Narratives of Competition, Competition of Narratives? United States–China Relations, Technology, and the Role of Storytelling

Abstract

The article addresses the interplay between narratives and competitive dynamics in the context of the United States–China “tech war.” It investigates the narrative shifts that have impacted the salience of technology as part of the relationship between the two states. Unpacking both US and Chinese storytelling, it contributes to the debate on the “tech war” by highlighting that it is through such narratives that objects of competition are being constituted and that actors position themselves. The findings demonstrate that the narratives of competition have changed gradually in the last two and a half decades. Technology has long played an important role in this context. But in the United States, it became even more central as part of the democracy-vs.-autocracy narrative. This narrative allowed the United States to reinvoke traditional identity narratives and assume the role of a global democratic leader while constituting China as a significant Other. The digital authoritarianism narrative emerged as a sub-narrative that has painted technology as an enabler of authoritarianism. For China, on the other hand, technological development is part of its national modernization and ultimately rejuvenation. America’s use of the democracy-vs.-autocracy narrative has been seen as an effort to safeguard its position as a global hegemon. Both states have thus increasingly perceived narrating as a distinct dimension of the competition. The United States and China compete with each other therefore not only in terms of technological performance, but they also engage in a contest of narratives—on their role in the world, the meaning of technology, and the international order.

Este artículo aborda la interacción que tiene lugar entre las narrativas y las dinámicas competitivas en el contexto de la «guerra tecnológica» entre Estados Unidos y China. El artículo investiga los cambios narrativos que han influido para que la tecnología sea una parte prominente de la relación entre los dos Estados. Desglosamos las narrativas, tanto por parte estadounidense como por parte china, contribuyendo, de esta forma, al debate sobre la «guerra tecnológica», debido a que destacamos que, a través de tales narrativas, se constituyen objetos de competencia y se posicionan los actores. Las conclusiones demuestran que las narrativas en materia de competencia han cambiado gradualmente en las últimas dos décadas y media. La tecnología ha desempeñado, durante mucho tiempo, un papel importante en este contexto. Sin embargo, en Estados Unidos la tecnología cobró, aún más, una mayor relevancia como parte de la narrativa de la democracia contra la autocracia. Esta narrativa permitió a Estados Unidos volver a invocar las narrativas tradicionales en materia de identidad y asumir el papel de un líder democrático global, al tiempo que constituye a China como un Otro significativo. La narrativa del autoritarismo digital emergió como una subnarrativa que caracteriza a la tecnología como un facilitador del autoritarismo. Por otro lado, para China el desarrollo tecnológico forma parte de su modernización nacional y, en última instancia, de su rejuvenecimiento. Se ha considerado que el uso de la narrativa de la democracia contra la autocracia que lleva a cabo Estados Unidos es un esfuerzo por salvaguardar su posición como un hegemón global. Por lo tanto, ambos Estados han percibido, cada vez más, la narrativa como una dimensión distinta de la competencia. En conclusión, Estados Unidos y China compiten entre sí no solo en términos de rendimiento tecnológico, sino que también participan en una competición de narrativas sobre su papel en el mundo, el significado de la tecnología y el orden internacional.

L’article traite de l’enchevêtrement entre les récits et les dynamiques de concurrence dans le contexte de la « guerre de la tech » entre les États-Unis et la Chine. Il étudie les évolutions narratives qui ont eu des effets sur l’importance de la technologie dans le cadre de la relation entre les deux États. En décortiquant les narrations américaine et chinoise, il contribue au débat sur la « guerre de la tech » ; il souligne que ces récits permettent la constitution des objets de concurrence et le positionnement des acteurs. Les conclusions démontrent que les récits de concurrence ont progressivement changé au cours des vingt-cinq dernières années. La technologie joue depuis longtemps un rôle important dans ce contexte. Mais, aux États-Unis, elle a acquis une importance prépondérante dans le récit Démocratie/Autocratie. Ce récit a permis aux États-Unis d’à nouveau invoquer les récits identitaires traditionnels et d’endosser le rôle de leader mondial de la démocratie tout en présentant la Chine comme un Autre non négligeable. Leur récit sur l’autoritarisme numérique est apparu tel un sous-récit : selon lui, la technologie facilitait l’autoritarisme. D’autre part, pour la Chine, le développement technologique fait partie intégrante de sa modernisation nationale et finalement, de son rajeunissement. L’on a perçu le recours américain au récit Démocratie/Autocratie comme un effort de protection de sa position hégémonique mondiale. Aussi les deux États ont-ils de plus en plus reconnu le récit comme une dimension distincte de la concurrence. Par conséquent, en plus de l’affrontement vis-à-vis des performances technologiques, les États-Unis et la Chine prennent également part à une compétition narrative, par rapport à leur rôle dans le monde, au sens de la technologie et à l’ordre international.

Introduction

The United States–China competition has been a widely discussed topic. While tensions are high and technology appears to become more and more a central battleground between the two powers, scholars have engaged in diverse attempts to understand their strategies and actions. However, despite increased talk of an ongoing “tech war” (e.g., Lynch 2019; Allen 2023), many of these works simply take the role of technology as object of competition for granted, without further questioning the underlying perceptions of competition and technology. But although technology has always been an important element of United States–China relations, there has been a notable shift in the salience of the issue and the vehemence of the debate. To counter a rising digital authoritarianism became a cornerstone of US foreign policy as the Biden administration worked to build a coalition of democracies (e.g., Biden 2021a, 2022a, 2022b, 2022c, 2023a, 2023b; The White House 2022a, 2023a, 2023b, 2023c). China, on the other hand, has been warning that the United States was inciting a “clash of civilizations” (Xinhua 2023). At the same time, the Chinese government aspires to turn the country into an “S&T superpower” (Xi 2020).

While their different ideological stances have always been a point of friction between the two states, the concept of digital authoritarianism and the particular emphasis on the democracy–autocracy binary in the US discourse has been a relatively recent development. The present article contributes to this special forum and the wider debate on the United States–China “tech war” by unpacking this particular narrative shift as well as those preceding it and by exploring how both states’ accounts of their relationship and the role of technology have diverged from each other. It thereby sketches out an unfolding competition of narratives between the two powers.

