Russian News Media, Digital Media, Informational Learned Helplessness, and Belief in COVID-19 Misinformation

Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic has been paired with a global misinformation “infodemic.” Citizens in authoritarian countries, where most media is state controlled, often do not have access to credible information sources to help combat misinformation. In fact, the news media in these countries may be the primary drivers of misinformation while digital media may be sources of more accurate information. We test how news and digital media in an authoritarian context are associated with endorsing misinformation while introducing the concept of informational learned helplessness as an additional factor driving inaccurate beliefs. We test our hypotheses employing data from a nationally representative telephone survey of the Russian public (N = 1600) and discuss the implications of our findings for Russian attitudes about COVID-19 vaccination.

Introduction

The 2019 novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has been matched with a global “infodemic” of false or misleading information, that is, misinformation that has been difficult to combat (e.g., Broniatowski et al., 2020; Cinelli et al., 2020). Moreover, this misinformation has been shown to have real-world consequences for health behaviors and increasing the public health burden of the pandemic (e.g., Brainard & Hunter, 2020; Garfin, Silver, & Holman, 2020). In democratic countries, misinformation about COVID-19 may be abundant and spread by partisan news media, politicians, online news, or social media (e.g., Bursztyn, Rao, Roth, Yanagizawa-Drott, 2020; Jamieson & Albarracin, 2020), but at the same time, credible nonpartisan news media and independent fact-checking organizations provide resources for citizens to navigate the infodemic and help discern between accurate and inaccurate information.

Unfortunately, citizens in authoritarian countries—where both public and private media are state controlled, not independent, and often censored—do not have the same access independent, credible news sources to rely upon (Freedom House, 2020a). In fact, the news media in authoritarian countries are often the primary source of misinformation and propaganda whereas digital media such as online news websites, blogs, and social media may be resources for citizens to receive more accurate information (e.g., Stoycheff, Nisbet, & Epstein, 2020; Stoycheff & Nisbet, 2014). Considering the global nature of the pandemic, and that the majority of the world’s population reside in partly or not free media environments (Freedom House, 2020a), examining the relationships between news media and digital media use and endorsing misinformation about COVID-19 in authoritarian contexts is of great import.

In this study, we use Russia as a case study in which we explore this question of the differing roles of news media and digital media use in an authoritarian context and how they are associated with holding false beliefs about the COVID-19 pandemic. With the fifth largest confirmed global caseload of COVID-19 cases as of April 2021, nearly five million (Dong, Du, & Gardner, 2020), and 2020 excess deaths in Russia 28% higher (over 360,000 dead) than 2019 (Troianovski, 2021), questions about drivers of misinformation about the pandemic amongst the Russian public are highly salient. We also introduce the concept of informational learned helplessness (ILH) as a factor that may increase endorsement of misinformation, as well as moderate the relationship between media use and beliefs about COVID-19. We test our hypotheses employing data from a nationally representative telephone survey of the Russian public (N = 1600) conducted in June 2020. In addition, we also integrate more recent Russian survey data from December 2020 into our discussion that demonstrates the continued relevance of our findings as they relate to COVID-19 vaccine hesitation within Russia.

Literature Review

Misinformation Versus Disinformation

Before considering the relationship between reliance on state-controlled Russian TV and newspaper media outlets and digital media information sources and the accuracy of audience beliefs about COVID-19, we need to distinguish between the concepts of misinformation and disinformation for the purposes of our study. The term “misinformation” comes out of the field of cognitive psychology and originally referred to the sincerely held false or misleading beliefs individuals may possess (Freelon & Wells, 2020). In recent years, this meaning has expanded to incorporate the act of spreading of false or misleading information but without the intent of harm and/or believing the information to be inaccurate (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017).

In contrast, “disinformation” originates from the Russian term “dezinformatsiya” and refers to covertly and purposefully spreading false or misleading media messages with malicious intent to mislead others (Freelon & Wells, 2020; Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). In this context, though we discuss and highlight prominent disinformation narratives about the COVID-19 pandemic in Russian state-controlled media, our focus are the processes by which this content is reflected in audience’s sincerely held false beliefs about COVID-19, that is, misinformation. As a consequence, we will employ the term misinformation henceforth in our article when referring to audience beliefs about the COVID-19 pandemic, though recognizing a source of these false beliefs was possibly disinformation in Russian state-controlled news media.

