Under China’s shadow: Authoritarian rule and domestic political divisions in Thailand

Abstract

This article examines the relationship between public perception of China in Thailand and the domestic political divisions in the country that reflect people’s orientation towards either democratic or authoritarian values. Utilizing data from an original survey, we explore the alignment between individuals’ political values and their perceptions of China’s impact on Thailand and Southeast Asia. We argue that there is an entanglement of the ‘China factor’ in Thailand, which is mediated through polarized domestic politics. First, there is a close correlation between people’s ideological values and their perceptions of China. Different political dispositions condition people’s judgement of China’s public image. Furthermore, there are notable political divisions within the country that view China’s regional influence and its impact on Thailand differently. As a result, opposing political forces in the country have strategically used China and its perceived influence or alignment as a political tool in domestic debates and power struggles.

Key Words: China, Thailand, Authoritarianism, Southeast Asia

1. Introduction

The past decade has seen a troubling trend of democratic recession across the world. Larry Diamond, for instance, comments that this trend encompasses a range of challenges: accelerating democratic breakdowns, declining quality or stability of existing democracies, deepening authoritarianism, and a lacklustre commitment by Western democracies, notably the USA (Diamond 2015: 144). Recently, the literature on democratic backsliding and authoritarian resilience has been growing, with numerous accounts investigating the reasons behind these shifts (Waldner and Lust 2018; Sinkkonen 2021; Grumbach 2023).

A significant focus within this literature is the role of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The PRC is often cited as bolstering authoritarian rule worldwide. As Larry Diamond comments, many authoritarian governments have ‘increasingly used China’s booming aid and investment … as a counterweight to Western pressure for democracy and good governance … they have been only too happy to point to China’s formula of rapid state-led development without democracy to justify their own deepening authoritarianism’ (Diamond 2015: 151). Andrew Nathan also identifies six methods through which China exerts its influence, including setting an example for other authoritarian regimes, promoting authoritarian values, providing technical assistance, stifling democratic openings, ensuring authoritarian survival through economic and strategic engagements, and shaping international institutions to be ‘regime-type-neutral’ (Nathan 2015). Jessica Chen Weiss similarly observes how ‘China’s actions abroad have offered alternatives to US-led international institutions, made the world safer for other authoritarian governments, and undermined liberal values’ (Weiss 2019: 93).

In Southeast Asia, a region that is geographically proximate and historically deeply intertwined with China, there seems to be a substantive amount of Chinese influence in the regional distribution of democracies and authoritarian governments (Reilly 2013). However, what are the exact mechanisms when we conceptualize China’s influence in shaping authoritarian rule in Southeast Asia? Situating within the literature on how national politics interact with international relations, this article proposes a new framework to understand how China’s influence on regional authoritarianism is channelled through domestic political divisions, using Thailand as the empirical case.

In the past two decades, Thailand experienced domestic breakdowns of democracy, with military coups in 2006 and 2014 (Chachavalpongpun 2014). The 2014 coup, led by General Prayut Chan-o-cha, resulted in a domestic political climate characterized by a deterioration of civil liberties and human rights violations. In February 2020, the dissolution of the Future Forward Party by the Constitutional Court sparked a new wave of antigovernment protests, with explicit demands for sweeping reforms of the monarchical system and its royalist political institutions, alongside calls for constitutional changes and the resignation of PM Prayut.¹ This bold targeting of the monarchy, an extremely controversial move, triggered severe state repression, including the arrest of protest leaders under Article 112 of the lèse majesté clause (Haberkorn 2018; Streckfuss 2019).

Then in May 2023, Thailand held a national election. The Move Forward Party (MFP), a reinvention of the dissolved Future Forward Party, secured a plurality of seats in the parliament.² Nonetheless, despite the electoral success, the MFP was thwarted from forming a government, while the Pheu Thai Party, which finished second in the election, managed to form a government through a coalition with some conservative forces.³ Most recently, through the Constitutional Court, the conservative forces in the country managed to dissolve the MFP and banned its executive board, which includes its former leader Pita Limjaroenrat, for 10 years.⁴

Because of such political regressions during the past decade, despite the existence of regular elections, Thailand’s political system has been described as either ‘democratic authoritarianism’ (Pongsudhirak 2003), or ‘democratic dictatorship’ (McCargo and Alexander 2019), or ‘authoritarian hybrid regime’ (Bamrungsuk 2019). While Thai conservative force seems to have prevailed in domestic authoritarian rule, Thailand’s relations with China have also deepened in recent years. Facing pressure from the USA, the Thai government under Prayut simply turned towards Beijing to seek Chinese endorsement as a strategic counterbalance (Hewison 2018). Bilaterally, China has become Thailand’s top trading partner and a major source of foreign direct investment (FDI), rivalling Japan and the European Union (Goh and Liu 2021). Moreover, China has emerged as the largest source of foreign tourists, numbering around 10 million Chinese tourists per year and almost a quarter of Thailand’s total foreign visitors in 2019 (Han 2022). Despite the halt caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, bilateral economic relations seem to have rebounded. Therefore, how can we understand what role China plays in domestic authoritarianism in Thailand?

