Reputation and Interdependence: How Japan Perceives US Resolve in Distant Regions

Abstract

During the last decade, the US credibility abroad was put into question as it was accused of lacking resolve in crises. American policymakers and scholars have been worried tremendously about the reputational costs of backing down and the effect on the credibility of commitments and threats. While the debates revolve around the deterrence literature and official allies, there is surprisingly much less theoretical contribution referring to informal security partnerships. When it comes to US partners such as Ukraine and Taiwan, the existing theoretical concepts have not been adequately updated. Allies and adversaries around the world do monitor US actions in other places, especially when it comes to other alliances. What happens about the US actions towards partnerships? Do allies make reputational inferences about the show or lack of resolve when the United States fails to adequately support an informal partner? This paper examines how Japan perceived the United States resolve during the withdrawal from Syria and the Kurdish crisis of 2019 in an effort to fill the aforementioned gap. After examining secondary and primary sources findings show that Japan was much more concerned about its defender's allocation of resources and whether its interests with the United States still align rather than making reputational inferences. The findings can have severe policy implications given the US level of involvement with key partnerships and the latter's concern about showing as a reliable ally.

Resumen

Durante la última década, se ha puesto en duda la credibilidad de EE. UU. en el extranjero, debido a las acusaciones que recibe EE. UU. con respecto a su falta de resolución en las crisis. Los responsables políticos y los académicos estadounidenses han estado muy preocupados por los costes de reputación que tiene el hecho de dar marcha atrás y por el efecto que esto tiene sobre la credibilidad de los compromisos y las amenazas. Si bien los debates giran en torno a la literatura relativa a la disuasión y a los aliados oficiales, resulta sorprendente el hecho de que existe mucha menos contribución teórica relativa a las asociaciones informales en materia de seguridad. En lo relativo a socios de los EE. UU. como Ucrania y Taiwán, los conceptos teóricos existentes no se han actualizado de manera adecuada. Los aliados y los adversarios de todo el mundo llevan a cabo una monitorización de las acciones de EE. UU en otros países, especialmente en lo que se refiere a otras alianzas. ¿Qué pasa con las acciones que lleva a cabo EE. UU con relación a sus alianzas? ¿Llevan a cabo los aliados inferencias reputacionales sobre la muestra de resolución, o falta de esta, por parte de los EE. UU. cuando los EE. UU. no consiguen apoyar adecuadamente a un socio informal? Este artículo estudia cómo Japón percibió la resolución por parte de Estados Unidos durante su retirada de Siria y la crisis kurda de 2019, en un esfuerzo por llenar el vacío antes mencionado. Después de analizar las fuentes secundarias y primarias, nuestras conclusiones demuestran que Japón estaba mucho más preocupado por la asignación de recursos de su defensor y por si sus intereses aún estaban alineados con los de EE. UU., en lugar de llevar a cabo inferencias sobre la reputación. Estas conclusiones pueden tener graves implicaciones políticas debido al nivel de participación de EE. UU. en alianzas clave y a la preocupación de este último por mostrarse como un aliado fiable.

Résumé

Cette dernière décennie, la crédibilité des États-Unis à l’étranger a été remise en question, car ils sont critiqués pour leur manque de détermination par temps de crise. Les législateurs et chercheurs américains se sont beaucoup inquiétés du coût d'un retrait pour la réputation du pays et de l'effet des engagements et menaces sur sa crédibilité. Tandis que les débats tournent autour de la littérature sur la dissuasion et des alliés officiels, étonnamment, il existe beaucoup moins de contributions théoriques quant aux partenariats de sécurité informels. Quand il s'agit de partenaires des États-Unis, comme l'Ukraine ou Taïwan, les concepts théoriques existants n'ont pas fait l'objet d'une mise à jour adéquate. Les alliés et les adversaires des États-Unis dans le monde entier surveillent leur comportement à d'autres endroits, notamment s'agissant d'autres alliances. Qu'en est-il des agissements américains concernant des partenariats? Les alliés tirent-ils des conclusions sur leur réputation par rapport à leur démonstration ou manque de détermination quand les États-Unis n'apportent pas le soutien qu'il faudrait à un partenaire informel? Cet article examine la façon dont le Japon a perçu la détermination des Américains lors du retrait de la Syrie et de la crise kurde de 2019 afin d'actualiser les concepts existants. Après un examen des sources primaires et secondaires, les conclusions montrent que le Japon se préoccupait bien plus de l'allocation des ressources de son défenseur et de savoir si ses intérêts s'alignaient toujours sur ceux des États-Unis, plutôt que de tirer des conclusions quant à leur réputation. Les conclusions de ce travail de recherche peuvent s'accompagner d'implications politiques importantes étant donné le niveau d'implication américain dans des partenariats clés et le fait qu'ils souhaitent se montrer comme un allié fiable.

Introduction

“I feel like a Kurd today.” This was the response of Dore Gold, a foreign policy official under Benjamin Netanyahu, during an interview in 2019 as reported by the New York Times, following the decision of the Trump administration to withdraw from Syria (Halbfinger 2019). More press releases at that time emphasized both domestic and international reactions to what was interpreted as abandoning or betraying, a protégé during a crisis. Daniel Fried, former assistant secretary of State for European affairs, during an interview at PBS News, stated that senior officials from Poland “behind closed doors asking me, ‘If this is how America treats its comrades in the battlefield, can America be counted on?” (“Why the U.S. Decision in Syria Has Left Some Allies Anxious” Quran and Wood 2019).

The decision of the US administration to withdraw its troops from Syria was considered by many as an abandonment of a long-standing ally. While an unofficial partnership, the vast majority of the Kurdish population, representing a sui generis situation of a nation without a state, felt betrayed; equally a portion of the US military personnel felt ashamed. Most importantly, however, the decision unnerved allies with the above examples of Poland and Israel being indicative. The notion of the interdependence of commitments, or assumed commitments, means exactly that what happens in one region is being monitored by allies in distant ones—and affects their perception of its defender's resolve and credibility. While how exactly it shapes their strategic interactions with their patron and their adversaries in an extended deterrence situation is difficult to assess, one can observe the reactions of allies and try to understand their perceptions of the US resolve—and how it affects its credibility.

Of course, the case of the Kurds in the fall of 2019 was not the only one causing shockwaves among different allies. The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 took US policymakers by surprise and it was a clear situation of deterrence failure (Edward 2022). President Obama's administration was accused of issuing noncredible warnings and failing to effectively arm Ukraine leaving the area “defenseless” (“When Obama Left Ukraine Defenseless” McCarthy 2022). In an article in The Atlantic in 2017, the former President was also quoted stating that “The fact is that Ukraine, which is a non-NATO country, is going to be vulnerable to military domination by Russia no matter what we do,” highlighting the overall administration's policy and different perspective on interests (Calamur 2017).