Russian Media Ecosystem

Within Russia, the relationships between reliance on different information sources and audience misinformation about the COVID-19 pandemic are heavily shaped by Russia’s state-dominated, authoritarian media ecosystem. Whilst democratic media systems generally provide a high amount of accurate or credible media content to their citizens, Russian TV news, and newspapers, regardless of whether they are state or privately owned, are dominated by the government and for the most part do not provide independent, credible sources of information (Cooper, 2020; Freedom House, 2020a; Nisbet, Kamenchuk, Dal, 2017; Roudakova, 2017; Stoycheff, Nisbet, & Epstein, 2020). Mainstream, popular Russian news media evolved from the fall of the Soviet Union to formally embrace independent commercialism while informally maintaining paternalistic norms that allow the state or state-controlled groups to dominate its content (Kiriya, 2019). At the same time, Roudakova (2017) argues that Soviet journalistic culture devolved over the last 30 years to the point where mainstream Russian TV and newspaper news organizations and reporters no longer maintain a professional ethos of “truth-seeking” in their journalistic practice.

Within the rise of online news websites, blogs, and social media as alternative information sources to state-controlled Russian TV and newspaper outlets, the Russian government has moved to restrict of internet freedom and online information by a variety of means: censorship, blacklisting websites, blocking some social media or messaging platforms, and legal or economic sanctions against bloggers, journalists, and online news, blogs, or websites (Nisbet, Kamenchuk, Dal, 2017; Cooper, 2020; Freedom House, 2020b; Lonkila, Shpakovskaya, and Torchinsky, 2019). This “occupation” of the Russian digital space by the Russian government has substantially increased its control over what information is available from online news websites, blogs, and social media (Freedom House, 2020b; Lonkila, Shpakovskaya, and Torchinsky, 2019;,Nisbet, Dal, & Kamenchuk, 2017).

However, this state occupation of the internet is not total and opposition-oriented online news, blogs, and social media and messaging channels continue to provide counter-narratives to state-controlled news media (Cooper, 2020; Kiriya, 2019; Lonkila, Shpakovskaya, and Torchinsky, 2019). This relative (as opposed to state-controlled TV and newspaper news) openness of digital media resources provides opportunities for “window-opening” and “mirror-holding” (Bailard, 2014, Stoycheff & Nisbet, 2014; Stoycheff, Nisbet, & Epstein, 2020). These metaphors allude to the potential for citizens in authoritarian contexts to access a wider, more credible array of information sources, both domestically and internationally, as compared to those available through state-controlled TV and newspaper news outlets. Previous international research (e.g., Bailard, 2014; Stoycheff & Nisbet, 2014), and in Russia specifically (e.g., Stoycheff, 2020; Stoycheff et al., 2020), has shown that Russian digital media such as online news websites, blogs, and social media are associated with these mirror-holding and window-opening processes.

False COVID-19 News Narratives in Russian State-Controlled Media

This distinction between state-controlled news media and more open digital media in the relative availability of credible information is important when considering how the Russian government and its state-controlled media have portrayed the COVID-19 pandemic. Multiple analyses of Russian state-controlled news coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic, especially during its first three months, identified two major false and misleading narratives about the pandemic prevalent in its coverage: (a) the health severity of COVID-19 was similar to, or not substantially greater than, the common flu and (b) the coronavirus that causes COVID-19 did not originate naturally, but from a Chinese or American laboratory (e.g., Cooper, 2020; Demishina & Semkina, 2020; DFRLab, 2020; European Union External Action Service, 2020; ISANS, 2020; Sukhankin, 2020, Tulchinskii, 2020). Based on the best scientific evidence available, including at the time of these news reports and the data collection of this study, both of these narratives are false and/or misleading and are not based on any credible evidence.¹

