Injustices and Insecurities: Victimhood in Rodrigo Duterte's Populist Script of Philippine Foreign Policy

Abstract

Philippine foreign policy under Rodrigo Duterte is notorious for its abrupt pivot to China and the unraveling of the country's longstanding alliance with the United States. His pronouncements have vividly reflected these to rationalize significant foreign policy recalibrations. It is from this understanding that this article seeks to explore the specific discourses that he has promoted in relation to China and the United States in pursuit of a coherent foreign policy logic for his administration. This article introduces victimhood as a framework to analyze Duterte's salient policy discourses and explores how these discourses influenced his administration's foreign policy behavior and informed his unique populist leadership. By invoking a discourse of suffering from past and present injustices, along with perceived insecurities arising from shifting power dynamics between the two major powers, Duterte constructed and internalized a victim identity for the Philippines, which has profoundly influenced the country's external relations during his tenure.

La política exterior filipina bajo el Gobierno de Rodrigo Duterte es conocida por su abrupto giro hacia China y por el desmoronamiento de la antigua alianza del país con Estados Unidos. Sus discursos han reflejado estos puntos de forma clara con el fin de racionalizar las importantes recalibraciones que se produjeron en la política exterior del país. El artículo parte de este entendimiento y busca analizar aquellos discursos específicos que Duterte promovió, tanto en relación con China como con Estados Unidos, con el fin de buscar una lógica en materia de política exterior que resulte coherente para su administración. Este artículo presenta el victimismo como un marco que nos permite analizar los discursos políticos más destacados de Duterte y estudia cómo estos discursos influyeron sobre el comportamiento de su administración en materia de política exterior e influyeron en su liderazgo populista único. Duterte, al invocar un discurso de sufrimiento por las injusticias pasadas y presentes, junto con las inseguridades percibidas que surgen de las cambiantes dinámicas de poder entre las dos grandes potencias, construyó e internalizó una identidad de víctima para Filipinas, lo cual ha influido profundamente en las relaciones externas del país durante su mandato.

La politique étrangère philippine durant le mandat de Rodrigo Duterte est connue pour son revirement abrupt vers la Chine et le détricotage de l'alliance historique du pays avec les États-Unis. Ses déclarations les reflètent clairement afin de rationaliser d'importants réajustements de politique étrangère. Aussi cet article cherche-t-il à examiner des discours spécifiques qu'il a promus relativement à la Chine et aux États-Unis afin de rendre sa logique de politique étrangère cohérente pour son administration. Cet article introduit le statut de victime en tant que cadre d'analyse dans les discours politiques essentiels de Rodrigo Duterte avant d'explorer leur influence sur le comportement de son administration en politique étrangère et la façon dont ils ont renseigné ses qualités uniques de dirigeant populiste. En faisant appel à un discours de souffrance vis-à-vis des injustices passées et présentes, ainsi qu'aux insécurités qu'il ressent face à l’évolution de la dynamique de pouvoirs entre les deux superpuissances, Rodrigo Duterte a construit et internalisé une identité de victime pour les Philippins, qui a profondément influencé les relations extérieures du pays au cours de son mandat.

Introduction

2016 is a significant turning point for Philippine foreign policy, marked by two historical events: the resurgence of populism in the Philippines, through the person of President Rodrigo Duterte, who assumed the presidency for six years; and the country's legal victory, through the Permanent Court of Arbitration's favorable ruling over Filipino claims in the South China Sea. Together, these events placed the Philippines at a crossroads where the president's agency as chief architect of foreign policy proved consequential. As observed by many, Duterte has chosen to downplay the award since his assumption of office, choosing instead to jumpstart relations with China at the expense of leveraging the country's legal victory in the South China Sea (Storey and Izzudin 2016; Batongbacal 2021; De Castro 2022). Indeed, the foreign policy of his administration is widely considered as a pivot to China and a rejection of the country's longtime ally despite minute efforts to assert the country's sovereignty throughout his six-year tenure. The dynamics of this foreign policy shift are surmisable from the leader's foreign policy rhetoric. If one aspires to comprehensively understand Philippine foreign policy during this specific period, it is imperative to consider this rich display of foreign policy rhetoric from which salient discourses of status-seeking can be uncovered. This article seeks to contribute from this angle. It focuses on how Duterte justified the country's position vis-à-vis the two most consequential major powers in the region—China and the United States—and makes sense of his overall foreign policy logic through the salient discourses that he has promoted. In doing so, this article intends to complement existing explanations based on rational choice ontologies by highlighting deeper meanings that animate populist Duterte's foreign policy choices.

Philippine foreign policy under Rodrigo Duterte has often been evaluated as a curious and outlier case representing sudden deviations from the status quo. Different from previous presidents, Duterte has openly expressed his disdain towards the country's traditional ally and his deep Utang na Loob (debt of gratitude) towards China through vivid and memorable descriptions. Indeed, an important component of Duterte's overall policy logic is his signature rhetoric that is openly confrontational against the West yet extremely complimentary to China. As Nicole Curato (2017, 147) has pointed out, Duterte “pushed the boundaries of traditional political practice” as the leader embodied a populist performance fresh in Philippine politics. Randy David (2016), for his part, coined the term “Dutertismo,” describing the president's brand of leadership that emphasizes “a sensual experience rather than the rational application of ideas to society's problems.”

