Imagining the Cognitive Science of Religion: Magic Bullets, Complex Theories, Experimental Adventures, By E. Thomas Lawson

This collection of solo-authored essays from E. Thomas Lawson opens and closes with accounts of his academic journey in the study of religion. After initially obtaining a PhD in the philosophy of religion at The University of Chicago in 1963, Lawson had a series of encounters with scientists and philosophers of science that convinced him of the possibility and value of a scientific study of religion. He went on to play a key role in creating and nurturing the subdiscipline of the cognitive science of religion (CSR). Reading these more personal bookends and the research contributions between them, one cannot help but be struck by the joy Lawson demonstrates in intellectual discovery, creation, and friendship.

One should be clear what the book is not. It is not a thorough review of the now-sizable subdiscipline of the cognitive and evolutionary sciences of religion, though Lawson does review what he sees as the key early contributions (e.g., Pascal Boyer’s work on intuitive ontologies and Justin Barrett and Frank Keil’s work on theological correctness) and makes clear his position on the debate over whether elements of what is commonly called religion should be seen as evolutionary adaptations or by-products (Lawson firmly endorses the by-product view). Neither is it a full-throated defence of CSR against various criticisms, though the text contains a few (e.g., a defence of CSR from charges of reductionism in chapter 3, “The Wedding of Psychology, Ethnography, and History: Methodological Bigamy or Tripartite Free Love”). Rather, the chapters show Lawson at work over six decades in conceiving of the need and possibility of CSR and subsequently leading its ongoing development.

One of the many contributions of Imagining the Cognitive Science of Religion is its detailing of how Lawson was inspired to develop CSR and why his theories took the forms they did. Through the introduction, chapters 1, 2, 7, and 13, as well as the conclusion, Lawson provides the reader with details of how the CSR came to be. Of particular note in relation to theory is the role of linguistics, especially the work of Noam Chomsky, as Lawson makes clear that the inspiration for his work on ritual was the ability of Chomskyan linguistics to show that underneath diverse languages lie universal principles of grammar that provide individuals competence beyond what they have been explicitly taught: “I was elated because I thought that if this was true of language, a clearly cultural phenomenon, why could it not be true of cultural systems such as religion?” (2). Of particular note in relation to disciplinary history is the scotch shared by Lawson and his long-time collaborator and friend Bob McCauley “at some point in the mid-1970’s” (4), before which Lawson’s initial thoughts on applying linguistics to ritual actions were thought potentially “trivial” and after which were seen as deserving serious exploration.

Another contribution of the volume is the inclusion of summaries of Lawson’s key work on ritual form. Chapter 4, “Cognitive Categories, Cultural Forms, and Ritual Structures” and chapter 8, “Psychological Perspectives on Agency” detail Lawson and McCauley’s theory of ritual competence and Lawson’s efforts to empirically test the theory. To summarize, as Chomsky proposed a Universal Grammar underlying language acquisition and competence, Lawson and McCauley propose an “Action Representation System” underlying how human beings understand action, which involves “agents,” “actions,” and “objects.” And, as Chomsky’s hypothesized grammar is constrained by universal principles, so too is cognition concerning religious ritual action. The “principle of superhuman agency” concerns whether a supposed superhuman agent is represented as or most closely connected to the agent, instrument, or object in the ritual and governs inferences of a ritual’s well-formedness, repeatability, and reversibility, whereas the “principle of superhuman immediacy” concerns how many enabling actions or rituals are required to reach the involvement of a superhuman agent and governs inferences of a ritual’s centrality to a religious system. Chapter 8 summarizes the experimental work Lawson has conducted with Justin Barrett providing evidential support for these principles through the probing of participants’ intuitions about the well-formedness and centrality of novel rituals.