For example, at the beginning of the pandemic, Russian state-controlled TV and newspaper published stories downplaying its seriousness and disputing the severity of the health threat posed by COVID-19 (e.g., Cooper, 2020; Malkevich, 2020; Tulchinskii, 2020). Some of the most popular state-controlled TV news outlets such as Channel One Russia, the most watched TV channel in Russia, and TV Zvezda, a popular TV channel run by the Russian Ministry of Defense, disseminated reports and commentary downplaying the severity and health risk of COVID-19 as compared to the common flu (e.g., Deikin, 2020; Ivlev, 2020; Leontiev, 2020). Likewise, prominent national newspapers and tabloids did the same (e.g., Chernikh, 2020a; Pichugina, 2020). In contrast, Russian independent digital media provided Russians some of the earliest and most stark information about the health risks posed by COVID-19 (Cooper, 2020). Russian digital media also provided fact-checking of COVID-19 misinformation and was a resource for credible information not provided by Russian news media (Cooper, 2020).

A second prominent false narrative prominent in Russian state-controlled media was about COVID-19’s origin. For example, early in the pandemic, Zvezda Weekly, a publication also from of the Russian Ministry of Defense, published an article claiming COVID-19 was a man-made biological weapon developed by the United States targeting Russia and China (Papsheva, 2020). A lengthy broadcast and article published on its sister TV station, TV Zvezda, not only downplayed the severity of the virus but also endorsed conspiracy theories that the virus originated in a secret laboratory in the United States funded by Bill Gates (Ivlev, 2020). Channel One Russia also began running a daily TV news segment promoting popular conspiracy theories, including that COVID-19 was biological weapon developed by the United States in a Georgian laboratory (BBC 2020; Cooper, 2020). This narrative about COVID-19 originating in a laboratory and/or the United States was also repeated in Russian tabloids (e.g., Berk, 2020; Chernikh, 2020b). Additional analyses show these disinformation narratives about COVID-19 being manmade and/or created by the United States were frequently repeated across various Russian state-controlled media targeting both domestic and international audiences (Cooper, 2020; DFRLab, 2020; European Union External Action Service, 2020; Sukhankin, 2020; Tulchinskii, 2020).

Media Exposure and Audience Misinformation

This proliferation of COVID-19 misinformation in Russian news media may intersect with audience cognitive biases that increases the likelihood of endorsing false or misleading information as true. One means that audiences use to judge the veracity of information is its processing fluency, ease, or difficulty of processing new information (Schwarz, 2012). Repeated exposure to information increases its familiarity and ease of recall, which becomes conflated with its veracity regardless of what prior knowledge on the topic the individual may possess (Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2010; Fazio, Brashier, Payne, & Marsh, 2015). This convergence between familiarity and veracity is termed the “illusory truth effect” (Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2010; Fazio, Brashier, Payne, & Marsh, 2015). This bias may lead us to believe that false or misleading information to which we are repeatedly exposed is true, even when the information itself does not have any credibility on its face (Ayers & Reder, 1998; Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, & Yoon, 2007). As a consequence, false or misleading information about COVID-19 that is highly prevalent in Russian state-controlled news media lead to greater exposure and familiarity among audiences that rely on those information sources, which in turns leads to audiences using them as cues to assess their veracity (Pennycook et al., 2018).

As a consequence, if Russian state-controlled TV news and newspapers are frequently repeating false or misleading claims about the COVID-19 pandemic, then audiences who rely on them will be more likely to be exposed, and more familiar, with these false claims. As a consequence, we may hypothesize that reliance on Russian TV and newspapers for information about COVID-19 is associated with greater likelihood of endorsing of false information about it (H1). In comparison, Russian digital media such as internet news websites, blogs, and social media are comparatively less likely to contain state-sponsored disinformation narratives and/or allow access to more credible information. Therefore, audiences who rely on these media for information about COVID-19 are less exposed and less familiar with state-sponsored disinformation and accordingly are less likely to endorse them (H2).

Informational Learned Helplessness

Beyond the influence of information sources and cognitive biases, we posit that the high volume of competing claims and information inherent to infodemics increases cognitive and emotional costs of discerning accurate from inaccurate information for audiences, leading to what we call “informational learned helplessness” (ILH) (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2017; Nisbet & Kamenchuk, 2019). The concept of ILH is based on psychology scholarship that shows that people who experience prolonged exposure to difficult, uncontrollable situations, which they can neither avoid nor alleviate, will “learn” to accept the situation as a given (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Maier and Seligman, 1976). As a consequence, the individual eventually no long attempts to correct or avoid an aversive situation because they believe there is no relationship between their actions/efforts to and outcomes.

