The Principle of Accountability in Human Rights-Based Approaches to Development: Towards a New Understanding

Abstract

Human rights-based approaches to development (HRBADs) have been pointed out as the most accomplished form of integration of human rights in development. Despite the growing talks among development practitioners on the need for human rights-based approaches to development policies and practices, it remains unclear what exactly the human right principle of accountability at the heart of these approaches consists of. This article seeks to unravel some of the difficulties. What does the principle of accountability mean? Who is accountable and to whom? What does it mean for current development practice? Reflecting on these questions, this article critically delves into policy, guidance, operational documents, evaluations, and other analyses by a selected number of bilateral development agencies. This desk-based research is in some cases backed by semi-structured interviews designed to provide a review of the current approaches to applying the principle of accountability. The article sheds light on how the principle of accountability is understood and applied by those agencies, and notes challenges and inconsistencies. It argues that the principle of accountability should be made fit for purpose so as not to become mere political rhetoric without practical meaning in development practice. It is thus contended that development agencies and state donors should move beyond understanding the principle of accountability as one that is grounded in internal accountability mechanisms and systems of evaluation and aim for holding all stakeholders, including themselves, accountable to the rights-holders of their development programmes and projects.

1. Introduction

Human rights have played an increasingly important role since the 1990s, not only in shaping the objectives of development policies but also the programmes and approaches towards cooperation between different development actors. Although human rights and human development have traditionally been perceived as independent from one another, the relationship between these fields has evolved over the years. The 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to Development (DRD) was a first step in bridging the gap between human rights and development and was followed by the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights which played a substantial role in reaffirming the link between those two fields (Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall 2004a; Linder 2019). In the wake of this, the 1997 United Nations (UN) Reform Programme advocated the move towards the integration of human rights in all UN activities and programmes (UN Secretary General 1997). Following these first steps, a number of UN agencies acknowledged the link between human rights and development. The year 2002 notably marked a shift from ‘policy formulation to field action’ (Vandenhole 2013). During this period, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) issued its first guidelines on human rights-based approaches in the context of Poverty Reduction Strategies, and in 2003 the interagency statement on United Nations Common Understanding on a Human-Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation (UNCU) was adopted by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG). In its 2006 publication Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) on a Human Rights-based Approach to Development Cooperation, the OHCHR highlighted the capacity of human rights and development to strengthen one another in the process of overcoming development problems and highlighted the idea that both human rights and human development ‘reflect a fundamental concern with institutions, policies and processes as participatory and comprehensive in coverage as possible, respecting the agency of all individuals’ (UNOHCHR 2006). The significant link between human rights and development is also acknowledged in several international documents, including the Declaration on the Right to Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Several UN agencies demonstrated early commitments to human rights-based approaches to development (HRBADs), both at the policy and programmatic levels. The United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) assumed pioneering roles by taking initial steps to adopt HRBADs, with a primary focus on practice-oriented HRBAD policies (UNDP 1999; UNDP 2006; UNICEF 1998a; UNICEF 1998b). Some bilateral development agencies also played a leading role, particularly the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and, for a brief period, the British Department for International Development (DFID) by initiating the implementation of HRBADs (D’Hollander et al. 2013; Nelson and Dorsey 2018; Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall 2004a). UN treaty bodies have also called on states to integrate HRBADs into their development cooperation and assistance policies and programmes (CESCR 2014; CESCR 2015). Subsequently, a significant number of multi- and bilateral development agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international financial institutions, and international organizations adopted a HRBAD in their development policies, budgets, programmes, and projects.

HRBADs have been pointed out as the most accomplished form of integration of human rights in development (OECD and World Bank 2016). These approaches regard the realization of human rights as the primary objective of development cooperation, policies and technical assistance. At the core of these approaches is the aim to promote the realization of human rights and to guarantee that the norms, standards, and principles established by the international human rights system serve as the guiding framework for all development cooperation policies, strategies, and procedures. According to the UNCU, six human rights principles must be given special weight: universality and inalienability; indivisibility; interdependence and interrelatedness; accountability and the rule of law; participation and inclusion; and equality and non-discrimination. These human rights principles serve as the foundational framework upon which all development processes should be operationalized. They, in turn, guide development programmes and projects, shaping how they are conducted and influencing the selection of monitoring indicators (Brosse et al. 2020). Some authors have notably stressed that human rights principles are not just a desirable aspect of development but the sine qua non of the actual enjoyment of rights through the development process (Darrow and Tomas 2005). Within this context, accountability has been understood as an overarching principle and—arguably—the principle which provides the greatest interest for development. Indeed, development scholars and practitioners have long argued that the principle of accountability, central to human rights practice, is also a cornerstone for the development enterprise (Darrow and Tomas 2005; UNOHCHR 2013; Uvin 2007). The principle of accountability places a core emphasis on the relationship between duty-bearers and rights-holders, and their corresponding rights and obligations under international human rights law. Most development agencies that have adopted a human rights-based approach to their development policies and practices have paid increased attention to this human right principle. Yet, what exactly characterizes accountability under HRBADs remains unclear. The principle of accountability has not only been said to be one of the least operationalized principles on the ground, but development actors also tend to be particularly vague in their use of this principle. This has resulted in a range of implicit understandings of the principle of accountability informing their development policies and work (D’Hollander et al. 2013; Rand and Watson 2007; Sano 2013b; Uvin 2007).

This article discusses the principle of accountability under HRBADs through an analysis of bilateral development agencies’ policies and practices. It essentially posits that the principle of accountability needs to be normatively conceptualized and sufficiently clear in order to effectively guide the development objectives and processes of development agencies. It is argued that the principle of accountability should be analysed via a series of core questions: What are the implications of this human right principle for bilateral development agencies? Who is accountable for development policies and strategies under HRBADs? And to whom are those duty-bearers accountable? To this end, this article begins with a concise overview of the principle of accountability in HRBADs. It then examines the policies and strategies of five bilateral development agencies applying the approach, in order to analyse the operationalization of this principle: the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the Danish International Development Agency (Danida), the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), and the French Development Agency (AFD). Although this article focuses on the policies, budgets, programmes, and projects of these bilateral development agencies, it also takes into account multilateral development actors. Indeed, the work of these actors relates to, and influences, development work in ways that can provide a more comprehensive understanding of the framework for human rights and development. On the basis of the analytical part of this article, an evaluation of the principle of accountability under HRBADs will be conducted. To conclude, a discussion of the shortcomings of the understanding and application of the principle of accountability will be provided, followed by a number of recommendations. The objective is essentially to deepen the understanding of accountability in HRABDs, by highlighting the interplay between this human right principle and the current development discourse of these development agencies.

