Global Perspectives on Science, Polarization, and Populism Special Issue Introduction

Abstract

For many decades, scholarship in the Global North on public opinion regarding science, environmental, and health issues was dominated by the so-called “deficit model”—the assumption that scientific literacy was the primary determinant of attitudes and opinions about science and related topics (Bauer, 2008; Brossard & Lewenstein, 2009). In the Global South, this assumption was reflected in classical modernization theory and development communication, which also emphasized the role of education and technical knowledge in shaping public opinion about science and technology (e.g., Rogers, 1962; Schramm, 1964). However, over the past 25 years, this assumption has been successfully challenged, and it is now widely understood that opinion formation about science is a far more complex process, with scientific literacy being just one of many individual or contextual factors influencing public attitudes toward science.

As scholars have moved beyond a focus on scientific literacy, they have increasingly examined the role of political polarization and populism in shaping public opinion about science around the globe. For instance, both Nisbet and Nisbet (2019) and Zapp (2022), analyzing data from dozens of countries from the World Values Survey, found that defiance of traditional authority and populist sentiment undermined support for science, especially in countries low in democratic governance. Cologna et al. (2025), analyzing survey data from 68 countries, found that polarization, hierarchical worldviews, and science-related populism were all significant predictors of trust in scientists. Consistent with the contextual thesis of partisan bias toward science (Nisbet, Cooper, & Garrett, 2015), their findings showed that whether liberals or conservatives were more likely to trust scientists depended on the political context. In some countries, liberal or left-leaning respondents exhibited greater trust in scientists, whereas in others, conservatives or right-leaning respondents were more trusting. Hierarchical worldviews and science-related populism were also consistent predictors of lower trust in science across the countries in their sample.

More specifically, a significant portion of recent cross-national public opinion research on science has focused on global climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic and vaccination. Rutjens et al. (2022), using data from 24 countries, found that conservative ideology was a consistent predictor of public opinion about climate change. Similarly, Ejaz, Altay, Fletcher, and Nielsen (2024), in a survey of eight countries spanning both the Global North and Global South, found that conservative worldviews and trust in political parties were reliable predictors of false beliefs about climate change. Jennings et al. (2023) analyzed two cross-national survey datasets covering more than 100 countries and concluded that political trust and ideology were consistent drivers of public opinion about vaccination.

These examples of cross-national public opinion research underscore the growing scholarly importance of explicating how political polarization and populism—often in conjunction with media behaviors—shape public opinion about science within and across different international contexts. This special issue of the International Journal of Public Opinion Research contributes to this endeavor.

Polarized Attitudes About Science

Polarized attitudes toward science have become a growing global concern, particularly in the wake of recent public health crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic and increasing science skepticism (Rutjens et al., 2022). While much of the existing research focuses on WEIRD (i.e., Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) contexts (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010)—with the United States dominating the literature—political polarization around science-related issues is rising worldwide (Gauchat, 2012; Krause, Brossard, Scheufele, Xenos, & Franke, 2019; Li & Qian, 2021).

Science polarization is often studied in relation to the concept of trust. Trust can refer to varying levels of specificity, ranging from belief in specific scientific claims to confidence in expertise within fields such as epidemiology, sociology, or environmental sciences, or even to trust in the institution of science as a whole (Rekker, 2021). Within this framework, scholarship on the drivers of science polarization generally focuses on two major theses (Nisbet, Cooper, & Garrett, 2015). On the one hand, the intrinsic thesis suggests that polarization stems from deep-seated psychological differences between conservatives and liberals, with the former being more likely to distrust the scientific community (e.g., Mooney, 2012). On the other hand, the contextual thesis, which has recently gained greater scholarly attention, argues that polarization of factual beliefs around science may be driven by political elites or institutional actors who shape public discourse around specific scientific policies (Rekker, 2025).

In this vein, studies focusing on the United States experience have documented that both liberals and conservatives engage in motivated reasoning, selectively processing scientific evidence in ways that reinforce their ideological beliefs (Ditto et al., 2019; Nisbet, Cooper, & Ellithorpe, 2015). This phenomenon has been particularly evident in debates surrounding climate change and public health policies, where ideologically incongruent scientific evidence may be perceived as a challenge to individuals’ values or political identities, leading to the entrenchment of pre-existing attitudes (e.g., Hart & Nisbet, 2012; Kahan et al., 2012). Regarding scientific attitudes, sociodemographic factors such as education, religion, and political affiliation have long been recognized as key determinants (see Anderson, Scheufele, Brossard, & Corley, 2012; Azevedo & Jost, 2021; Funk, Hefferon, Kennedy, & Johnson, 2019; Gauchat, 2012). In addition to these individual-level predictors, the role of political elites and media in communicating scientific issues is also crucial, as media narratives interact with polarized political identities to influence how the public perceives and reacts to scientific claims in an increasingly polarized and fragmented media landscape (e.g., Chinn, Hiaeshutter-Rice, & Chen, 2023; Diehl, Huber, Gil de Zúñiga, & Liu, 2021; Hameleers & Van der Meer, 2021; Newman, Nisbet, & Nisbet, 2018; Nisbet, Cooper, & Ellithorpe, 2015; van Aelst et al., 2017).