We argue that the proliferation of false or misleading information about the COVID-19 pandemic, mixed in with accurate or true information, substantially increases the cognitive costs of determining what information is accurate or reliable. If the cognitive cost is high enough, it may lead to cognitive exhaustion, low motivation, and anxiety when audiences process high volume of news and information, impairing their ability to evaluate the veracity of information (Maier & Seligman, 1976; Nisbet & Kamenchuk, 2019; Sedek & Kofta, 1990). In turn, these factors may lead audiences to be less deliberative when in evaluating the veracity of messages and more likely to focus peripheral cues rather than arguments in information they encounter about COVID-19 (Amichai-Hamburgerm, Mikkulincer, & Zalts, 2003). This lack of deliberation and central processing of information has been shown to be a driver of endorsing, and sharing, misinformation among audiences (Bago, Rand, & Pennycook, 2020; Pennycook, Mcphetres, Zhang, Jackson, & Rand, 2020). Cognitive exhaustion associated with ILH may also potentially reduce reactance and counter-arguing to less credible messages (Dillard & Shen, 2005; Jacks & Cameron, 2003).

In addition, the affective dimensions of ILH may also increase endorsement of false or misleading information to which audiences are exposed. Anxiety, for instance, increases reliance on less credible sources, information, and/or messages with a negative valence (Gasiorowska, 2014; Weeks, 2015). The lack of deliberative effort and anxiety associated with ILH may also lead audiences to use the congruence between their emotional state and the emotions induced by information to which they are exposed as a shortcut to judge its veracity, leading to false beliefs (Martel, Pennycook, & Rand, 2020; Na, Garrett, & Slater, 2018; Niedenthal & Setterlund, 1994). In addition, feeling a lack of control, for example driven by the massive number of competing claims about COVID-19 and high uncertainty about the pandemic, has been shown to increase the likelihood of endorsing conspiracy theories (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). Thus, as a consequence of these cognitive and affective factors associated with ILH, we hypothesize that ILH is associated with higher likelihood of endorsing false or misleading information about the COVID-19 pandemic (H3).

Moreover, we also hypothesize that ILH may moderate the relationship between media behaviors and accuracy of beliefs about COVID-19. Individuals high in ILH may either be less able or less motivated to take advantage of digital media as a “window-opening” information resource—thus dampening the relationship between digital media use and the (lesser) likelihood of endorsing inaccurate information about COVID-19 (H4a). Cognitive exhaustion and lack of deliberation may also lead audiences to rely on other cognitive biases in determining the veracity of information. For example, they may be more likely to rely on the aforementioned familiarity, or illusory truth, of repeated false claims. ILH, therefore, may amplify the impact of Russian state-controlled TV and newspaper reliance on the likelihood of endorsing false information about COVID-19 (H4b).

Methodology

Sample

The data for our analysis were collected by Russian pollster VCIOM’s (www.vciom) weekly omnibus national computer-assisted telephone interview poll of sixteen hundred (N = 1600) Russian respondents on June 5, 2020 with a 3.9% response rate (AAPOR RR4). The data were provided to authors for analysis. The sample was weighted to match Russian general population parameters.² The full text of all questions used in the analysis are available in Supplementary Material.

False Beliefs About COVID-19

Three dichotomous variables indicating false beliefs about COVID-19 were coded based on questions from the omnibus survey. The first variable measured the percentage of respondents who believe COVID-19 had a similar or lesser health risk than the common flu (51.8%). The second measure was the percentage of respondents who believe COVID-19 either accidently or purposefully originated in a laboratory (53%). The third measure was the percentage of respondents who believe COVID-19 originated in the United States (21.9%).

Informational Learned Helplessness

Respondents agreed or disagreed with four statements (see Supplementary Material for exact wording) designed to assess their ILH derived in part from a self-administered test to measure learned helplessness more generally (Quinless & Nelson, 1988). The four items load on a single factor employing varimax rotation that explains 63.2% of the variance (eigenvalue = 2.527). They were summed and averaged to create an assessment of informational learned helpless (M = 3.1, SD = 1.2, α = .81).