2. Research methodology

The research methodology involved both a doctrinal legal research method and an empirical legal research method, specifically a qualitative research method through the conduct of semi-structured expert interviews. The doctrinal legal research was carried out within a desk-based research approach of secondary sources. The research included policy documents and reports from multi- and bilateral development actors, scholarly journals, and studies related to human rights and development. This necessarily involved reading and interpreting the literature to synthesise the available information and draw insights to inform the research on the principle of accountability. The decision was made to focus on five bilateral development agencies for an in-depth examination of the principle of accountability. The choice of the sample was undertaken meticulously for academic reasons and was based on a range of criteria including insights from relevant literature, guidance from general policy papers, and studies conducted by development agencies, as well as exploratory research on bilateral policies. The selection of five bilateral development agencies was done through a cross-cutting analysis of the different development actors applying HRBADs, selected for their significant role within the HRBAD framework and their established prominence in the adoption of HRBADs (D’Hollander et al. 2013). Four of these agencies are recognized as ‘steward donors’ with a substantial history of promoting international human rights (namely Sida, Danida, GIZ, and ADA),¹ while the fifth agency, AFD, is a relatively new player in this field. The doctrinal examination thus also involved policy, guidance, evaluations, and operational documents by the five bilateral development agencies under review.

The research further included the conduct of ten semi-structured expert interviews. This empirical research method allowed for a more in-depth exploration of the different understandings, best practices, insights and challenges with respect to the principle of accountability. This method helped complement the doctrinal legal research method by providing additional information on the principle of accountability in the context of development work. The interviews were designed to yield as much information as possible and to address the specific objectives of the research. The format allowed the respondents to diverge from the key questions to pursue an idea, allowing in turn for the elaboration of information by the interviewee (Legard et al. 2003). The interviews were recorded and taped when consent was given by the respondent, allowing an ex-post analysis of the full transcript and inclusion of the data in the research. The data analysis was done through a classical content analysis enabling examination of the research-generated texts—in this case the interview transcripts (Patton 2002; Webley 2012). The research subjects were selected through purposeful sampling (Webley 2012) which included experts working in bilateral development agencies, multilateral institutions, non-governmental organizations and academics working on HRBADs. The interviewee selection was made on the basis of criteria indicative of relevant expertise, experience, and knowledge in the field. In total, four interviews were conducted with staff experts of bilateral development agencies. Due to limitations in obtaining responses, it was not feasible to conduct interviews with staff members from the five bilateral development agencies selected. Consequently, interviews were limited to staff members from two of the five bilateral agencies initially chosen. Furthermore, one interview was conducted with an expert affiliated with a UN institution, and five interviews engaged experts from academia and NGOs. The interviews conducted with staff of the agencies were aimed at gauging their understanding of the principle of accountability, but also to have an insight into the measures that are being taken (or not) and how they are being applied to conform with the principle of accountability. Conversely, interviews with other experts were directed towards comprehending the evolution of the principle and its various components as perceived by the diverse actors engaged in its implementation.

As the research involved the processing of personal data, ethical considerations were at the forefront of the research methodology. Through pseudonymization of the data, confidentiality of the respondent was protected, and any potential negative effect of the participation in the research was excluded. Finally, although it is acknowledged that there are limitations about drawing firm conclusions based on a limited number of interviews, the findings made on the basis of the documentary analysis and the semi-structured expert interviews offer valuable insights into how those involved in development cooperation have conceptualized the principle of accountability within the framework of HRBADs.

3. Theoretical framework

The concept of accountability within development has traditionally been viewed through the lens of principles, political commitments, and policy frameworks, resembling broader good governance practices, rather than being built on legally binding obligations under international law (McInerney-Lankford 2009: 74–75; Sarelin 2012: 117). However, the accountability propounded through traditional development frameworks has been criticized for failing to establish accountability for human rights obligations for development policies, budgets, programmes, and projects. This has often been said to result in states—both donors and recipients—engaging in development activities without evaluating their impact on human rights or providing legal recourse for negative consequences of those activities (McInerney-Lankford 2009: 74–75; Sarelin 2012: 117). In contrast, by framing development in a human rights language, a HRBAD identifies rights-holders (individual or groups) with specific human rights entitlements and duty-bearers (state and non-state actors) with correlative obligations. It thereby provides a shift in thinking: while both human rights and governance traditions have established accountability at the centre of the relationship between the state and its citizens, HRBADs ultimately ground this relationship within a framework of rights and obligations (UNOHCHR 2013: 17). This implies that development objectives can be framed in line with the international obligations of states, and in turn that human rights international standards serve as a ‘performance standard for development purposes’, enabling duty-bearers to be held accountable for something that is both specific and objective (Darrow and Tomas 2005: 511;UNOHCHR 2013; Sano 2013b: 397; Sarelin 2012: 121). The principle of accountability in HRBADs thus establishes the relationship between rights-holders and duty-bearers, and their corresponding rights and obligations under international human rights law, and focuses on mechanisms and processes for rights-holders to claim their rights (demand-side conditions) and duty-bearers to fulfil their obligations (supply-side conditions) (UNDG 2003; UNDP 2006). In the following paragraphs, the different components of the principle of accountability in HRBADs will be described as found in the literature to provide a comprehensive understanding of accountability in the context of development.

An important component of the principle of accountability in HRBADs is that it draws attention, in all sectors of development cooperation, to the need for duty-bearers to be answerable for the observance of human rights, in line with legal norms and standards enshrined in human rights instruments (Sano 2013b: 396). States are identified as the primary duty-bearers, but the role of other duty-bearers, namely non-state actors with correlative obligations is also to be taken into account (UNDG 2003). The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR 2011) has notably emphasized that, while states are the primary accountable duty-bearers in international human rights law, it is necessary to take a multidimensional approach to accountability in development due to the proliferation of actors in international development, and to include the international community at large (UNOHCHR 2002; UNOHCHR 2013). There is a consensus in the current HRBA(D) literature that this includes not only private sector actors, but also international financial institutions, multi- and bilateral development actors (Darrow and Tomas 2005; D’Hollander et al. 2013; Filmer-Wilson 2005; Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall 2004b; Twomey 2007). The ramifications of such recognition, including for bilateral donors and their development agencies, will be explored in this article.