We argue there is an entanglement of the ‘China factor’ in Thailand, which is mediated through polarized domestic politics. First, there is a close correlation between people’s ideological values and their perceptions of China. Different political dispositions condition people’s judgement of China’s public image. Furthermore, there are notable political divisions within the country that view China’s regional influence and its impact on Thailand differently. As a result, opposing political forces in the country have strategically used China and its perceived influence or alignment as a political tool in domestic debates and power struggles. Advocates of authoritarian rule in Thailand often laud the Chinese development model, endorse Chinese investments, and support an increase in Chinese influence in Thailand. In contrast, opponents of the authoritarian government tend to favour reduced Chinese involvement in Thailand and leverage China’s negative connotations to criticize the government and tarnish the reputation of authoritarian leaders. In this case, domestic institutions and political contests serve as conduits of Chinese influence, because ‘domestic institutions create particular payoff matrices and empower particular political players, in ways that encourage or discourage receptivity’ (Fung et al. 2023).

The article is organized as follows: First, we begin by engaging with the literature on authoritarian rule and the ‘China factor’, with a particular focus on Southeast Asian countries within China’s immediate neighbourhood. We propose our theoretical framework on the entanglement of domestic politics and international relations in providing the conduit through which authoritarian rule is affected by China’s presence. We then conduct a detailed case study of Thailand using empirical data from a survey conducted in October 2022. We present correlational analyses that explore the relationship between Thai citizens’ political values and their divergent views on China, including its strategic presence in Southeast Asia and influence in Thailand. We interpret these findings by illustrating how China’s role is entangled with domestic political contestations within Thailand. We further demonstrate how domestic political divisions have led to the strategic use of the ‘China Card’ by opposing Thai political actors to further their own political agendas. The discussion and conclusion section will synthesize our findings from Thailand and discuss the broader implications for democratic resilience in Southeast Asia and beyond in the context of China’s rising influence.

2. Authoritarian rule and the ‘China factor’

On the issue of global authoritarian resilience, Thomas Ambrosio identifies two key pivotal mechanisms. The first is the embattled influence of democracy, which depends on the health of democratic institutions and the evolution of societal values. Notably, the inclination towards right-wing populism and the weakening of democratic institutions in Western democracies, such as the USA, cast doubt on the strength of the democratic paradigm. Secondly, the ability of authoritarian regimes to present successful governance models also challenges the appeal of democracy (Ambrosio 2010). In this case, China’s remarkable economic ascent under the CCP exemplifies such a model and challenges the traditional narrative linking democratic institutions to economic prosperity (Nathan 2015). The ‘China model’, which combines economic dynamism with authoritarian political and media control, could serve as a blueprint for other authoritarian governments (Ambrosini 2013: 383).

Although scholars disagree on whether China intends to actively export its governance model, its diffusion could still occur as an unintentional consequence, potentially reinforcing authoritarianism in other countries (von Soest 2015). Moreover, some authoritarian regimes may seek to learn from China’s experiences, adopting certain practices without China’s explicit encouragement. Concurrently, economic cooperation with China, in some cases, has been found to stabilize authoritarian rule, regardless of the Chinese government’s intentions (Bader 2015b). These effects often arise not from an explicit strategy by China but as a by-product of its professed noninterventionist foreign policy, which often benefits incumbent governments and their economic allies. Although some studies have found that China’s aid can negatively impact democratization (Hess and Aidoo 2019), the long-term influence of China’s engagement on the resilience of authoritarian regimes remains, at the very least, uncertain (Bader 2015a), and in some instances, can even weaken autocratic governance structures (Melnykovska, Plamper, and Schweickert 2012).