International relations (IR) scholarship has not been inattentive to the narrative dimension of United States–China relations (e.g., Breuer and Johnston 2019; Gries and Jing 2019; Turner and Nymalm 2019; Winkler and Jerdén 2023). The issue of technology, however, has remained understudied so far. The present article focuses on the development of narratives of the United States–China competition between 2000 and 2023. The early 2000s have been sometimes identified in the literature as a time in which the United States becomes more critical of its relationship with China and in which China’s rise as global power becomes more tangible (e.g., Carrai et al. 2022, 5). For this reason, the article takes 2000 as a starting point for the analysis.

The article’s findings demonstrate that there has been a gradual change in the meaning of competition. As a vital part of this, the perception and valuation of technology have shifted as well. Technology’s role at the center of this conflict can therefore not be understood without taking into account these shifting competition narratives that, in turn, are firmly connected to master narratives of the international order as well as identity narratives. Within the United States, a relatively recent shift to the democracy-vs.-autocracy narrative and the emergence of a digital authoritarianism sub-narrative can be observed. This sub-narrative has characterized technology as an enabling factor in the global resurgence of authoritarianism. China’s efforts to achieve technological leadership have been viewed as an attempt to export the country’s authoritarian model. For the United States, this sub-narrative suggested two conclusions or lessons: first, that a coalition of democratic states needed to be built in response to China’s bid for technological leadership and, secondly, that technology development needed to concentrate on tech that will strengthen democracy, rather than undermine it. In the case of China, there have been two interrelated narratives that shape the tech competition. The Chinese government has perceived the competition as a conflict driven by the United States in an effort to contain China’s rise and secure its own “digital hegemony” (Xinhua 2020). In so doing, China has argued, the United States has been not just harming its main competitor but also inhibiting international technological progress. This narrative has portrayed the United States as a bully and China as a peaceful nation pursuing key technologies as part of its modernization (Lu 2023). This provides a link to the master narrative of the so-called Chinese Dream, which has been shaping Chinese politics since 2012 and focuses on the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (Wang 2014; Gering 2023).

The article thereby contributes to our understanding of the United States–China “tech war” by highlighting the narratives through which the objects of competition are being constituted and that thereby shape competitive dynamics. Through these narratives, actors make sense of their relationships, identify what is at stake, and determine which strategies and measures are best to employ to compete successfully. While dependent on actors that (re-)produce them, these narratives are intersubjectively shared, i.e., not the construct of one individual actor.

The article is structured into four main parts. The first section outlines the theoretical framework, detailing a narrative approach to the study of competitive dynamics and the role of technology. The second section traces the narration of United States–China relations from 2000 to 2023. It follows three notable changes in dominant narratives, each of which is discussed in one of the sub-sections: from (1) narratives in both states that focused on a coexistence of competition and engagement, over (2) the great power competition narrative, which was promoted particularly by the first Trump administration and partly shared, partly rejected by China, to (3) the debate on the democracy-vs.-autocracy narrative. The third section examines the role of technology, and especially diverging stories put forward by China and the United States. The fourth section reflects on the way the actors compete through storytelling. The conclusion discusses the implications of the article’s findings.

Storytelling and United States–China Relations

There is not much doubt within IR that the relations between the United States and China have become more competitive in the course of the last decades. The competition between the two states is often perceived as inevitable—the natural course of the relationship between a status quo hegemon and an emerging great power. For many realist authors, for example, competition is an inherent feature of world politics (Walt 2018; cf. Allison 2017). Constructivist and poststructuralist approaches, instead, have long argued that competition rests on the social construction of identities and intersubjectively shared understandings. Narrative approaches point in this context toward the crucial role storytelling plays in constituting social relations, subject positions, and the international order (Miskimmon et al. 2013; Hagström and Gustafsson 2019; Turner and Nymalm 2019; Winkler and Jerdén 2023).

Actors make sense of and constitute events and processes by narrating them. Narratives can best be described as a specific subtype of discourse, characterized by a particular structure. They revolve around a plot that is embedded in a setting, containing a certain set of characters, and often conclude in a lesson (Krebs 2015; Hagström and Gustafsson 2019). Through narratives, actors place occurrences in a specific temporal and causal order, thus imbuing them with meaning. This process is called emplotment (Gadinger et al. 2014, 23; Krebs 2015, 11; Hagström and Gustafsson 2019, 388–90). The setting describes the world in which the narrator(s) envision(s) this plot to take place, including the characteristics and core dynamics of this environment. The identification and characterization of key actors are also an elemental part of storytelling. The lesson, finally, is the “morale” of the story—the conclusion the narrating actors draw for themselves and their further course of action.

It is through narratives that actors relate past, present, and future to each other and make sense of an ever-moving material world. The materiality of events and processes is therefore not in dispute, but the meaning attributed to them depends on the stories that are being told—and often that is more than one. That leaves room for the contestation and competition of narratives. For the case in hand, this means that the centrality of technologies in the current United States–China competition, much like the competition itself, is not an inevitable consequence of materiality. Rather, technology’s salience as object of competition stems from the way it is being embedded into a plot (cf. Thorsten 2012; Cave et al. 2020, 8–9).

Each narrative is connected to or nested within other narratives. Hagström and Gustafsson (2019, 388) speak in this context of internarrativity, the “discursive processes through which narratives implicitly or explicitly refer to, invoke and are empowered by other narratives.” Because humans tend to prefer the familiar, internarrativity plays an important role in the success of a narrative; an audience will more readily accept a story that resonates with what is already known to them.

Narratives differ in respect to their reach and stability. Some stories are deeply institutionalized and encompass far-reaching ideas about the world. Others are located on a lower level, so to speak. They are often more issue-specific and more easily contested. This first type can be described as master narratives (Hagström and Gustafsson 2019, 388). Lower-level narratives tap into or are embedded within these master narratives and derive some of their power and appeal from this connection. In the present case, the democracy-vs.-autocracy narrative in the US discourse, which paints current international politics as a contest between democracies and autocracies, functions as a master narrative that the sub-narrative of digital authoritarianism builds on.