An emphasis on the obligations of the various duty-bearers in development programmes unavoidably draws attention to the people(s), as ‘active subjects or claim holders’, with corresponding rights (Chapman et al. 2009). The category of right-holders includes individuals, but also social groups which are particularly vulnerable or disadvantaged with regards to the respect, protection and fulfilment of their rights (for example women, children, youth, indigenous peoples, local communities, and so on). Under HRBADs, the role of key players in the development framework are reconfigured, ultimately promoting a stronger position for rights-holders in development. The focus on rights-holders has been said to raise levels of accountability in the development process, where individuals are no longer perceived as ‘passive recipients of assistance’ but active rights-holders claiming their rights and ensuring that development actors implement their duties and obligations (Broberg and Sano 2018: 671; Sarelin 2012: 123).

It is furthermore important to draw attention to some of the prerequisites for accountability, and in particular those ensuring that duty-bearers are answerable to rights-holders. A central component of accountability is ‘accessible, transparent and effective’ accountability mechanisms in all stages of development policy and practice, and at all levels (local or central) to allow rights-holders to hold duty-bearers to account for their human rights obligations (Sano 2013b: 398). The UNCU notably promotes attention to so-called ‘legal human rights-based approaches’ encouraging development actors to focus on the development of laws, policies, institutions, administrative procedures and practices that facilitate the fulfilment of entitlements, address instances of denial, and uphold accountability (Sarelin 2012: 122). Development actors who have focused on ‘legal human rights-based approaches’ have typically engaged in political forms of accountability such as horizontal and vertical accountability, as well as legal and constitutional forms. The latter is notably promoted by supporting judicial accountability in partner countries. Quasi-judicial accountability mechanisms, including national human rights institutions (NHRI) and ombudspersons, have also been pointed out as mechanisms that can be reinforced to promote accountability for human rights failure. However, human rights accountability in development should extend beyond legal recourse and also include non-judicial accountability mechanisms including, for example, political mobilization, grassroots movements, and direct participation by groups (often referred to as social accountability). Lastly, it is doubtful that accountability can be achieved without a number of other related minimum requirements such as the right to information and transparency. The latter measures and requirements are not specific to the human rights framework, but echo broader concerns about accountability in good governance (Sano 2013b: 397; Sarelin 2012: 121).

For the purpose of this article, it is also necessary to note that a HRBAD is different from traditional development approaches because it, inter alia, introduces human rights principles in the development programming cycle, aiming at going beyond merely a focus on the outcome of development. This means that HRBADs establish increased accountability as the primary goal of any area of development programming, but also that the principle of accountability must be included within the policies, budgets, programmes and projects initiatives of development actors (D’Hollander et al. 2013: 39). In the context of development programming, the principle of accountability entails, inter alia, consistent assessment of the human rights impacts of development programmes. This requires systematic measurement of the human rights impacts of all development policies, budgets, programmes, and projects to evaluate the progress or failure in human rights terms (Sarelin 2012; Twomey 2007). Several authors notably emphasize the importance of incorporating the human rights framework in development as it establishes a normative foundation to uphold the principle of ‘do no harm’. This ensures that the development initiatives of donor states, multilateral agencies, and recipient states are monitored and evaluated from a human rights perspective (Darrow and Tomas 2005: 512; McInerney-Lankford 2009: 71; Sarelin 2012: 123). However, in the development process, it is also crucial for development actors to consider whether rights-holders have the capacity to advocate for and articulate their rights. Accessible information should be provided regarding the entitlements of all stakeholders involved in the programmes or projects, including information about any available grievance mechanisms (UNOHCHR 2006: 26). Importantly, by placing an emphasis on rights-holders, new lines of accountability have been said to emerge in HRBADs such as institutionalized local monitoring groups, enabling monitoring and evaluation at local level (Sano 2010: 29; Sarelin 2012: 12). The above-mentioned setting—where development issues can be directly grounded within a framework of human rights entitlements and their corresponding obligations—is one in which HRBADs have been said to raise levels of accountability in the development process. The principle of accountability has further been envisaged to enhance the effectiveness of development work, both because it induces duty-bearers in a given country to act, and also facilitates the monitoring of development programmes (Filmer-Wilson 2005: 218).

As outlined earlier, since the 1990s, a growing number of UN agencies, and other multi- and bilateral development agencies, NGOs and intergovernmental organizations have adopted a HRBA in their development policies and initiatives. In the realm of bilateral development agencies, the human rights-based rhetoric has undoubtedly evolved over the years, constrained by political, organizational and conceptual limitations (Nelson and Dorsey 2018). For example, DFID, known as one of the strongest advocates of these approaches in the early 2000s, eventually shifted away from human rights and embraced a result-based ‘value for money’ approach (D’Hollander et al. 2013; Nelson and Dorsey 2018). Conversely, Sida played a significant role in shaping the early understanding of HRBADs and incorporated a ‘rights perspective’ into every facet of its development policies, developing extensive guidance on these approaches and their application in different development sectors. Following suit, several other donors and their bilateral development agencies have also embraced these approaches to varying degrees, including the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the Austrian Development Cooperation (ADC), and the Danish Development Cooperation (Danida). More recently, the French (AFD) and Belgian (Enabel) agencies have also harnessed the momentum to promote HRBA in their development cooperation efforts (Hayes et al. 2019; Kayser and Osterhaus 2014). However, despite the commitment on paper of these development agencies to HRBADs, it is still striking to note the diversity of understanding and application of the human rights principles at the heart of these approaches, including most importantly different interpretations of accountability. The extent to which development actors, in particular bilateral donors and development agencies, must be held accountable for the human rights impacts of their development policies or activities is an ongoing debate (D’Hollander et al. 2013: 41; OECD and World Bank 2012: 84). In the same vein, the integration of human rights complaints mechanisms has been pointed out by some scholars as a matter that is relatively ignored by development cooperation policies (D’Hollander et al. 2013: 41). Ultimately, despite the wealth of literature, the question of who is accountable and to whom is still open to a wide range of interpretations. This article will address these questions, which are at the centre of the debate regarding human rights accountability in development.

