1. Nuclear Energy: A. Nuclear Safety

(1) Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS)

The CNS sets out the fundamental safety principles to ensure and maintain high safety in nuclear power plants. As of March 2023, ninety states and one regional organization—namely, Euratom—are contracting parties to the convention; between them, seven signatory states have not yet ratified it. Among the ninety-one contracting parties, thirty-one have nuclear power plants (NPPs) in operation and/or in permanent shutdown. Two contracting parties are constructing their first NPP, while fifty-eight contracting parties had no NPPs.

(A) Joint Eighth and Ninth Review Meeting

The eighth Review Meeting of the contracting parties of the CNS, which was originally planned to be held from 23 March to 3 April 2020, was postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Instead, a joint eighth and ninth Review Meeting of the contracting parties to the CNS was held on 20–31 March 2023, at the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, Austria. The Joint Review Meeting had the highest level of participation by contracting parties; eighty-one of the ninety-one contracting parties participated.

The meeting started with the opening speeches of IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi, and Dana Drábová, head of the State Office for Nuclear Safety of the Czech Republic and president of the Review Meeting. National Presentations were made by the contracting parties, summarizing the legal, regulatory, administrative, and other measures taken to fulfil their obligations under the CNS (a full summary report can be accessed at <https://www.ensi.ch/de/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2023/04/CNS89-Summary-Report.pdf>).

Based on the discussions of contracting parties held in country group sessions and plenary sessions, a summary of the significant outcomes of the Joint Review Meeting is outlined as follows:

• The decision on the credentials of Myanmar was deferred due to pending guidance from the United Nations General Assembly. Myanmar did not attend the meeting, but the president acknowledged its commitment to the spirit of the CNS.

• Managing extraordinary circumstances that impact the safe operation of nuclear installations: the contracting parties were urged to develop and maintain strategies, approaches, and contingency plans for the management of extraordinary circumstances, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, extreme natural disasters, armed conflicts, and so on. It was recommended that regulatory bodies develop and maintain appropriate procedures for dealing with exceptional circumstances and implement lessons learned for future regulatory enhancements.

• Strengthening of national regulatory capabilities to consider new and innovative technologies: the international cooperation between regulatory bodies must be bolstered to facilitate an exchange of knowledge regarding regulatory strategies and approaches for innovative and advanced technologies. The establishment of a sustainable capacity-building program by the contracting parties is essential for aligning regulatory capabilities with future requirements.

• Fostering international collaboration: contracting parties believe that international cooperation, including in the context of the design and review of small modular reactors, contributes to coordination and standardization. International cooperation on the development of safety standards enhances international harmonization to attain a high level of nuclear safety.

• The possible impact of global climate changes on the safe operation of nuclear installations: contracting parties were encouraged to consider potential climate change impacts on nuclear installations. While external hazards are addressed in a Periodic Safety Review or similar instrument, it is important to consider the increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather-related events and their combined impact.

• Securing reliable supply chains: the supply chains are evolving, and the new and alternative suppliers pose a challenge for both the licensee and the regulator. Reliability of supply chains is a prerequisite for the safe and reliable operation of nuclear installations, and contracting parties were encouraged to share experience in securing supply chains and exchange information on practices for dealing with non-conforming, counterfeit, fraudulent, or suspect items.

• Experiences in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic: in their National Report for the ninth review cycle, contracting parties were encouraged to include information on the pandemic and its potential impacts within the CNS framework.

• Contracting parties reaffirmed the requirement that comprehensive and systematic safety assessments be conducted on existing nuclear installations from design to decommissioning. Several contracting parties recalled Principle 2 of the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety in this context. Contracting parties were urged to share their knowledge regarding the implementation of their ageing management strategies and the efficacy of ageing management practices from design to decommissioning, with a particular emphasis on newly identified ageing processes.

• Canada, backed by France and the United Kingdom, submitted a revised proposal for the establishment of a working group tasked with preserving the long-term efficacy and efficiency balance of the CNS. This revised proposal was discussed and approved with additional modifications.