Nonetheless, China has made more overt moves to support some authoritarian states. Beijing’s aversion to foreign intervention on the grounds of regime change or human rights has led to protective measures for certain authoritarian regimes at the United Nations (UN). For example, China has vetoed UN resolutions pertaining to Syria based on these principles (Fung 2018). In recent years, China has also facilitated training and knowledge exchanges specifically tailored for authoritarian regimes. Particularly, China’s export of technologies designed for state control—like facial recognition, internet firewalls, and information censorship software—has significantly enhanced the surveillance and repression capabilities of many authoritarian governments (Polyakova and Meserole 2019). Together with Russia and others, China has invested heavily in propaganda aimed at discrediting the USA and Western democracies (Colley and Moore 2022), which indirectly impedes democratization efforts around the world.

In Southeast Asia, China’s presence and influence are deeply felt (Goh 2016; Strangio 2020; Han 2024). This region is known for its diversity of political regimes, including authoritarian states such as the single-party communist states of Vietnam and Laos, the military or military-dominated governments of Myanmar and Thailand, and strongman rule in Cambodia. Generally, mainland Southeast Asian countries display more authoritarian tendencies than their maritime counterparts (Reilly 2013). From Beijing’s perspective, political stability in this region is crucial for China’s peaceful rise, and therefore, it seeks to foster amicable and cooperative relations with its neighbours (Ba 2003). China’s cordial political ties with these governments have sparked criticisms, with some arguing that it is Beijing’s support that bolsters authoritarian resilience in the region. However, empirical evidence regarding its influence appears inconsistent at best.

There is some evidence that Beijing has boosted some authoritarian governments within the region. A notable example is the diplomatic protection it has extended to Myanmar’s military government from international censure (Hein 2020; Maung Aung Myoe 2011). In 2007, China exercised its veto power in the UN Security Council on a draft resolution proposed by the USA, which contended that Myanmar’s domestic situation posed a risk to regional and international peace and security. Following the military coup in 2021, Beijing again offered tacit backing to the military junta State Administrative Council, which was facing sanctions from Western governments while battling fierce resistance forces domestically (Brenner 2024). In this case, China’s support was pivotal for the military to maintain its claim to political legitimacy, especially as it faced ostracism from the broad international community (Centre for Strategic and International Studies 2022).

Beijing has also provided extensive economic aid and investment in Cambodia, which has allowed former Prime Minister Hun Sen to reduce the country’s reliance on Western aid and its often stringent conditionalities (Po and Primiano 2020). As Cambodia’s largest foreign investor, China accounted for nearly a quarter of foreign investment in the country from 2012 to 2018 (Loughlin 2021). Moreover, China emerged as Cambodia’s largest donor by 2019, contributing 48% of the country’s official development assistance (Ngin 2022). Given China’s considerable share of investment and aid, it is fair to say that China has played a significant role in Cambodia’s economic growth over the past decades, and has markedly enhanced the performance legitimacy of Hun Sen’s government.

While these examples highlight China’s engagements with the authoritarian regimes in Myanmar and Cambodia, the effect of China on authoritarian resilience in Southeast Asia extends beyond these two countries alone. However, in a larger economy such as Thailand that neither needs international diplomatic protection nor is economically dependent on China, what role has Beijing played in its domestic authoritarian rule?

3. Domestic political divisions and foreign policy orientations

Recently, studies have shown a common pattern of political and societal polarization in many parts of the world, which is symptomatic of the ongoing phenomenon of democratic erosion and/or authoritarian resilience (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018). For example, scholars have discovered that there is correlation between growing polarization in the USA and authoritarian tendencies on certain policy issues that reflect partisan divisions within the country (Cizmar et al. 2014). Similar polarization along the libertarian–authoritarian divisions has also been found in other Western democracies, such as the UK and some other European states (Vachudova 2019;Perrett 2021).

Although such polarization indicates the potential for conflicts over domestic policy (Hare and Poole 2014), it can also spill over into foreign affairs, whereby public perceptions of foreign relations might be correlated with ex ante levels of domestic polarization (Myrick 2021, 950). Therefore, polarization between the Republicans and Democrats in the USA has been found to manifest through their different levels of support for Ukraine in the context of the Russian invasion (Borg 2024). Even in the context of general bipartisan agreement on the China threat in the USA (Carothers and Sun 2023), it seems attitudes towards China are also conditional on whether the China threat narrative is accompanied by partisan cue (Myrick 2021, 950).