From a comparative standpoint, in countries with authoritarian or populist governments, trust in science may be shaped by complex interactions between political ideologies and institutional narratives (e.g., Belder et al., 2023). For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic, President Bolsonaro’s opposition to expert recommendations actively polarized public discussion in Brazil by presenting scientific guidance as politically aligned, thereby fueling division (Batista Pereira & Nunes, 2022). Similarly, the COVID-19 vaccine debate in Türkiye revealed a marked split based not only on support for the government but also on ethnic cleavages before the implementation of vaccines, further illustrating how institutional trust and political affiliation can deepen public divides over scientific issues (Dal & Tokdemir, 2022).

Ultimately, understanding context-dependent dynamics is essential for developing targeted science communication strategies that address the unique challenges societies face in building trust in scientific expertise (Rekker, 2025). By examining the interplay of predictors of scientific attitudes across various contexts, scholars can develop a more comprehensive understanding of the drivers of science polarization and devise more effective strategies to bridge divides in public opinion on scientific issues.

Populism’s Challenge to Scientific Authority

Polarized attitudes toward science-related issues have been extensively explored in the context of populism. Scholars have approached populism in various ways, conceptualizing it as a “thin” ideology (Mudde, 2004), a political style (Moffitt, 2016), a framing device (Bonikowski, Halikiopoulou, Kaufmann, & Rooduijn, 2019), a communication style (Brubaker, 2017), a discourse (Hawkins, 2010), and a worldview (Hawkins, 2009). Others interpret its rise as a challenge to liberal democracy (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017), a response to economic challenges, or a form of cultural backlash (Inglehart & Norris, 2017).

Despite these differing perspectives, many scholars converge on the ideational approach to populism, which views it as a set of normative ideas about contemporary societies, rooted in a morally charged conflict between “the people” and “the elite” (Laclau, 2005; Mudde, 2004). In this view, populist leaders position themselves as champions of a virtuous public, opposing the corrupt elite through populist discourse and communication styles. However, the surge in populism research continues to produce findings that are difficult to generalize across dissimilar political, social, and cultural contexts. This challenge often stems from the blending of populism with related ideologies such as nationalism, as well as the difficulty of applying the ideational perspective across diverse issues, contexts, and analytical approaches (Hunger & Paxton, 2022; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Rooduijn, 2019).

One of the primary areas of focus in populism scholarship has been its relevance to public opinion, with researchers examining populist attitudes as both dependent and independent variables (see Marcos-Marne, Gil de Zúñiga, & Borah, 2023, for a review). Studies on the predictors of populist attitudes have explored factors such as personality traits (e.g., Fatke, 2019; Vasilopoulos & Jost, 2020), pre-existing beliefs (e.g., Erisen et al., 2021), emotions (e.g., Dennison & Turnbull-Dugarte, 2022; Rico, Guinjoan, & Anduiza, 2017), and individuals’ interpretations of their socioeconomic conditions (e.g., Stanojevic et al., 2020) in relation to the demand side of populism.

Populism manifests across the political spectrum, making populist attitudes relevant to a variety of political actors and contexts (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Müller, 2016). This relevance extends to topics such as populist voting (e.g., Marcos-Marne, 2021), support for democracy (e.g., Bos, Wichgers, & van Spanje, 2023; Kaltwasser & Van Hauwaert, 2020), news consumption (e.g., Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2018), media skepticism (e.g., Fawzi, 2019), and conspiracy beliefs (Eberl, Huber, & Greussing, 2021). Presentational elements commonly found in populist communication help political actors mobilize policy support or frame political debates, with varying emphasis on appeals to “the people,” demonization of the elite, and exclusion of out-groups (Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017). Given the central role of media in spreading populist messages and styles, understanding contemporary populism requires close attention to the forms of populist communication individuals are exposed to, the channels through which they receive it, the issues it highlights, and the consequences it produces (de Vreese et al., 2018; Ernst et al., 2019; Esser et al., 2017).

