Abstract

Despite the potential of amicable messages to transform the course of conflicts, studies have neglected the reasons target audiences accept or reject such messages. This study examines the evaluation of amicable messages conveyed by three groups of leaders perceived as “controversial” in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict from the Israeli perspective: Palestinian, Middle Eastern, and Western. A content analysis of comments (N =1,885) to news reports about amicable messages delivered by leaders of the three groups showed that the use of Israeli commenters in source-, receiver-, and message-related argument vary when commenting to amicable messages from different leaders. We discuss potential explanations for these distinct patterns and how leaders aiming to appease foreign audiences can formulate effective amicable messages.

Protracted conflicts are frequently characterized by negative feelings, beliefs, and attitudes toward the opposing group, and in many cases also include extreme violence between the conflicting parties (Bar-Tal, 2009; Halperin, 2014). Within this destructive reality, surprising occurrences in the form of amicable messages exchanged between opposing states allow the imagination of an alternative reality (Mitchell, 2000). Conciliatory messages from a leader representing a country on one side of the conflict to the leadership and public of the other side can reduce hostility (Kriesberg, 2002) and as a consequence, may create an opportunity to divert the conflict to a different trajectory (Mitchell, 2000). Such transformation, however, is dependent upon the receivers’ evaluation of the amicable signal. Even if the political elite in the target state manages to overcome the distrust barrier and accept a conciliatory message conveyed by an opponent, opposition by citizens is likely to hinder an effective peace process (Kriesberg, 2002). A successful process is thus possible only if the public at the receiving end positively evaluates the message and expresses support for the initiation of relations with those perceived as enemies (Bar-Tal, 2000).

Existing literature in the field of conflict resolution has examined the conditions under which amicable messages and peace initiatives bring about a positive reaction among the target audience (Cohen-Chen et al., 2014; Kampf & David, 2019; Maoz, 2012; Mitchell, 2000). Yet, these studies mostly focused on the content of the messages or the emotional reaction of the recipients as the basis for evaluating amicable messages, while overlooking other contextual factors, such as the national identity of the messenger. Although studies that examined the effect of cognitive and social biases such as gender and group affiliation of the initiator (i.e., in-group vs. out-group member) on the assessment of peace initiatives are available (David & Maoz, 2015; Maoz, 2009; Maoz et al., 2002), almost no research thus far has focused on different evaluation patterns of amicable messages delivered by an assortment of controversial leaders. The only study within the purview of peace studies that focused on the role of messengers of amicable messages emphasized their political status in their home states, while ignoring their reputation in the target state and identity-related issues (Mitchell, 2000). Other studies that engaged in the evaluation of messages in light of their foreign messengers analyzed their reception in nonconflictual public diplomacy contexts (Agadjanian & Horiuchi, 2020; Dragojlovic, 2015; Goldsmith & Horiuchi, 2009; Schatz & Levine, 2010).

Using the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as a case study, we examine whether amicable messages delivered by controversial leaders in the context of a single conflict stimulate different patterns of evaluation by Israeli news commenters. To this aim, we build on previous categorization of three evaluative domains for assessing amicable messages conveyed by foreign controversial leaders: source credibility, commenter stance, and message components (Kampf et al., 2021). We apply this categorization to examine whether Israeli news commenters evaluate messages that concern the Israeli–Palestinian conflict differently when their source is Palestinian, Middle Eastern, or Western. Based on the literature of conflict resolution and public diplomacy, we can expect that amicable messages delivered by various adversaries will result in different responses; however, the nature of this difference would be hard to speculate, and thus this study is exploratory by nature. Uncovering the distinct patterns of evaluation of amicable messages from different leaders may improve our understanding as to how to increase the potential of such messages to be positively evaluated by the target audience, and as a consequence, advance reconciliation and peace processes.

For this purpose, we conducted a content analysis of comments posted by Israeli news readers (N =1,885) to reports covering amicable messages delivered by Palestinian, Middle Eastern, and Western leaders. This enabled us to trace the extent to which commenters used source-, receiver-, and message-related arguments when expressing their opinion regarding such messages. We then repeated this procedure, distinguishing between the odds the commenters would use these three types of arguments in a positive manner, as opposed to a negative manner. Overall, our results show that controversial leaders differing in their national identity stimulate different evaluation patterns toward amicable messages.

Theoretical background

Amicable messages in conflicts

Amicable messages are verbal and nonverbal conciliatory, friendly, or constructive signals sent from an opponent aiming to initiate, restore, reinforce, or maintain the relationship with the message’s target (Kampf et al., 2021). In line with Mitchell’s (2000) typology, such messages can express a withdrawal from past accusations or positions (abandonment), an acceptance of the opponent (acknowledgment) or a possible future joint activity (initiation). While formal political talks and negotiations can achieve settlement in the later stages of a reconciliation process, amicable messages from opposing parties are considered initiatives or first signs of change in a conflict and signal a willingness to talk to the other side (Mitchell, 2000). They are designed to build trust and change the perspectives and beliefs of both sides about the intentions and goals of the other (Bar-Tal, 2000; Kampf et al., 2019). Studies have examined the role of such signals in initiating or renewing communication between opponents: apologies (Cohen, 2004), greetings (Kampf, 2016), and other signs of respect and recognition (e.g., symbolic handshakes between rival state representatives [Ross, 2004]). The transformative power of amicable messages lies at the tactical level (i.e., in the change of behavior of the actors) and their potential consequences, which range between short-term (i.e., explicit attention to a message) and medium-term (initiating an accommodative sequence; Mitchell, 2000).

While aiming to calm the tension, not all amicable messages will be successful in achieving their intended results. Although the endorsement of positive signals by decision-makers in the target state is a basic condition for the initiation of a reconciliation process, an effective process also requires mobilizing the support of public opinion in that state (Kriesberg, 2002). Public rejection or the resistance of influential groups to an initiative can influence the decisions of target leaders and impede reconciliation processes (Bar-Tal, 2000).