The distinction of master and lower-level narratives is not the only way to identify different layers of narratives that have been proposed in the literature. Miskimmon et al. (2013), for instance, differentiate between system, identity, and issue narratives. Identities are crucial for the unfolding of competition and will be discussed in more detail below. In addition, narratives on the technology competition are connected to both system and issue narratives. The democracy-vs.-autocracy narrative can, for example, be described as a system narrative, while the digital authoritarianism narrative is an issue narrative that is, however, closely linked to the system narrative. But while these can be helpful distinctions, the present article is more focused on exploring the way narratives shift over time and intertwine or compete with each other.

Actors’ sense of themselves and others plays a crucial role for competitive dynamics. Their identities are, in turn, constituted through the stories they rely on to make sense of their experiences. As Somers (1994, 618) states, “to have some sense of social being in the world requires that lives be more than different series of isolated events or combined variables and attributes.” IR scholars have argued that it is not only individuals but also groups, such as states, that depend on stories about who they are, how they came into being, and what they aspire to (Ringmar 1996, 452; Berenskoetter 2014, 268–9; Subotić 2016, 612). The study of identity narratives has been closely linked to the concept of ontological security. While there are different approaches and understandings, ontological security studies presume that states have the need for a relatively stable and secure sense of the Self. To be ontologically secure thus translates into “being able to sustain one’s biographical narrative through time” (Gustafsson 2020, 10).

However, there are different views on the primary mechanisms of identity formation. Some scholars emphasize the relationality of identity formation, meaning that groups largely constitute their identity vis-à-vis Others (Somers 1994; Mitzen 2005, 352). Others argue that this “external” differentiation is overstated as groups first and foremost seek internal consistency (Berenskoetter 2014). The present article adopts the stance that while groups seek for an internally coherent biographic narrative, the differentiation from Others is necessarily part of this process. Thus, groups or communities seek to locate themselves in space and time, positioning themselves in relation to a meaningful past and imagined future(s). In doing so, they also position themselves in relation to other actors. Identity narratives are therefore stories actors tell about themselves—about their past and “coming into being,” about their present role in relation to their environment and other actors, about the values and ideas they represent, and about the future and aims they aspire to.

Method

The article investigates the narrative constitution of technology as the center of the United States–China competition and pays attention to the way actors draw on master and identity narratives to make sense of and engage in this competition. For the purpose of exploring US foreign policy narratives, the analysis draws on a range of documents that have been produced by different actors between 2000 and 2023. To be more precise, the analysis centers on the US National Security Strategies, State of the Union addresses, annual reports to Congress, and relevant hearing transcripts by the United States–China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) as well as public reports by the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI). In an effort to broaden the scope and capture possibly more “spontaneous” or issue-specific moments of narrating, the textual sources also included statements and speeches that were made as part of press briefings, state visits, international conferences, and election campaign events. These were identified through keyword searches of the American Presidency Project database. The analyzed documents address both domestic and international audiences. Some sources, for example, the USCC’s reports to Congress, were originally primarily intended for a domestic audience—in this specific case, for a highly selective one, namely the members of Congress. But since they have been subsequently published online, they have been made accessible to a wider, international audience.

In order to gain insights into Chinese narratives regarding the technology competition, the article also analyzes multiple sources by China’s government, equally dating from 2000 to 2023. These include the government’s English-language foreign policy and defense white papers, the political reports presented by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the Party’s quinquennial National Congress, and news reports published by the Xinhua News Agency, which is the official state news agency and under direct control of the government. The latter were identified through a keyword search of the database Nexis. All documents have been officially published in the English language. One can therefore assume that they are meant to be read by an international audience and thus particularly interesting to gain insights into the competitive dimension of narratives.¹

Using an interpretivist approach, the materials were analyzed in the following way. The study of the narratives’ setting(s) included analyzing the underlying understandings of technology and visions of the international order. It was further examined how the United States and China, and potentially other relevant actors, are being characterized as part of the narratives. To reconstruct how events and processes are being emplotted, the analysis focused on how the relationship between the United States and China and its past and future trajectory is being portrayed, the specific events and time scales that are being referred to in this context, and the role attributed to technology in the relationship. Finally, the analysis also extended to the lessons, or recommendations for actions, provided in the material. Special attention was further paid to the way the narrating actors reflect about their own storytelling.

Shifting Narratives of the United States–China Competition

The characterization of the United States–China relationship has noticeably changed since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Other scholars have already established that there has been a discursive shift from the idea of “engagement” (USCC 2004, iii), which still leaves room for partnership, to an increasing emphasis on competition (cf. Carrai et al. 2022, 4). However, as the following subsections will explore, there are more nuances to this change. The subsections trace three notable shifts in dominant narratives. While I argue that it is possible to identify distinct narratives that differ in their portrayal of the competition, it should be noted that the shifts between these narratives are rarely clear junctures. Instead, the change occurs gradually.

Competition and Cooperation

During the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, talk of competition coexisted with ideas of strategic engagement. Cooperation and competition were narrated as mutually non-exclusive processes that could run in parallel. This was part of a narrative that characterized China as a currently irresponsible actor, whose ideological stance is at odds with US values, but which is not yet a “lost” cause. The narrative did not deny that China’s rise as economic and military power presented a challenge to the United States. But the plot kept open the possibility that China may still find its way to democracy in the future and conflict may be avoided. As the National Security Strategy of 2002 summarized

We welcome the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous China. Yet, […] China’s leaders have not yet made the next series of fundamental choices about the character of their state. […] China is following an outdated path […] In time, China will find that social and political freedom is the only source of that greatness. (The White House 2002, 27)

The story’s lesson was that the United States should continue to engage China and, where possible and desirable, be open for political cooperation. Given a number of global challenges that were set out as “the context for relations between the United States and other main centers of global power” (The White House 2002, 28), seeking an improved relationship with China could serve both the United States and the international community. Especially in the direct aftermath of 9/11, when the focus on US national security was on terrorism, China appeared as a possible partner (Bush 2002; Turner 2014, 138–9).

The sentiment was at first echoed in China. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in 2001, it was noted that “the relationship in terms of security between China and America as well as that between Russia and America have improved” (Yuan 2001). America’s unilateral action in Iraq, however, changed this to some degree as it was thought to have “fully exposed the dual standards of the U.S. on human rights and its hegemonism” (Information Office of the State Council 2004).