4. Bilateral development agencies’ understanding and application of the principle of accountability

Having set out the meaning of the principle of accountability in HRBADs according to the literature and indicated some of the current debates on its implications, this article will now take stock of its actual implementation in development policies and practices by the selected five bilateral development agencies. As explained in the previous section, the meaning of the principle of accountability lies in its focus on the obligations of duty-bearers, the identification of rights-holders and in the strength that the international legal framework brings with it. The conventional approach to the principle of accountability by the bilateral development agencies analysed has been to work on the ‘supply-side’ of accountability by focusing on the development of ‘laws, policies, institutions, administrative procedures and practices’ (Sarelin 2012: 121) at different levels in the partner country. This has included a support in increasing accountability of all organs and agents of the state, including parliaments, ministries, ombudspersons, judges, police officers, and teachers. Some of the development practices by the bilateral development agencies analysed have thus focused on advocating for the alignment of national legislation with the human rights framework, creating legal accountability where it was absent in the national legal framework. For example, in its focus on the right to water and sanitation, the ADA emphasizes its role in supporting states in their legislative capabilities in codifying the right to water in laws and regulations, thereby laying the ground for legal accountability (ADC 2012). This approach was also adopted by the GIZ in its support of the right to water in Kenya (BMZ 2013). In other cases, there has also been a focus on enhancing accountability-oriented state institutions. Sida’s work in Cambodia exemplifies this approach, as the agency supported institutions and structures for democratic development and human rights through a portfolio of interventions that specifically focus on institutions and organizations ‘capable of driving targeted changes’ (Sida 2020).

Development agencies have also worked on the ‘demand-side’ of accountability by supporting social accountability actions and mechanisms, notably through awareness raising initiatives. For example, three Danida development projects (in Bangladesh, Mali and Tanzania) emphasized the efforts of the agency to strengthen dialogue and accountability between rights-holders and duty-bearers at the local level (Danida 2016). These projects aimed to enhance accountability by actively involving rights-holders and facilitating meaningful engagement with duty-bearers at the local level. Strategies employed included promoting community participation in decision-making processes and establishing new forms of social accountability partnerships. These initiatives enabled reaching out to vulnerable groups and ensuring their voices were heard and considered in the development process (Broberg and Sano 2018: 671; Piron and Sano 2017: 28). The GIZ appears to also adopt this perspective to a certain extent by acknowledging the importance of employing social accountability mechanisms, such as facilitating civil society engagement in policy or budget monitoring, organizing public hearings, or conducting social audits, in order to enhance accountability (Kayser and Osterhaus 2014: 23). At the multilateral level, community participation and awareness-raising tools have also been used to foster accountability of development projects. For example, a UNDP initiative in Sri Lanka (AidWatch 2005 Initiative) aimed to foster accountability in the planning and implementation of various projects, including through rights awareness training, community groups access to local authorities and to grievance-redress mechanisms (OECD and World Bank 2012; UNDP 2008). This not only allows rights-holders to hold duty-bearers accountable, but can also help them, among others things, to gain a better understanding of the process, facilitate the contextualization of programmes, and the ‘upstreaming of local concerns’ (Destrooper 2015: 236; D’Hollander et al. 2013: 41; Haugen 2015: 43). The focus on mechanisms of social accountability, relying on civic engagement towards bottom-up processes of accountability, is in line with a broader understanding of HRBADs which focuses on ‘changing mentalities’ by enabling the subjects of development programmes to analyse their situation and seek ways to improve it (D’Hollander et al. 2013: 30). These non-legal channels of accountability and preventive measures, such as communication with target groups, surveys, or consultations, have notably been pointed out by Interviewee 5 as a more ‘realistic’ way of fostering accountability for development projects due to the social and political dynamics linked with including human rights in development projects (Interview 5, 8 November 2022).

Nevertheless, according to our desk-based study and subsequent interviews conducted with development actors, it appears that despite these policy engagements and ensuing best practices, the principle of accountability has proven difficult to operationalize. This is particularly true in fragile states where the accountability of state structures is questionable (for example distrust in the institutional and judicial processes). Analysis of Sida’s operations, for instance, highlighted that accountability appears to be one of the most difficult principles to implement in practice (Sida 2012; Sida 2020: 94). One interviewee further highlighted difficulties in engaging with partner countries because of weak state capacities or because of the politically sensitive context of human rights (Interview 2, 18 October 2022). The difficulties linked to contextual factors, such as fragile states, have a strong bearing on the implementation of the principle of accountability. Indeed, accountability presupposes that there are identified duty-bearers and subsequent obligations, and that rights-holders are able to claim their rights against these duty-bearers. In fragile states, such as where government capacities are weak or where democratic institutions are failing, it will for instance be difficult to enforce any rights against the state, even the most basic ones such as access to services. Some agencies have thus adopted a more implicit or pragmatic approach to HRBADs in specific contexts, one which does not require a systematic implementation of human rights principles, including accountability (Piron and Sano 2017: 33). For example, Danida advocates an ‘implicit’ HRBAD in contexts where it deems this appropriate: this can range from framing policies in the conflict sensitive language adopted by local NGOs, to supporting indigenous people’s rights without using this language due to government restrictions. These practices are aimed at engaging with partner countries ‘in a way that does not impose human rights as a foreign concept, but strengthens local dialogue’ (Piron and Sano 2017: 19). Likewise, some Sida-funded interventions seem to prioritize a strong commitment to ownership by cooperation partners leading to flexibility in the way the HRBAD is expressed in intervention design and implementation (Sida 2020: 73). The GIZ tends to follow a similar approach, as it has stipulated that in difficult contexts, human rights principles can be applied implicitly, as confirmed by one of our interviewees (Interview 5, 8 October 2022; Kayser and Osterhaus 2014). As there is already some ambiguity surrounding the interpretation of accountability in development projects and programmes (Destrooper 2015; D’Hollander et al. 2013; Sano 2013a), it remains a subject of debate whether adopting a pragmatic or implicit approach leads to favourable outcomes or produces deeper inconsistencies in the application of the principle of accountability.²