The importance of public reception of amicable messages has aroused scholarly interest in the factors underlying their evaluation. One group of studies focuses on the structure, form, and characteristics of the message (Maoz, 2012; Mitchell, 2000). These studies have demonstrated that the effectiveness of a conciliatory message is higher when the initiative is framed as a threat rather than a promise (Maoz, 2012), emphasizes acceptance rather than empowerment (Shnabel et al., 2009), or emphasizes the possible losses in continuing the conflict (Gayer et al., 2009). For example, according to Maoz (2012), elucidation of fear is effective when seeking approval for compromise-based peace proposals. More specifically, receivers will be more inclined to accept such proposals if they are accompanied by threats that war will erupt if they are rejected. Another group of studies focuses on the receivers of the message and their predispositions. They argue that existing worldviews, attitudes, and societal beliefs held by the receivers are central factors shaping the evaluation of positive signals from rivals (Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011). Furthermore, typical conflict emotions like anger or hatred function as psychological barriers that may prevent the cognitive processing of positive information coming from a rival, leading to noncompromising attitudes (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011; Halperin, 2011). Low level of trust in opponents is another prominent factor that can undermine the positive evaluation of amicable messages (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006), indicating that perception about opponent leaders can shape the target audience’s evaluation of their message.

Building on these findings, a recent study suggests a framework for understanding the grounds upon which amicable messages delivered in a conflict are evaluated by their target audience (Kampf et al., 2021). Within the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, they found that Israeli news commenters employ eleven evaluative categories that can be clustered into three domains: the source of the message (e.g., characteristics), the receiver of the message (e.g., emotional reaction), and the form and content of the message (e.g., lexical choices). The three domains and their respective categories are applied to evaluate the message, either positively, in a manner that encourages accepting the message (opportunity repertoire), or negatively, advocating the rejection of the message (suspicious repertoire).

The current study extends the above framework by examining how the three domains are applied by news commenters when evaluating the messages of various leaders. We examine whether the evaluation of amicable messages vary in accordance with leaders’ national identity, stimulating greater or lower degree of use in source-, receiver-, or message-related categories, and how the use of the three domains differ in its valence (positive or negative) across leaders. Revealing such differences and their features can serve as a guide for shaping amicable messages to achieve optimal results. For example, if a message from a leader with national identity X is more likely to be negatively evaluated based on the source of the message but positively evaluated based on the content, emphasizing the content of the message rather than its messenger may result in a better evaluation of the message. According to this logic, a less disputed messenger can convey the message to the target public on behalf of the controversial leader, potentially resulting in wider acceptance of the message.

Messenger identity and evaluation of their messages

Although less common in conflict resolution studies, understanding the source-identity-oriented mechanisms through which messages from a leader in one state are interpreted and evaluated by the public of another was the main goal of many public diplomacy studies (Agadjanian & Horiuchi, 2020; Dragojlovic, 2011, 2013, 2015; Goldsmith & Horiuchi, 2009; Nye, 2008; Schatz & Levine, 2010). Public diplomacy messages carry a potential not only to improve the leaders’ and their states’ image in the international arena, but also, and perhaps more importantly, to influence public opinion in the target state in matters regarding domestic issues and foreign affairs (Agadjanian & Horiuchi, 2020; Dragojlovic, 2013; Goldsmith & Horiuchi, 2009; Schatz & Levine, 2010). Whether their signals are verbal (e.g., formal statements, speeches directed toward foreign publics) or nonverbal (e.g., visits, gifts, or even symbolic handshakes), foreign leaders are evaluated for their trustworthiness, and their messages for their value (Hall & Yarhi-Milo, 2012; Kampf & David, 2019; Mitchell, 2000).

From these studies, we can learn that the identity of the foreign leader delivering a message affects the way a message is evaluated by the target audience (Dragojlovic, 2011; Goldsmith & Horiuchi, 2009; Schatz & Levine, 2010). Goldsmith and Horiuchi (2009) found that official visits of credible foreign statespersons can produce a positive impact on the visited state’s public opinion regarding the image of the visitors’ states. However, they argue that this positive outcome occurs only when the visiting leaders are perceived as credible. Moreover, studies found that images of foreign leaders can influence a foreign public’s attitude regarding them, the citizens they represent, and the foreign policy their own state should implement toward the leaders’ states (Balmas, 2019; Dragojlovic, 2011; Schatz & Levine, 2010). Overall, these studies demonstrate that the identity of the source and their reputation are important factors shaping the evaluation of their messages by a foreign public.

Applying the findings from the field of public diplomacy to amicable messages delivered from a foreign leader in conflict situations, it is reasonable to expect that controversial leaders representing the various actors in a conflict (i.e., opponents, mediators) have different reputations and are perceived differently by the target of the message. Although their differing identities are expected to stimulate different evaluation patterns to their messages, it is hard to speculate in what ways. Relying on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as a case study, this study aims to map such differences.

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict as case study

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict meets all the main features of an intractable conflict, including having a violent nature, centrality in the lives of the opponent groups, presence in all aspects of social and political life, and a sense of irreconcilability (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). The extensive international intervention by other states’ representatives in the conflict (Kriesberg, 2001; Melander et al., 2009), provides the opportunity to examine how messages from leaders with diverse identities are evaluated. Focusing on Jewish Israelis’ evaluations of controversial foreign leaders, we distinguish between three groups of leaders that can be classified according to their level of controversial stance toward the Israeli position in the conflict: direct opponent, indirect opponent, and controversial proponent.

From the perspective of Jewish Israelis, Palestinians are the direct opponent in the conflict, thus their leaders constitute the first group of representatives in our study. Second, Middle Eastern leaders (e.g., Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey) are defined as indirect opponents because of the ethnic and religious links with and general support of the Palestinian side. Although peace agreements between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and United Arab Emirates opened the path to official relations between Israel and parts of the Arab world, many of the Arab League states still do not formally recognize the existence of Israel (House of Representatives Resolution, 2008), and occasionally their leaders criticize Israeli policy or act against Israel in diplomatic forums. Therefore, their leaders are considered controversial from an Israeli perspective, constituting the second group of representatives.