Media Use

A measure of reliance on Russian TV and newspaper news for information about COVID-19 was created by averaging two survey items (M = 3.0, SD = 1.3, r = .63) asking respondents how often they relied on national TV news and newspapers (M = 3.2, SD = 1.5) and local TV news and newspapers (M = 2.8, SD = 1.5). Similarly, a measure of reliance on digital media for news and information about COVID-19 was constructed by averaging (M = 2.8, SD = 1.4, r = .63) how often respondents used social media websites or applications (M = 2.6, SD = 1.5) and online news, websites, and blogs (M = 2.9, SD = 1.5).

Control Variables

Measures of age (M = 5.7, SD = 16.3), educational attainment (M = 4.4, SD = 1.0), gender (43% male), economic status (M = 2.9, SD = 1.1), urbanity (M = 4.5, SD = 2.1), and trust of President Vladimir Putin (M = 2.9, SD = 1.0) were included as controls in the analyses.

Results

We conducted three logistic regression models predicting the likelihood of holding each one of the false beliefs about COVID-19 we measured. We also tested whether ILH moderated the relationship between reliance on Russian news media (national and local TV and newspaper news) and digital media (social media and online news, websites, and blogs) for information about COVID-19 pandemic and holding a false belief using the SPSS macro PROCESS (Hayes, 2018). We probed interactions and graphed results for low (one standard deviation below), mean, and high (one standard deviation above) levels of each variable. The results of all three models with unstandardized coefficients and standard errors are presented in Table 1 and described below, along with corresponding odds ratio (OR).

The first set of models (1 and 2) predicted endorsing false beliefs about COVID-19 health risks as compared to the common flu. Among the control variables age (b = −.02, OR = .98, p ≤ .001) and trust in President Putin (b = −.17, OR = .84, p ≤ .05) decreased the likelihood of endorsing this false belief.

Consistent with H3, ILH was associated with greater likelihood of believing that COVID-19 posed similar or less health risk than the common flu (b = .17, OR = 1.19, p ≤ .001). In contrast, reliance on Russian TV and newspaper news was associated with decreased likelihood of holding false belief about COVID-19 (contrary to H1) (an OR decrease of .88). ILH did not significantly moderate the influence of reliance on Russian TV news failing to support H4b. There was no “main effect” of digital media use associated with the likelihood of holding a false belief about COVID-19 health risk, but consistent with H4a, ILH significantly moderated the influence of digital media on the likelihood of holding inaccurate health risks about COVID-19 (b = .08, OR = 1.08, p ≤ .05).

The interaction is depicted in Figure 1. As the frequency digital media use rises among those with low ILH, the likelihood of holding a false belief about COVID-19 health risk as compared to the flu decreases significantly (b = −.21, OR = 1.08, p ≤ .01) from a marginal probability of 59.9% to 41.8%. Digital media use did not significantly reduce the likelihood of endorsing false belief about COVID-19 health risk among those with mean or high ILH.

Models 3 and 4 predicted the likelihood of respondents believing COVID-19 originated in a laboratory. Among the control variables, only economic status was a significant predictor of believing COVID-19 originated in a laboratory (b = −.14, OR = .87, p ≤ .05). Again, consistent with H3, ILH significantly increased (b = .21, OR = 1.23, p ≤ .001) the probability of holding the false belief that COVID-19 originated in a laboratory. Likewise, consistent H2, reliance on Russian news media also increase the likelihood of adhering to this false belief (b = .13, OR = 1.14, p ≤ .01). Similar to false beliefs about the health risk of COVID-19, ILH did not significantly moderate the influence of Russian TV news use but did moderate the association between digital media use and likelihood of holding a false belief was contingent upon one’s ILH (b = .11, OR = 1.12, p ≤ .01) consistent with H4a.

We again used PROCESS to probe the interaction between ILH and digital media use in predicting likelihood of believing COVID-19 with the results depicted in Figure 2. At low levels of ILH, reliance on digital media for information about the pandemic significantly reduces the likelihood (b = −.14, p ≤ .05) of believing COVID-19 originated in a laboratory with the marginal probability of holding this false belief at 53.7% at low levels of digital media use compared to a 41.2% marginal probability at high levels of digital media use. However, conversely, at high levels of ILH, reliance on digital media significantly increases the likelihood of believing COVID-19 originated in a laboratory (b = −.17, p ≤ .05). At a high levels of ILH, the marginal probability of believing COVID-19 came from a laboratory is 53.7% with this probability increasing to 67.8% among those with both high levels of ILH and reliance on digital media.