Political polarization indeed has been the dominant feature of Thai politics for the past decades (Kongkirati 2024). Since the dawn of the twenty-first century, Thailand has experienced domestic instability and polarization marked by rounds of opposing mass protests, featuring competing rallies between political factions known as ‘yellow shirts’ and ‘red shirts’ (Chachavalpongpun 2011). These grassroots confrontations at the time reflected the political divisions within the country and the power struggles between the then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and supporters of the royalist conservative order, which prompted the military to seize power twice, in 2006 and 2014.

However, as we have seen, the political division between royalist conservative political forces and the pro-democracy opposition has continued in the country. In many ways, such deep-rooted political polarization might be indicative of the divisions in political attitudes in the country regarding democracy versus authoritarianism (Kirsch and Welzel 2019; Fails and Pierce 2010). Such polarization in people’s political attitudes likewise should also colour how they view international relations, especially when different external powers are concerned. Therefore, we hypothesize that the Thai public’s political values on a spectrum between authoritarianism versus democracy should be correlated with how they view China:

• H1: Individuals with higher pro-authoritarian values are more likely to have pro-China attitudes.

• H2: Individuals with high pro-democracy values are more likely to hold anti-China attitudes.

4. Research design

To empirically test the above hypotheses, we conducted an online survey. The survey was conducted through Dynata between 10 October and 31 October 2022, to adult Thai citizens and we obtained a total of 2,380 responses.

Our survey comprised three main segments (see Table 1 for an overview). The first segment assessed democratic values through two sets of questions.⁵ Respondents rated essential characteristics of democracy on a 10-point scale, evaluating statements about free elections, military intervention, civil rights, and obedience to rulers. They then assessed different political systems on a 4-point scale, considering scenarios ranging from strong leadership without parliamentary oversight to military rule and democratic governance. These responses formed the basis for our continuous measures of liberal democratic and authoritarian values through latent variable analysis.

The second segment examined Thailand’s foreign relations through questions about regional alignment preferences, particularly regarding security tensions between the USA and China, territorial disputes, and cross-strait relations. Respondents also evaluated China’s regional role and influence relative to the USA in Southeast Asia.

The final segment focused specifically on China’s influence in Thailand, with respondents evaluating the impact of Chinese engagement across political, cultural, and economic dimensions. This included assessments of specific initiatives like the high-speed railway and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), followed by standard demographic and partisan affiliation questions. We analyse responses to these questions in detail in subsequent sections, where we examine how people’s political values towards democracy and authoritarianism correlate with attitudes towards China. The complete questionnaire with Thai translations is provided in Supplementary Appendix A.

Our survey sample (N = 2,380) was collected through Dynata, a digital market research firm’s crowdsourcing platform, with quotas set to approximate national demographic patterns. When comparing our sample characteristics (Table 2) to Thailand’s national demographics, we note both alignments and deviations. The gender distribution closely matches national figures, with males comprising 50.7% of respondents. The regional distribution broadly reflects population concentrations, with the Northeast representing the largest share (33.6%), followed by Bangkok (27.8%), Central region (18.3%), South (12.1%), and North (8.15%).

However, our sample skews younger than the national population distribution. In all, 38% of our participants are aged 35 years or younger and approximately 50% between 36 and 55 years, which represents a slightly younger demographic profile than the national distribution (e.g., according to Thai census data, 30.3% are aged 35 years or younger, and 29.9% are between 36 and 55 years). This younger skew is typical of online surveys in Thailand and reflects higher internet penetration rates among younger demographics. While conventional wisdom and recent events suggest that younger Thais tend to hold stronger democratic values compared to their older counterparts, as evidenced by movements such as the ‘Milk Tea Alliance’,⁶ studies suggest that demographic compositions in Thai surveys do not necessarily predetermine political ideological trends (Meyer 2017). Our data reveal diverse opinions on China and democratic principles across demographic groups, which we explore in subsequent sections.

To test our hypotheses, we first need to understand the political value distributions among Thai citizens. Building on but also diverging from Kirsch and Welzel’s (2019) framework examining how democracy is understood across different societies, we propose a distinction between political values that support democracy versus authoritarianism: Pro-Democratic Values (PDV) and Pro-Authoritarian Values (PAV). While Kirsch and Welzel characterize authoritarian notions as alternative understandings of democracy, we argue that this conceptualization risks diluting the definitional integrity of democracy itself. Instead, we explicitly categorize these authoritarian tendencies as distinct from democratic values, reflecting a separate preference for authoritarian governance structures.