Third, leaders of Western states were referred to as controversial proponents in this study. Their ongoing attempts to mediate between the conflicting parties (Aggestam, 2002; Soetendorp, 2002), forces them to articulate their stances regarding sensitive issues, with the inevitable scenario of taking sides often resulting in accusations of bias. From the perspective of Jewish Israelis, the cultural and political similarities between Israel and Western countries create an expectation for such countries to favor the Israeli perspective (Sheafer & Shenhav, 2009; Sheafer et al., 2014). When formulating messages that are considered neutral or biased, Western leaders may break the Jewish–Israelis expectations. Against the backdrop of their dual position, Western leaders constitute the third group in our study.

Method

Data collection

This study aims to examine the patterns of evaluation of amicable messages conveyed by foreign leaders perceived as controversial to different degrees by the target audience. Hence, we conducted a content analysis of comments to news reports in Hebrew covering amicable messages from controversial leaders published in Israeli online news sites.

Comments were chosen as our unit of analysis because they serve as a platform for individuals who are motivated to publicly express their opinions and contribute to public discourse (Spyridou, 2019). While it is acknowledged that user comments to online news stories may not represent general public opinion, there are several important advantages to studying public opinion as expressed in such comments. First, in contrast to methods such as surveys and experiments, comment sections in online news platforms provide access to individuals’ stances and evaluations in natural settings, allowing the capture of public opinion in a nonartificial context (Cho & Hong, 2009). Second, such evaluative comments present possible interpretations of social and political issues and thus have a role in shaping public opinion (Henrich & Holmes, 2013). Accordingly, exposure to other readers’ comments may affect the evaluation of messages and shape the opinion of news readers with regard to news stories (Lee et al., 2017). Third, although criticized in the past for lack of deliberative qualities (Dori-Hacohen & Shavit, 2013), comment sections are a discursive environment in which commenters articulate their spontaneous opinion when evaluating news stories (Henrich & Holmes, 2013; Marmorstein & Sclafani, 2019). In other words, even if the deliberative quality of the comment is low, the commenter’s attitude can be extracted. In this specific study, the analysis of comments from a broad range of news platforms enabled us to demarcate the patterns through which Israeli commenters verbally evaluate amicable messages coming from foreign leaders.

Our final corpus comprised 1,885 comments made in 53 reports on 38 different amicable messages coming from foreign, controversial leaders. The 53 reports on amicable communication between states were collected in a multistep process:

Step 1: 300 reports were collected by four researchers in 1-year tracking (2016–2017) of news-media stories with friendly or reconciliatory interstate interactions, adhering to the definition of amicable messages. We defined amicability on the basis of studies on solidarity and reconciliation (for a detailed description of the theoretical procedure see Kampf et al., 2019), and included both messages (e.g., statements of support of the Israeli official policy) and gestures (e.g., willingness to renew peace talks after a long hiatus) in our searches.

Step 2: On the basis of the collected data, a list of various types of amicable messages (e.g., greetings, expression of gratitude, condolences) and respective keywords (e.g., congratulate, willing, recognize, wish, agreed, regret) were consolidated (see the list of keywords in the Supplementary Materials).

Step 3: For the purpose of the current study, only amicable messages from foreign controversial leaders were included in the corpus. Focusing on the Israeli perspective, we defined controversial leaders as non-Israeli statespersons who, before making amicable statements, were publicly perceived as acting unfavorably toward Israel in the context of the Israeli–Arab conflict. Building on this definition of controversial leaders and our earlier definition of amicable messages, we used the list of keywords to search in online Israeli news media platforms (Ynet, Ha’aretz, Walla, Mako, Israel Hayom, Globes, Ma’ariv NRG, Rotter) for all news items that included relevant stories, until we reached a saturation point in which we could not identify further variation. Overall, we identified 53 relevant reports between the years 2004 and 2019 (see full list of reports in the Supplementary Materials). To the best of our knowledge, all relevant reports that were published in the mainstream Israeli online news websites are included in our corpus. These 53 news reports have covered 38 different amicable messages conveyed by foreign controversial leaders toward Israel, with several instances covered in more than one news website.

Step 4: Next, all users’ responses posted in the comment sections (N = 4,301) of the 53 reports were collected. After excluding irrelevant and duplicate comments, the final corpus comprised 1,885 comments.1Table 1 summarizes the distribution of reports, amicable messages, and relevant comments across the three groups of leaders. Overall, of the 53 reports to 38 amicable messages, the highest number of reports covered amicable messages from Middle Eastern leaders, with a total of 22 reports and an average of 26.6 comments per report (SD = 25.14). A total of 20 reports that covered amicable messages from Palestinian leaders had 50.7 comments on average (SD = 42.48). Finally, 11 reports concerned messages from Western leaders, with an average of 25.8 relevant comments per report (SD = 20.66).

Table 1.

Distribution of reports, messages, and relevant comments across leader groups.

PalestinianMiddle EasternWesternTotal
Reports20221153
Messages1417738
Relevant comments1,0145872841,885
PalestinianMiddle EasternWesternTotal
Reports20221153
Messages1417738
Relevant comments1,0145872841,885
Table 1.

Distribution of reports, messages, and relevant comments across leader groups.

PalestinianMiddle EasternWesternTotal
Reports20221153
Messages1417738
Relevant comments1,0145872841,885
PalestinianMiddle EasternWesternTotal
Reports20221153
Messages1417738
Relevant comments1,0145872841,885

Coding procedure and measures

Exploratory stage

The aim of the coding procedure was to map the prominent criteria employed by commenters in evaluating amicable messages from controversial foreign leaders. A bottom-up approach was adopted in the initial stage, during which 1,200 comments were fully read one by one by a team of four researchers in the course of ten meeting. This process yielded a list of the main criteria serving Israeli commenters in evaluating amicable messages (the full list is discussed below).

