Genetic Essentialism Among Supporters of Populist Radical-Right Parties: Evidence From Sweden and Norway

Abstract

In recent years, at least 3 extreme-right terrorists have justified their mass murders and racist ideology by citing behavioral genetic studies or concepts. Some of their manifestos promoted an essentialist view of biology, with genes portrayed as being racially clustered and reliable predictors of social abilities and behavior. This research note examines a critical question that remains unaddressed: do conventional supporters of populist radical right parties also endorse genetic essentialism? A brief literature review presents key concepts, theoretical explanations, and hypotheses. The empirical section tests the genetic essentialism hypothesis in 2 Nordic countries: Sweden, among supporters of the Sweden Democrats (SD), and Norway, among supporters of the Progress Party (FrP). While both studies confirm key expectations, the results show more substantial effects in Sweden, where an exponential function best represents the relation between genetic essentialism and support for the SD. This finding raises concerns for minority rights, as research indicates that genetic essentialists tend to support eugenic policies. This paper concludes by discussing how researchers in behavioral genetics can help prevent or invalidate misuses of their work.

May 14, 2022, Buffalo, New York: 10 Black individuals are murdered in a supermarket. A document previously posted online by the 18-year-old white shooter reveals his racist ideology, citing recent genetic studies on the roots of intelligence as evidence (Wedow, Martschenko, & Trejo, 2022). March 15, 2019, Christchurch, New Zealand: an Australian gunman murders 51 Muslims in two separate mosques. In his manifesto, the terrorist evokes concepts of population genetics to explain racial differences. July 22, 2011, Norway: a neo-Nazi kills 77 people by detonating a bomb in Olso and shooting participants at a political rally. Citing a Princeton University evolutionary biologist, the terrorist’s manifesto describes his fantasy of a future where technology would allow Nordic parents to preselect the traits of their embryos, with the goal of preserving Nordic characteristics and increasing their offspring’s IQ.¹

All three manifestos explicitly support far-right groups and promote an essentialist view of biology, with genes being portrayed as racially clustered as well as reliable predictors of social abilities and behavior. Despite widespread condemnation of these mass murders by elected officials of all political affiliations, one critical question remains unaddressed: do conventional supporters of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) also endorse genetic essentialism?

This research note begins to bridge the gap. A brief theoretical review highlights possible reasons why genetic essentialism might be more common among PRRP supporters than among those of other parties. Survey data from two Nordic countries provide initial support for this hypothesis, thus raising concerns for minority rights and outlining unexplored questions for future studies.

Literature Review

Terminology

When describing parties on the right side of the political spectrum, this paper adopts a typology that offers clear classification criteria and facilitates international comparisons (Mudde, 2019). On the one hand, mainstream right-wing parties focus their platform around two central ideological positions: fiscal conservatism (e.g., tax cuts, balanced budgets), and social conservatism (e.g., defending traditional institutions and values).

On the other hand, far-right parties orient their political agenda around nativism (i.e., nationalism and xenophobia) and authoritarianism (severe punishment against those who interfere with the strict order of society). Pride of the nation and fear of immigrants from foreign ethnic groups drive stricter immigration policies, welfare chauvinism, and opposition to supranational states. Security concerns drive support for additional police force, stricter law enforcement, and harsher crime punishment. Fiscal and social conservatism may be part of their platform but are rarely at the forefront. The far-right includes two branches: radical-right parties, who accept the electoral process as a means of gaining power, and extreme-right parties, who believe power should be taken by force through insurrection. Contemporary radical-right parties often support a populist ideology, claiming that corrupted elites (e.g., established parties, mainstream media, corporations, international powers) defend their own interests at the expense of the honest people. In line with recent works, this paper uses the term “populist radical-right parties” (PRRPs).

Genetic essentialism refers to a worldview in which one assumes that social differences or similarities between individuals or groups mostly reflect their genetic makeup. Confirming (or dismissing) genetic causation requires rigorous scientific studies. Still, children intuitively start invoking biology to explain social differences from an early age (Gelman, 2003). As they grow up, kids may also overvalue the influence of genetics following exposure to an inadequate science curriculum (Donovan, 2017). News covering research findings from behavioral genetics, and population genetics can also trigger genetic essentialism (Morin-Chassé, 2014, 2020).