In the policy world, empty promises or inaction are seen as undermining the US credibility. In an op-ed in 2014, Senator Bob Corker criticized Obama's inactions as hurting the US credibility and unnerving allies: “Those around the world who are looking to the United States for support against intimidation, oppression or outright massacres have learned a tough lesson in the past few years: This U.S. president, despite his bold pronouncements and moral posturing, cannot be counted on” (Corker 2014). In contrast, findings in a study conducted regarding the reactions from the Baltic States, following the Crimean crisis of 2014, found that allies perceived the growing threat and reacted nervously but no abandonment fear regarding the United States was identified (Hank 2020).

In the meantime, a recent study on Japanese perception of the Crimean crisis of 2014 gave new evidence. Japanese officials expressed concerns about the invasion of Ukraine linking it to President Obama's statements of the United States not being more the “world's policeman” and due to the reduction of military spending. According to one official of the Liberal Democratic Party, as stated in the research findings of Simon & Kim, “half a year after this statement by Obama, Russia military invaded Ukraine. . .and China began from this period the land reclamation on seven reefs in the South China Sea” (Kim and Simón 2021, 17). In the meantime, the analysis found that the Japanese were also worried that the US resource constraints and the war in Europe would be “detrimental” to the US commitments in East Asia. As cited in the above research, a Japanese member of the parliament stated “These developments in Europe in that sense can affect situations in East Asia” (Kim and Simón 2021, 17).

During the US withdrawal from Syria and the alleged abandonment of Kurds, there is limited data from official Japanese sources. How concerned policymakers and the bureaucratic apparatus were and how did they perceive the withdrawal? A Japanese foreign ministry official, on the eve of the announcement, stated in the Japan Times that “The Japanese government shouldn't react to a tweet by the president each time . . . If it's their official position, we need to deal with it, but the president says various things” (Banks n.d.). Additionally, the Defense White Paper of 2020, refereeing to the events associated with the fiscal year 2019, makes only a brief reference to the US troop withdrawal from North East Syria and there is no evidence of reputation or credibility concerns (“Defense of Japan 2020”, 53). The same venue was also used by Kim and Simon (2021) concerning the Russian annexation of Crimea where resource allocation and credibility concerns were indeed discussed there.

Hence, how do allies perceive and assess the US resolve and credibility in cases of showing a lack of resolve in other regions? Most importantly, what happens when the protégé is a partner/unofficial ally? This paper is taking Japan as a case study. The reactions from Japan have been interesting in both the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 and the Syrian crisis of 2019. In previous research focusing on Ukraine, Japanese officials were worried about the US credibility and ability to support Japan in a time of crisis (Kim and Simón 2021). Preliminary data regarding the withdrawal from Syria seemed to suggest that Japan was indifferent. In the meantime, one should expect concerns about an ally's or partner's abandonment as happened with other European and Middle Eastern allies such as Israel, Poland, and France. This paper answers the question of how Japan, one of the most important US allies with one of the most long-standing bilateral alliances to date, perceived its defender's choice of withdrawing from Syria and leaving a long-standing partner behind.

Trying to explain allied perceptions of the US resolve and how it affects its credibility is crucial for various reasons. First, it is an understudied phenomenon. While a lot of discussion is being made regarding the US reputation and how to advance deterrence, the majority of the literature is focusing on perceived threats of the adversary and not perceived promises from an ally's perspective. More importantly, when partners and unofficial allies come into the discussion, they are either treated the same way as a formal ally, or they are disregarded and downplayed. At the end of the day, there is a reason why a formal commitment exists. However, the United States is discussing if Taiwan is worth fighting for and has invested billions in the war in Ukraine, at least until the second Trump administration in 2025 which may change the overall policy towards the latter. While the above actors are partners and not allies, the United States is deeply involved and concerned about its deterrence posture, credibility, reputation, and what it means for its place in the world. Literature and theory have not kept up with these developments, with the majority of the research only focusing on formal allies even if the United States has not been called to support them for decades now.

Secondly, the existence of credibility is being showcased as a duality; either it exists or not. I assume that one should examine it in a continuum: some promises and actions are more credible than others and allies recognize that; hence interdependence in some cases is weak and in others strong depending on the lessons learned from an ally's perspective regarding its protégé and its immediate interests. That does not mean that allies do not monitor past actions as some previous contributions suggested. Thirdly, besides the contribution of this study to the academic literature, there are severe policy implications. Deterrence is back in the discussion after the war in Ukraine. Understanding how allies think and perceive seemingly nonrelated events in other regions involving unofficial allies can lead us to better assess if abandonment fears are present and if the US credibility is at stake—and if it its worth being obsessed over it. At the time of the writing, the second Trump administration has already threatened withdrawal of support from Ukraine to stop the war, with allies in Europe raising concerns about the US credibility. Hence, this study becomes even more timely and relevant at this point. Lastly, findings can further inform US policy-making, leading to a more efficient prioritization and better understanding of alliance politics.

Japan offers a great opportunity as a case study being one of the longest bilateral alliances of the United States in a highly volatile region with great interests at stake. I argue that allies like Japan do monitor US actions in distant regions, showing support towards the reputation and interdependence thesis. However, I did find support for the “prioritization versus reputation trade-off” thesis of Kim and Simon (Kim and Simón 2021). The Middle East withdrawal was not perceived negatively since it was seen as part of a premade decision that would free US resources for other places in the globe and it did not affect the US credibility the way American actors worried about. In order to make this assessment I look at the reactions of the elites, either directly through the official documentation and reactions of the Japanese establishment or indirectly through the in-depth interviews conducted. When concerns about US credibility arise, these are usually expressed through expressions such as “losing confidence,” “becoming worried,” or losing “trust” in the US administration. Similar qualitative measurements were used in the above study as Kim and Simon were analyzing the perceptions of the Japanese policy elite.

Conceptualizing Perceptions of US Credibility

Perceptions are rather impossible to quantify, but the same happens with the other concepts of security and deterrence. After all, these terms are deeply psychological in their nature and definition. To approach the research question, first, it is beneficial to define the dependent variable. Jervis's work on perceptions and misperceptions is a good starting point. In his book, he describes perceptions as beliefs and offers the option of different levels of analysis one may choose to approach in order to describe and examine questions relevant to this concept. For Jervis, the analysis on the decision-making level seems the most appropriate since each decision maker, or decision-making body at the end of the day, has certain beliefs about the world. These beliefs shape their countries’ approaches but they can also be incorrect and the reality could be largely different (Jervis 1976, 28). Hence people behave differently in what seems to be similar situations because their perceptions of the world and other actors equally differ.