While early populism scholarship primarily focused on political movements and electoral processes, the increasing politicization of scientific discourse worldwide has led to growing interest in science-related populism (Mede & Schäfer, 2020; Mede, Schäfer, Metag, & Klinger, 2022). Consistent with the theme of this special issue, the anti-expert, anti-elitist stance adopted by populist leaders and movements often accentuates the division between the allegedly homogenous ordinary people and the out-of-touch scientific elite regarding science, technology, environmental, and health issues. Populism’s broader critique of intellectualism positions experts as an elite class working against the interests of the virtuous public, fueling cultural skepticism about scientific issues (e.g., climate change) as well as distrust in scientific institutions and their role in public policymaking (Huber, Greussing, & Eberl, 2022; Motta, 2018). Cross-national, longitudinal analyses further indicate that while favorable attitudes toward science had been rising since the 1980s, they have declined in parallel with populism’s breakthrough in the last decade (e.g., Zapp, 2022).

Populism’s critique of intellectualism is driven largely by contemporary challenges to scientific epistemology and the complexity of modern information environments. Criticisms regarding how the scientific elite engages in knowledge production—contrasted with science-based populism’s glorification of laypeople’s experience-based common sense—result in competing claims over truth and decision-making authority (Mede & Schäfer, 2020; Ylä-Anttila, 2018). This duality undermines the legitimacy of expert authority in shaping public policy, a process exacerbated by post-truth communication trends that deviate from the principles of democratic discourse, such as evidence-based reasoning and tolerance (Waisbord, 2018).

Given the increasing global prevalence of populist efforts, it is unsurprising that science-based populism has been successful in promoting narratives that override those of the scientific elite on critical issues such as climate change, vaccines, genetically modified food, and technological regulation. Nevertheless, there remains ample room for comparative public opinion research, as existing analyses of populist narratives do not indicate uniform populist responses to science, environmental, technological, and health issues across either the Global North or Global South.

About This Special Issue

This special issue of the International Journal of Public Opinion Research explores the complex relationships between political polarization, populism, and public opinion surrounding science, health, technology, and environmental issues. Drawing on empirical evidence from diverse global contexts, the articles collectively expand our understanding of how polarization and populism are associated with public attitudes toward critical scientific issues across different political and cultural settings.

The articles in this special issue may be categorized into three themes. The first centers on how populism undermines trust in science, promotes skepticism, and fosters ideological narratives that challenge scientific authority. The second theme centers on the role of traditional, alternative, and social media in shaping public opinion, disseminating misinformation, and fostering polarization about scientific, environmental, and health issues. The last theme addresses how climate or health crises and global dynamics shape polarization, opinion processes, and public attitudes.

Populism and Trust in Science: Undermining Authority and Promoting Skepticism

These four articles in this theme examine how populism erodes trust in science, fuels skepticism, and advances ideological narratives that challenge scientific authority across political and cultural contexts. Together, they highlight populism’s global impact on science and the need for context-sensitive strategies to restore public trust and counter populist-driven skepticism.

The article by Cinar and Kose (2025) examines how such regimes amplify populist attacks on scientific institutions. Populist leaders in these systems often portray scientific communities as elitist threats to “the will of the people.” Using data from nine countries in the seventh wave of the World Values Survey, the study finds that supporters of populist parties are more skeptical of science and less optimistic about its potential. By linking competitive authoritarianism with populism, the article underscores the global erosion of institutional credibility and its implications for science-based policymaking.

Erisen and Erisen (2025) collect survey data to examine how populist attitudes, misinformation, and trust in experts, scientists, and institutions interact in Türkiye’s polarized context. Populist skepticism toward elites increases susceptibility to misinformation, which significantly reduces trust in vaccines, climate science, and GMOs. Social media amplifies this effect by exposing users to more misinformation, further eroding trust. While populist attitudes directly undermine trust, their impact through misinformation is even greater. The study emphasizes the need for strategies to combat misinformation, enhance science literacy, and promote critical thinking, particularly on social media, to rebuild trust in science and institutions.

The third study in this theme investigates how genetic essentialism—the belief that complex social traits stem from immutable genetic differences—relates to support for populist radical-right parties in Sweden and Norway (Morin-Chassé, 2025). Survey data reveal a stronger link between genetic essentialism and support for Sweden’s Sweden Democrats (SD), reflecting alignment with the party’s extreme ideological platform. In Norway, the association with the Progress Party (FrP) is significant but weaker, likely due to its broader, more moderate appeal. The findings highlight how essentialist beliefs align with nativist, anti-immigration, and anti-science rhetoric, shaping distrust of social policies and scientific authority among radical-right populist supporters.

The final article in this theme explores how science-related populist beliefs shape the link between ethical research conduct and public trust in scientists (Zillich, Schlütz, Roehse, Möhring, & Link, 2024). An online survey experiment with German citizens tested the impact of experimental deception—with and without debriefing—on trust. Deception without debriefing significantly lowered trust, particularly among those with low populist beliefs. However, individuals with high populist beliefs, already distrustful of scientists, were less affected, likely due to low initial expectations. Science literacy also played a role—those with higher literacy were more sensitive to misconduct. The study underscores the importance of ethical research and transparency in maintaining public trust.