(B) Response to the Extraordinary Circumstances in Ukraine

In light of the situation in Ukraine, as a result of the armed conflict, some contracting parties stated that they were reviewing and/or updating emergency preparedness and response arrangements, with a focus on transboundary impacts, to address the potential consequences of a nuclear accident at nuclear installations. In addition to their participation in bilateral and/or multilateral joint exercises, certain contracting parties are actively monitoring the situation and providing information to the public and media. Contracting parties recalled the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Event of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency in this regard.

Contracting parties were urged to strengthen cross-border cooperation, which includes participation in joint emergency exercises, and to promote cooperation between nuclear and radiation safety experts regarding emergency response. Several contracting parties noted that they had taken additional emergency preparedness measures because of the armed conflict in Ukraine and the potential impact of a radiological release. Several contracting parties acknowledged the difficulty of securing nuclear installations and associated safety-related infrastructure from armed attacks on a nuclear installation used for peaceful purposes. Simultaneously, several contracting parties are voluntarily providing material and financial assistance to help maintain the safety of nuclear installations affected by the armed conflict.

(2) Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (Joint Convention)

The Joint Convention was opened for signature on 29 September 1997 and entered into force on 18 June 2001. As of February 2023, there were eighty-nine parties and forty-two signatories to the Joint Convention.

(A) Seventh Review Meeting of the Joint Convention (June–July)

The seventh Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties of the Joint Convention was held on 27 June–8 July at the Headquarters of the IAEA in Vienna, which is the depositary and Secretariat for the Joint Convention. Seventy-six of the eighty-eight contracting parties attended the Review Meeting. Observer status was extended to the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (NEA-OECD). Eighty-four contracting parties provided national reports, and no national reports were submitted by Benin, Congo, Gabon, and Rwanda.

Since the sixth Review Meeting, ten new contracting parties have joined the Joint Convention: Benin, Bolivia, Congo, Eritrea, Malawi, Paraguay, Rwanda, the Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, and Zimbabwe. It was noted, however, that a substantial number of IAEA member states with radioactive residue and spent fuel are not yet contracting parties to the Joint Convention. Contracting parties agreed to encourage and facilitate ratification of the Joint Convention. Multiple contracting parties have consented to make their National Reports accessible to the public on their national websites. Others reported that they intended to make their national reports and queries and answers accessible on the Joint Convention’s public website. The following are the significant outcomes from the seventh Review Meeting (<https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/07/summary-report-seventh-review-meeting.pdf>):

• In policies recently approved by governments, the majority of contracting parties developed additional national policies and strategies for the secure management of spent fuel, radioactive waste, and decommissioned sealed sources. Numerous contracting parties created new regulations and accompanying guidance. In some contracting parties, budget and personnel constraints continue to pose a formidable obstacle. In national strategies, the need for storage and disposal facilities was generally identified.

• Several contracting parties sought international assistance for the development or revision of their national strategies. The importance of international peer review missions in the formulation of national radioactive waste management strategies was emphasized, yet again. In several Country Groups, the facilitation of international peer review missions was identified as an area of good performance.

• Plans for the disposal of low- and intermediate-level waste advanced in many contracting parties. In certain contracting parties, however, the disposal of exhausted fuel, high-level waste, and long-lived intermediate-level waste remained a challenge.

• Multiple contracting parties examined the safety implications of long-term spent fuel storage. Some contracting parties presented their practices for the reprocessing of spent fuel, including the construction of new facilities and nuclear reactors that can utilize the reprocessed fuel. The engagement of stakeholders and the general public was designated as a critical success factor in the siting of geological disposal facilities.

• The seventh Review Meeting demonstrated, once again, that international peer review missions are widely implemented and regarded as an effective method for enhancing the national framework and infrastructure for nuclear and radiation safety. Contracting parties acknowledged the significance of hosting such missions regularly, and some contracting parties encouraged the dissemination of mission results.