In an extended deterrence situation, the actions of the patron towards its protégé can be perceived in a way that generates anxiety and nervousness over the credibility of a commitment; also referred to in the alliance literature as fear of abandonment. That means that the ally perceives that his defender will not step in to aid him in times of a crisis if immediate deterrence fails. Mixed signaling can dangerously intensify this perception and can lead to different reactions. Hooper found in her research that some allies do worry that they will not secure “US support in a less than existential conflict over a disputed island territory or maritime boundary” (Rapp Hooper 2015, 128). She argues that while in the majority of the scenarios, the United States would provide military support to Japan and the Philippines in case a major war breaks out, this is not the case for nonexistential conflicts. The difference in perceptions is evident. The Senkaku–Diaoyu dispute is considered by Japan as existential but for the United States, it is not if one carefully takes into consideration the nonzero-sum game with China and the vague treaty commitments on this subject. She concluded that this difference in perceptions generates especially high abandonment fears for Japan and the Philippines (Rapp Hooper 2015, 130).

In addition to the above, even if the Obama and Biden administrations did reaffirm their commitment to Japanese interests regarding the Senkaku islands, the fear of abandonment is still evident. According to Tow (1991), uncertainty regarding the US commitment will always exist. The junior partners of an alliance such as Japan and Australia are suffering from a fear of entrapment/abandonment in their asymmetric alliance with the United States and deliberately they are avoiding questioning the willingness of the United States to fight on their behalf. The nature of the United States extended deterrence commitment is ambiguous but the protégé will continue to assume that it is valid. Hence, as he notes, “Asia-Pacific allies have questioned the readiness of Washington to fight a general war in support of their survival” (Tow 1991).

Theoretical Framework: Reputation, Interdependence, and Credibility

The role of reputation and interdependence is well documented in the literature. Since the Cold War and the domino effect theory present at the time, relevant discussions are always present in the US policy-making circles. In an extended deterrence situation, a defender is committed to protecting a protégé against a potential adversary. The former's promise to the protégé and threat to the adversary need to be credible to work. Credibility is usually defined as “the perceived likelihood that an actor will follow through on their threats and promises” (Press 2005) and it is largely conceptualized in the literature as a function of interests, capabilities, and resolve of the defender. In that sense, resolve is the willingness to stand firm and stay determined in the face of a crisis, and when present it contributes and boosts credibility.

In the unique case of the United States as a great power, there are multiple protégés in different regions that compete for the defender's resources. They also observe the defender's actions towards its other allies and “see complementary reputational links between the credibility of a patron's extended deterrence commitments in each other's region.” Interdependence is linked to a reputation for resolve. To avoid doubts about being resolute in the future, states will stand robust during a crisis that includes a protégé, even if interests are not vital to them (Montgomery 2020, 776). That is also the point when the interdependence of commitment problem appears.

In a recent study by Kim and Simon (2021), it is evident from the analysis that indeed allies from distant regions examine developments elsewhere, and those can affect “the reputation of the US as a security guarantor” (Kim and Simón 2021, 726). Reputations at the end of the day are inherently transferable across cases. However, the way the defender prioritizes their resources is even more important from an allied perspective, since the latter compete for interests and capabilities that boost the defender's credibility posture. Additionally, as Henry (2020) states, policymakers have adopted the logic “that a state's character is judged through displays of innate loyalty” and that “discreet alliance commitments are interdependent” (Henry 2020, 45). The above reasoning does not affect only formal treaty allies where commitments are codified and a casus foederis is clear. The current debate on Taiwan is one of the examples used in the study since policymakers do highlight loyalty and interdependence when it comes to deterrence. For instance, if Taiwan is abandoned that could also be a blow to the US–Japan alliance and the US credibility (Henry 2020, 46).

Montgomery (2020) in their work also focuses on the so-called interdependence of commitment problem. First of all, the US strategy is inherently more fragile due to the latter; the costs of sustaining commitments in different theatres simultaneously and managing different adversaries can be particularly problematic for a maritime superpower (Montgomery 2020, 773–5). He also highlights the military dimension of it: the deployment of assets, such as personnel and platforms, is limited and cannot be present everywhere at the same time (Montgomery 2020, 777). Danilovic in her work (2001a) regarding threats and credibility, also mentions that costly threats, such as a limited intervention or troop mobilization, are considered important to prevent domino effects and signal strong resolve (Danilovic 2001a, 345). At the same time, threat perception is very much tied to this logic. Oren found that over time Japan's threat perception became more concrete and increasingly homogenous despite the fact that different groups domestically usually have different perceptions on what constitutes a threat (Oren 2020). Additionally, in the US thinking, international reputational costs have guided its policy in numerous post-Cold War crises, such as in Somalia, Haiti, and other interventions (Danilovic 2001a, 346). In a similar discussion, argue differently: “faraway military interventions do not reassure allies rather they call into doubt the intervener's will and capacity to fulfill its alliance commitments” (, 575). A costly military campaign, for instance, in a distant region, may leave the defender unable or with much less will to respond to a potential crisis of another ally.

Of course, the above literature has its origins in the works of deterrence theorists such as Schelling, Huth, and Jervis. While Schelling argued that there is a clear link between a defender's past behavior and future deterrence success, Huth also noticed that deterrence theory at its very essence conceptualizes credibility as context-dependent (Huth 1997, 83). However, there is a variation in conceptions regarding reputations for resolve. One of those is viewing the security commitments as interdependent (Huth 1997, 75–6). Potential attackers may assume that the defender will intervene in conflicts everywhere to avoid negative consequences for its other commitments. Additionally, “retreat results in considerable loss of face for a state and weakens the credibility of future threats” (Huth 1997, 83–4). Jervis in his work on deterrence and perceptions states also that “how reputations are established and maintained is not clear” (Jervis 1982, 9). The credibility of a threat largely depends on the specific situation and if one actor is actively trying to influence another, first it needs to be perceived.

The notion that events and commitments are interdependent and a strong willingness to act is necessary to be displayed in “peripheral areas to contain instability in central areas” has been used for justifying interventions after the Cold War (Danilovic 2001b, 345). Hence, it is normal that a part of scholars have refused the above suggestion claiming that little evidence supports the existence of interdependence and the role of reputation in calculating credibility. This part of academics adopts a context-dependent approach to events, abandoning the notion of transferability of commitments since “today's defeats do not reduce future credibility” and the existing credibility of a country “is not driven by its past behavior but rather by power and interests” (Press 2005, 2–12). As Press (2005) argues, for evaluating if someone will honor their commitments, balance of power and interests are the factors to take into account in each presented case, and in reality, an adversary's history does not play any role in the calculation (Press 2005, 3). On the same page, Mercer (1996) argues that everyone mistakenly believes that “however, we behaved in the past we will behave similarly in the future” where there is no empirical evidence to support this hypothesis (Mercer 1996, 8). For Mercer commitments are independent and there is no interdependence as theory suggests, hence, no transferability. Each case shall be examined separately looking for military balance and the importance of interests.