From a psychometric perspective, individuals stand at various points on the spectrum of genetic essentialism. Some people hold heterogeneous beliefs: they may think, for example, that intelligence is strongly rooted in genetics, but see gambling addiction mostly as a bad habit. Genetic essentialists, for their part, believe that genes are a robust biological force that occupies a central role in most aspects of social life. According to this worldview, social traits are inheritable from parent to child and shared among family members or descendants of common ancestry (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011). Furthermore, social traits result from natural, strong, invisible and immutable biological forces on which social or medical interventions have limited impacts. Genetic essentialists tend to believe group members share a common biological underpinning, which accounts for their similar skills and behaviors. Therefore, men and women as well as ethnic populations are discrete and exclusive biological groups. At the end of the spectrum, determinists attribute every human trait, every similarity and every difference to DNA.

Reasoning About Genetics

At least three paths of reasoning could explain why genetic essentialism may be more prevalent among supporters of PRRPs.

Some people may develop strong genetic essentialism first, and later gravitate toward PRRPs. The grid-group cultural theory classifies worldviews in four categories: individualists, fatalists, egalitarians, and hierarchists (Douglas, 1986; Mamadouh, 1999; Wildavsky, 1987). According to this theory: (1) hierarchists strongly identify with the social group/category they belong to, and thus feel detached from, and sometimes repelled by, other groups (group dimension); (2) hierarchists believe social order is best achieved when individuals play a predefined, specific role within dominant to subordinate dynamics, and accordingly, show little tolerance for behaviors that deviate from this norm (grid dimension). Unsurprisingly, hierarchists tend to support PRRPs (Bjånesøy, 2014; Olli & Swedlow, 2023). Yet, hierarchism has a strong essentialist component: it views human nature as predetermined and robust to changes, and groups as fundamentally distinct (Mandalaywala, Amodio, & Rhodes, 2018). Policy preferences may develop accordingly. If biology explains why immigrant ethnic groups adhere to different values, integration policies will undoubtedly fail to overcome cultural differences resulting from centuries of segregated evolution. Similarly, if violent behavior is rooted in criminals’ DNA, crime prevention can only be inefficient. At least, harsher sentences would protect the public by preventing hardwired criminals from committing additional assaults.

A second possible path of reasoning reverses the causal arrow: party discourse and in-group pressure among partisans move supporters toward genetic essentialism. Politicians from PRRPs rarely, if ever, make explicit claims suggesting that social differences have biological underpinnings, the issue being too contentious. Nevertheless, far-right parties tend to make generic statements about criminals and immigrants, such as “recidivists are a lost cause” or “foreigners will always remain foreigners.” Such statements assert without nuance that the given characteristic applies uniformly to all members of a group. It is well established that generic statements trigger essentialist beliefs (Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012). Leaders of PRRPs may also argue that out-groups’ differences are intrinsic to their nature. Both unequivocal and vague, such claims can lead partisans to derive their own explanations regarding the origins of differences they observe or assume. Genetic causation can be a simplistic yet satisfying explanation, especially if partisan peers share this assumption or fail to question it (Toff & Suhay, 2019).

A third possibility is motivated reasoning. Here, people hold no explicit beliefs about the role of genetics in society but tend to assign genes a role (or not) if doing so is coherent with some other belief, opinion, or preference on which they hold firm views. People fighting homophobia may not know for sure what causes homosexuality (Frias-Navarro, Monterde-i-Bort, Pascual-Soler, & Badenes-Ribera, 2015). Yet, they may choose to believe/argue that sexual orientation is a permanent, inherited trait if this helps discredit conversion therapy. Others may attribute the characteristics of an outgroup they dislike to its genetic makeup to dissociate themselves from it (Haslam & Levy, 2006; Panofsky, Dasgupta, & Iturriaga, 2021; Suhay, Brandt, & Proulx, 2017). In line with system justification theories (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), genetic arguments may also be used to legitimate the status quo and established social hierarchy (Morin-Chassé, Suhay, & Jayaratne, 2017; Suhay & Jayaratne, 2013).