The last set of models (5 and 6) predicted the false belief that COVID-19 originated in the United States. Several control variables were significant predictors of holding this belief. Male respondents (b = .46, OR = 1.58, p ≤ .01) and trust in President Putin (b = .24, OR = 1.3, p ≤ .01) increased the likelihood of endorsing this false belief, whilst educational attainment (b = −.16, OR = .85, p ≤ .05) and economic status (b = −.20, OR = .82, p ≤ .01) decreased it. Consistent with the other two false beliefs, ILH increased the likelihood of holding the false belief that COVID-19 stemmed from the United States (b = .12, OR = 1.13, p ≤ .05), consistent with H3. Neither reliance on Russian news media nor digital media had a main effect on the likelihood of believing COVID-19 originated from the United States, though ILH again moderated the influence of digital media (b = .13, OR = 1.14, p ≤ .01) as hypothesized in H4a.

Probing the interaction using PROCESS revealed that reliance on digital media use significantly decreased the likelihood of holding this false belief at low levels of ILH (b = −.21, p ≤ .05) but not at mean or high levels of ILH (see Figure 3). As reliance digital media use increases from low to high among respondents with low ILH, the marginal probability of believing COVID-19 stems from the United States drops from 24.8% to 13.6%. Conversely, at high ILH, digital media use increases the likelihood of holding this belief at marginal level of significance (b = .15, p ≤ .10). As Figure 3 illustrates, among those with high ILH, the marginal probability of believing COVID-19 came from the United States increases from 19.8% at low levels of digital media use to 29.3% among those reporting a high level of ILH.

Discussion

In terms of study limitations, this study primarily utilized secondary data, and as such, the measurement was limited with several single items representing theoretical constructs. The available measurement of reliance on different information sources about the COVID-19 pandemic was coarse and limited as it did not identify specific media outlets, blogs, and platforms. As such, our hypothetical argument and analysis is focused on relative differences in endorsing false beliefs between these broad categories of information sources upon which Russian’s rely, as moderated by our construct of ILH. Additional scholarship that more fully isolates reliance specific TV channels, newspapers, online news websites, blogs, or social media platforms would be a contribution and may demonstrate even stronger relationships between the endorsement of misinformation and media use behaviors.

Though the analysis was also correlational, and thus strong causal inferences from the analysis are cautioned, the hypothesized relationships are based on previous scholarship and empirical research. Furthermore, the strength of the analysis is that it employs a national, generalizable survey sample with high external validity. Notwithstanding, future research should aim to replicate this analysis with study designs with more causal leverage (e.g., longitudinal panel survey, experimental) across a range of national contexts and topical beliefs beyond COVID-19.

The goal of our study was to examine the relationships between news media, digital media, ILH, and endorsement of COVID-19 misinformation within an authoritarian context with limited media freedom. An interesting pattern of results emerged with the most consistent finding centered on ILH being associated with a greater likelihood of endorsing false beliefs about COVID-19 in all three analyses. This set of relationships highlights how those who feel “helpless,” due to the greater and greater cognitive and emotional costs of discerning truth from fiction, are the most vulnerable to high levels of circulating false and misleading information—whether about COVID-19 or other topics (e.g., elections, etc.).

These findings also identify the need to further unpack ILH as an independent variable (i.e., how it influences ability to make veracity judgments) and dependent variable (i.e., identifying are the individual and contextual factors that cause it). Within our analysis we treat ILH as an independent variable and stable trait that moderates the relationship between media exposure and holding false beliefs. In addition, ILH has little to no correlation with either of our media reliance measures, with a small negative correlation with reliance on digital media use (r = −.10, p < .001) and no significant correlation with reliance on TV and newspaper news (r = .00, p = n.s.). In contrast, as our results show ILH has a significant association with all three of our false belief items suggesting that ILH is not likely a result of high levels of exposure to media in general.