Obama publicly endorsed cooperation with China in certain policy fields while engaging in economic competition. His administration therefore arguably continued a narrative that allowed for a certain parallelism of competition and cooperation. While not dismissing national security concerns, Obama narrated the competition as a mainly economic phenomenon (e.g., The White House 2010; cf. Turner 2014, 150).² In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, out-innovating China was primarily considered a means to secure America’s position in the global economy. As Obama (2010) remarked at a Town Hall Meeting,

[…] back in the 1980s, it wasn’t China that everybody was worried about, it was Japan. And people were having almost the exact same conversation […] that they’re having now: Japan was cleaning our clock, they’re taking over, they’re buying Rockefeller Center, and there’s no way we can compete. And yet American businesses got leaner and they got more efficient, and people started working harder, and we were more innovative […].

The Chinese narrative of the United States–China relationship also strongly emphasized the coexistence of competition and cooperation during that time. It set out a world in which the major powers are necessarily competitive but at the same time highly interdependent and, in consequence, need to cooperate in certain areas. The Xinhua News Agency (2012a) reported: “The coexistence of interdependence and competition has become a prominent feature of China–U.S. ties, and a long list of global challenges could not be tackled without collaboration between the two nations.” The Chinese government highlighted that common interests and cooperation between the two states outweigh areas of competition (e.g., Xinhua 2015). China’s rise, according to this plot, increases the competitive pressure, but does not pose a threat to the United States (Xinhua 2012b). Similar to the United States, the Chinese government noted that a constructive relationship between the United States and China is needed to address certain global issues.

However, the threat of military conflict was not altogether absent during those years, especially with regard to China’s military build-up in the South China Sea (e.g., The White House 2012). Indeed, claims of a new assertiveness of Chinese foreign policy were on the rise in the United States between 2009 and 2010 (Jerdén 2014; Turner 2014, 158). China offered an alternative plot. Whereas the Obama administration considered its “pivot” (Clinton 2011) to Asia a response to China’s assertive behavior in the region, China’s story identified the United States and its new strategy as the cause for the growing risk of military confrontation (Xinhua 2012c; Information Office of the State Council 2019b). Compared to the United States, the Chinese government narrated the events, therefore, in a reversed order, temporally and causally. It characterized the modernization of its armed forces as a solely defensive measure (Central Committee of the CCP 2017).

Great Power Competition and the Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation

During the first Trump administration, a new competition narrative emerged with a more pronounced focus on the contest for military and political power. The narrative heralded the return of great power competition. In the 2017 National Security Strategy, the Trump administration essentially provided a summary of the narrative’s plot: “after being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned. China and Russia began to reassert their influence regionally and globally” (The White House 2017, 27). The great power competition narrative is rooted in realist master narratives that imply that competition between major powers is the “natural” state of the international system (cf. Gries and Jing 2019). According to this view, policymakers need to move away from “the policies of the past two decades—policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals [. . .] would turn them into benign actor” (The White House 2017, 3).

As part of the great power competition narrative, China has been characterized as a revisionist power that turns against a status quo, which, in turn, has been narrated as the legitimate order of things (The White House 2017, 25; cf. Jerdén 2014; Johnston 2019, 2022, 52; Turner and Nymalm 2019). According to this narrative, the United States has a rightful claim to global leadership because of its role in creating and upholding the rule-based order (e.g., The White House 2015, 29, 2022c, 32). Revisionist powers are often perceived to be economic free riders who take advantage of international institutions while they, in disrespect of human rights, act irresponsibly on the world stage and defy common norms, thus posing a “civilizational challenge to the Western liberal democratic order” (Schmitt 2018, 5; cf. Chan et al. 2021). The characterization of revisionist powers therefore centers around ambition, dishonesty, and malevolence. But while they are considered a threat, there is still a strong notion of inferiority in that they are painted as less “civilized,” falling short of the expectations toward the behavior of great powers (cf. Turner and Nymalm 2019). As part of the tech competition, a common element of this has been the argument that China only reached its current level of development through means of espionage and illicit technology transfers (e.g., USCC 2015, 18; The White House 2017, 21; NSCAI 2021, 225).

China has been telling a different story. Since 2016, the plot has been increasingly that the United States is driving competition, whereas China is seeking to build mutual trust and re-establish a positive-sum relationship. While competition is a natural feature of great power relations, the story goes, both states have, because of their standing in the world, a responsibility toward the international community to “manage such competition in an effective and constructive way” (Xinhua 2018). Competition is thus accepted as the “natural” (Xinhua 2018) mode of relationship between great powers, but does not need to escalate into conflict: “Instead of bearing antagonism or confrontation in mind, policymakers in Washington need to join hands with China to foster a form of responsible cooperation and competition” (Xinhua 2019). In other words, the Chinese narrative continued to build on a setting according to which international politics and power relations can be a positive-sum game. From this perspective, the United States is to blame for actively choosing zero-sum tactics.

Accordingly, the roles China has constructed as part of its narrative differ strongly from the US role characterizations. China has been presenting itself mainly as a developing country that still has a long way to go to reach the status of a developed nation (Central Committee of the CCP 2017). At the same time, it has portrayed its rise, or rather the restoration of its historical great power status, as a peaceful process and itself as a responsible actor. This imagination of China’s rejuvenation is at the heart of the so-called Chinese Dream, a master narrative that has shaped Chinese foreign policy since 2012. The plot of the Chinese Dream, also referred to as the China Story, depicts China’s rise, which follows a history of humiliation inflicted by external forces (mainly Japan and the US-led West) and will be achieved through a process of modernization and the hard work of “the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation” (Central Committee of the CCP 2017), as an inexorable process³ (cf. Wang 2014; Lams 2018; Brown 2021; Gering 2023). The Chinese Dream functions as a master narrative as it provides the basis for many issue-specific narratives in Chinese politics. At the same time, it offers a specific story of the Chinese nation—past, present, and future—and is therefore crucial for China’s national identity.

The United States, on the other hand, has been narrated as increasingly irresponsible and erratic, a bully that abuses its power to coerce countries into acting in a way that serves US hegemony (Xinhua 2021b, 2021c, 2021f; Lu 2023; Shi et al. 2023). In contrast to the United States, China has described the status quo as illegitimate as it is shaped by “hegemonism, power politics, [and] unilateralism [. . .]” (Information Office of the State Council 2019b). While the United States thus becomes a global villain, China sees itself on the right side of history: accelerating, instead of inhibiting, an international trend toward international multipolarity and peace.