Psychological Profile

It is beyond the scope of this research note to disentangle which types of reasoning are at play, for whom, when, and why. However, the empirical literature already offers strong indications that genetic essentialism could be more prevalent among PRRP supporters.

Simply put, these individuals share a common psychological profile. Support for PRRPs and genetic essentialism positively correlate with various psychological orientations, including nationalism, racism, out-group prejudice, and xenophobia (Foscher & Kteily, 2020; Huddy, Del Ponte, & Davies, 2021; Keller, 2005; Lee, Reis, & Rogge, 2020; Rangel & Keller, 2011; Van Assche, Dhont, & Pettigrew, 2019). Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientations are prevalent among both PRRP supporters and genetic essentialists (Andrighetto, Trifiletti, Pasin, & Capozza, 2008; Caricati, 2007; Forscher & Kteily, 2020; Lee et al., 2020; Rangel & Keller, 2011; Van Assche et al., 2019; Vasilopoulos, Marcus, Valentino, & Foucault, 2019). PRRP supporters and genetic essentialists also score high on scales measuring soft and hostile sexism (Foscher & Kteily, 2020; Iatridis & Stergiou, 2016; Lee et al., 2020), as well as conservative ideology (Cheung, Schmalor, & Heine, 2021; McGann & Kitschelt, 2005; Vasilopoulos, Marcus, Valentino, & Foucault, 2019).

Hypotheses

This review leads us to cast the following hypotheses:

• H1: Genetic essentialism will be positively associated with support for PRRPs.

• H2: The effect described in H1 will prevail when controlling for sociodemographic profile and ideological self-placement.

• H3: The effect described in H1 will be specific to radical-right parties. Therefore, the association between genetic essentialism and support for other parties will be weaker.

• H4: The effect expressed in H1 is best described as curvilinear. The positive effect of genetic essentialism will be stronger for higher values than for weaker ones.

Study 1. Sweden

The Sweden Democrats

The Sweden Democrats (SD) party was founded in 1988. Initially, its extreme ethnic nationalist ideology, strong positions against immigration and support of the death penalty attracted partisans who self-identified as neo-Nazis or fascists. Change in leadership contributed to the party’s moderation, with self-imposed norms regarding etiquette and a purging of hardline supporters who were unwilling to align with these norms (Widfeldt, 2008). Today, the SD party holds firm anti-immigration views (Hübinette & Lundström, 2020), favors strong police forces and harsh crime punishment (Åberg, 2019), and supports social conservatism through traditional values and customs. The party blames the left elite that has long been in power for most of the problems facing the country. Experts from the PopuList classify the SD as far-right populist (Rooduijn et al., 2024).

Methods

The Citizen Panel of the University of Gothenburg comprises a large and diversified pool of Swedish adult participants. In June 2015, 8,833 participants received an invitation to answer an online survey. After 21 days and two reminders, 8,218 had completed it, for a participation rate of 91.5%. The sample is balanced in terms of gender and heterogeneous with regards to age, educational attainment, and ideological self-placement.

Party Support

Participants had to report how much they like or dislike nine political parties on scales ranging from 0 (strongly dislike) to 10 (strongly like).² While support for the SD is highly skewed (53% of respondents score 0), this variable still shows a significant amount of variation (M = 2.67; SD = 3.55), with 24% answering 6 or higher.

Genetic Essentialism (GE)

11 items were extracted from the original 18-item Belief in Genetic Determinism (BGD) scale proposed by Keller (2005). The BGD scale has repeatedly shown good validity and reliability indicators in various countries. The Swedish translation offered very good internal consistency in the full sample (α = 0.88; M = 2.48; SD = 1.07; min = 0; max = 6).³

Control Variables

Ideological self-placement is coded from 0 (far to the left) to 10 (far to the right) (M = 4.74; SD = 2.58). Educational attainment is coded from 1 (elementary school or lower) to 5 (university/college three years or more) (M = 3.07; SD = 1.46). Age is coded in 7 categories, from 1 (18 to 25) to 7 (76 and older), in ten-year increments (M = 4.35; SD = 1.52). Women represent 48% of the sample.