Some bilateral development agencies have recognized in their HRBAD policies their own accountability to rights-holders in partner countries. That is the case with the Danida HRBAD strategy which emphasizes—as an integral part of the principle of accountability—that accountability also applies to Danida, and to the intermediaries it uses. It is thus recognized that Danish embassies should be able to directly receive complaints from people in partner countries if Danish development cooperation has a negative impact on them (Danida 2012: 11). Accordingly, Denmark’s development cooperation has set up a so-called feedback mechanism, a possibility for individuals in partner countries to complain directly to the Danish embassies.³ Yet, it is unclear from an analysis of Danida’s policies how this feedback mechanism is to be implemented and what the consequences of it would be. The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) also notes the possibility of establishing a human rights complaint mechanism for citizens in partner countries, allowing individuals or groups affected by German-funded development programmes or projects a way to voice their concerns (BMZ 2011). However, recent evaluations have emphasized that the complaint mechanism proposed by the BMZ never saw the light of day and instead that responsibility was largely shifted to the implementing agencies (Polak et al. 2021). It can however be noted that, despite the absence of a human rights complaint mechanism at the German ministry level up to now, the German implementing agency—the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)—has now introduced two measures. These measures include the Safeguards+Gender Management System aimed at identifying human rights risks and impacts in the first two phases of the project cycle, and the Whistleblower Portal which acts as an institutional grievance mechanism used to report breaches of integrity and compliance standards (GIZ 2021: 2; Polak et al. 2021: 46). According to Interviewee 3, the acknowledgement that a technical cooperation agency—such as the GIZ—now has to have human rights safeguards and a whistle-blower mechanism is already a step towards greater accountability (Interview 3, 3 November 2022).

By contrast to the above-mentioned policies and practices, it appears that the possibility of holding bilateral development agencies accountable to rights-holders in partner countries is not shared by all of the bilateral development actors analysed for the purpose of this article. In some cases, the accountability of the development agencies is mentioned, but only to the extent that it refers to the strengthening of partner-donor financial accountability or domestic accountability to taxpayers, criterion closer to the concept of accountability found in good development programming. For instance, the HRBAD policies and initiatives of Sida make no mention of the agency’s accountability in development programmes and projects, nor of the possibility for establishment of (local or central) complaint mechanisms. Instead, Sida’s recent evaluation shows that the agency understands accountability as largely related to the partner’s accountability, occurring both through internal channels (for example, requirements for financial contributions) and external channels (for example, publication of information). Interviewee 2 corroborated this finding, pointing out that Sida’s mandate is to assist national structures rather than to implement projects and, as a result, the agency does not regard it as its responsibility to set up central channels to lodge complaints for those impacted by its funding (Interview 2, 18 October 2022). Although the ADA’s and the AFD’s HRBAD strategies seldom discusses the possibility of creating complaint or grievance mechanisms for people affected by development projects (Hayes et al. 2019; ADA 2010), it is unclear what the implications of such human rights mechanisms would be for those agencies.

Hence, some interviewees were critical of the current strategies of the bilateral donors and their development agencies, as well as their prevailing understanding of the principle of accountability. Some interviewees mentioned that, despite the commitment on paper by these development agencies to HRBADs, the human rights principles at its basis often appear in practice to be treated as boxes to be ticked, without aiming for a genuine change in development policies and programmes (Interview 4, 4 November 2022; Interview 6, 10 November 2022). Interviewee 3 observed the importance of incorporating accountability mechanisms at the ministry level of donor states because, in certain instances, project-level grievance mechanisms may not suffice to hold state donors accountable for their development policies. The interviewee did, however, point out that the existence of accountability mechanisms within development agencies is often considered satisfactory as bilateral donors believe that grievance mechanisms should be solely managed by the project implementers who are directly engaged in the implementation process (Interview 3, 3 November 2022). Likewise, as highlighted by Interviewee 1, accountability within the realm of development cooperation predominantly revolves around two aspects: domestic accountability, which involves being accountable to taxpayers as well as complying with procurement and budget laws; and accountability to partner governments, as they are regarded as clients. However, attention was brought to the fact that accountability towards the individuals whom development plans, projects, programmes and budgets aim to benefit often becomes blurred and lost in the process (Interview 1, 17 October 2022). This last observation highlights a discernible trend whereby the majority of bilateral donors and their development agencies, as examined, perceive accountability primarily in terms of domestic accountability and bolstering the partner countries’ accountability towards their citizens. This emphasis tends to overshadow the broader concept of accountability in HRBADs that encompasses all development actors, including bilateral donors and their development agencies, being accountable to the rights-holders of development policies, budgets, programmes, and projects, as outlined in the existing literature. In the following sections, this article draws attention to some of those discrepancies and, tentatively, suggests some consolidated points to be explored.

5. Evaluation of the understanding and application of the principle of accountability by bilateral development agencies

The principle of accountability has been embraced by all of the bilateral development agencies analysed as a crucial element in their HRBADs strategies, guiding the formulation and implementation of development policies, budgets, programmes, and projects. A number of good practices can notably be highlighted from the analysis of the principle of accountability in development practices, which have been to some extent aligned with the principle of accountability as understood in the literature. Through the identification of duty-bearers and rights-holders and their corresponding obligations and specific human rights entitlements, accountability has been conceptualized in a more comprehensive manner that extends beyond traditional governance criteria, rooted in a framework of rights and obligations. In particular, the principle of accountability is used as a guiding principle in a number of development sectors (health, access to water, education, and so on) enabling rights-holders to claim their rights and ensuring that duty-bearers implement their obligations. Promising practices from those bilateral development agencies have shown that the principle of accountability leads to a greater focus on strengthening accountability mechanisms (that is, political accountability, legal and constitutional accountability, and social accountability) in the partner countries, independently of the sector addressed. The approaches employed by these agencies target both the supply-side and demand-side of accountability, each possessing its own strengths. The supply-side approach aims to enhance the capacity of the state to fulfil its human rights obligations through the development of a favourable political, legal, and administrative framework for holding duty-bearers (governments and other actors) in partner countries accountable. On the other hand, the focus on demand-side accountability creates opportunities for new lines of accountability at the local level, such as government to target groups, through the active involvement and mobilization of rights-holders (Sarelin 2012: 121). However, limitations may also be highlighted: according to some research, the latter strategy should be included in a ‘comprehensive’ HRBAD as it frequently suffers from a lack of bottom-up engagement and, by itself, cannot provide legal recourse (Ackermann 2005; D’Hollander et al. 2013; Sano 2013b). Likewise, some studies have argued that legal accountability in development is imperfect, among other reasons, because of the challenges surrounding implementation and enforcement, such as weak enforcement mechanisms (Sano 2013b). These strategies still represent an undeniable way to enhance accountability in development work, and thus align with the principle of accountability (Broberg and Sano 2018; Brosse et al. 2020; UNOHCHR 2006).