The Democracy-vs.-Autocracy Narrative and Its Contestation

Since 2017/2018, the competition has been increasingly narrated by the United States as a confrontation between democracies and autocracies:

The CCP has taken new steps to promote itself globally as a model worthy of emulation, attempting to cast its political system and approach to economic development as superior alternatives to that of the United States and other democratic countries. (USCC 2019, 30)

This narrative only gained more prominence when Joe Biden took office. The democracy–autocracy distinction became the central binary of the competition, which was now regarded as “a contest to show which system of governance can best deliver for their people and the world” (The White House 2022c, 7). The plot of the democracy-vs.-autocracy narrative describes a worldwide resurgence of authoritarianism that has led to a competition between democracies and increasingly assertive authoritarian powers that will ultimately determine which political system—democracy or authoritarianism—will prevail in the international system (e.g., Biden 2021a; The White House 2022c).

Their differences in political systems and ideologies have, of course, always been a source of tensions between the United States and China. And yet, the extent and form in which this is being discussed have noticeably changed. The US narrative’s plot identifies certain events as key episodes of this change, mainly the rise to power of Xi Jinping and a more assertive Chinese foreign policy under his government, the more repressive domestic policies in Russia under Putin as well as its annexation of Crimea in 2014.

When we look at the character roles constructed within this narrative, one possible explanation why the democracy-vs.-autocracy narrative became so dominant is that it fed into familiar US identity narratives at a time in which many perceived the country as internally divided (cf. Pan 2022, 40; Winkler and Jerdén 2023, 163). This impression is supported by the fact that calls for bipartisanship were often woven into the narrative as lesson or morale of the story:

The idea that we should compete with major autocratic powers to shape the international order enjoys broad support that is bipartisan at home and deepening abroad […]. We live at a moment of passionate political intensities and ferment that sometimes tears at the fabric of the nation. […] but that will not stop us from defending our values and continuing to pursue our national security interests in the world. (The White House 2022c, 7)

It has already been discussed that the narrative cast China as the villain contesting a legitimate status quo (cf. Turner 2014, 134). The United States, consequently, gained the role of the hero defending democracy and the liberal order, instead of simply engaging in an inter-state competition for military or economic gains:

As China attempts to spread its influence around the globe, a nuanced and comprehensive policy to push back against negative aspects of influence while welcoming legitimate contributions will become increasingly important to protecting democratic processes and ensuring the durability of the liberal international order. (USCC 2018, 14)

Narrating hero–villain binaries is a popular tool in US national security discourse that evokes a particular emotional appeal (Homolar 2022). Feeding into a familiar narrative of the United States as “a beacon for democracy” (The White House 1987, 9), this could have fostered a process of national self-assurance and simultaneously added to the emotional salience of the issue for the US audience. President Biden declared in his State of the Union Address in 2023: “Democracy must not be a partisan issue. It’s an American issue” (The White House 2023d). In that sense, China has served as a significant Other that allowed the United States to reinvoke central elements of its identity narratives at a time of internal division.

China has offered an alternative story. Its plot sees the cause of the growing frictions between the two states mainly in an intensifying declinist anxiety on part of the United States that, in its fear of losing its position as world hegemon, antagonizes China: “In recent years, Washington has been experiencing a degree of strategic anxiety and has become increasingly overbearing, especially in its campaign to contain and smear China” (Xinhua 2021b).

With regard to a potential contest between democracies and autocracies, China has argued that the United States was a country whose democratic system is flawed and that has used democratization as a pretext to spread American influence. From this viewpoint, the United States has undermined democratic principles by trying to impose its political system onto others and establish hegemony (Xinhua 2022c; Shi et al. 2023). Hence, the Chinese narrative has not portrayed democratization itself as a negative trend but has painted the United States as “undemocratic” in character: “The contemporary world calls for the democratization of the international order. Any intention to seek hegemony is destined to fail” (Xinhua 2021e).

Temporality plays a special role in this context as it is argued that the United States holds on to an outdated mindset that is focused on zero-sum games and great power competition and blind to its own flaws and history of hegemonism. The United States has been thereby portrayed as backward. This draws on a narrative account of US history according to which US behavior on the international stage has been largely characterized by the use of military force, expansionism, and unilateralist actions (Xinhua 2021d; Lu 2023). According to the plot of the Chinese narrative, the United States stems itself against an “irreversible” (Central Committee of the CCP 2002) historical trend toward multipolarity and must therefore inevitably fail. A spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry stated:

We oppose the outdated Cold War mentality and zero-sum mindset. We see no benefit in any rhetoric or act that plays up geographical conflict or major power competition, for they go against the trend of the times and the aspiration of the international community. (as cited in Xu 2022)

“Techno-Democracies” versus “Techno-Autocracies”?—The Role of Technology

The quest for technological advances has been an important dimension of the United States–China competition for several decades. The USCC stated in its annual Report to Congress in 2004, “What China does with its growing technology capabilities—whether it converts them to military uses and/or to control the free flow of information to its population—is of direct national security concern to the United States” (USCC 2004, 12). During the first decade of the twenty-first century, these concerns over China’s technological development consisted of several aspects. First, it could harm the competitiveness of US firms and threaten US technological leadership, which was narrated as fundamental for US economic power at large (e.g., USCC 2004, 11–2; cf. The White House 2010, 28). Second, it contributed to China’s military modernization and growing capabilities—leaving it potentially with an asymmetric advantage over otherwise superior US forces. Third, the control China’s government exercised over the Internet and national media meant that it had the power to shape public opinion on the United States and could “undermine US diplomatic efforts” (USCC 2005, 191). Fourth, the United States feared that partly illicitly acquired technology could find its way via China to rogue nations (e.g., USCC 2006, 91; cf. Lee 2001). This last aspect tied China into the rogue states narrative that Homolar (2023) has shown to be the dominant US security narrative in the post-Cold War era. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, concerns over China took, however, a backseat to the issue of terrorism and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (cf. Turner 2014, 138–9). Another area of concern has been the management of international technology supply chains, which was part of the United States–China relationship long before chip shortages during the COVID-19 pandemic (for instance, USCC 2012, 7). Cyberwarfare additionally emerged as an increasingly important issue. Nevertheless, the discourse on China and technology in the later years of the Obama administration still centered mainly on economic competition (The White House 2015).