Following this conceptual clarification, we define PDV as political values that emphasize the hallmarks of liberal democracies, including free elections and civil liberties. Conversely, PAV reflects support for authoritarian governance, including obedience to authority and unchecked power of non-elected elites, particularly military authorities. While Kirsch and Welzel conduct a cross-national study using standardized World Values Survey questions, we adapt their methodological approach for our Thailand-specific context. We employ factor analysis on eight questions modified to reflect Thailand’s political environment. Using all eight questions—which cover topics including military rule, free elections, civil liberties, and deference to authority—our factor analysis generates two distinct measures: PDV and PAV (see Supplementary Appendix for detailed factor analysis results). For presentational purposes, we dichotomize these continuous factor scores into ‘low’ and ‘high’ categories based on their median values. The technical details of our factor analysis and categorization process are located in the Supplementary Appendix.

Figure 1 presents these eight questions and their response distribution, which we used to capture domestic political attitudes. The responses reveal a complex picture of Thai political value distributions. Approximately 80% of Thai respondents view systems led by strong leaders or experts—who may bypass elected legislatures—as ‘somewhat good’ or ‘very good’ (Fig. 1a and b). Additionally, 56% see a military takeover in the face of government incompetence as favourable. However, in what seems a contradiction, 88% also rate a democratic political system positively.

In terms of what constitutes democracy, 48% and 38% of respondents respectively believe that leaders elected through free elections and laws that guarantee civil rights are ‘essential’ (Fig. 1e and g). Yet, there is an even split on the necessity of direct army rule (Fig. 1f) and obedience to rulers (Fig. 1g), with just 17% considering them essential to democracy. Together, the distribution of responses suggests that Thai respondents hold complicated values towards both democracy and authoritarianism, which supports our approach of using factor analysis to uncover the underlying ideological values of PDV and PAV.

5. Divided perceptions of China in Thailand

Before examining how political values shape attitudes towards China, we first present an overview of Thai public opinion that reveals several important patterns (see Supplementary Appendix Figs A1 and A2 for detailed distributions). First, Thai citizens show complex and sometimes contradictory views towards China. When asked about Thailand’s preferred international alignment, the largest group of respondents (37%) chose to remain neutral rather than align with either China (29%) or the USA (33%). This preference for neutrality is even stronger regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea, where over three-quarters of respondents (77%) preferred Thailand to stay neutral rather than support either China or neighbouring Southeast Asian countries.

Secondly, Thai perceptions of China’s role in the region show distinct patterns across different domains. While most respondents believe China will replace the USA as the regional leader (69%) and will seek to reshape the existing international order (59%), they also see benefits in China’s engagement with Thailand. For example, large majorities support Chinese infrastructure projects in Thailand, such as the BRI and high-speed railway development (67 and 69%). Similarly, nearly two-thirds of respondents (64%) believe Chinese economic activities benefit Thailand, and over half (55%) see Chinese cultural influence as positive. However, when asked about increased Chinese immigration to Thailand, opinions are more divided, with less than half (42%) viewing it favourably.

This combination of cautious diplomatic stance alongside economic openness suggests that Thai attitudes towards China may be shaped by deeper political values and orientations, which we examine in our main analysis. To understand these patterns, we investigate how domestic ideological divisions within Thailand affect these public views of China, specifically analysing how democratic and authoritarian values shape Thai opinions on international security issues and China’s regional role.

Our analysis reveals how domestic political value divisions in Thailand shape views of China’s regional role and influence. Figure 2 demonstrates a clear pattern where political values systematically correlate with attitudes towards China across multiple dimensions.

In terms of security issues (top panel), individuals with high PDV consistently express more negative views towards China. Specifically, such respondents show a 14-point lower preference for aligning with China during regional security disputes, and a similar 13-point decrease is observed among those with low PAV (Fig. 2a). When it comes to territorial disputes, the trend persists, albeit less markedly; high PDV respondents’ preference for siding with China drops by 8 points, and for those with low PAV, the drop is 10 points (Fig. 2b). The most significant divergence emerges on the topic of Chinese unification of Taiwan, where high PDV corresponds to a 25-point decline in support and low PAV is associated with a substantial 36-point decrease (Fig. 2c). These consistent trends across various security issue domains highlighted that Thai public preference for China correlates closely with their political values on democracy versus authoritarianism.