Results

Nine OLS regression models measured the association between GE and each party support variable, and nine additional models measured the same associations with controls (see Supplementary Table A2). Coefficient values for GE were then extracted and plotted for comparisons (see Figure 1A).⁴

GE is positively associated with support for the SD. The inclusion of control variables weakens the coefficient for GE, suggesting that part of the raw association reflects other covariates.⁵ Standardized regression coefficients indicate that the effect of GE with controls (β = 0.25) is weaker than that of ideology (β = 0.37), but stronger than that of educational attainment (β = −0.13). Postestimation coefficient comparisons⁶ confirm that the association between GE and support for the SD is stronger (more positive) than for other parties (p < .001). Finally, additional models report statistically significant coefficients for GE squared. Figure 1B and C plot the predicted slopes, with and without controls. The effect is weaker when GE is low and stronger when GE is high. These results support H1, H2, H3, and H4.

Study 2. Norway

The Progress Party

The Progress Party (FrP) was created in the 70s in reaction to the rapid expansion of the welfare state. The FrP criticized the left-wing political elite while promoting tax reduction, privatization of state services, and less generous governmental subsidies (Jupskås, 2015). Initially, the party favored limiting immigration on the grounds of economic arguments. In the 90s, however, the party began insisting on integration problems, including cultural differences and risks to public safety (Hagelund, 2003). The FrP shifted its position in favor of welfare chauvinism and rigid integration norms (Bjerkem, 2016). Today, the FrP also supports increasing the police force and imposing harsher sentences on criminals (Jupskås, 2015). Meanwhile, the party platform still favors tax reduction and a less bureaucratic state. The PopuList classifies the FrP as borderline far-right populist (Rooduijn et al., 2024).

Methods

The University of Bergen oversees the Norwegian Citizen Panel. In March 2016, 10,193 of its members, adult participants living in Norway, were contacted to answer an online survey; 4,859 completed it. With passive opt-outs excluded⁷, the survey offers a 67.3% response rate. Among them, 1,190 were asked to answer questions measuring genetic essentialism. The panel included survey weights based on gender, age, and geographic location, extracted from the official national register.

Party Support

Participants had to report how much they like or dislike each of the nine parties represented in parliament on scales ranging from 0 (strongly dislike) to 6 (strongly like). The FrP mainly attracted negative views, with 62% of the sample scoring 0, 1, or 2.

Genetic Essentialism (GE)

Due to limited questionnaire space, Study 2 included only four items derived from the BGD scale adapted for the Norwegian language. These items measured genetic attribution for racial differences, gender differences, similarities between parents and children, and intelligence. Items were combined to form an abridged version of the BGD scale (α = 0.71; M = 2.43; SD = 1.19; min = 0; max = 6).

Control Variables

Ideological self-placement is coded from 0 (far to the left) to 10 (far to the right) (M = 6.06; SD = 2.27). Educational attainment is coded from 1 (no education) to 3 (university/college) (M = 2.47; SD = 0.37). Age is coded in seven categories, from 1 (18 to 25) to 7 (76 and older), in 10-year increments (M = 3.74; SD = 1.68). Women represent 49% of the sample.

Results

Study 2 adopts the same analytic approach as Study 1 (see Supplementary Table B2). Figure 2A presents regression coefficients for GE predicting party support, without and with controls.

GE is positively associated with support for the FrP, but its coefficient is weaker when controls are included.⁸ Standardized regression coefficients suggest that the effect of GE (β = 0.08) is weaker than that of ideology (β = 0.62), while also weaker than that of educational attainment (β = −0.34).⁹ For models without controls, GE has a stronger coefficient on support for the FrP than for any other party (p < .001). This conclusion holds for coefficients with controls (p < .05), with one exception: the Center Party (Sp). While this finding contradicts H3, it is noteworthy that GE is not a significant predictor of support for the Sp, and that its coefficients lean in different ways depending on whether controls are included or not. Additional models find no indication that GE has a curvilinear effect on support for the FrP. Figure 2B and C plot the linear effects without and with controls. These results support H1 and H2, partly support H3, and disprove H4.