This altogether shows, however, that concerns about China’s potential technological leadership and its control over supply chains in key technologies were present in the United States long before the notion of a “tech war” entered the debate (e.g., Lynch 2019; Allen 2023). China, in turn, has pursued the goal of technological self-sufficiency for a long time, dating back to the policies of Mao Zedong (Miller 2022; Allen 2023). Similarly, it has long treated the development of its technological capabilities as a priority of its national development strategy and as the core of its military build-up (cf. Central Committee of the CCP 2002). Within the last two and a half decades, technology has thereby always been a part of the competition between the United States and China. So why does it still seem like the salience of the issue and vehemence of the debate have changed in recent years?

The present analysis of US foreign policy narratives indicates that the perceived relevance of technology increased with the emergence of the larger, newly dominant democracy-vs.-autocracy narrative. A sub-narrative emerged that focused on technology as a key enabler of authoritarianism. The NSCAI (2021, 2) stated that “we have learned enough about the power of technology to strengthen authoritarianism abroad and fuel extremism at home.” The Biden administration shared this narrative, often referring to a rise of “digital authoritarianism” (Biden 2021a, 2022a, 2022b, 2022c, 2023a, 2023b; The White House 2022a, 2023a, 2023b, 2023c). Labels like “techno-democracy” and “techno-autocracy” have found their way into the wider public discourse (e.g., Cohen and Fontaine 2020; Ignatius 2021). Central to the digital authoritarianism narrative has been the view that there is an international trend toward “authoritarian tech” (NSCAI 2020, 222), meaning that technology is on a development path that strengthens or enables authoritarian governments. This perception was fostered by a series of events and their interpretation, from the Russian interference in the US presidential elections, to disinformation campaigns and microchip shortages during the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g., Biden 2021b; The White House 2021). Instead of focusing on other possible root causes of rising populism or an international crisis of democracy, this digital authoritarianism narrative has honed in on technology as enabling force. In some sense, that has made the perceived threat to democracy more manageable as it reduced complexity and provided a clear cause and a single adversary that needed to be stopped.

According to the digital authoritarianism narrative, the Internet and digital technologies emerged out of a drive for freedom and were inherently linked to democratic values and an open society. Hopes were high that technological progress would lead to democratization in authoritarian countries. Instead, the story goes, recent years have been marked by a global retreat of democracy and a resurgence of authoritarian regimes (cf. US Department of State 2022).

While the US government spoke of an international trend toward digital authoritarianism, it remained relatively vague as to what this included. In general, the term has been used to refer to a bundle of practices that rely on digital tools for the purpose of political repression.⁴ Among the practices named by the Biden administration were censorship, surveillance, disinformation, and (social) media control, as well as cyberwarfare (Biden 2021a, 2022a, 2023a). In 2022, a White House official stated,

we have seen a trend of rising digital authoritarianism, where some states have been acting to repress freedom of expression, to censor independent news sources, to interfere with elections, promote disinformation around the world, and deny their citizens other human rights. (The White House 2022a)

It is noteworthy that as part of the digital authoritarianism narrative, technology sometimes has become an acting character of the story that can initiate change itself. In other instances, as the quote above illustrates, technology has been less a driving force than an enabling instrument that can be used for both good and evil, depending on whose hands they fall into. What can be observed here is a blending of two different understandings of technology, usually conceptualized as essentialism⁵ and instrumentalism. Instrumentalist approaches view technologies as the mere tools of their users and creators. Their impact on the social world depends on the choices and beliefs of the persons using them (Feenberg 1991, 5; McCarthy 2015, 20). Essentialism, on the other hand, presumes that technologies have inherent characteristics that will have a specific effect on the social world, independent of their users’ interests (Feenberg 1991, 7; McCarthy 2015, 20).

Both understandings have been to some extent present in the digital authoritarianism narrative as one of the lessons the United States drew as part of the narrative was the need to develop “democracy-affirming technology” (Biden 2022a, 2023a). For this purpose, the government initiated a series of prize competitions⁶ (Biden 2023a). The definition of “democracy-affirming” remained rather vague, but the US government seemed to envision technologies that were not just designed for a democratic purpose but also had built-in safeguards against misuse. This blending of the two different conceptualizations of technology might seem contradictory, but is not untypical for US technology narratives as Peoples (2010) shows. It allows US policymakers to reconcile their perception of the United States as a technological power and “the glories of American technological innovation in the past” (Peoples 2010, 251) with their vision of technology as an external threat.

But why was the emergence of a new narrative important? Narratives provide a crucial foundation for the constitution of alliances (Homolar and Turner 2024). The lesson of the digital authoritarianism narrative suggested not just to develop new technology but also to counter China’s bid for technological leadership and thereby halt an export of authoritarianism. The United States therefore tried to gather allies and partners to build a coalition of “like-minded democracies” (The White House 2022c, 33) in the area of technologies. Initiatives included the launch of a Summit for Democracy and the establishment of the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (Biden 2022a, 2021b).

One could argue, however, that the narrative lacked consistency in certain aspects, and other narratives would have certainly been possible. The distinction between “techno-democracies” and “techno-autocracies” has been, for instance, not necessarily clear-cut. While China and Russia were usually named as examples for digital authoritarianism, US officials rarely mentioned other states. The United States also had to acknowledge that autocracies are not the only states that have adopted “authoritarian tech” such as commercial spyware:

Misuse of these powerful surveillance tools have not been limited to authoritarian regimes, however. Democratic governments also have confronted revelations that actors within their own systems have used commercial spyware to target their own citizens without proper legal authorization, safeguards, and oversight. (The White House 2023b)

In an effort to advance a “more democratic” usage of surveillance technology, the Freedom Online Coalition, under the leadership of the United States, published a list of guiding principles for governments’ use of surveillance technology that were supposed to

ensure that the use of surveillance technologies is lawful and responsible, and also that there are safeguards in place that apply to the collection, handling, and disclosure of material obtained using these technologies in order to protect individual privacy, personal data, and human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to foster transparency, accountability, and civic participation, while effectively and appropriately pursuing legitimate law enforcement, public safety, and national security objectives. (US Department of State 2023a)

These guidelines remained relatively vague. The implementation is dependent on each state’s domestic legal framework, which varies widely between the signatories. The United States itself, for example, has much less restrictive data privacy laws than the European Union. Furthermore, the Biden administration supported a reauthorization of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which has been the object of domestic controversy. It enables US intelligence agencies to collect electronic communication from non-Americans without a warrant. Critics within the US fear that the data of US citizens communicating with individuals abroad are being gathered as well (Ryan-Mosely 2023; The White House 2023e).