Another part of the scholarship presents an in-between argument. Reputation and past actions are not as important as traditional deterrence theorists believed but they do play a role in the calculation. As Harvey and Mitton (2016) argue in their more recent study on reputation, “cases are often different and credibility is not perfectly transferable” but they dismiss the idea that “past behavior has no impact on future credibility” (Harvey and Mitton 2016, 3–4). Despite growing consensus against the role of reputation this part of academia, represented by the above scholars among others, argues that when important similarities between crises or events exist, it is more likely that transferability takes place (Harvey and Mitton 2016, 89). They also suggest that it is wrong to consider it irrelevant. Adversaries do take into account past actions to calculate the potential resolve of another party and inform their strategies as studies have shown (Harvey and Mitton 2016, 92). The current paper supports the latter. Allies like Japan do monitor actions in distant regions showing support towards the interdependence thesis. At the same time, this does not mean that negative reputational costs are generated. That instance was perceived as a decision towards a general retrenchment from the area which could potentially be of benefit to the US–Japan alliance since more resources would be free to use. This paper adds to the literature by looking at a case of US withdrawal not academically studied before from the perspective of a major US ally, contributing to the theoretical, and practical, debate about reputation and signaling of resolve.

Japan's Credibility Concerns through the Years and the Relationship with the United States

Two more things need to be mentioned and considered simultaneously when it comes to the fluctuations of the relationship and the Japanese perceptions of the US credibility and vice versa. The first is directly related to the long-standing relationship between Japan and the United States and the different seasons they had gone through. The second is part of it but it touches the neo-isolationist policy that the Trump administration followed during the period under examination which affected Japan's perceptions of US credibility, pushing Abe administration to focus on appeasing the former President and taking steps towards advancing the country's defense posture.

The Foundations of the Relationship: From the Yoshida Doctrine to the Nixon Shocks

The alliance has been through a lot of ups and downs through the decades affecting how credible the commitment is perceived at certain periods. Even during the first decade of the alliance, crises and complaints emerged at both sides of the Pacific with a major part of the Japanese feeling subordinate to the United States, mainly due to the asymmetric nature of the relationship. After the 1960 revision of the Treaty, political crises were de-escalated and some of these complaints were addressed. Nevertheless, Japan was still encouraged to advance its efforts in order to be able to provide for its own defense. What was known as the Nixon Shocks of the early 1970s, characterized by the dual shocks of the crashing of the Bretton Woods system and the reproachment with China, heightened the fear of abandonment in Japan and as a second step put the credibility of the commitment into question. According to President Nixon, Japan should assume “primary responsibility for its own defense,” signaling an attention of Washington to a better military burden sharing with its ally, a demand which was absent during the first years of the Cold War (Smith 1999, 73).

It is also true that Japan was favoring from the very beginning with a moderate policy of being lightly armed, focusing on its economic growth and development while relying on the United States for security. This vision which turned into dominant policy option was first introduced by Shigeru Yoshida, and was known as the “Yoshida Doctrine,” viewing Japan as a “merchant nation” (Berger 1999, 197). As Samuels also noted, “Security policy would now aim to enhance autonomy but would center on trade and international cooperation” (Samuels 2007).The lopsided nature of the security relationship, along with a plateau of 1 percent of the Japanese GDP spent on the military sector, augmented the free-riding accusations by the US taxpayers, questioning the serviceableness of the alliance (Stone 1999, 244). What was known as the “Nixon Doctrine,” forcing Japan to acquire the largest independent defense capabilities via a tough negotiation approach, was utilized by the United States managing to push Japan to further assume more costs and missions (Stone 1999, 255–6).

By the late 1980s, an increased interdependence in the economic and security sectors between the two countries became even more evident. In the security sector, the alliance was viewed as providing great security for both countries with relatively low costs, reassuring East Asian nations of a nonfuture militarization of Japan and creating a sentiment of stability in the region. Nonetheless, frustrations and complaints were not absent, and previous opinions reemerged. For a significant part of the American population, and of course, for policymakers in Washington, Japan was a free, or more accurately “cheap,” rider on US defenses claiming the status of a major power without going along with the deriving responsibilities of a global actor and following an economic model of protectionism that among other factors, has created huge trade deficits with the United States (Armacost 1996, 18). In other words, Japan was flourishing under the security umbrella of Washington at the expense of the US economy, which at the time was decaying. As a result, at the end of the Cold War, the theory that the alliance was no longer necessary began to gain more ground in the United States.

The Modern Era: From Obama's Stability to Trump's Shakedown

The above position, that the US–Japan alliance was becoming obsolete, did not prevail. The rise of China, the threat from North Korea's nuclear program, and the value of the US forward presence in the area, thanks to the bases in Japan, were some of the reasons that led to a flourishing and stable partnership through the years. Reflecting on the recent two decades, the alliance was at a stable state, and the commitment was unshaken until, at least, the first Trump administration. The major focus was still regarding the enhancement of the US–Japan defense cooperation. The importance of Japan and East Asia region was widely acknowledged, especially with the Obama's “Rebalance to Asia” approach and the later rebranding of the Pacific Command to the Indo-Pacific one (INDOPACOM) reflecting a more Japanese and Indian-oriented way of thinking about the region. A new alliance coordination mechanism was also initiated by the Obama administration in 2015. The goal was to respond effectively to crises, expand cooperation, and confirm the commitment to de-escalate incidents (Smith 2017, 15). The public rhetoric was also focusing on reassuring Japan about US defense commitments and highlighting the political and ideological affinity of the two partners. President Obama has embraced that rhetoric as it has been shown last time on the eve of his second term, on a visit to Japan in 2016 (Miller 2018, 151).

Nonetheless, with the election of President Trump in 2016, the US foreign policy took a turn towards a nationalist and transactional approach, focusing on narrow interests and gains, and the most important element, on reassessing long-standing alliances and commitments (Patrick 2017, 53). During the pre-electoral campaign, the President was heavily criticizing Japan as “ripping off” the United States and “stealing American jobs,” holding a bilateral trade relationship with the United States that is “unfair and not open” (Miller 2018, 151). Despite the hopes that the rhetoric will be eased after the election, criticism remained. The US leadership focused on two issues. The first one was burden sharing. Among the demands, the US President asked for a quadruple of payments for US troops in Japan. The latter is spending approximately $2 billion for 54.000 troops stationed in the Japanese bases (Seligman and Gramer 2019). The United States was asking for an increase of approximately 300 percent, with the US President wondering “why they are not paying 100 percent” (Smith 2017, 13). The second Trump presidency, beginning in 2025, is also expected to test the limits of the alliance even if specific demands have not yet been made at the time of the writing of this article.