Nonetheless, whereas there appears to be a strong focus by bilateral donors and their development agencies on the strengthening of human rights accountability in partner countries, a recognition of the accountability of all development actors involved in development policies, budgets, projects and programmes towards the recipient of development is largely absent. Indeed, the principle of accountability is understood in most cases to mean that bilateral development agencies are accountable to their own administration rather than to the rights-holders in development policies, budgets, programmes and projects. For example, Sida positions itself as a government agency offering financial support for project implementation, rather than directly implementing projects. As a result, it argues that it is not responsible for establishing accountability mechanisms for the projects it funds (Interview 2, 18 October 2022). However, this seems to conflict with the understanding of donors’ accountability under HRBADs in the academic literature. Such a position also raises concerns about the extent to which the bilateral agency recognizes its obligation to oversee the allocation and utilization of its funds in accordance with human rights principles as outlined in HRBADs. This further prompts concerns about possible accountability gaps: while partner-donor accountability and domestic accountability to taxpayers are important, and can strengthen other components of accountability, they are surely not sufficient to conform with the HRBADs principle of accountability (Grene et al. 2008: 37; Piron 2005: 1). These issues have already been emphasized by other authors, who argue that this element has been missing in development agencies’ efforts towards the integration of human rights in development policies and programmes (Chenwi 2022; Khalfan 2012; Sarelin 2012). Relatedly, most of the bilateral donors analysed here do not take a clear position on the scope of their human rights obligations when engaging in development cooperation. As a consequence, the understanding that the partner country is the sole duty-bearer of human rights obligations in development seems to prevail. Indeed, even though some bilateral donors acknowledge the need to be held accountable by the ‘do no harm’ principle as the foundation of their HRBADs policies (Hayes et al. 2019; Kayser and Osterhaus 2014), the extent to which these actors are willing to be seen as duty-bearers of positive obligations remains to be seen. In keeping with some recognition of their extraterritorial obligations (ETOs), only the BMZ and Danida appear to have adopted a slightly more progressive approach than the other development agencies, as evidenced by their HRBADs strategies. However, it is still unclear from both those HRBAD strategies what the extent of those obligations for development projects is. As will be highlighted in the next section, these issues seem to arise from broader discrepancies as regards who is accountable in development cooperation and assistance and to whom those duty-bearers are accountable.

In a similar vein, the research conducted shows that few mechanisms for human rights complaints have been developed by bilateral development agencies in this matter (D’Hollander et al. 2013; Piron 2005). The assessment of the five bilateral development agencies made in this research has confirmed the absence or insufficient nature of grievance mechanisms by bilateral donors and their development agencies to investigate complaints raised by those who are adversely affected by development cooperation programmes or projects. Indeed, although certain good practices were identified in section 3 of this article, these mechanisms do not always seem to be applied in a way that prioritizes a focus on right-holders of development policies, budgets, programmes and projects. For instance, despite the emphasis by Danida on the possibility for people affected by their programmes to complain to the relevant Danish embassy through a feedback mechanism, the actual implementation in practice of such a mechanism, and its links with international human rights standards, remains unclear. It is also questionable whether and to what extent this type of mechanism is accessible and practical for rights-holders seeking to lodge such complaints. Likewise, while the GIZ Whistleblower Portal provides a strong entry point towards ensuring greater human rights accountability for development projects, this mechanism is not yet managed by a separate institution, acting independently of the GIZ division (Polak et al. 2021: 102). As a general matter, the utility of these mechanisms as instruments for human rights accountability in HRBADs may be limited by three main challenges: To what extent do they focus on human rights standards and principles? Are they known by and accessible to individuals or communities affected by development programmes and projects? To what extent do they focus on redress and remedy for people affected by those projects? In sum, there is still considerable ambiguity regarding the meaning of the principle of accountability in HRBAD, as well as the procedures and mechanisms put in place by the five bilateral development agencies under review to align with this principle.

6. New perspectives on the principle of accountability in HRBADs: the way forward

The analysis put forth in this article reveals that despite recognizing the significance of integrating enhanced human rights accountability into their development policies, budgets, programmes, and projects, bilateral donors and their development agencies have not given sufficient priority to the aspect of accountability that encompasses all development actors, including themselves. These actors have primarily focused on adopting a governance-centred understanding of accountability in their development initiatives rather than fully embracing the intrinsic human rights dimension of the principle of accountability. Indeed, the focus on accountability in development programming has mostly been on internal accountability mechanisms and central systems of evaluation—resembling broader governance criteria—rather than on the international human rights framework and the ensuing obligations of duty-bearers. Although a trend towards a greater acknowledgement of bilateral donors and development agencies’ human rights obligations in HRBADs can be identified, not all bilateral donors appear to accept those obligations towards rights-holders, nor most importantly the consequences of such obligations. There is a clear lack of consensus on this matter: the idea of development cooperation and assistance being framed in terms of obligations to protect, respect and fulfil human rights, and therefore, accountability of donors for their development engagements towards rights-holders, remains contentious. It can however be argued that if the meaning of the principle of accountability is left to the discretion of donor countries and their agencies, then its added value—that is ‘the concrete, enforceable standards it entails’—is undermined (McInerney-Lankford 2009: 54). In what follows, it is contended that the meaning of the principle of accountability should thus be redirected in two ways. The initial argument, supported by the empirical research conducted, advocates for pragmatic reforms within development agencies, aiming to enhance alignment with the principle of accountability as part of their HRBAD strategies. The second argument is informed by a holistic approach to human rights in development and seeks to contribute to a broader discussion, moving beyond a narrow focus on territorial human rights obligations and placing equal obligations on all actors involved in development cooperation. It emphasizes the importance of holding all parties involved accountable for upholding and promoting human rights principles throughout the entire development process.

