the Indigenous Guard to interrupt violence and pressure armed actors, while the White Helmets focus on avoidance and rescue. Both consider technology vital for reputation protection, persuasion and avoiding stigmatization. Their social media use supports protection, as damage to their public image can justify violent attacks. While technology appears to have identifiable effects, it was not able to eliminate violence against civilians in either case, and its effectiveness depends on community capacity and internet connectivity, among other factors. Further research can explore how these technology adoption models generalize to other settings and their conditions for reducing violence.

The analysis suggests several recommendations for community technology use and support from intergovernmental organizations or NGOs. Investing in widely-used tools and apps may be advisable, as they are harder for states or actors to censor without affecting broader populations. They may also elicit greater engagement, since communities are already familiar with them. Intergovernmental organizations could help establish communication groups for early conflict warning as part of trainings focusing on safe behaviours. In addition, they could enhance security by providing trainings on safe app/tool use and protective strategies (such as encryption or the use of secure servers). Strengthening communications infrastructure may also be needed in some contexts, though this is challenging if the infrastructure is controlled (either directly or indirectly) by armed groups, rather than the public or private sector, as in the case in Syria.

Our analysis points to a new research agenda to better identify, catalogue and assess protective uses of technology. The wars in Ukraine and Gaza, much of which take place on the digital battlefield, underscore the need to understand technology for civilian self-protection, as many aspects remain unknown.⁸⁴ Researchers should examine the conditions that shape the ability of civilians to successfully learn about and adopt ICTs for protection, considering factors like internet access, connections to external suppliers, community organization, and baseline levels of education and of familiarity with technology. Armed actors' use of similar technologies should also be studied, as it may drive civilian adaptation. Similarly, civilian technology use cannot be examined in isolation, as it may influence how armed actors use technology.

Further research should document how different self-protection mechanisms function through technological adoption, as these may vary by context. Technologies may interact differently with protection strategies depending on the type of adoption and organizational capabilities. For example, enhanced early warning could give civilians an edge to safely flee conflict, or it could reduce the need for safe migration technology if it enables other technology-aided non-violent strategies, such as shaming and deterrence.

Research should also more precisely assess the effectiveness of technological adoption in generating protection and reducing violence. Although there is some empirical evidence (for example, from the Indigenous Guard and White Helmets), it is limited. Future studies could compare risks before and after technology adoption, or across cases where technology or protective strategies have not been adopted. Scholars should evaluate the impact of messaging and social media on outcomes such as violence—a critical endeavour for countering disinformation and protecting reputations during the ‘fog of war’.

Finally, questions remain about the future of ICTs for protection. Recent advances, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) equipped with thermal imaging and AI-driven analytics, have expanded beyond military applications to support civilian protection. Following the 2023 Turkey earthquake, rescue teams used drones to locate survivors.⁸⁵ As AI technology evolves, its potential for civilian protection grows. However, accessibility for grassroots organizations and associated risks must be considered. What is clear is that civilian self-protection will continue to evolve as new conflicts and technologies emerge, with civilians finding innovative ways to use ICTs.

Footnotes

Author notes