Codebook

Based on the list of criteria generated in the exploratory stage, a codebook was formulated to examine the dominance of arguments in the commenters’ verbal evaluations related to the source (the persons delivering the message), the receiver (commenters and their Israeli in-group members), and the content of the messages. Each criterion found salient in the initial exploratory step served as a category in the codebook (see Supplementary Materials). Furthermore, each criterion could be used to express a positive or a negative stance (acceptance or rejection) toward the amicable message. Table 2 presents the criteria and examples for each criterion, divided into three domains as follows:

Table 2.

Criteria of commenter evaluation divided into three domains of evaluation.

DomainCriterion of evaluationExamples
Source-related argumentsPrevious and present acts“She…spreads hatred against Israel whenever possible”.
“The people of Israel will never forget your support for Israel’s security needs”.
Source’s intentions“He is here to act out, but later will try to hurt us”.
“He sounds credible”.
Source’s characteristics“The most unsuccessful and hostile president towards Israel”.
“A brave good man”.
Source’s motive“He is saying that because his wife is [being treated] in an Israeli hospital”.
“Presumably what changed the prince’s mind is the fear of Iran”.
Receiver-related argumentsEmotional reaction“Exciting, honestly”.
“I feel humiliated”.
In-group identity“Go on Bibi [Netanyahu, prime minister], don’t miss this opportunity like you do with others”.
“Israel will manage without Saudi Arabia as it has done to this day”.
In-group action“When we are strong and not giving up—the world respects us”.
“He is a saint all of a sudden only because Israel caught the released [Palestinian] prisoners”.
Message-related argumentsSatisfaction of content“Convincing. His words make sense”.
“He didn’t really apologize for what he said”.
Value of words“Peace starts with personal relations, telephone conversations, and WhatsApp messages”.
“Empty talk”
Future outcomes“Maybe it will be an opening for peace”.
“If we listen, we will be going like sheep to slaughter”.
No message will suffice“No apology will make up for his statements”.
“My children and I and the next generations will not forgive you”.
Reference to mediation“We’ll believe it when we’ll hear it from her [Sweden’s foreign minister] in public”.
“Good to know that he [the Palestinian Authority President] is willing to contact you [Israeli politician mediator]”.
DomainCriterion of evaluationExamples
Source-related argumentsPrevious and present acts“She…spreads hatred against Israel whenever possible”.
“The people of Israel will never forget your support for Israel’s security needs”.
Source’s intentions“He is here to act out, but later will try to hurt us”.
“He sounds credible”.
Source’s characteristics“The most unsuccessful and hostile president towards Israel”.
“A brave good man”.
Source’s motive“He is saying that because his wife is [being treated] in an Israeli hospital”.
“Presumably what changed the prince’s mind is the fear of Iran”.
Receiver-related argumentsEmotional reaction“Exciting, honestly”.
“I feel humiliated”.
In-group identity“Go on Bibi [Netanyahu, prime minister], don’t miss this opportunity like you do with others”.
“Israel will manage without Saudi Arabia as it has done to this day”.
In-group action“When we are strong and not giving up—the world respects us”.
“He is a saint all of a sudden only because Israel caught the released [Palestinian] prisoners”.
Message-related argumentsSatisfaction of content“Convincing. His words make sense”.
“He didn’t really apologize for what he said”.
Value of words“Peace starts with personal relations, telephone conversations, and WhatsApp messages”.
“Empty talk”
Future outcomes“Maybe it will be an opening for peace”.
“If we listen, we will be going like sheep to slaughter”.
No message will suffice“No apology will make up for his statements”.
“My children and I and the next generations will not forgive you”.
Reference to mediation“We’ll believe it when we’ll hear it from her [Sweden’s foreign minister] in public”.
“Good to know that he [the Palestinian Authority President] is willing to contact you [Israeli politician mediator]”.
Table 2.

Criteria of commenter evaluation divided into three domains of evaluation.

DomainCriterion of evaluationExamples
Source-related argumentsPrevious and present acts“She…spreads hatred against Israel whenever possible”.
“The people of Israel will never forget your support for Israel’s security needs”.
Source’s intentions“He is here to act out, but later will try to hurt us”.
“He sounds credible”.
Source’s characteristics“The most unsuccessful and hostile president towards Israel”.
“A brave good man”.
Source’s motive“He is saying that because his wife is [being treated] in an Israeli hospital”.
“Presumably what changed the prince’s mind is the fear of Iran”.
Receiver-related argumentsEmotional reaction“Exciting, honestly”.
“I feel humiliated”.
In-group identity“Go on Bibi [Netanyahu, prime minister], don’t miss this opportunity like you do with others”.
“Israel will manage without Saudi Arabia as it has done to this day”.
In-group action“When we are strong and not giving up—the world respects us”.
“He is a saint all of a sudden only because Israel caught the released [Palestinian] prisoners”.
Message-related argumentsSatisfaction of content“Convincing. His words make sense”.
“He didn’t really apologize for what he said”.
Value of words“Peace starts with personal relations, telephone conversations, and WhatsApp messages”.
“Empty talk”
Future outcomes“Maybe it will be an opening for peace”.
“If we listen, we will be going like sheep to slaughter”.
No message will suffice“No apology will make up for his statements”.
“My children and I and the next generations will not forgive you”.
Reference to mediation“We’ll believe it when we’ll hear it from her [Sweden’s foreign minister] in public”.
“Good to know that he [the Palestinian Authority President] is willing to contact you [Israeli politician mediator]”.
DomainCriterion of evaluationExamples
Source-related argumentsPrevious and present acts“She…spreads hatred against Israel whenever possible”.
“The people of Israel will never forget your support for Israel’s security needs”.
Source’s intentions“He is here to act out, but later will try to hurt us”.
“He sounds credible”.
Source’s characteristics“The most unsuccessful and hostile president towards Israel”.
“A brave good man”.
Source’s motive“He is saying that because his wife is [being treated] in an Israeli hospital”.
“Presumably what changed the prince’s mind is the fear of Iran”.
Receiver-related argumentsEmotional reaction“Exciting, honestly”.
“I feel humiliated”.
In-group identity“Go on Bibi [Netanyahu, prime minister], don’t miss this opportunity like you do with others”.
“Israel will manage without Saudi Arabia as it has done to this day”.
In-group action“When we are strong and not giving up—the world respects us”.
“He is a saint all of a sudden only because Israel caught the released [Palestinian] prisoners”.
Message-related argumentsSatisfaction of content“Convincing. His words make sense”.
“He didn’t really apologize for what he said”.
Value of words“Peace starts with personal relations, telephone conversations, and WhatsApp messages”.
“Empty talk”
Future outcomes“Maybe it will be an opening for peace”.
“If we listen, we will be going like sheep to slaughter”.
No message will suffice“No apology will make up for his statements”.
“My children and I and the next generations will not forgive you”.
Reference to mediation“We’ll believe it when we’ll hear it from her [Sweden’s foreign minister] in public”.
“Good to know that he [the Palestinian Authority President] is willing to contact you [Israeli politician mediator]”.