We theorize, rather, that ILH develops over a long-period of high exposure to false and misleading information competing with accurate media claims that increases the cognitive and affective costs of discriminating between accurate and inaccurate information—which leads to individuals “giving up” trying to do so. This, in turn, increases their likelihood of endorsing false information as true. Future scholarship on this topic, thus, should endeavor to examine ILH as a state that develops over an extended period of repeated exposure to high levels of mediated false or misleading information. This question necessitates a different research design than this study, for example, such as a longitudinal survey panel that could tease out both the causes and consequences if ILH in population over long period of time.

A second consistent finding was that the relationship between digital media use and the likelihood of endorsing COVID-19 misinformation was highly contingent on ILH. At low levels of ILH, digital media reduces the likelihood of endorsing Russian state-sponsored misinformation about COVID-19. However, at higher levels of ILH, digital media either has no relationship with, or in fact increases, the likelihood of endorsing COVID-19 misinformation. Thus, whether digital media promotes greater accuracy of beliefs, as compared to reliance on Russian state-controlled TV news and newspapers, is dependent on how helpless individuals feel to discern fact from fiction—again highlighting the importance of further unpacking the concept of ILH in future research. At the same time, this pattern of relationships highlight how digital media may be a source of (relatively) more accurate information in comparison to major news media in authoritarian contexts. This role stands in in contrast to how digital media sources, such as online news sites and social media, are usually portrayed as less reliable and credible in comparison to traditional news media outlets in democratic contexts.

In regard to reliance on domestic Russian TV news and newspapers, its association with audience misinformation was mixed. Reliance on Russian news media was associated with a greater likelihood of believing the falsehood that COVID-19 originated in a laboratory. In contrast, despite the Russian news media questioning the health risk posed by COVID-19 at the outset of the pandemic, reliance on Russian news media was associated with a lower likelihood of holding the false belief that it posed a health risk similar or less than the common flu. A similar pattern exists in the relationship between the likelihood of endorsing misinformation and trust in President Vladimir Putin. Those who trust Putin are less likely to believe COVID-19 has a similar or lesser health risk than the common flu but more likely to believe (incorrectly) that it originated in the United States.

This discrepancy may be due to the change in Russian government messaging and news coverage about COVID-19 that stressed the high health risk of the pandemic as cases began to surge inside Russia in late March and early April 2020 (Cooper, 2020; Higgins, 2020a). Thus, in retrospect, these results are consistent with the proposition that Russians who rely heavily on Russian state-controlled TV news and newspapers media for information are more likely to have beliefs, whether accurate or inaccurate, reflecting the primary messaging of the Russian government and news media. In sum, our article highlights how reliance on state-controlled media in authoritarian countries have a great deal of power to shape beliefs in line with state propaganda regardless of its veracity. At the same time, it demonstrates that online news, blogs, and social media have the potential to be an alternative information resource in authoritarian environments that increases the accuracy of beliefs, for at least some members of the public that are not overwhelmed by the volume of claims and counter-claims about the pandemic.

Real World Impact

Misinformation also has real world consequences. For instance, even with the Russian media and government modifying its messaging about the health risk of COVID-19 during the course of the pandemic, a small majority of Russians (51.2%) in the June 2020 VCIOM poll believed that COVID-19 posed a health risk similar to, or lesser than, the common flu. The same question again asked by VCIOM, six months later in December 2020 for the Trianon Dialogue, found that nearly half (49.5%) of the Russian public continued to endorse this false belief (Trianon Dialogue, 2020). This false belief about the severity of COVID-19, in turn, may negatively impact preventive health behaviors such as social distancing and mask wearing inside Russia as the pandemic continues (e.g., Higgins, 2020b) demonstrating how misinformation can increase the public health burden of the pandemic.