The second issue during the first term, which is expected to return in 2025, was regarding the defense cooperation and the role of Japan in the Security Treaty. In 2017, the Trump administration has characterized the US–Japan defense pact as “unfair” stating that “if Japan gets attacked the US must immediately go to their aid” but not the other way around (Jiji Press English News Service 2015). Most recently, in 2019 ahead of the G-20 Summit, the US President questioned again the alliance in an interview on Fox Network stating that “We will fight at all costs, right? But if we are attacked, Japan doesn't have to help us at all. They can watch on a Sony television the attack” (Higgins 2019). In the meantime, experts suggest that the US President is advocating nuclear proliferation in the region by indirectly encouraging allies like Japan and the Republic of Korea to keep their options open regarding the development of their own nuclear weapons (Patrick 2017, 53).

On the Japanese side, the Abe administration has mainly focused on rebuilding Japan's economy and taking measures in the security and military sectors. Prime Minister Abe has been a strong advocate of enhancing Japan's military capabilities, with plans to revise the pacifist constitution, acknowledging the significance of the alliance for the security of Japan. He managed to establish a new National Security Council and Strategy, relax government's bans on arms exports and readjust the Japanese capability for collective self-defense, revise the US–Japan Guidelines for Cooperation in 2015, and promote the establishment of security agreements with India and Australia (Green and Cooper 2015, 2). The main strategic vision of the administration that has shaped Japan today is distancing from a static defensive posture heading towards a more dynamic one, along with an adequate economic program as referred above.

Japan is highly valuing the Mutual Security Treaty as the cornerstone of its security and the Abe administration has made efforts to meet the demands of the United States in terms of burden sharing and cooperation. As it happened decades ago, burden-sharing issues, the role of Japan in the alliance, the criticism that the relationship is “unfair” or “lopsided” and a discussion of a potential withdrawal had reemerged in the public discussion in 2019. The Trump administration challenged the extended deterrence commitment, implying the possibility of abandoning its allies “if they are not paying their bills,” (Ikenberry 2017, 2) and questioning the value of Japan, accusing the country of military and economic free-riding. These were, and still are, significant elements shaping the environment of the US–Japan alliance today, bringing uneasiness and doubts regarding the US credibility (O'Hanlon 2019, 194).

The Year 2019: Withdrawal from Syria and Tension with Allies Globally

Staying at the 2019 period, a more recent piece was aiming to examine how NATO allies responded to Trump's threats (Richter 2021, 298). Richter (2021) noticed that the troop withdrawal from Syria caught allies “off guard” and allies feared the “unpredictability of the US.” He also found that there was an interesting variation in how allies responded after the demands of the United States to augment their pay-share and reach the 2 percent target following threats of withdrawal. Following a comparative analysis of three NATO allies, he concluded that Canada was the most reluctant and did not fulfill the goal; the United Kingdom only verbally expressed its commitment; and Germany was the only one advancing her spending, though some military rebuilding was already scheduled at the time of his research.

On the opposite side of a perceived fear of abandonment of an ally, reassurance stands. Strong signaling from the side of the defender, such as troop presence on allies’ soil or being under a nuclear umbrella are ways to reassure an ally that the commitment of its patron is credible since he has “skin in the game” (Kim and Simón 2021, 5). However, it is unclear how these perceptions are shaped based on the ally's perspective in an interregional context. While it is evident that signaling of resolve can boost reassurance in an ally, and the absence of it can cause fear of abandonment, it is unclear how reputations created by actions in distant regions affect an ally's perception of the credibility of the commitment of its patron.

Examining this issue during the US withdrawal from Syria, where the Kurdish population was long considered a long-standing unofficial partner, findings suggest that this did not affect Japan's perceptions of credibility. As I will showcase later during the case study analysis, Japan did want the United States to uphold its commitments in other parts of the world, especially the Middle East in which Japan holds great energy-related interests. However, the United States by leaving a region, automatically becomes more available to defend Japan's interests in the Indo-Pacific theater. Resource allocation and individual, regional immediate interests seem to trump any credibility and reputational concerns, with Japan welcoming some form of disloyalty to other partners if it means greater US availability for her. This is in agreement with the most recent literature findings of both Kim and Simon, 2021, and Kim et al., 2024, where they explored the effect of the US nonactions towards partners and how they were perceived by East Asian allies, specifically regarding the Ukrainian annexation of 2014 and the withdrawal from Afghanistan of 2021, respectively.

Approaching the Case: Methodology and Limitations

The current study is by choice a single case one with no variance in the dependent variable. The concerns about no-variance designs are well documented. A common counter-argument is that a single-observation research design can lead to “incorrect inferences if there is a measurement error” and they are at great risk of “indeterminacy” (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). It is also true, however, that “no variance designs can be quite useful in theory development and testing” (George and Bennett 2005, 32). This study has a dual purpose: first, a descriptive one, since there has not been a study on the Syrian, Kurdish case. There are studies examining other unofficial security partnerships, and how allies perceived the US resolve towards them, that the current paper builds on, adding one more crucial case to the literature (Kim and Simón 2021; Kim, Byun, and Ko 2024).

The second purpose is theory testing. Deterrence theory and the literature on credibility and reputation have not quite touched, with the few exceptions mentioned above, on how the behavior of a great power such as the United States towards an informal partner might be understood by key allies in other regions. Hence this paper through this design provides an extra test of the theoretical concepts of interdependence and reputation, examining the allied perceptions of the credibility of their defender's commitments elsewhere.

Regarding the data collection and analysis, this is a qualitative study. Primary data was collected from semi-structured, in-depth, anonymous interviews with five prominent Japanese experts working in senior research positions with direct access to the Japanese policy-making elite. Two of those experts are Senior Political Scientists in two of the biggest and most prominent research institutes and think tanks in Washington DC working on the US–Japan alliance. The other three experts are senior academics with years of experience and knowledge of Japan based in Europe and the United States. The interviews took place within 4 months of the Kurdish incident and the above interviewees had direct access to Japanese policymakers in Tokyo, in both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense.