Closer examination also shows that authoritarian states obtain technological tools used in repression and surveillance usually from more than one state and frequently also from corporations located in democracies (Feldstein 2021, 64; Bradford 2023, 296, 301, 312). Despite observing China’s employment of technologies for social control and political repression with great concern, some scholars have additionally challenged the idea that China’s technology exports make other states “more” repressive or have transformative effects on the model of government (Walker et al. 2020, 130–1; Feldstein 2021, 48; Bradford 2023, 297). Feldstein has found that states that adopt Chinese technology do so for a variety of reasons and that the technologies usually supplant or accelerate already existing practices of repression (Feldstein 2021, 48–50).

By sidestepping these possible inconsistencies and by keeping the definition of democratic values relatively open, the United States maintained the necessary “narrative flexibility” (Homolar and Turner 2024, 213) to gather a broad coalition behind the story. The US government under Biden launched a number of initiatives to foster international cooperation on the basis of this narrative.⁷ By mobilizing a coalition of democratic states defending against the threat of digital authoritarianism, the United States attempted to strengthen its role as an international leader and also further cement a “we” in the face of an Other. However, the United States was confronted with contesting narratives, which further drove competitive dynamics.

The present analysis indicates two Chinese narratives that have been particularly relevant for the United States–China tech competition: One narrative has centered on US digital hegemony. The other is the Chinese Dream in which technologies feature as a factor in China’s modernization and rejuvenation (for instance, Central Committee of the CCP 2017). The two narratives are linked, especially in respect to the constitution as China as the hero whom external forces—namely the United States—are trying to contain, as well as its underlying understanding of technological progress as something that can and should be treated as a win–win process for all humankind.

In contrast to the United States, China narrates its technological advances mainly as part of its economic development. Since 2019, China’s government has been putting forward a narrative according to which the US wages a unilateral war against China’s tech industry in order to secure its own “digital hegemony” (Xinhua 2020; cf. Tan 2022). As the villain of this story, the United States has been considered to drive political competition in the area of technology. At the same time, China accused the United States of undermining fair economic competition through increasingly protectionist measures. China’s Foreign Minister is reported to have said that “China will not evade competition if it is needed, but competition should be fair and just and abide by market rules, and refrain from setting obstacles, abusing power, and depriving others of their legitimate right to development” (Xinhua 2021a).

In so doing, China argued, the United States was seeking to contain China’s rise and effectively hinder its development as well as international technological progress at large (e.g., Xinhua 2021e; Shi et al. 2023). In 2019, the Chinese government stated that “the US is engaging in technological and institutional innovation in pursuit of absolute military superiority” (Information Office of the State Council 2019b) while highlighting that China itself has been “actively promoting the ‘going global’ of scientific and technological innovation to the advantage of both China and the rest of the world” (Information Office of the State Council 2019a). China has thus portrayed its pursuit of technological advances and the international expansion of Chinese tech firms as beneficial for the international community. Its narrative advances an understanding of technological progress as a positive-sum process and characterizes China as a responsible and benign actor.

This narrative recognizes technological leadership as a major aspect in the rise of the United States to the position of a global superpower. This serves to support the notion among Chinese elite circles that “tech leadership equals global leadership” (Tan 2022). The government under Xi Jinping regards technology as a central factor for achieving the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. As an important element of modernization, the quest for technological leadership is thus embedded in the Chinese Dream master narrative. A part of this, Xi has repeatedly argued for the centrality of technology for spreading Chinese culture and increasing the state’s soft power as well as demonstrating the superiority of the Chinese political system (Central Committee of the CCP 2012, 2022; Xi 2020). China therefore shares the US perception of the important role technology plays in international competition. Indeed, the government has made it a political priority to achieve technological self-sufficiency and to ramp up innovation in core technologies, with Xi (2020) declaring this “the foundation for building China into an S&T superpower.”

The coalition-building efforts by the United States, which America narrated as an effort to safeguard global democracy by mobilizing international support, were presented in the analyzed Chinese sources as an attempt to establish a “digital iron curtain” (Xinhua 2021e). Foreign Minister Wang remarked on the Summit for Democracy that

The so-called “Summit for Democracy” held by the United States last year excluded nearly half of the countries in the world. That in itself is an assault on the spirit of democracy, and holding such a summit again would be unpopular. (as cited in Xinhua 2022b)

China accused the United States of bloc-building. It claimed that the US attempts to build coalitions around the issue of technology were meant to further cement its own role as technological leader:

By building small blocs on technology such as the “chips alliance” and “clean network,” the United States has put “democracy” and “human rights” labels on high-technology, and turned technological issues into political and ideological issues, so as to fabricate excuses for its technological blockade against other countries. (Lu 2023)

A Competition of Narratives

As the previous sections have shown, the two states’ narratives have reproduced different role characterizations as well as competing understandings of how and why their competitive relationship is evolving and what constitutes a “legitimate” international order. Both the United States and China, however, have considered technological performance as a means to demonstrate the superiority of their political system (cf. Chan and Lee 2024).