Discussion

Overall, the data from Sweden and Norway support our main hypotheses: genetic essentialism was positively linked with support for PRRPs, with and without controls, and this link was stronger than for other parties. However, the evidence was stronger in Sweden for the Sweden Democrats (SD) than in Norway for the Progress Party (FrP). The FrP is often viewed as less radical than the SD (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014), possibly attracting supporters with a broader range of beliefs and worldviews. This weaker effect may also stem from genetic essentialism being measured with fewer items in Norway, potentially providing less accurate estimates.

The curvilinear effect observed in Sweden offers interesting matter for thought. The distribution of genetic essentialism is bell-shaped: moderate levels of genetic essentialism are common, while very low and very high levels are exceptional. The curvilinear function suggests that the positive association forms a steep slope when genetic essentialism approaches the deterministic end, a view endorsed only by a small minority. This original finding was made possible thanks to a Swedish dataset that included some 8,000 participants. The smaller sample size in Norway would have made it more challenging to detect a curvilinear effect, had there been one at play.

Specific hurdles could complicate attempts to replicate this association elsewhere. In countries where PRRPs have garnered significant electoral support, core supporters’ essentialist views might be diluted among those of moderate voters who feel dissatisfied with mainstream parties. In countries with low electoral support for PRRPs, accurately surveying their rare supporters might require oversampling. Social pressure may also prevent PRRP supporters from reporting their real party preference. Finally, cultural specificities could necessitate adjusting the BGD scale content.

This research sought to test the genetic essentialism hypothesis. Given that no prior research had examined it, resources were invested on sample size (Study 1) and sample representativeness (Study 2). Future research should explore underlying mechanisms and include questions about potential mediators. Our literature review offers some directions. One path suggests that genetic essentialism fosters support for nativist and authoritarian policies, which in turn causes adherence to PRRPs. Another path reverses the causal arrow: repeated exposure to generic and essentialist rhetoric from far-right leaders and community members lead PRRP supporters to further endorse genetic essentialism. These two phenomena may also occur simultaneously, reinforcing one another to create a vicious circle of radicalization.

Our findings raise concern for minority rights. In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), recognizing all humans as “born free and equal in dignity and rights” regardless of “nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, language, or any other status.” Dozens of nations recognized the need to protect the rights of minority groups against the majority’s will. Seventy-five years later, many signatory countries see PRRP candidates gain seats, supported by partisans who endorse some of the essentialist views the UDHR hoped to prevent. Growing evidence suggests that genetic essentialism is correlated with support for eugenic policies, such as incentives to have or not to have children depending on talents or behavior (Cheung et al., 2021; Schneider & Gonzalez, 2021; Zigerell, 2020). If genetic essentialism and support for PRRPs are indeed correlated, as the present research suggests, one might expect that PRRP supporters will favor eugenic policies more than supporters of other parties. Future works should investigate this possibility.

Behavioral geneticists are acutely aware of the risk that their work can be misinterpreted or instrumentalized (Panofsky, 2014; Wedow et al., 2022). For non-geneticists, study limitations¹⁰ may seem inconsequential compared to high heritability estimates or misleading soundbites like “gene A predicts behavior B” (Heine, 2017; Morin-Chassé, 2020). Paulich et al. (2024, p.25) stress the need for behavior geneticists to produce freely available online appendices that communicate “both what their research means and does not mean in an accessible way.” In addition, behavioral geneticists must vigorously defend their ground and denounce misappropriations of their work (Balter, 2014; Wedow et al., 2022). In our view, these necessary steps may help mitigate the potential harms caused by misinterpretation, such as stereotype endorsement, discrimination, or worse.

Acknowledgments

The author is grateful to Paul Appelbaum, Maya Sabatello, and Elina Lindgren for their comments and support at an early stage of this project.

Funding

Part of this research was conducted while the author completed a post-doctoral fellowship and Columbia University, New York City. This fellowship was funded by the Fonds de recherche du Québec—Société et culture (FRQSC). The author also benefited from the resources granted by the Swedish Citizen Panel, University of Gothenburg, and the Norwegian Citizen Panel, University of Bergen.

References

Biographical Note

Alexandre Morin-Chassé works for the public sector. He completed a PhD in political science at the Université de Montréal. His research interests include public opinion, political psychology, public understanding of science, science communication and survey methods.

Footnotes