6.1 Practical steps towards enhancing accountability under HRBADs

There are multiple difficulties in establishing a universal approach to understanding and implementing the principle of accountability in HRBADs, including differences in donor strategies, the various operational models utilized by development agencies, overlaps between existing accountability practices in governance and development, as well as variations in the adoption of HRBADs among different development agencies (D’Hollander et al. 2013; OECD 2012). Despite these challenges, there are some key points that bilateral donors and their development agencies must consider when applying their HRBAD strategies. Addressing a significant gap identified in the application of the principle of accountability, this article emphasizes the need for bilateral donors and their development agencies to systematically integrate human rights-based impact assessments (HRIAs) and grievance/complaint mechanisms into their development programmes and projects (Chenwi 2022; De Mesquita et al. 2010; Grene et al. 2008; Pribytkova 2022; McInerney-Lankford 2009; Sarelin 2012; Twomey 2007). From a human rights accountability perspective, these mechanisms ensure that failures or risks in programmes and projects are identified. The latter in particular enables affected parties to directly lodge complaints, have ownership over programmes, and potentially seek redress in cases of human rights infringements (Kämpf 2015). These preventive and remedial measures are also crucial in aligning with internationally recognized frameworks such as the United Nations Guiding Principles (UNGP) on Business and Human Rights, which the bilateral donors and their development agencies under review have committed to in their HRBAD strategies (BMEIA 2022; GIZ 2021; Hayes et al. 2019; Danida 2013; Sida 2015). Even though some agencies have already established complaint mechanisms for their development programmes and projects, this article has shown that there exists substantial room for improvement in terms of the design, accessibility, and procedures of these mechanisms. Although discussions on what is genuine accountability of NGOs, transnational corporations (TNCs) and development finance institutions (DFIs), and importantly what it involves in terms of complaints and redress, have only started recently (UNOHCHR 2022), there are already valuable experiences to be learned from existing grievance mechanisms. In certain instances, these mechanisms have been influenced by the effectiveness criteria of the UNGP on Business and Human Rights, which also provide a valuable framework for non-judicial grievance mechanisms (UNOHCHR 2022; UNGP 31). Several lessons are particularly relevant.

Research has shown that, in many cases, there is insufficient information about the mechanisms that individuals and communities can access, and that, in some instances, it becomes virtually impossible for external parties to determine the appropriate channels for lodging a complaint (Ferrando et al. 2022; Kämpf 2015; Polak et al. 2021). Clear and direct information to the rights-holders regarding the existence and operating system of these mechanisms within programmes and projects needs to be provided (D’Hollander et al. 2013; Post and Agarwal 2012; UNOHCHR 2006;,UNDP 2012). These mechanisms should be made visible to end-beneficiaries, which can for instance be facilitated through effective information-sharing with communities during community involvement and monitoring (Ferrando et al. 2022). The latter also better aligns with other human rights principles under HRBADs, including participation and empowerment. Equally important is the need to promote the transparency of these grievance mechanisms as a prerequisite for accountability (UNOHCHR 2006; Sano 2013b). Previous experiences from DFIs have shown that ensuring transparency in both the procedures and the resulting outcomes benefits not only the funding government and the agencies themselves but also the affected individuals and communities (Ferrando et al. 2022). Transparency is valuable because it not only serves as a preventive measure by enabling development actors to systematically integrate feedback into future development programming but it also ensures that individuals and communities are well-informed of these mechanisms or grievances that have already been raised (Ferrando 2022; Ferrando et al. 2022; Kämpf 2015). Another critical concern revolves around enhancing the independence of existing grievance and complaint mechanisms of bilateral development agencies, similar to those employed by GIZ or Danida. In the latter case especially, the introduction of complaint mechanisms within embassies raises questions about potential conflicts of interest, but also doubts about their effectiveness, as embassies might be reluctant to actively oversee complaints related to human rights violations (Herre and Backes 2022). These mechanisms should be strengthened by guaranteeing a sufficient degree of autonomy from the respective agency, by for instance having external experts reviewing claims. This would notably ensure a neutral approach to the grievances that are raised, but also build trust with communities who (might) suffer grievances (Ferrando et al. 2022; Kämpf 2015). Finally, it is crucial to consider the establishment of a centralized and independent grievance mechanism that would operate across the entire spectrum of development cooperation. For example, despite the existence of agency-level mechanisms in German development cooperation, several studies have emphasized the necessity for a centralized accountability mechanism encompassing the entire spectrum of development cooperation in Germany (Forum Mensenrechte 2012; Kämpf 2015; Polak et al. 2021). This centralized mechanism would primarily serve the purpose of addressing situations where existing mechanisms within bilateral development agencies prove inadequate, providing an additional avenue for lodging complaints, thereby ensuring a more systematic and coherent approach at the donor policy level (Kämpf 2015; Polak et al. 2021).

It is essential for both state donors and bilateral development agencies to delve deeper into the challenges associated with these forms of accountability mechanisms in the context of development cooperation. Importantly, the aforementioned accountability mechanisms not only serve the purpose of ensuring accountability in development policies, budgets, programmes, and projects, but also signal greater attention for the rights of the people who the projects are supposed to benefit and ensure that development actors be held accountable for agreed standards of responsibility under international human rights law (UNOHCHR 2013). These accountability mechanisms are ultimately more consistent with a HRBAD logic—that is the realization of all human rights building on the participation and empowerment of rights-holders.

6.2 Rethinking the HRBADs principle of accountability: adopting a holistic approach

In what follows, this article concludes by adopting a holistic approach in addressing the questions and issues raised throughout the preceding sections. The approach suggested—while far from pretending to provide a silver bullet—encourages a deeper reflection on the space and role of Western actors in the development agenda, pushing for a shift in power relations within current development practices. In recent years, it has become increasingly evident that attention must be paid to the extra-territoriality of human rights in development work, especially given the transnational nature of development cooperation and the increased acknowledgement of the potential adverse effects of development projects on human rights. Consequently, while previously overlooked, there has been an increased focus in the literature on the human rights accountability of bilateral donors and their development agencies, considering their pivotal role in the development agenda (Chenwi 2022; Kämpf 2015; Khalfan 2012; Linder 2019). NGOs and local non-state actors have also voiced concerns about policy consistency, demanding human rights accountability from the very organizations and donors that drive the development agenda (Broberg and Sano 2018; Chenwi 2022; Kämpf 2015; Sarelin 2012). In practice, the growing attention on integrating human rights into development efforts has led to a rise in the adoption of HRBAD strategies by bilateral donors. These approaches were understood as a means to shed light on the role of development cooperation in ensuring a development process that itself respects, protects and fulfils human rights. Some scholars notably envisioned that incorporating human rights standards and principles into development cooperation could effectively prevent and address unintended negative impacts on human rights in development processes and outcomes (Chenwi 2022; McInerney-Lankford 2009; Uvin 2007). However, the misalignment with the aforementioned objectives—as outlined in the first part of this section—gives rise to a substantial accountability gap in bilateral development cooperation when viewed through a human rights lens. This, in turn, raises concerns about the consistency of the HRBAD strategies employed by bilateral donors. It is indeed worth questioning how bilateral donors and their development agencies can claim to prioritize a development process that upholds and promotes human rights when the beneficiaries of their development work lack the ability to hold these entities accountable.