Source-related arguments

The first argument domain included four criteria that referred to the sender of the message: (a) reference to previous and present acts and expressions by the source; (b) arguments about the source’s sincere or misleading intentions; (c) arguments referring to the source’s identity or characteristics; and (d) arguments concerning the source’s motive.

Receiver-related arguments

The second argument domain contained comments that focused on the receiver, that is, the commenter’s emotions, identity, and in-group actions. The three criteria in this subset are (a) emotional reaction, including expression of feelings or laughter; (b) references to the Jewish Israeli in-group, mentioning subgroups within it or calling for Israeli statespersons to accept or reject the message based on solidarity, identity, and image-related arguments; and (c) arguments maintaining that the message responded to a previous action of the in-group, namely Jewish Israeli receivers and their representatives.

Message-related arguments

The third argument domain contained five distinct criteria referring to the content of the message: (a) whether the content of the message was satisfying; (b) utterances about the value of the words used in the message (i.e., “costly” or “cheap” talk) and the importance of conversations; (c) future outcomes if the message were to be accepted; (d) expressions stating that no gesture would suffice and forgiveness was not an option; and (e) in cases where the message was mediated, references to the mediator of the message or criticism about the fact that it was mediated by another person, a politician, or journalist.

Coding

All reports and comments were coded for the news platform and the year they were published. We also coded comments according to the type of amicable message reported. Some comments contained more than one utterance and thus were not necessarily coded exclusively to a single argument type. For example, a single comment was coded for both receiver-related and source-related categories when a commenter expressed an emotional reaction and trust in the source’s intentions (Exciting and honest). An inter-coder reliability test between two trained coders for all the variables in the codebook achieved satisfying scores (Krippendorff’s α > 0.7).

Results

The results are presented in three stages. In the first section, we examine the differences in the general use of source-, receiver-, and message-related arguments in comments to amicable messages across the three groups of leaders. The second section focuses on the extent of use of each type of argument and their valence (i.e., positive or negative) across the three groups of leaders. In the third section, we present the results of an intra-group analysis, examining the consistency and/or differences in the evaluation patterns of commenters toward messages delivered by different leaders from the same group.

General use across three groups of leaders

Figure 1 presents the proportion of use of each type of argument in the comments across the three groups of leaders. Source-related arguments were the most common response to messages from Palestinian leaders (75.5%) compared with comments to messages from Middle Eastern (55.9%) and Western (54.9%) leaders. Comments to messages from Western leaders had the highest rate of receiver-related arguments (62.8%) compared with comments to messages from Palestinian (49%) and Middle Eastern (48.9%) leaders. Message-related arguments in comments to Middle Eastern leaders were more common (42.5%) compared to the two other groups. Message-related arguments were less frequent compared to other types of arguments in comments to messages delivered by leaders from all three groups.

Proportion of use of three types of arguments in the comments across the three groups of leaders.
Figure 1.

Proportion of use of three types of arguments in the comments across the three groups of leaders.

Overall, these results exclude the possibility that commenters use all three types of arguments equally when commenting to reports about amicable messages from various controversial foreign leaders. While messages from Palestinian leaders trigger more source-related arguments compared with messages from Middle Eastern or Western leaders, messages from Western leaders stimulate more use of receiver-related arguments compared with the two other groups. Although the corpus included all the cases relevant to this study (i.e., comments to news reports on amicable messages from controversial foreign leaders published in Israeli news sites), we have conducted a logistic regression analysis to confirm the differences in the evaluation patterns. The results of the analysis supported the findings (see Table S5 in the online Supplementary Data), demonstrating significant differences in the likelihood of using source-, receiver-, and message-related arguments in line with the patterns evident in Figure 1.

While these results provide a better understanding of the domains on which commenters based their evaluate messages from the various leaders, the valence of use in each type is still not clear. The patterns of positive and negative use of source-, receiver-, and message arguments are examined in the next section.

Positive vs. negative use of arguments across the three groups of leaders

The proportion of positive and negative use in source-, receiver-, and message-related arguments is presented in Figure 2. The use of source-related arguments to positively evaluate messages is relatively low across all three groups of leaders. Negative references to the source were most common in comments to messages from Palestinian leaders (64%) compared with comments to messages from Western (35%) and Middle Eastern leaders (34.6%). Positive receiver-related arguments were mostly used in comments to messages from Western leaders (35%). Negative receiver-related arguments were more common when the messenger was Palestinian (34.8%). Finally, the use of positive message-related arguments was relatively low, but most common in comments to messages from Middle Eastern leaders (22.5%), followed by Palestinian leaders (12.2%).

Proportion of positive and negative use in the three types of arguments in comments across the three groups of leaders.
Figure 2.

Proportion of positive and negative use in the three types of arguments in comments across the three groups of leaders.