While the ideal outcome would be to include Japanese experts and policymakers, the COVID-19 constraints when the research took place in 2020 did not make it possible as it was extremely difficult to contact and schedule interviews. Hence, Japanese experts in Europe and the United States were interviewed taking advantage of their unofficial interactions/oral history with Japanese policymakers and bureaucrats. Secondary data deriving from previous research on Japan's perceptions, books, and documentation were also examined, both from official Japanese documents, as well as blogs and opinion articles of former Japanese bureaucrats commenting on the Syrian case. The Japanese sources include primary data collection from the Japanese Diet records including the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the National Assembly Security Committee.

Hypotheses and Main Theories to Test

Previous work in the alliance politics and deterrence literature as presented above offers interesting insights. As I examine Japan's perception of the US credibility based on its reactions in a case where the United States failed to show willingness to act/fight (resolve), I start from Simon and Kim's “reputation versus prioritization trade-off” model. The basic assumption of this theory is that allies do assess the US credibility inter-regionally, but inferences about the defender are mainly a product of the dynamic security environment. In their case of Japan's perception of the US commitment after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, they found that Japanese policymakers were mostly worried about the resource constraints of their patron rather than their reputation as a global commodity. Hence, if an ally perceives that its patron is prioritizing another region, and the threat of its immediate adversary is growing, then fear of abandonment will intensify. This generates the following hypotheses for Japan:

 

In the meantime, Mercer and Press argued that capabilities and interests are the variables that matter. Commitments are independent, and assuming that reputation is a global commodity, transferable between cases, is not empirically tested or proven. Press's Current Calculus theory focuses on a categorization of interests which has a strong explanatory power on calculating credibility: the more important (“vital” in Press's terminology) the interests of the patron in a specific region and the more important the value of the protégé, the more likely the commitment will be credible and the United States will show resolve. This comes in agreement with more recent findings which emphasize the locally focused nature of US credibility (Henry 2020; ; Kim and Simón 2021). Hence,

 

The third hypothesis derives from what Henry states as the “alliance audience effect” theory (Henry 2022, 4). He makes a crucial distinction between loyalty and reliability. Part of his argument suggests that an ally would welcome the US decision to be disloyal to another ally and a universal character trait of loyalty is not desirable. In certain situations, it can be counter-productive for the security of the first protégé under question if, for instance, the common defender needs to fight a two-front war and simultaneously support two allies with limited resources. As Henry notes, for its theory to be valid, the behavior in the alliance “must suggest a discrepancy between an ally's professed interests and those to which its behavior attests” (Henry 2022, 34). Hence the third hypothesis:

 

Case-Study Analysis: The Kurdish Case in 2019 and Japan's Perceptions

On October 6, 2019, the United States suddenly decided to proceed with pulling US troops from Northeast Syria in a significant policy shift (Sly, Dadouch, and Khattab 2019). Following a phone call by President Erdogan, the President of the Republic of Turkey, announcing its intention to invade the Kurdish-controlled territories, President Trump gave the green light via Twitter, announcing the immediate withdrawal of US troops from the area under question (“United States Withdraws Troops from Syria, Leaving Kurds Vulnerable” 2020, 144). The move provoked huge reactions from US institutions, namely the House of Representatives which loudly expressed its opposition, US prominent members of the Armed Forces, allies, and of course, the Syrian Kurds (“United States Withdraws Troops from Syria, Leaving Kurds Vulnerable” 2020, 144–5).

The United States had partnered with the latter for almost five years to efficiently fight ISIS (see Table 1 below for the timeline). It is normal to see that the Kurds perceived the US withdrawal as an “abandonment and betrayal of their trust” (Sly, Dadouch, and Khattab 2019). Kurdish and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Commanders had been cooperating with American Officers in joint command centers and the former had received multisided support in ammunition, training, arms, and medical supplies (Schmitt et al. 2019). With the partnership of SDF, the United States managed to protect its interests in the region and abroad. First, limited the influence of Russia and Iran in Syria by supporting a strong opposition force against the Russian-backed Bashar Al-Assad; and second, they relied for five years on the Kurds to effectively deal with ISIS and protect the US nationals from terrorist attacks (Hubbard et al. 2019).

The decision had brought reactions from many Americans and Kurdish leaders. Some scholars such as Chulov (2019) have also criticized the US action noting that it has “left Israel and other allies shakier” by abandoning the Kurds (Chulov 2019). Kirkpatrick et al. (2019) had also characterized the move as a “betrayal to a loyal partner” indicating that a credibility issue had risen leaving allies to guess “where the US stands and for how long” (Kirkpatrick, Hubbard, and Halbfinger 2019). The authors wondered about the durability of US commitments mainly in the Middle East. In another interview in the New York Times, a former Trump special envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, Brett McGurk, mentioned that it is “shameful to leave partners to their fate” (Specia 2019). In an article of his in Foreign Affairs he also stated that the argument of President Trump that ISIS has been defeated so it was time to leave was “reckless” and the action has left US allies “in disbelief” (McGurk 2019, 72). Other Special Forces Officers were cited in similar interviews to oppose the decision stating that “they trusted us and we broke their trust” and others declared to be ashamed for abandoning an ally (Schmitt et al. 2019).

Severe repercussions followed the decision to withdraw. First, a significant power vacuum was created which gave the opportunity to Russia and Iran to fill it (Chulov 2019). An indication of this evolution was the subsequent agreement of the Kurds with the Russian-backed government of Bashar al-Assad, trying to find another ally to deal with the Turkish offensive. It became thus extremely difficult to negotiate a favorable peace agreement with Russia in the post-war era and halt Iran's ambitions to expand its sphere of influence in the region, threatening key US allies such as Israel and Jordan (McGurk 2019, 70–5). However, there was an extra concern. The decision of Washington's policy shift which was taken without previous consultation rose questions regarding the fate of 60.000 ISIS detainees who were under the captivity of Syrian Kurds who had to tackle the Turkish invasion with all their resources and manpower (Borger and McKernan 2019). Hence, an ISIS reemergence in the unstable environment was extremely likely to happen, risking years of counter-terrorism efforts from the international community.

The Japanese Perspective of the US Decision

How do allies actually make inferences and perceive their defender's actions when it comes to informal partners it is not clear enough besides its great policy implications and the number of those partners. A recent study is looking specifically at this issue by looking at the public opinion of certain countries, namely China and South Korea, and their perception of the US credibility in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan (Kim, Byun, and Ko 2024). They found that against conventional wisdom, abandoning an informal partner in one region did not hurt the US credibility in East Asia but in contrast, it increased South Korea's public confidence.

How did Japan react and perceive the US's withdrawal in 2019, arguably abandoning a long-standing partner? Findings overall support the above conclusion since I have not found any dispositional attributions regarding the US credibility. In October 2019, when the decision to withdraw took place, one of the first reactions was the official one coming from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As the Japanese diplomat stated:

The Japanese government shouldn't react to a tweet by the president each time … If it's their official position, we need to deal with it, but the president says various things. (Banks n.d.)