What they have in common as well is that both states reflect on the creation and dissemination of narratives as part of the competition. Xi Jinping has in the past called on Chinese officials, the media, and the public to “tell [. . .] China’s story well” (Lams 2018; Brown 2021; The China Media Project 2021). On the occasion of the 20th National Congress of the CCP, the Party’s Central Committee stated that

We will accelerate the development of China’s discourse and narrative systems, better tell China’s stories, make China’s voice heard, and present a China that is credible, appealing, and respectable. We will strengthen our international communications capabilities […] and strive to strengthen China’s voice in international affairs so it is commensurate with our composite national strength and international status. (Central Committee of the CCP 2022)

According to the Xinhua News Agency, Xi further personally criticized Biden at a meeting on the sidelines of the Bali G20 summit in 2022 for promoting the democracy-vs.-autocracy narrative. Xi, Xinhua reports (2022a), told the US president that the narrative was not an appropriate representation of international competition. In 2023, Xi added that the narrative was highly divisive and threatened to “split the world and lead to [sic] clash of civilizations” (Xinhua 2023). The United States, it was argued, promoted this narrative to foster anti-Chinese sentiments on the international stage: “Washington [. . .] has been hyping up the so-called ‘democracy vs. autocracy’ narrative; [..] it is bent on building up a series of exclusive blocs like the Quad and AUKUS alliance to encircle China” (Shi et al. 2023). In particular, the accusation that the United States was inciting a “clash of civilizations” has become popular. It harks back to a statement made by Kiron Skinner, the then-head of policy planning at the US State Department, in 2019. Skinner was reported to have described the relationship with China as a “fight with a really different civilization and a different ideology [. . .]” and stated that this was “the first time that we will have a great power competitor that is not Caucasian” (as cited in Ward 2019). The Chinese state media described this as “outrageous and outdated Cold-War, racial rhetoric” (Xinhua 2019) and has since referred to it multiple times.

In the United States, China’s ambitions to become a louder voice on the international stage have been perceived as an effort to challenge the international order and establish itself as an international leader. On several occasions, the US government and advisory bodies voiced concerns over China’s narratives about the technology competition. The USCC, for example, criticized China’s dissemination of a “narrative of superiority” (USCC 2021, 26) and its refusal to alter “its prediction of eventual triumph over the United States and other democratic countries” (USCC 2021, 26). The NSCAI remarked critically that “measures need to be undertaken to counterbalance the narrative of China’s technological dominance” (NSCAI 2021, 430).

The threat perception of China—the concern that China is seeking to export its authoritarian model—has also been fueled by China’s storytelling. In 2023, the Global Engagement Center of the US State Department (2023, 1) published a report in which it stated

Every country should have the ability to tell its story to the world. However, a nation’s narrative should be based on facts and rise and fall on its own merits. The PRC employs a variety of deceptive and coercive methods as it attempts to influence the international information environment. […] Unchecked, the PRC's efforts will reshape the global information landscape, creating biases and gaps that could even lead nations to make decisions that subordinate their economic and security interests to Beijing’s.

In this sense, the dominant narrative on the competition has also extended to the way the United States perceived Chinese storytelling. Similar to how the United States has argued in respect to Chinese trade and technology policies, the United States claimed that China is not just “telling its story” like any other nation, but that it does so by using illegitimate means. Importantly, the Global Engagement Center tied that directly to China’s influence over international technological infrastructures.

Technology thus plays a twofold role. For one, it is embedded in the narratives that the two states promote. But it is also part of the infrastructures that facilitate the spread of narratives—which, in turn, places technology once again at the heart of the competition. As the space where narratives are created, reproduced, and contested in front of an international audience, the United States and China struggle over influence in the “global information environment” (Global Engagement Center 2023; cf. Lu 2023).

In summary, the actors have recognized narratives as relevant for the unfolding competition. They have attempted to counter each other’s visions of the international order and their relationship. Both governments remarked on each other’s promotion of narratives in an almost accusatory fashion, hinting at each other’s dishonesty and duplicity. The significance that the actors have ascribed to narratives as part of the competition, in turn, has heightened once more the centrality of technological infrastructures for what the actors considered to be a contest between two political systems.

Conclusion

To conclude, while in the early years of the twenty-first century narratives of competition and engagement coexisted, the room left for cooperation between the two states became increasingly smaller. The democracy-vs.-autocracy narrative in the United States has painted the competition as not just one between two powerful states, but, more fundamentally, as a contest between different political systems. While portraying China as a revisionist power, the narrative allowed the United States to reinforce traditional identity narratives at a time of internal division. China, on the other hand, has depicted the United States as a declining hegemon that seeks to contain China’s rise and prevent an inevitable trend toward multipolarity.

Technology has to some extent always played a part in the relationship. But the meaning attributed to it and its salience has changed over time, placing it now at the center of competitive dynamics. In the United States, technology has come to be understood as the central tool for authoritarian governments to export their political system. For China, seeking technological leadership has been a central factor in its rejuvenation. America’s conduct in technology issues has been viewed as a Cold War-like strategy to undermine China’s development and secure US hegemony. This demonstrates that technology’s role as object of competition has been shaped by narratives that have evolved and shifted over time.

But the relationship between narratives and technology is by no means a one-sided one. As both states recognize the relevance of narratives, storytelling has become another component of the competition. The actors not only actively push their own stories, but they also publicly contest each other’s narratives, calling into question their credibility and legitimacy. While it is through narratives that we attribute meaning to technological artifacts and thereby shape the development, usage, and regulation of technology, information, and communication technologies constitute the infrastructures through which narratives are being articulated and disseminated. This opens up possibilities for future research that investigates more closely how these infrastructures are being utilized and how they shape storytelling practices.

Another avenue for further inquiry is the effect and possible outcome of the competition of narratives. The United States drew on the digital authoritarianism narrative in its effort to foster a coalition of democracies. It evaded possible inconsistencies by keeping a certain amount of narrative flexibility. In response to these efforts, China accused the American government of sowing division in the international community.

The question is how this competition of narratives will play out, how it will be impacted by the change of government in the United States, and how other actors will react to it. For instance, if the digital authoritarianism narrative gains more momentum internationally, this could foster cooperation between democracies. It could, however, also reinforce a global binary and strengthen the momentum for techno-nationalism. Whereas the present article outlined an ongoing contest of narratives between China and the United States, further research on the effect of their storytelling and their communication power could help to understand how this impacts other actors and international technology regulation.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the editors of this special forum, Ingvild Bode, Cecilia Ducci, and Pak K. Lee for their insightful comments on my research. I am also grateful for the valuable feedback I received on earlier versions of this article from colleagues at Bielefeld University and during a stay at the Swedish Defence University. My particular thanks go to Thomas Müller, Linus Hagström, Lindy Newlove-Eriksson, Nicola Nymalm, and Charlotte Wagnsson. I further wish to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions. This article is based on research that was conducted in the context of the Collaborative Research Centre 1288 “Practices of Comparing” at Bielefeld University, funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). I acknowledge support for the publication costs by the Open Access Publication Fund of Bielefeld University and the DFG.

Footnotes

References