Overall, the results indicate several evaluation patterns. First, while there are no major differences between the three groups of leaders in the positive use of source-related arguments when commenting to their amicable messages, messages from Palestinian leaders are much more likely to be evaluated by commenters negatively based on the source and their characteristics compared with the two other groups. Second, the use in positive receiver-related arguments when evaluating amicable messages is more likely when commenting to messages conveyed by Western leaders, followed by Middle Eastern leaders. Messages from Palestinian leaders, on the other hand, have stimulated the lowest rate of positive receiver-related arguments, but the highest rate of negative receiver-related arguments. Finally, while the differences in the use of negative message-related arguments were not substantial, positive message-related arguments were used to a larger extent in comments to messages from Middle Eastern leaders, followed by Palestinian leaders. An additional logistic regression analysis was conducted to confirm these different patterns of evaluation. The results of the analysis supported most of the findings (see Table S6 in the online Supplementary Data), yet no significant differences were found in the use of negative receiver-related arguments between the three groups.

Intra-group analysis

The results presented above indicate differences in commenters’ use of the three types of arguments when evaluating messages conveyed by the three groups of leaders. In order to examine to what extent commenters’ evaluation patterns were consistent in regard to messages conveyed by different leaders from the same group, we analyzed the types of argument (positive or negative) they expressed toward leaders assigned to each of the three groups.2 Within each group, we identified the leaders whose messages stimulated the lowest and the highest percentages of use of each type of argument in the comments. We then subtracted the lowest percentage from the highest. The results represent the gap in commenter use of each type of argument across leaders within a certain group. The lower the percentage, the more similar commenter evaluation patterns of messages were across leaders from the same group.

As can be seen in Table 3, commenter evaluation patterns toward messages conveyed by different Palestinian leaders were mostly consistent, with gaps of 5.6% or lower for each argument type. The only exception was the use of negative message-related arguments. While messages from the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, stimulated such arguments in 22.5% of the comments, messages delivered by Hamas leader in the West Bank, Hassan Yousef, did so in 48% of the comments, resulting in a gap of 25.5% between the two leaders. This difference can be attributed to Hamas being defined a terror organization; therefore, their amicable messages may have been evaluated as “cheap talk” as long as they are not supported by concrete appeasing actions.

Table 3.

Within-group differences in commenter evaluation patterns.

PalestinianMiddle EasternWestern
Positive source3.9%43.5%17.6%
Negative source5.6%39.6%17.3%
Positive receiver0.0%28.9%8.6%
Negative receiver0.9%48.0%6.9%
Positive message4.2%30.8%0.9%
Negative message25.5%30.4%2.8%
PalestinianMiddle EasternWestern
Positive source3.9%43.5%17.6%
Negative source5.6%39.6%17.3%
Positive receiver0.0%28.9%8.6%
Negative receiver0.9%48.0%6.9%
Positive message4.2%30.8%0.9%
Negative message25.5%30.4%2.8%

Note. Percentages represent the gap between the leaders with the highest and the lowest rates of commenter use of the argument type. Lower percentages indicate that commenter evaluation patterns are more similar among the leaders in the group.

Table 3.

Within-group differences in commenter evaluation patterns.

PalestinianMiddle EasternWestern
Positive source3.9%43.5%17.6%
Negative source5.6%39.6%17.3%
Positive receiver0.0%28.9%8.6%
Negative receiver0.9%48.0%6.9%
Positive message4.2%30.8%0.9%
Negative message25.5%30.4%2.8%
PalestinianMiddle EasternWestern
Positive source3.9%43.5%17.6%
Negative source5.6%39.6%17.3%
Positive receiver0.0%28.9%8.6%
Negative receiver0.9%48.0%6.9%
Positive message4.2%30.8%0.9%
Negative message25.5%30.4%2.8%

Note. Percentages represent the gap between the leaders with the highest and the lowest rates of commenter use of the argument type. Lower percentages indicate that commenter evaluation patterns are more similar among the leaders in the group.

While the analysis indicates similar patterns of receiver- and message-related use in comments aimed at different Western leaders, with gaps of 8.6% or lower between Western leaders for each of the argument types, there are greater differences in comments’ use of source-related arguments across Western leaders in both positive and negative argument types (17.6% and 17.3%, respectively). More specifically, amicable messages delivered by Barack Obama, the former U.S. President, stimulated greater use of positive source-related arguments in the comments compared with those targeted at the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Margot Wallström (27.9% and 10.3% of the comments, respectively). In addition, Wallström’s messages stimulated greater use of negative source-related arguments in the comments compared to Obama’s messages (50% and 32.7%, respectively). These differences may stem from the perceived severity of the specific leader’s actions toward Israel. While Obama is considered controversial due to specific actions perceived unfavorable toward the Israeli official agenda (e.g., nuclear accord with Iran, stopping settlement construction in the West Bank), he is not considered generally anti-Israeli. In contrast, during her time in office, Wallström accused Israel in abstract terms of committing war crimes and thus was perceived generally anti-Israeli. Due to this difference, Wallström may have stimulated more negative comments related to her overall character, intention, and motives when delivering amicable messages as compared to Obama.

The Middle Eastern group reveals a more complex picture, with greater gaps in the use of all types of arguments between leaders, ranging from 48% to 28.9%. One explanation may be the different levels of hostility vis-à-vis leaders and the countries they represent. Specifically, the former President of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, and the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, are part of the group of Middle Eastern leaders who were included in the indirect opponent group (together with leaders from Egypt and Saudi Arabia). However, due to the deep hostility, these two leaders and their states are perceived to have with Israel, they should be considered direct opponents in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. In other words, within the group of Middle Eastern leaders, a distinction between direct and indirect opponents may explain the gaps in the evaluation patterns.

To examine whether such a distinction within the group of Middle Eastern leaders could account for the gaps in commenter evaluation patterns of messages conveyed by leaders in this group, we divided the group into two subgroups: Middle Eastern direct opponents (i.e., the former President of Iran and President of Turkey) and Middle Eastern indirect opponents (e.g., the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Egypt and Saudi Arabia). We then repeated the analysis of gaps in commenter evaluation patterns within each group. The results are presented in Table 4.

Table 4.

Within-group differences in commenter evaluation patterns—Middle Eastern direct and indirect opponents.