Political values also shape Thai perceptions of China’s geopolitical influence in Southeast Asia (bottom panel), with PAV playing an especially important role. Respondents with strong PAV orientation perceive China as a stabilizing force, evidenced by significant increases in positive perceptions: a 25-point increase for China maintaining the regional status quo (Fig. 2g) and a 32-point rise in viewing China as benevolent (Fig. 2f). These individuals are also 17 points more likely to believe China will redefine the international order (Fig. 2d) and 14 points more likely to view China as the future regional leader (Fig. 2e). Meanwhile, high PDV holders approach China’s rise with scepticism and are less likely to see it as benevolent. However, their PDV scores do not significantly influence opinions on whether China will transform the international order or usurp the USA as the regional leader—nor on China’s overall impact on regional stability.

Figure 3 further illustrates how political values shape Thai perceptions of China’s influence in Thailand. The top panel (Fig. 3a–c) reveals that those with higher PAV perceive China’s influence as substantially more beneficial across all dimensions—with increases of 38, 31, and 36 percentage points for political, economic, and cultural influence, respectively. In stark contrast, respondents with high PDV show a more nuanced response: they demonstrate no significant change in their perception of China’s economic influence, a slight 7-point dip in the perceived benefit of Chinese cultural influence, and a notable 24-point drop in viewing China’s political influence in the country.

When examining specific policy issues associated with China’s presence in Thailand (Fig. 3d–f), PDV does not significantly shape perceptions of China’s major economic projects like the BRI or the high-speed rail project. The general sentiment towards these infrastructure projects remains overwhelmingly positive, with approval ratings hovering around 68–70 points. However, attitudes towards Chinese immigration reveal sharp divisions; high PDV respondents show a 33-point decrease in viewing increased Chinese immigration positively.

Conversely, those with strong PAV scores consistently endorse Chinese involvement across all domains, registering a 25-point increase in support for the BRI, a 26-point rise for the high-speed rail project, and a 34-point increase in favour of Chinese immigration. These findings suggest that while PDV-related differences influence Thai attitudes towards China’s presence, PAV variations more strongly predict patterns of support to China’s engagement with Thailand.

6. Partisan differences and divided views on China

Thailand’s contemporary party system is relatively fragmented and fluid, which has experienced some dramatic changes in recent years as a result of military coups and authoritarian rule. Its political parties often centre around influential figures rather than cohesive ideological platforms, and in fact, party switching has also been a notable phenomenon. Currently, there is a mix of long-established parties and some new political forces that reflect the country’s diverse social, economic, and ideological divides. Among the major players is the Pheu Thai Party, a populist-oriented party associated with the Shinawatra family, which has traditionally garnered support from rural and working-class voters in northern and north-eastern Thailand. On the other side of the spectrum is the Democrat Party, the country’s oldest political party, known for its pro-establishment stance and support from urban and southern regions. Another significant party is the Palang Pracharath Party, closely linked to military influence and conservative interests, which rose to prominence after the 2014 coup. However, right before the 2023 national election but after our survey, there was a major split within the Palang Pracharath Party. Furthermore, the Move Forward Party, previously known as Future Forward Party, has come out with a major following among younger voters and has emerged as the largest opposition party after the 2023 national election (Laohabut and McCargo 2024). However, the party was dissolved after a controversial decision by the constitutional court and renamed itself the People’s Party in 2024.

Having established how political values shape attitudes towards China, we now examine how these ideological differences manifest through supporters for various domestic political parties in Thailand at the time of the survey. Below we present analyses showing how partisan identification serves as a key mechanism through which underlying values are correlated with their views on China.

Figure 4 depicts how people’s political values align with their partisan affiliations, with Fig. 4a focusing on PDV and Fig. 4b on PAV. In Fig. 4a, we see that the Pheu Thai Party and Move Forward Party supporters show a stronger preference for PDV, with average scores of 0.18 and 0.48, respectively. These scores place them in the top one-third for PDV, indicating a strong preference towards democratic principles. On the other end of the spectrum, supporters of the Palang Pracharath, the Bhumjaithai Party, and the Democratic Party exhibit lower enthusiasm for PDV, with mean scores of −0.20 and −0.27. These figures sit below the overall average and median, suggesting a less liberal stance compared to the average Thai respondent.

Shifting our attention to Fig. 4b, the pattern inverts. Here, Palang Pracharath supporters score within the highest third for PAV, suggesting strong backing for authoritarian values. Meanwhile, the Move Forward Party and Pheu Thai Party supporters record scores of −0.40 and −0.14, which positions them in the lower third and just under the average for PAV, respectively. This juxtaposition in Fig. 4a and b illustrates a significant ideological split that corresponds to party identifications at the time of our survey.