Media, Misinformation, and Public Opinion About Science

The second theme centered on the intermediary role of media, broadly defined, in shaping perceptions and public opinion about science (Scheufele, 2014). The studies within this theme represent the diverse ways in which media and misinformation shape public opinion about science, particularly in the context of populist and polarized discourse about science. Taken together, these articles also highlight the strengths of applying both survey and computational methods to explicating media content and its relations with public opinion.

Huepe, Bellolio, Ortiz, Baboun, & Arriagada (2025) employ computational text analysis to examine online vaccine discourse in Chile during the height of its COVID-19 vaccination efforts in 2021. They identified three populist objections to vaccination: moral (framing it as an elite conspiracy), democratic (opposing mandates as threats to personal freedom), and epistemic (distrusting science in favor of anecdotal evidence). They analyzed tweet engagement to track how these narratives spread. The study underscores social media’s role in amplifying populist resistance to science, even in high-trust, high-vaccine-uptake countries like Chile.

The second study in this thematic cluster also uses computational social science to examine online polarization among Spanish-speaking YouTube users discussing science topics like climate change, health, and technology (Serrano-Contreras, García-Marín, & Luengo, 2025). Analyzing 769,000 comments with machine learning, researchers found greater affective polarization in climate change and technology discussions than in health or general science. Comments with replies were less polarized but replies themselves were often more polarized. While polarizing content received fewer likes, it spurred more replies. Notably, polarization remained stable or declined over time for science and technology topics. The study highlights YouTube’s role in shaping public opinion and the need for moderation to foster constructive science discussions.

How right-wing populist alternative media in Germany cover environmental topics and influence environmental attitudes is the question that Areal, Behnert, Lajic, & Bach (2025) explore. The authors used a three-wave online panel survey and web-tracking data from the 2021 German federal election to track media consumption and attitude shifts. Natural language processing (NLP) analyzed alternative media narratives, comparing them to mainstream coverage. Findings show that alternative media frame environmental issues through populist rhetoric, emphasizing anti-elitism and national sovereignty, often portraying environmental policies as a globalist threat to economic stability and personal freedoms. While short-term attitude shifts were limited, exposure reinforced climate skepticism among right-wing populists, highlighting alternative media’s role in politicizing climate discourse.

The last study in this theme extends the Risk Information Seeking and Processing model by introducing “defense information insufficiency,” which explains how people seek, avoid, and process information to defend core beliefs in polarized debates (Fung, Lai, Griffin, & Leung, 2025). An online survey of Hong Kong residents during COVID-19 measured emotions like fear and anger and their impact on information seeking. Fear and informational subjective norms increased defense information insufficiency, driving selective exposure to belief-consistent content while avoiding contradictions. This behavior reinforced echo chambers and polarization, hindering public consensus and effective health communication.

Global Crises and Polarized Opinions

The articles in the final theme collectively explore how polarization and global crises shape public opinion about science and health issues, revealing both the unique dynamics of polarization within individual countries and the broader interconnectedness of global public opinion.

Employing India as a representative context for the Global South, Rajan, Gangopadhyay, & Ghatak (2025) examine politicization and polarization in public discourse about COVID-related scientific-related issues during 28 months of the pandemic. Analyzing over 231,000 news articles from major Indian newspapers, the study used computational text analysis to track trends in politicization around topics like vaccines and lockdowns, with spikes during election seasons. Notably, while politicization rose during key political events, polarization diminished during critical moments like the second COVID-19 wave. The study highlights India’s unique “punctuated” political dynamics during the pandemic and the complex interplay between political competition and crisis management in shaping public discourse.

The second article in this theme explores the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact on affective polarization in Spain (Galais & Balinhas, 2025). Using data from a three-wave Spanish panel survey (2019–2021), the study examines shifts in political attitudes during the pandemic. It finds that extreme evaluations of the government’s pandemic response increased individual polarization, while aggregate polarization declined after lockdown restrictions eased. This depolarization was linked to reduced perceptions of elite ideological differences. The study underscores how short-term external shocks, like pandemics, influence public opinion and the nuanced dynamics of affective polarization during crises.

How do foreign climate policies influence U.S. public opinion on the polarizing issue of climate change is the focus of Schult and Wang’s (2025) paper. Through two survey experiments, the researchers examined whether learning about climate pledges by entities like China or the EU shaped perceptions of public support for climate action abroad and domestic support for international treaties. Results showed that second-order beliefs about foreign public opinion boosted domestic support for international cooperation, highlighting the role of foreign governments’ actions shaping U.S. public attitudes on climate policy.

Biographical Notes

Aysenur Dal is an assistant professor in the Department of Communication & Design at Bilkent University, Türkiye. Erik C. Nisbet is the Owen L. Coon Professor of Policy Analysis & Communication and the Director of the Center for Communication & Public Policy at Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA.

References