Middle Eastern direct opponentsMiddle Eastern indirect opponents
Positive source3.9%24.4%
Negative source3.0%12.0%
Positive receiver0.1%17.1%
Negative receiver19.5%15.1%
Positive message3.4%15.6%
Negative message11.6%30.4%
Middle Eastern direct opponentsMiddle Eastern indirect opponents
Positive source3.9%24.4%
Negative source3.0%12.0%
Positive receiver0.1%17.1%
Negative receiver19.5%15.1%
Positive message3.4%15.6%
Negative message11.6%30.4%

Note. Percentages represent the gap between the leaders with highest and the lowest rates of commenter use of the argument type. Lower percentages indicate that commenter evaluation patterns are more similar among the leaders in the group.

Table 4.

Within-group differences in commenter evaluation patterns—Middle Eastern direct and indirect opponents.

Middle Eastern direct opponentsMiddle Eastern indirect opponents
Positive source3.9%24.4%
Negative source3.0%12.0%
Positive receiver0.1%17.1%
Negative receiver19.5%15.1%
Positive message3.4%15.6%
Negative message11.6%30.4%
Middle Eastern direct opponentsMiddle Eastern indirect opponents
Positive source3.9%24.4%
Negative source3.0%12.0%
Positive receiver0.1%17.1%
Negative receiver19.5%15.1%
Positive message3.4%15.6%
Negative message11.6%30.4%

Note. Percentages represent the gap between the leaders with highest and the lowest rates of commenter use of the argument type. Lower percentages indicate that commenter evaluation patterns are more similar among the leaders in the group.

The analysis reveals consistent patterns of commenter use of source-related arguments and positive receiver- and message-arguments when evaluating messages from Middle Eastern leaders who are considered, from the Israeli perspective, direct opponents of the country. However, the gaps were wider in commenter use of negative message and receiver-related arguments when commenting on amicable messages delivered by the former President of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, compared to messages delivered by the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. More specifically, 56.7% of the comments to Erdoğan’s messages included negative receiver-related arguments, compared to 37.3% of those to Rouhani’s messages (gap: 19.5%); 23.5% of the comments to Rouhani’s messages included negative message-related arguments, compared with 11.9% of those to Erdoğan’s messages (gap: 11.6%). Within the group of Middle Eastern leaders considered indirect opponents, gaps in the use of all types of arguments were still higher compared to the other groups. The most consistent pattern across the leaders of this group was commenter use of negative source-related arguments, with a gap of 12% between the leaders whose comments stimulated the lowest and the highest use of such arguments. Overall, these results indicate that the evaluation patterns of messages from Middle Eastern leaders are not consistent across the leaders in this group.

Discussion and conclusion

Amicable messages conveyed by controversial foreign leaders can positively transform the trajectory of a conflict. Since such messages are not always accepted by the public toward which they are targeted (Kriesberg, 2002; Mitchell, 2000), this study sought to examine a major factor that potentially shapes the receivers’ evaluation. We asked how amicable messages delivered by foreign controversial leaders in the context of a conflict are evaluated by the public of the country to which the message is targeted. Our findings suggest that the national identity of the leader conveying the message is a factor shaping the receivers’ evaluation of the message. A content analysis of comments published in Israeli news websites to reports about such messages from various leaders revealed distinct patterns of responses, which can be attributed to the group affiliation of the leaders delivering the message. However, while the evaluation patterns of messages delivered by Palestinian and Western leaders were mostly consistent across leaders within each group, in the Middle Eastern group the picture was more complex.

The first evaluation pattern revealed in the analysis is that Israeli commenters tended to focus on the intentions, honesty, and motives of the messenger to a greater extent when evaluating amicable messages from Palestinian leaders, compared with Middle Eastern or Western leaders. A nuanced analysis revealed that the national identity of the leader is of importance to the use of negative source-related arguments, but less important to the use of positive source-related arguments. Such negative source-related arguments were used consistently when commenting on messages from various Palestinian leaders. The fact that Palestinian leaders represent the direct opponent, the increased hostility and decreased trust toward Palestinian leaders in Israeli public opinion in the past two decades (Yuchtman-Yaar & Alkalay, 2016) can account for this finding. Frequent negative encounters and experiences with Palestinian representatives and their constant presence in the Israeli news (Cohen, 2013) may also explain the tendency to refer negatively to the (un)trustworthiness, (in)credibility, and motives of the source when evaluating their messages. Even when a specific Palestinian leader is relatively anonymous, the messages may be evaluated in light of their national identity affiliation, resulting in increased negative references to the source.

Second, Israeli commenters tend to use more receiver-related arguments, and in particular, more positive receiver-related arguments when evaluating messages from Western leaders compared with Palestinian and Middle Eastern leaders. Israeli commenters’ propensity to refer to their own identity, image, and emotions when verbally evaluating the message resonates with theories on cultural and political proximity. Accordingly, cultural and political similarities between countries lead to higher mutual understanding and openness and more favorable attitudes toward one another (Sheafer & Shenhav, 2009; Sheafer et al., 2014). Although geographically distant, cultural and political similarities link Israel with Western states in North America and Europe (Harkham, 2011). Such similarities may route Israelis to evaluate amicable messages from those who are perceived to be similar (Western leaders) more favorably, relying on considerations that positively emphasize the “we”, the message receivers, as an in-group.

Third, Israeli commenters are most likely to refer to the content of the message and its possible outcomes in a positive manner when commenting on amicable messages from Middle Eastern followed by Palestinian leaders, and are least likely to include such positive-message-related arguments when the messenger is a Western leader. Mentioning their satisfaction with the content and the lexical use, as well as the wishful outcomes of accepting the message, emphasizes the ability of message components to stimulate positive evaluation. This finding corresponds with the list of conditions for successful conciliatory messages offered by Mitchell (2000), according to which the content, structure, and form of a message are the substantial factors shaping reactions to such a message. A possible account for this finding is based on the receivers’ expectations. Amicable messages from Palestinian and Middle Eastern leaders divert the (non)expectations of Jewish Israelis from their direct and indirect opponents (Kampf et al., 2021; Leshem et al., 2016; Mitchell, 2000), which may lead to greater focus on the surprising message and its positive features.