While it is evident that Japan was approaching the United States carefully during the Trump administration, trying not to aggravate existing situations and remain a cool-headed ally, the Defense White Paper of 2020 sheds a bit more light on how Japan perceived the Syrian incident. Two things can be derived from examining the Paper: First, it provides support for our first hypothesis (H1: Japan was less concerned because the US resources are driven towards the Indo-Pacific theater). As it stated:

Although the United States has set out a policy of prioritizing the allocation of military forces to the Indo-Pacific region and Europe while reducing forces in the Middle East and Africa, it has also been dealing with security issues in the latter regions and it would be hard to describe the transition in the U.S. force posture as a smooth one. (“Defense of Japan 2020”, 53)

While there is some concern, or impatience, about the transitioning of the US force posture is evident, it also seems that Japan is more concerned about the resource allocation and prioritization of the military forces and resources rather than the US credibility. One could argue that this statement could debunk the first hypothesis: After all, it seems that it is making a distinction between the US willingness and what is happening on the field. Combining the read, however, with the next paragraph, one can realize that the Kurdish case was not interpreted negatively regarding the perception of the US resolve and credibility but rather the focus is on resource allocation; something that confirms the hypothesis that Japan was less concerned than in previous occasions such as the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014:

Of the forces involved in OIR, the U.S. Forces deployed in Syria are stationed in the east of the country following their withdrawal from the vicinity of the border with Turkey, due to a military operation undertaken by the Turkish army in northern Syria in October 2019. (“Defense of Japan 2020”, 53)

Digging deeper into the various Japanese perceptions following Trump's withdrawal, in October 24, the 200th Security Committee convened addressing the issues in the Middle East. Keitaro Ohno, member of the House of Representatives, described negatively the US decision to withdraw the troops and how it was viewed in a negative way overall. However, there was no inference on the US credibility and it was judged through a situational lens:

When it comes to the withdrawal of US troops, there is a lot of confusion in neighboring countries such as Israel and Turkey, as well as what to do with the SDF, which is mainly Kurdish, and what to do with the remnants of ISIS, so it was said that withdrawal would be difficult. However, even in this situation, the decision to withdraw was made, so either the strategic goal was wrong, or the intention and decision to withdraw were wrong, or in any case, something was wrong. (“200th National Assembly Security Committee, No. 2” 2019)

At the same time, another member of the Committee, Kazuhiko Shigenori, provided an explanation of the situation which focused on two things: the US interests in the region and the role of leadership, specifically what one could describe as the Trump effect:

I feel that the United States is changing its commitment to this Middle East issue due to President Trump's relatively strong personal feelings. The United States is no longer in a situation where it depends on the Middle East for oil, and the withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement was made despite the opposition of other countries. In that sense, I think it is quite a difficult issue to see how far Japan will deal with the Trump administration, which seems to be changing its policy in a sudden manner. (“200th National Assembly Security Committee, No. 2” 2019)

The above statements support the third hypothesis (H3) as well: Japan did not express concern about the Kurdish case per se and did not draw lessons from there, since the action was in line with the implementation of the US long-term policy in the Middle Eastern region and the change of its interests, especially regarding energy resources. This is supported by an interview conducted with a well-respected Japanese expert who mentioned:

Big difference between the commitments in the Middle East and East Asia. I think the situation is very different. The US is in the Middle East is first of all because of oil. The importance has decreased also because of the instability of the region. There are of course other strategic interests, Israel and terrorism. Hence the US is interested in keeping deterrence in the Middle East. Depending on interests you have a position of deterrence - and deterrence costs money. Fewer interests mean less deterrence. (Interview with Subject Matter Expert, 2020)

At the same time, however, Japan did monitor the US actions there and it grew concern over the US leadership choices and the sudden, abrupt policy decisions do cause concern on how to deal with the United States. While Japan did not have any clear lessons learned from the withdrawal from Syria, they did make an inference on how they would deal with the Trump administration which was unreliable during the handling of the situation. During my discussion with one of the experts at the time, with extensive consultation with Japanese officials in an official and unofficial capacity, he admitted that

Because the United States is Japan's only ally, Japan looks at its actions globally, trying to read what it would do for Japan's defense. Things like pulling out from the TPP, and the Paris Climate, were read by Japan very poorly because Japan thought: was going on here? We are on the same page. It caused disappointment for sure. (Interview with Subject Matter Expert, 2020)

Regarding our hypotheses, it was evident that while Japan was monitoring the situation in the Middle East, it was more concerned with issues in its proximity and immediate—existential concerns namely Taiwan and North Korea. For another interviewee, the situation in Syria was decoupled and assessments regarding resolve are more context-dependent than creating a global reputation. Additionally, he also supported the argument that Japan was much more preoccupied with the developments in the negotiations between North Korea and the Trump administration. As he stated:

Essentially, the issues are decoupled [referring to Syria]. In general, it is fair to make the argument that the US has lost a degree of credibility in terms of operating as a global police force … From a Japanese perspective we have seen continuity; Abe used the US actions to continue its policy line on being more proactive (proactive pacifism). Help to demonstrate that the Japanese military can be more proactive abroad. The biggest concern for Japan is how the US responds to North Korean, as, particularly Abe, has so much political capital invested in the hard-line against North Korea. (Interview with Subject Matter Expert, 2020)

The rest of the interviews provided strong support for the hypotheses H1 and H2 into question. Japan is generally more worried about where the money goes; and where the United States is directing its resources. And, while there is concern about the US commitments in other regions, a potential withdrawal from a region is not necessarily interpreted as something negative. In contrast, it can mean that the United States is less likely to be drawn into a conflict there (e.g., in the Middle East), and is relatively less invested. As the interviewees mentioned:

The upside: if the US makes commitments and upholds these commitments in the Middle East from a Japanese perspective is going to make commitments and uphold them elsewhere. The downside is that the US is going to be drawn more to the Middle East. In general, a lot of Japanese policymakers want the US to uphold its commitments but without taking the focus away from East Asia. In Europe as well. They want the US to stand firm against Russia but do not want the US to get into a conflict there. It is more like a 50–50 decision in Tokyo. Want to see the commitment but not too much action. (Interview with Subject Matter Expert, 2020)

At the same time, Japan was focusing on its own resources and how to prioritize its own interests. Looking at the transcripts of the Diet meetings in both the Security Committee and the Foreign Affairs one which took place in 2019 after the Kurd withdrawal, the majority of the discussions were focusing on the US–Iran relationship and how this would affect the long-standing, historical Iran–Japan relationship; the potential dispatch of SDF vessels in the Straits of Hormuz in which Japan has vital interests due to its energy imports from the region; and the attack on the Saudi Arabia facilities from Houthi rebels which took place in September 2019, a month before the US abandonment of the Kurds. Minister Taro Kono for instance, set the stage by focusing the discussion on this exact topic:

In this context, the situation in the Middle East is now extremely tense. There have been attacks on tankers in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. Considering the attacks on Saudi Arabia's oil fields and the civil wars in Yemen and Syria, it is necessary for Japan to keep a close eye on the situation in the Middle East. In particular, the Strait of Hormuz is the place through which most of Japan's crude oil imports pass, and not only Japan but also the world economy is dependent on it for energy. In this context, if something were to happen here, it would have a major impact on the Japanese and world economies, so I think Japan must keep a close eye on this area. (“200th National Assembly Security Committee, No. 2” 2019)

At the same time, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives which took place a day before the Security Committee above, on 23^rd of October 2019, was also focusing more on the attack on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia than the withdrawal from Syria, linking it to the vital interests of Japan. Toshimitsu Motegi, who served at the time as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, reaffirmed the opinion above:

Japan is deeply concerned about the increasingly serious situation in the Middle East, following the recent incidents such as the attack on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia. Peace and stability in the Middle East is extremely important for the peace and stability of the entire international community, and is also an issue that is directly linked to the national interests of Japan, which relies on this region for more than 80% of its crude oil imports. (“200th Diet, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 2” 2019)

The above statements, combining the expertise of the interviewees and their information from Japanese officials, seem to reinforce all three hypotheses. In another question regarding reputation and transferability, they all agreed with the existence of the concept but under certain circumstances, focusing more on the context. While allies, and Japan, do observe how the United States behaves in other regions there is not an automatic assumption about its resolve or credibility status. As it was more concretely stated by another interviewee:

When you look into the transferability of these issues whether the US responds in relationship to the Kurds, there is also a tendency among treaty allies to say yeah but we are different. The more difficult question (for Japan) is Taiwan. Should or not (the US) give a more unambiguous commitment. (Interview with Subject Matter Expert, 2020)

The above findings seem to confirm the three hypotheses. First, Japan was not concerned about the US–Kurdish relationship, besides the general tendency of Trump's administration to disparage allies and of the potential withdrawal, since Japan's vital interests are not affected. When there was a possibility of those getting affected in the Straits of Hormuz, Japan did turn worried and dedicated long sessions of Parliamentary discussions about the Middle East. Hence three main variables explained Japan's perception and reactions which led to a situational read of the Middle Eastern crisis: one, its vital interests in the region and if they were affected; secondly, Trump administration's handling of Syria; third the US interests in the Middle East and where the resources are going.

Additionally, the Kurdish situation was different than previous occasions since it was perceived as part of the general retrenchment from the Middle East and re-prioritization of resources in other theaters, specifically the Indo-Pacific one. The above findings also strongly support the thesis of Kim and Simon: allies care about where the resources going rather than making inferences about a global US reputation and they care more if their own vital interests are hurt and if they align with their defenders. It also supports the most recent findings of Kim et al., 2024: the US credibility did not get negatively affected by the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.

Secondly, concerns about the US's credibility or resolve came mostly from issues of immediate concern. All experts seem to agree that the negotiations of the Trump administration with North Korea unnerved Japan since the latter thought that Japanese interests may be neglected or traded. Additionally, how Taiwan is treated seems to trigger the abandonment-entrapment effect in Japan. How the Taiwanese crisis evolves is far more crucial and it is very much monitored by Japanese officials, also regarding the US resolve and the ambiguity of its commitment.

Conclusion

The role of reputation in calculating credibility has long puzzled scholars and policymakers. When it comes to a three-party situation where a patron, a protégé, and an adversary are involved, it can become even more complicated. In an extended deterrent situation like the above, we assume that both the adversary and the ally proceed to rational inferences about their adversary/patron by looking at its past actions. In this paper, I focused on the patron's behavior in a distant region, following the notion of interdependence and transferability. Of course, other parameters seem to weigh in dramatically and past actions by themselves are not enough to explain allied perceptions.

In our case, Japan indeed monitored the Syrian crisis and what was happening in the Middle East. Policymakers are also monitoring developments in Europe and other theaters where the United States, its only ally, is involved. Monitoring, however, does not mean that links are also created between the cases in the sense of attributing the actions to the US global reputation of honoring its commitments. The withdrawal from Syria, when the Kurds a long-standing partner needed support and protection against its adversary (Turkey), was not interpreted as a negative development. It was seen as a part of the US retrenchment from the Middle East because of the change of its interests and the Trump effect, also following the policy of reprioritizing resources in other theaters, especially the Indo-Pacific one. Japan focused more on its own vital interests and the potential crisis in the Straits of Hormuz because of its energy dependency in the region.

Secondly, it was evident from the analysis that resource allocation and immediate threats in its proximity troubled Japan more urgently; and there one could notice growing concerns and fear of abandonment. The negotiations with North Korea made Japan worry that the Trump administration may trade off the Japanese interests; and the escalation in Taiwan poses a severe threat of entrapment, as it is well known. As the interviews show, allies like Japan would be happy to see the United States implementing its withdrawal from certain low-priority regions. This would mean that there will be more focus and resources available for them. Hence, no specific concerns regarding the US credibility of its commitments globally were found besides a criticism of the handling of the situation in Syria. What happened in the Middle East was framed in a situational, context-dependent manner, as far as Japan's vital interests were not concerned.

However, one cannot rule out the role of reputation and past actions. Allies, and adversaries, do monitor the US behavior in other regions and take lessons from there and this was very clear in the case analyzed above. Inferences, though, regarding its loyalty, credibility, and resolve are not universal but it depends on each ally's lens and the circumstances at the time. For instance, it is not clear how Japan would perceive the current US support towards Ukraine in the current war. Would they be happy that the United States is fulfilling its promises of supporting an unofficial ally against an aggressor? Would it be worried that the United States is spending a lot of resources there instead, jeopardizing its posture in East Asia against China? Or would they feel more reassured seeing that the United States is following its word with actions and being credible towards its commitments, unofficial or not?

This remains to be seen, since the research on allied perceptions of the United States extended deterrence commitments is currently being enlarged with new findings. In the above case, Japan was indeed silent; not because of being indifferent about the developments in the Middle East, but rather because the Trump administration's behavior in issues of immediate concern in its proximity, occupied the attention of the policymakers at the time. It is rather to be examined under what circumstances allies worry, and what external shocks may trigger their concern about credibility and resolve. The second Trump administration, already having plans to withdraw from the support of Ukraine and bringing credibility concerns among allies to the forefront, will provide new avenues for further exploration and research.

References