This article thus argues that moving forward, bilateral donors and their development agencies should reframe their HRBAD strategies in a way that demonstrates awareness and addresses their substantial influence in partner countries (Linder 2019), as well as the positive and negative impacts their development strategies can have. To achieve this, the development actors under review should re-evaluate their approaches in two key ways. First, in line with the previous recommendations, it is crucial to acknowledge the extraterritorial obligations (ETOs) of state donors when engaging in development activities. For donor states, this includes complying with their obligations to respect, protect and fulfil. Although the latter obligation is contentious (Vandenhole 2007), the obligations to respect and protect require that donor states refrain from any conduct—whether direct or indirect—that hinders enjoyment of rights in other states, and protect against any potential violations of rights by the implementers of a project funded through their development assistance in partner countries (Chenwi 2022; Maastricht Principles 2011). Additionally, there should be a stronger emphasis on the development agency’s responsibility and its ability to be held accountable for human rights violations throughout the entire development process. Failing to do so would indicate that bilateral donors’ current HRBAD strategies are merely perpetuating the very same patterns that were criticized in traditional development approaches, particularly the imperative to move away from a Western-centric development paradigm to one that considers the rights-holders at the basis of development work. Second, in line with the aforementioned arguments, this article advocates for a transition from donor-led development activities towards a paradigm that prioritizes addressing power imbalances and placing rights-holders at the forefront of development programmes and projects. It is essential to critically examine the extent to which individuals, who were previously seen as ‘passive beneficiaries’ of development, have genuinely transformed into rights-holders if they still lack the ability to demand accountability from international development actors. This fundamental shift is the essence of what HRBADs aim to achieve: irrespective of how they are implemented, HRBADs offer limited value if development actors fail to address unequal power dynamics in development (Darrow and Tomas 2005; Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall 2004b). This approach further aligns with principles of development ethics, where the focus on rights-holders not only establishes the accountability of development actors towards them, but also ensures a development process that is both meaningful and ‘worthwhile’ for rights-holders (Drydyk 2019: 151; Sarelin 2012: 118).

7. Conclusion

Interest in placing greater emphasis on the integration of human rights in development cooperation has intensified in the last decade as development actors have realized that a charity-based approach would be insufficient to address global needs (Rand and Watson 2007). In particular, HRBADs have found support by a number of development actors as it places the focus on the need for all sectors and phases of development cooperation and programmes to be guided by human rights standards and principles. In a similar vein, due to the emphasis on the international human rights law framework in the context of development cooperation and assistance, HRBADs have also been highlighted as a framework that could help overcome some of the challenges linked with development work, including the possibility of allaying concerns about the neo-colonial nature of development cooperation and assistance (Chenwi 2022: 212). In essence, the principle of accountability—often regarded as the foundation of human rights in development—is recognized as essential in accomplishing the above-mentioned objectives.

This article has shown that the application of the principle of accountability in development policies, budgets, programmes, and projects is mostly in line with its understanding in the HRBAD literature. The analysis presented in this article reflects, to some degree, the objective of bilateral development agencies to transition towards a stronger emphasis on human rights accountability in their development work. This is achieved through the identification of rights-holders and duty-bearers, and by strengthening different types of accountability mechanisms within the partner country. The practices outlined above not only provide an understanding of how the principle of accountability is interpreted by the examined bilateral development agencies, but also offer valuable insights into the challenges that arise when implementing this principle, particularly in difficult contexts such as fragile states. Nonetheless, although bilateral donors and their development agencies have been working towards a greater understanding of HRBADs in their development practices, they have overlooked the aspect of accountability that aims to hold all actors involved in development accountable to rights-holders, including themselves. Indeed, any understanding of the principle of accountability needs to be analysed in terms of its meaning—that is its direct anchoring in international human rights standards as well as the mechanisms and processes aimed at enabling rights-holders to claim their rights and hold duty-bearers accountable. The lack of attention given to the accountability of all development actors, including bilateral donors and their development agencies, diminishes the overall significance of the principle of accountability in HRBADs.

Adhering to the principle of accountability would entail placing more emphasis on accountability mechanisms in development cooperation, including mechanisms for handling human rights complaints from individuals or groups impacted by development policies, budgets, programmes and projects of bilateral donors. However, there are several remaining questions regarding the scope of these accountability mechanisms: What challenges are inherent in the establishment of human rights (centralized) accountability mechanisms for development cooperation policies, budgets, programmes and projects? To what extent can bilateral donors be held accountable for extraterritorial human rights violations? And to what extent can development agencies themselves be directly held accountable for human rights violations (Kämpf 2015; Linder 2019)? The last section of this article in particular raises a number of issues for future discussions with respect to the ETOs of donor states in international cooperation and assistance. Indeed, the recognition of the need for human rights complaint mechanisms for development cooperation inherently suggests that bilateral donors are willing to subject their actions to legal standards. In turn, this raises questions about the extent and limitations of their ETOs and the resulting division of responsibilities between the multiplicity of actors involved in development cooperation. In particular, the extent to which the involvement of bilateral donors would constitute legal liability, potentially implying remedies in the form of compensation, remains a topic of contention and has yet to be clearly legally determined (Chenwi 2022; Erdem Türkelli 2022; Herre and Backes 2022; Kämpf 2015). However, it is argued that the recognition of international human rights law in the development process and the related ETOs of donor states cannot be overlooked if the aim is to move towards the realization of human rights in development work. Although a shift towards greater accountability for bilateral donors and their development agencies is still difficult to envision within the existing development architecture, primarily due to the way global power structures and the international human rights system are structured, studies have already pointed out to solutions in addressing these gaps (Chenwi 2022; Erdem Türkelli 2021; Linder 2019; Sarelin 2012).

The imperative for human rights accountability in development has grown undeniable. Moving forward, these discussions should be taken up by bilateral donors and development agencies that have adopted HRBADs to address the accountability gap discussed in this article. In fine, if the adoption of HRBADs is considered crucial in furthering human rights, then bilateral donors and their development agencies must be ready to walk the talk by paying greater attention to the rights-holders at the basis of their development policies, budgets, programmes and projects.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Wouter Vandenhole for his invaluable comments and recommendations on this article. The author further extends gratitude to the anonymous research participants for their participation and for sharing their insights on the matter.

Conflict of Interest Statement

None declared.

References

Footnotes