• Numerous contracting parties that were evaluating and revising their legal and regulatory frameworks raised concerns. The concerns included the establishment and administration of decommissioning and waste management funds, the independence of the regulatory body, the provision for the application of new international standards, the release of facilities and sites from regulatory control, and the evaluation of safety.

• During the country group sessions, thirteen ‘good practices’ were identified in total. Notable ones include an effective step-by-step licensing process for the spent fuel disposal program; a socioeconomic study of the deep geological repository to determine its long-term value to society; a study of the safety of the deep geological repository; and entering a bilateral agreement (as a country with significant nuclear infrastructure) to receive, treat, and dispose of small volumes of waste from a nearby non-nuclear country.

• The Review Meeting identified a total of 244 areas of good performance in all areas of spent fuel management and radioactive waste management safety. Regarding the application of good practices, there was a widespread perception that this was not carried out uniformly across country groups. The contracting parties recognized the need for additional discussions.

The conclusion reached was that the review procedure established by the Joint Convention is a crucial instrument for identifying progress and outstanding challenges. The seventh Review Meeting demonstrated that the international safety community remains committed to enhancing the safety of radioactive refuse and spent fuel management.

(B) Sixth Review Meeting of the Joint Convention (May–June 2018)

The sixth Review Meeting of the contracting parties was convened at the headquarters of the IAEA, the depositary and Secretariat for the Joint Convention, on 21 May–1 June 2018. Since the fifth review meeting, in May 2015, the number of contracting parties to the Joint Convention increased from sixty-nine, and with the recent addition of Mexico, the number of contracting parties is now seventy-eight. The NEA-OECD held observer status during plenary sessions.

The president noted that as encouraging as this was, it must, however, be recognized that several IAEA member states are not yet contracting parties to the Joint Convention. Included among these are some contracting parties to the CNS and several states that have issued expressions of support for the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. The president emphasized the need for contracting parties to collectively increase efforts to encourage those IAEA member states that are not yet contracting parties to the Joint Convention to become parties to the CNS (<https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/summary-report-sixth-review-meeting-e.pdf>).

The Review Meeting determined that many aspects of spent fuel and radioactive waste safety are progressing well. Frequently, obstacles are identified when employing measures to increase safety, and the Joint Convention is increasing its efforts to raise awareness of these obstacles and provide a forum for the exchange of knowledge and experience in overcoming them. Contracting parties are engaged in constructive discussions and knowledge sharing, and they acknowledged the significance of the Joint Convention peer review process. However, the contracting parties noted that a robust peer review procedure necessitates the full and active participation of all contracting parties, and they encouraged measures to increase participation.

Peer review missions of the IAEA are widely used and regarded as an effective method for strengthening the national framework and infrastructure for nuclear and radiation safety. Contracting parties acknowledged the significance of hosting such missions regularly, and some contracting parties encouraged the dissemination of mission results. The voluntariness of relevant national decisions was highlighted. Overall, the review meeting observed overarching issues as ‘topics that pose challenges for multiple contracting parties and may benefit from increased attention at future review meetings.’ Some of these issues were identified as:

• competence and staffing linked to the timetable for spent fuel management and radioactive waste management programs;

• inclusive public engagement on radioactive waste management and spent fuel management programs;

• funding of long-term projects;

• management of radioactive waste and spent fuel from new technology applications as well as planned new projects using existing technologies;

• legacy wastes linked to decommissioning and remediation projects;

• ageing management of packages and facilities for radioactive waste and spent fuel;

• considering extended storage periods;

• response to natural or man-made events that could adversely affect the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste;

• realization of disposal facilities;

• long term management of disused sealed sources; and

• including sustainable options for regional as well as multinational solutions.

(3) Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

This convention was opened for signature in Vienna on 26 September 1986 and entered into force on 27 October 1986. As of February 2011, there were 132 contracting parties and sixty-nine signatories to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident.

(4) Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

This convention was opened for signature in Vienna on 26 September 1986 and entered into force on 26 February 1987. As of October 2022, there were 127 contracting parties and sixty-eight signatories to the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.