It also may contribute to the high levels of vaccine hesitancy among the Russian public. As of December 2020, 58% of Russians say they are not ready to be vaccinated with the Russian Sputnik V COVID-19 vaccine (Levada Center, 2021). Likewise, a similar question by VCIOM on the December 2020 survey conducted for the Trianon Dialogue found 52% of all Russians saying they were extremely unlikely or unlikely to get vaccinated against COVID-19 with a Russian vaccine (Trianon Dialogue, 2020). A pattern emerges if we cross-tabulate vaccination intentions with belief about the severity of COVID-19 from the same December 2020 Trianon Dialogue poll. Among those who accurately believe that COVID-19 is much more severe than the common flu (50.5% of the sample), 52.4% say they are extremely likely/likely to receive a Russian COVID-19 vaccine. In comparison, among those who believe COVID-19 has similar to lower severity than the flu (49.5% of the sample), a substantially small percentage, 36.7%, report being extremely likely/likely to be vaccinated with a Russian COVID-19 vaccine.

Moreover, our analysis indicates that Russians who do not trust Putin are more likely to believe COVID-19 has similar or lesser health risk than the common flu. In other words, Russian citizens who are most likely to oppose Putin politically are the same citizens who are most likely to dismiss the health risks of COVID-19. This confluence may be partially a result of the aforementioned shift in messaging about the risks of COVID-19 by Russian government and media that likely sowed distrust amongst those most opposed to Putin and the Russian government. It also portends possible resistance from a significant portion of the population to any COVID-19 vaccination programs the Russian government plans to institute to combat the pandemic—which in turn may hamper the establishment of herd immunity and increase the public health burden of the pandemic.

Again, the Trianon Dialogue survey data from December 2020 sheds some light on this question. The Trianon Dialogue did not ask a question about trust in President Putin, but they did ask a similar question about whether respondents approved or disapproved of his performance. In their survey, 59% of respondents approved of President Putin’s performance, 30.6% disapproved, and 10% neither approved nor disapproved. A cross-tabulation of this question with the questions about severity of COVID-19 as compared to the flu and vaccination intentions toward the Russian COVID-19 vaccine reveals a sizable “trust gap.”

Respondents who approve of President Putin are more likely to accurately believe the severity of COVID-19 is much greater than the flu than those who disapprove of him (53.2% compared to 44.7%). This gap is consistent with our study results based on data from June 2020. Likewise, approval of President Putin is associated with intention to get the Russian COVID-19 vaccine, with 58.3% of those who approve of him saying they are extremely likely or likely to get it. In contrast, the vast majority, 76.7%, of those who disapprove of his performance say they are extremely unlikely or unlikely to get vaccinated. Whether the overall high level of vaccine hesitancy, and this trust gap, continues in Russia in the face of additional evidence that the Russian Sputnik V COVID-19 vaccine is safe and effective (Jones & Roy, 2021) is unknown. However, the early Russian state-controlled TV and newspaper news coverage disparaging COVID-19’s severity, regardless of its change in tone and coverage in late spring about the health risks of the pandemic, may have contributed to promoting an inaccurate belief that continues to impacts willingness to vaccinate against COVID-19.

Widely endorsed false beliefs amongst the Russian public that COVID-19 is manmade and that the United States was its originator also have potential implications for U.S.–Russian relations. Public opinion research has shown that the Russian and American publics are not inherently antagonistic toward each other as often as portrayed in the news media and political discourse in both countries (e.g., Hale & Kamenchuk, 2020). In actuality, when it comes to mutual global threats such as terrorism or nuclear war, publics in both countries are willing to compromise and cooperate with each other to solve them. The global nature of pandemic and severe consequences for many countries invites such cooperation between Russia and the United States, however, these false beliefs about the source and origin of COVID-19 spread by the Russian government and media for both domestic and international audiences will further sour relations and hamper any international cooperation fighting the pandemic between the two countries.

SUPPLEMENTARY DATA

Supplementary Data are available at IJPOR online.

Conflicts of interest: Olga Kamenchuk consults with VCIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Center) on international research projects.

Notes

Erik C. Nisbet (PhD, Cornell University) is the Owen L. Coon Professor of Communication & Policy Analysis and an associate professor in the School of Communication at Northwestern University. His research interests focus on political communication and public opinion with a focus on science and environmental policy, foreign policy, democratic governance.

Olga Kamenchuk (PhD, Utah State University) is a senior lecturer in the School of Communication and an associate research professor at the Institute for Policy Research at Northwestern University. Her research concentrates on political psychology, public diplomacy, international communication, public opinion, and post-communist politics.

Footnotes

References