While the evaluation of messages delivered by different leaders within each group was mostly consistent in the case of the Palestinian and Western leaders, within the Middle Eastern group there was greater variability in commenter use of the different types of arguments to messages from the various leaders. However, when considering additional factors, such as level of hostility and conflict with Israel, these differences were reduced. Specifically, commenter evaluation of amicable messages delivered by Middle Eastern leaders who are considered direct opponents of Israel is more consistent across such leaders. In the case of Middle Eastern leaders who are considered indirect opponents, there is greater variability and the commenter evaluation patterns of messages delivered by different leaders are less consistent.

Taken together, these findings indicate that the various actors delivering messages may evoke distinct processes of evaluation by the public in the target country. Identifying the existence of such patterns adds to our understanding of the potential of amicable messages to successfully advance conflict resolution and forefronts an additional factor that shapes the evaluation of such messages—the national identity of the leader conveying the message. Furthermore, the findings expand existing theories from the field of public diplomacy, contributing to the field of conflict resolution. Accordingly, previous studies pointing out that messages delivered by different leaders are evaluated differently by the target public are harnessed in our study to provide a deeper understanding of how amicable messages delivered by a specific leader can shape the course of a resolution process.

This study also constitutes a first step toward advancing our theoretical knowledge of inter-group amicable communication in general, and more specifically, the importance of source-related variables in amicable communication. For example, the extent to which the target audience of a message is familiar with the source or the extent to which the source is perceived as controversial are two factors that could shape the evaluation of amicable messages from foreign controversial leaders. This logic can also be applied to better understand amicable communication in other settings, such as domestic political conflicts. For example, in the context of U.S. politics, exploring Democrats’ patterns of evaluation of amicable messages conveyed by Republican leaders (and vice versa) could advance our understanding of how members of different political groups evaluate messages from leaders of their opposing group. Finally, it could also be beneficial to study how the interaction between source-related and message-related considerations, such as type of message (e.g., recognition, greeting, apologies) or structure (e.g., length, lexical choices), shape the target audience’s evaluation of amicable messages in states of dispute.

Alongside the theoretical contribution to the field of conflict resolution, the findings have practical implications concerning the formulation of successful amicable messages in times of political tension. First, in order to bypass receivers’ tendency to focus on negative source characteristics when evaluating their messages, direct opponents should emphasize their credibility and positive characteristics. For example, mentioning former statements or actions taken by the messenger that favored the target audience may disprove claims of untrustworthiness. Second, controversial proponents interested in appeasing a target public should utilize the propensity of that public to positively evaluate their messages based on receiver-related considerations. This can be done by including in the message references to solidarity between the target public and the leader delivering the message (and those they represent). Third, if amicable messages from direct and indirect opponents are positively evaluated on the basis of message components, composing a message that will allow the target audience to imagine positive outcomes can increase their effectiveness. Future studies could examine the potential of such adjusted messages in calming political tension.

Some limitations of this study are notable to mention. First, factors besides the group affiliation of the leader (e.g., severity of the source’s transgressions toward Israel or contextual factors such as the current state of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict) delivering them may shape the verbal evaluation of the messages. Moreover, since no two leaders delivered the same message, it is not clear if identical messages would evoke different reactions when coming from different leaders. An experimental design examining the evaluation of the same message coming from different leaders could provide further support for our results and reveal the causal relations between leaders’ national identity and evaluation of their messages based on source-, receiver-, and message-related arguments. Another limitation stems from the use of the perspective of one side of the conflict. Future studies could examine the use of the three types of arguments among Palestinians when they evaluate messages from leaders perceived as controversial from their perspective. This may reveal similar patterns of evaluation, whereby amicable messages from Israeli leaders would be negatively evaluated based on the source. Furthermore, if messages from Middle Eastern leaders were to be positively evaluated by Palestinians on the basis of receiver-related arguments, it could provide further support for the assumption that cultural and political proximity leads to evaluation focused on the in-group. Finally, news-site commenters are not a representative sample of the Israeli population, thus it is not possible to draw unequivocal conclusions relying on that group only. Expanding the sample to include more segments of the Israeli population could add to our understanding of the evaluation of amicable messages.

Despite these limitations, this study advances our understanding of message decoding in conflict-resolution processes by emphasizing the importance of the source, their identity, and their group affiliation. Since amicable messages are expected to bring about positive changes in conflicts and promote conciliation if accepted by the target audience (Kriesberg, 2002; Mitchell, 2000), understanding how these messages are evaluated could enable the formulation of effective amicable messages.

Supplementary Data

Supplementary Data are available at IJPOR online.

Dana Chudy holds an MA degree from the Department of Communication and Journalism, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Zohar Kampf PhD is an associate professor of communication at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is the author of Transforming Media Coverage of Violent Conflicts (2013, Palgrave McMillan) and of more than 60 papers in language and communication journals. He is currently an associate editor of Journal of Pragmatics.

Footnotes

1

Irrelevant comments included irony (utterances “with figurative meaning that departs from its literal meaning” [Wilson & Sperber, 2012: 123]) or digression (utterances that are not directly related to the main conversational contribution [Dascal & Katriel, 1979]). An inter-coder reliability test between two trained coders achieved satisfying agreement (Krippendorff’s α > 0.7) on which comments were irrelevant. Despite the potential of irony to provide further insight to the interpretation of online comments, the gap between what was said and what was meant posed a methodological challenge to reliable identification of argument types.

2

In order to avoid biases in the analysis, we only included leaders whose messages stimulated more than 50 comments. The leaders included were: President of the Palestinian Authority (Mahmoud Abbas), Hamas leader in the West Bank (Hassan Yousef), the Saudi Heir (Mohammed bin Salman), former President of Iran (Hassan Rouhani), President of Turkey (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan), the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bahrain (Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa), the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt (Sameh Shoukry), former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia (Saud bin Faisal Al Saud), former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden (Margot Wallström), former President of the United States (Barack Obama).

Acknowledgements

The authors are indebted to Roni Danziger and Mia Schreiber for their contribution to this study.

Funding

This work was supported by the Israeli Science Foundation (987/61).

Conflicts of interest: None declared.

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