Judicial Independence and the American Constitution: A Democratic Paradox
Judicial Independence and the American Constitution: A Democratic Paradox
Cite
Abstract
This book argues that American constitutionalism is properly deemed to dictate adherence to the rule of law achieved through a process of checking of government’s unlimited power over the individual, the majority’s unlimited power over the minority and government’s unlimited power over the populace. Thus, paradoxically, it is only by vigilant enforcement of prophylactically assured judicial independence, insulating the judiciary from majoritrarian control, that our nation’s form of constitutional democracy is able to function effectively. Our Constitution—unlike its British predecessor—takes written form, is framed in the form of mandatory directives, and is explicitly made subject to alteration only through a complex counter-majoritarian process. Absent vigorous, prophylactic protections of judicial independence, our counter-majoritarian constitutional system would be vulnerable to manipulation and circumvention by the majoritarian elements of government. This is simply because if those vested with the final say as to the meaning of the Constitution are subject to control of the very majoritarian branches sought to be limited by that Constitution, as a practical matter the document will be deprived of its force and effectiveness as a limitation on those possessing political power. The book is designed to stand as a response and alternative to the recent development of scholarly theories, such as departmentalism and popular constitutionalism, which dangerously ignore the centrality of judicial independence to the American constitutional system.
-
Front Matter
-
Introduction.
America’s Contribution to Political Thought: Prophylactic Judicial Independence as an Instrument of Democratic Constitutionalism
-
One
The Foundations of American Constitutionalism
-
Two
A Taxonomy of Judicial Independence
-
Three
Judicial Impeachment, Judicial Discipline, and American Constitutionalism
-
Four
State Courts, Due Process, and the Dangers of Popular Constitutionalism
-
Five
Constitutionalism, Democracy, and the Pathology of Legislative Deception
-
Six
Habeas Corpus, Due Process, and American Constitutionalism
- Conclusion
-
End Matter
Signed in as
Institutional accounts
- National Science & Technology Library
- Capital Medical University
Sign in
Personal account
- Sign in with email/username & password
- Get email alerts
- Save searches
- Purchase content
- Activate your purchase/trial code
- Add your ORCID iD
Purchase
Our books are available by subscription or purchase to libraries and institutions.
Purchasing informationMonth: | Total Views: |
---|---|
May 2023 | 1 |
September 2023 | 2 |
October 2023 | 2 |
October 2023 | 2 |
October 2023 | 2 |
October 2023 | 2 |
October 2023 | 3 |
October 2023 | 2 |
October 2023 | 2 |
November 2023 | 2 |
November 2023 | 2 |
November 2023 | 2 |
December 2023 | 1 |
January 2024 | 3 |
January 2024 | 1 |
January 2024 | 2 |
January 2024 | 2 |
January 2024 | 2 |
January 2024 | 3 |
January 2024 | 2 |
January 2024 | 2 |
January 2024 | 2 |
January 2024 | 2 |
January 2024 | 4 |
January 2024 | 4 |
February 2024 | 3 |
April 2024 | 2 |
August 2024 | 1 |
August 2024 | 1 |
August 2024 | 2 |
August 2024 | 1 |
August 2024 | 2 |
August 2024 | 1 |
August 2024 | 1 |
August 2024 | 1 |
August 2024 | 1 |
August 2024 | 1 |
August 2024 | 1 |
August 2024 | 1 |
August 2024 | 2 |
October 2024 | 1 |
October 2024 | 3 |
October 2024 | 2 |
November 2024 | 2 |
December 2024 | 1 |
April 2025 | 3 |
Get help with access
Institutional access
Access to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways:
IP based access
Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. This authentication occurs automatically, and it is not possible to sign out of an IP authenticated account.
Sign in through your institution
Choose this option to get remote access when outside your institution. Shibboleth/Open Athens technology is used to provide single sign-on between your institution’s website and Oxford Academic.
If your institution is not listed or you cannot sign in to your institution’s website, please contact your librarian or administrator.
Sign in with a library card
Enter your library card number to sign in. If you cannot sign in, please contact your librarian.
Society Members
Society member access to a journal is achieved in one of the following ways:
Sign in through society site
Many societies offer single sign-on between the society website and Oxford Academic. If you see ‘Sign in through society site’ in the sign in pane within a journal:
If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society.
Sign in using a personal account
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below.
Personal account
A personal account can be used to get email alerts, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions.
Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members.
Viewing your signed in accounts
Click the account icon in the top right to:
Signed in but can't access content
Oxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian.
Institutional account management
For librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more.