Beyond specific research contributions, the volume also details Lawson’s view of the metatheoretical contributions of CSR, namely the move away from “magic bullet” explanations and toward a “fractionated” understanding of “religion.” Chapter 2, “Magic Bullets and Complex Theories,” notes that “magic bullets are wonderful things [as] they hit all targets simultaneously, no matter how far apart” (23) and that magic bullet theories of religion have been quite popular, as scholars mostly interested in interpretation sometimes veer into explanation by citing theories that can supposedly explain religious beliefs, practices, and experiences through one mechanism or dynamic. For example, the symbolic functionalism of Durkheim holds that the human use of symbols to understand the nature of the social is key to explaining many different elements grouped under the category religion. In place of this, CSR offers a “fractionated” understanding of the myriad of phenomena often labeled as religion, with different explanatory mechanisms and dynamics for ritual competency, ritual compulsion, supernatural agent belief, sacred values, religious experiences, etc. This account fits well with the now widespread view that religion is a socially constructed category with limited scientific value.

As most of the above has been detailed by Lawson and others elsewhere, one may ask what lessons this particular volume provides. I see two main takeaways. The first is the evidence the volume presents for the personal qualities that have helped Lawson make his contributions. The volume illustrates not only Lawson’s ambition but also his intellectual openness and rigor. From the detailed analysis of available resources for the explanation of myth in chapter 7 (published in 1978) to his seeking advice from McCauley on the potential triviality of his insights to collaborating with Barrett to put his theories to the test, we see Lawson exploring many disciplines to address his questions and then critically evaluating his answers. This combination of openness and rigor is, alas, not as common as we might wish.

The second takeaway is a reflection on the power of encounters and opportunities in our formation as scholars. While chapter 13, “Experimental Adventures,” details many of the academic meetings and conversations that inspired Lawson, a noteworthy set of experiences occurred during a workshop on biology, philosophy, and the social sciences in 1976. Besides including a number of respected philosophers of science and biologists, the workshop offered participants the chance to apply to accompany the biologist and philosopher of science Richard Levins on a five-day study of harvester ants. Most applicants were biologists. Despite being a philosopher of religion, Lawson won a coveted place. As Levins told him, “Your mind was devoid of all the many wrong ideas that people who study biology often acquire” (162). Lawson goes on to describe the life-changing experiences of working with Levins, his fellow assistants, and the harvester ants, as he was amazed at the complexity of their behavior and the power of experimental science: “After my summer in Colorado Springs, I came back to Kalamazoo as a new person. I was inspired to develop a genuinely interesting scientific study of religion that was theoretically sophisticated and that could, in the long run, be experimentally driven (163).” This narrative shows not only the power of opportunity but also a time when a researcher with little experience in a field could be selected for a highly competitive opportunity. In the hyperspecialized and bureaucratic academy of today, one has to wonder whether this would be possible and, if not, what transformative scholarly experiences we might be precluding.

Like many volumes, Imagining the Cognitive Science of Religion could use some additional copy editing. Although most typos do not affect comprehension, there are a few frustrating ones, such as the use of “FORGE” rather than “FORCE” (95–97) in describing psychologist Alan Leslie’s work on agency. Readers may find themselves puzzled enough to consult Leslie’s papers for understanding.

The reader should also note that there is a danger in placing too much foundational status on particular scientific contributions. Science is always moving, with Chomsky’s theories coming under sustained criticisms from a number of corners and Boyer’s work on the memorability of minimally counterintuitive concepts showing a mixed replication record. Although those works may have been crucial to demonstrating the potential of cognitive scientific work on language and religion, they are now only two perspectives among many in the cognitive sciences. As Lawson relates, “What started out as a conversation between a few scholars in the humanities grasping rather tentatively the reins of science ended up with a veritable crowd of chariots charging around the scientific arena. It is not always clear that these risk-takers are now all participating in the same arena, but the excitement of the game is palpable” (133). What is clear from reading this volume is that E. Thomas Lawson has had a substantial and positive effect on CSR and that we could do much worse than emulate his ambition, openness, and rigor in our pursuit of a scientific understanding of religion.