Figure 5 further investigates how such political divisions along party lines are associated with various attitudes towards China across different policy areas. For presentational simplicity, we selected salient issues on Chinese influence in Thailand and China’s regional influences along with supports for the five major political parties in Thailand. In Fig. 5a, Palang Pracharath, Bhumjaithai, and the Democratic Party supporters perceive China’s political influence as more positive by 17 to 11 percentage points than those supporting the Pheu Thai Party, with supporters of the Move Forward Party scoring the lowest in terms of viewing Chinese political influence positively. This tendency is consistent when considering economic and cultural influence, with Palang Pracharath, Bhumjaithai, and the Democratic Party supporters displaying a greater receptiveness to Chinese influence in these areas than those aligned with Pheu Thai and Move Forward Party (Fig. 5b and c).

When it comes to regional security issues and China’s influence in Southeast Asia, there is a noticeable difference in opinion among Thai political party supporters. Figure 8d shows that Palang Pracharath, Bhumjaithai, and the Democratic Party supporters are more inclined to align with China on security issues—by margins of 12, 20, and 28 percentage points, respectively—compared to those who supported the Pheu Thai Party. Supporters of the Move Forward Party share similar sentiments to Pheu Thai, indicating a more cautious stance towards China’s security and geopolitical influence. Furthermore, when it comes to the topic of Chinese unification across the Taiwan Strait, the gap widens, with Palang Pracharath, Bhumjaithai, and Democratic Party respondents showing approximately 20 percentage points more support than their Pheu Thai and Move Forward counterparts (Fig. 5e).

The perception of China as either a benevolent or threatening power is also split along party lines. Figure 5f reveals that a significant majority of Palang Pracharath, Bhumjaithai, and Democratic Party supporters view China as a benevolent power. Conversely, when considering the perception of China as benevolent, only 46% of Pheu Thai supporters and an even smaller 28% of Move Forward Party supporters agree with this sentiment. These results show that Thai political party support is correlated with their attitudes towards China’s impact on Thailand at multiple levels, from domestic to regional. Although we understand that in Thailand political parties have been characterized as feckless and fluid in their political ideologies (Allen and Erik Martinez 2015), we can still say that at least at the time of our survey, people’s identification with various political parties is correlated with how they perceive China’s role within their country, in the surrounding region, and in the wider international arena.

7. The ‘China card’ phenomenon

Peter Trubowitz and Jungkun Seo once described a so-called ‘China Card’ phenomenon in American politics, where politicians use it to gain partisan advantages in the polarized domestic political milieu (Trubowitz and Seo 2012). In the US context, as China’s global influence expands, American politicians increasingly consider their stance on China as a critical part of their political identity and strategy. Both Democrats and Republicans deploy the ‘China Card’ as an effective means to rally support, mobilize their base, or shift focus from other issues.

In the Thai context, we have seen that domestic polarized political values towards democracy and authoritarianism have coloured people’s views of China and its influence. Similarly, we have also seen such divided views on China have been filtered through different political parties that people supported domestically. Indeed, we contend there is a similar ‘China Card’ phenomenon at work in Thailand, where opposing political forces have strategically deployed China-related narratives to advance their domestic agendas. Indeed, the ‘China Card’ can serve as simultaneously a strategic asset for those in power and those challenging the authoritarian government, with its use reflecting Thailand’s deep political polarization.

For example, conservative pro-military forces in Thailand, especially pro-military aligned media outlets, tend to hold China’s governance in positive terms, consistently praising its political stability, economic growth, and social order as a model for Thailand’s development. A case in point is Sondhi Limthongkul, a right-wing royalist and media personality, who has used his online talk show ‘Sondhi Talk’ to cast China in a positive light. His YouTube channel features episodes that often praise China’s international influence and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s leadership, contrasting them with critical views on the United States’ negative influence on Thailand.⁷

Such deliberate pro-China positioning has also been evident in formal political channels. Palang Pracharath, previously the ruling party affiliated with the military, openly praised the CCP for raising living standards and establishing China as a global power. They also advocated for Thailand to learn from the CCP’s approach to governance.⁸ Although the party recognized there were differences in governing systems between China and Thailand while emphasizing that it will only choose things that benefit the Thai people, Palang Pracharath nonetheless considered the CCP as a good friend.

Therefore, the conservative forces have used the ‘China Card’ to demonstrate the benefits of continual authoritarian rule versus the perceived chaos and instability of a democratic government. For Thailand’s pro-military establishment, the ‘China Card’ has been a convenient justification for their law-and-order stance and the continuation of authoritarian rule. Aligning with China can promise economic benefits, infrastructure investments, and diplomatic support—key for Thailand’s stability and growth. They emphasized the need to maintain a harmonious relationship with China to secure economic and investment opportunities, arguing that cooperation with China is vital for Thailand’s prosperity.

