The rise and fall of the Department for International Development

In 2020, Boris Johnson combined the United Kingdom's international development department with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to form the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. Overnight, the globally recognized poster child for international development was merged, leaving civil servants deflated and NGOs regretful. The rise and fall of the Department for International Development marks its history. Sir Mark Lowcock and Ranil Dissanayake's book demonstrates that there are still those out there who tackle poverty reduction and deliver assistance to developing nations. Through first-hand accounts and in-depth interviews, this book offers a forensic, chronological account of the UK's Department for International Development (DFID).

The first part details the creation of the department, its initial policies and the leadership of Clare Short (who served as Secretary of State for International Development from 1997 to 2003). Lowcock and Dissanayake emphasize the values and goals that once resonated so strongly with those on the left and centre of British politics. Drawing on interviews, the authors expertly outline the flagship political decision to launch the DFID and reveal the internal politics that underpinned it. It is a useful narrative for those interested in institutional reform and altruistic governance. The second part covers the challenges of implementing the DFID's programmes. The analysis here is somewhat scattered. It starts with an exploration of the DFID's growing budget and then jumps to the key crises, including the Iraq war and the invasion of Afghanistan, the global financial crisis of 2008 and the climate crisis. It concludes with a commendation of the progress that the department made towards reducing global poverty. The authors carefully highlight how, leading its counterparts abroad, the DFID made substantial efforts towards UN Millennium Development Goal indicators. Given that the DFID operated in the context of the flourishing economic environment before the 2007–8 financial crash, it is difficult to ascertain whether there was a level of causation or correlation. However, the book uses data on health, education, private–public partnerships and social protection that illustrate the DFID's model of success and soft power.

The third and fourth parts of the book cover the changes in the domestic political context, beginning with David Cameron's coalition premiership in 2010. Here, the book takes a noticeable turn, from a descriptive historical telling to an analytical reproval of austerity, the post-Brexit chaos and the lack of political leadership. The authors' stance is apparent, and one must reflect on the book's overall positionality. Their view cannot be apolitical but, given their careers as former DFID employees, the book does not provide a completely detached account of either the events or the DFID's reputation and work. The book concludes with the authors' longing that Sir Keir Starmer might reinstitute a singular department that can carve out its own international development agenda, rebuild expertise and sit apart from foreign affairs interests. Following recent international development cuts in the UK, this recommendation seems a far cry from reality.

There are two further areas for improvement. First, the book could have benefited from a deeper reflection on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Perhaps in a conscious attempt to avoid the latest politics of the SDGs, the book focuses on the simpler, poverty-focused MDGs. Lowcock and Dissanayake briefly criticize the SDG framework, but it could have provided a useful backdrop for the overall feeling of discontent regarding intergovernmental and external influence on UK foreign policy. The second has to do with the references to the UK's participation in the Iraq war. In 2003, there was increasing frustration on the domestic front as the DFID grappled with Downing Street's political choices regarding the decision to join the United States-led intervention. Official support for the war led to large public demonstrations, driven by the Stop the War Coalition, and to government-wide resignations. The book does a good job of covering the impact of the conflict, emphasizing the increasing tensions between Downing Street and senior figures at the DFID. However, the book could have included more accounts or references to the mood and concerns of junior or mid-level staff. This would have provided a more complete picture of the resulting internal shocks.

Overall, the book is a timely reminder of the role that the UK could be taking to improve well-being internationally. Many people in the world live in poverty and the DFID's accomplishments in this area may backslide if decisive steps are not taken to ensure clear goals, substantial funding and transparent management of international assistance. The book provides a comprehensive and favourable history of the DFID. Yet, one is left wondering whether the progressive, principles-based opinions of the authors are a priority for those now in power. In light of cuts to international development budgets in the UK (and also in Europe), it appears that the overall message of this book sits at odds with the priorities and concerns of current leaders.