Conversely, the pro-democracy camp strategically has leveraged the ‘China Card’ to discredit the authoritarian military-associated government. Since Thailand’s protest movement in 2020, there was the formation of a ‘Milk Tea Alliance’, an online coalition of political activists drawing parallels with the anti-Chinese rule protests in Hong Kong in 2019. This alliance has positioned itself as a transnational movement against authoritarianism at home and Chinese influence in the region (Schaffar and Praphakorn 2021). Pro-democracy activists and politicians have raised alarms over China’s involvement in Thai infrastructure, economic policy, and regional politics, claiming that it represented undue Chinese control of Thai internal affairs. Opposition politicians, tapping into the growing public sentiment against Chinese influence in their national affairs, often criticized China as a means to challenge Prayut’s government and the military’s tight hold on Thai politics.

The Move Forward Party, in particular, has levelled pointed criticism at the then PM Prayut’s dealings with China, labelling the relationship as unequal and likening China to a lion poised to consume Thailand, reducing it to a mere province of China. This rhetoric mirrored deep apprehensions among sections of the population in Thailand about the need to maintain strategic autonomy amidst China’s expanding reach. Given Thailand’s tradition of maintaining balanced foreign relationships with major powers, many have argued that the contemporary geopolitical climate has pushed Thailand too close to China’s embrace (Busbarat 2016; Han 2018).

Therefore, opponents of the authoritarian government have advocated for reduced Chinese influence in Thailand. They use the ‘China Card’ to criticize the government and highlight the dangers of over-reliance on China. The pro-democracy camp warned that such dependence could lead to a loss of economic autonomy and control over critical infrastructure. They leveraged the ‘China Card’ to discredit the current leadership, accusing officials of sacrificing national interests for personal or elite gains. By emphasizing the risks of close ties with China, they sought to undermine public confidence in the government’s decisions and its commitment to protecting Thailand’s sovereignty.

Thus, the ‘China Card’ has served a purpose in Thailand’s domestic politics, reflecting the divisions within its political landscape. Our survey findings align well with these observed political behaviours. This consistency suggests that the relationship between political values and attitudes towards China might not be merely correlational. Rather, it might have reflected calculated political messaging channelled through partisan mechanisms.

8. Concluding remarks

While our analysis demonstrates the correlation with people’s political values and perceptions of China, there are important scope conditions for these findings within their temporal and political context. Our survey only captured Thai public opinion during a specific period of political transition in late 2022, when Thailand was experiencing significant political uncertainty ahead of the 2023 election. The fluid nature of Thai party politics and the rapidly evolving regional situation suggest that the manifestation of the ‘China Card’ phenomenon may continue to evolve. Such contextual considerations aside, we consider our broader conclusions about the relationship between Thai domestic political values and attitudes towards China should hold.

While our study focuses on Thailand, the relationship between political values and perceptions of China may be relevant in other countries where China’s influence is increasingly felt. For example, we can observe similar patterns where comparable conditions exist. In Malaysia, although two-thirds of its public expresses favourable views towards China,⁹ substantial scepticism remains about China’s regional and international intentions. Because of such divisive views of China, the ‘China Card’ can be quite an effective tool for political mobilization. This was the case in former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s successful 2018 election bid, when his campaign tapped into the electorate’s scepticism of China (Yeoh 2020).

As China’s global presence continues to grow, its entanglement in domestic politics across Southeast Asia is likely to increase. Our findings suggest that the effectiveness of leveraging the ‘China Card’ in political contestation may depend on the strength of pre-existing democratic values within a given country. In contexts with substantial authoritarian predispositions, China’s perceived influence can become a potent tool for political legitimation. Conversely, in countries where democratic values are deeply entrenched, this strategy may be less effective.

Future research should explore how the ‘China Card’ phenomenon manifests under different institutional arrangements and political conditions, particularly in countries experiencing democratic backsliding or authoritarian consolidation. Additionally, examining how these relationships evolve as China’s regional role continues to expand should provide valuable insights into the intersection of domestic political values and international relations in Asia.

Footnotes

Supplementary data

Supplementary data is available at IRASIA Journal online.

Funding

Funding support for this article was provided by the internal research funding at the University of Hong Kong.

References