Yet despite the centrality of rhetoric and performance under the Duterte presidency, his rhetoric has often been dismissed as merely “symbolic and stylistic,” devoid of any material significance with respect to actual foreign policies on the ground (Velasco and Song 2023, 121; Destradi at al. 2023; Winger 2021). The US–Philippine alliance, for instance, remained intact despite clear threats of abrogating the Visiting Forces Agreement and explicitly announcing an intention to break away from the 70-year-old mutual defense pact (Duterte 2016a). From this example, it is easy to dismiss Duterte's rhetoric and personality as an insufficient basis for understanding foreign policy changes compared to factors such as domestic institutions and structural power dynamics in the region that long influenced the country's external relations. This article takes the view that much can be uncovered from the discourses promoted by leaders who obtained their legitimacy to begin with by adopting a populist rhetoric that resonated with their constituency. Acknowledging the possible gaps between discourse and actual foreign policies on the ground, this research assumes that dominant discourses promoted by political elites could reflect an underlying “foreign policy ethos” that could act as “signals of potential paradigm shifts” in both our understanding of the country's diplomatic history and the long-term realities of Philippine foreign policy (Magcamit 2021, 07). Likewise, such discourses, regardless of their consistency with policies implemented, serve as an important basis for framing subsequent foreign policy changes. If Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr.'s pro-American foreign policy is any indicator, it is apparent how Marcos’ sudden recalibration is being discussed, justified, and celebrated in light of Duterte's revisionist preferences.

This article introduces victimhood as a framework in unpacking discourses surrounding the two great powers and Philippine foreign policy reflected in Duterte's official speeches. It argues that through his foreign policy rhetoric, Duterte has strategically embraced a victim identity in order to justify his dismissal of any Western influence in Philippine foreign policy, argue for the logic of moving closer to China, and underscore the morality inherent in Philippine foreign policy. The succeeding sections proceed with a discussion of the related literature on the subject and introduce how victimhood as a framework could enlighten and contribute to these debates. This is followed by a discussion of findings from a discourse analysis of Duterte's relevant speeches.

Making Sense of Duterte's Foreign Policy Shift

Emphasizing great power competition remains a staple perspective in problematizing the logic of Philippine foreign policy (Baviera 2016; De Castro 2017; Kraft 2017). For instance, Renato De Castro (2016) highlights the Aquino Jr. Presidency (2010–2016) as a pivotal period in which “geo-politics” emerged as a “component of the country's external relations [that]…revolutionized Philippine foreign policy” (140). In this perspective, Philippine foreign policy revolves around balancing or bandwagoning to sustain power equilibrium among great powers. Hence Duterte's preference for China given its rising position is “an obvious pragmatic shift” consistent with the geopolitical implications of its ally's perceived decline (Tenorio et al. 2022, 68). Indeed, Harry Kazianis (2016), commenting early in Duterte's presidency, points to “pragmatism” as a key factor in Duterte's decision to lean closer to China amidst “American uncertainty” in the region.

Beyond the emphasis on realist pragmatism, others have highlighted hedging as a strategy to maintain geopolitical balance while simultaneously serving the national interest of small powers (Jackson 2014; Jones & Jenne 2021). Scholars highlight this alternative alignment strategy, which combines elements of balancing and bandwagoning or incorporates multiple policy options, as a means to address risks arising from the external security environment or domestic political uncertainties (Kuik 2008; Kei 2018). From this perspective, Cheng-Chwee Kuik (2021) notes that changes towards a more China-friendly foreign policy in the Philippines under Duterte are an example of a small power “hedging lightly… emphasizing cooperative and deferential acts while displaying defiance vis-à-vis China only in an indirect, low-key manner” (308). For analysts that look at small powers as hedging, the uncertainty of US-China competition in the region leads small powers like the Philippines to cling onto their “persistent propensity to hedge against great powers,” despite showing variations in this alignment strategy (Tan 2020, 148). In essence, there remains a key understanding that small powers are primarily driven by risk calculations aimed at maximizing security.

Further efforts to understand changes in Philippine foreign policy focus on perspectives that emphasize the rise of populism in the Philippines, as exemplified by Duterte's ascent to power. Consistent with Cass Mudde's definition of populism, the former president successfully built his support base from “the poor people” vs “the corrupt elite” narrative that simplifies the understanding of Philippine politics and portrays Duterte as a genuine representation of the Filipinos' “general will.” Hence, from this perspective, Richard Heydarian (2017) notes that Duterte's decision to “abandon his predecessor's counter-balancing strategy against China in favor of engagement is a function…anti-establishment populism” (229). Similarly, John Candelaria and Fernan Talamayan (2024) note that Duterte's populism “epitomized a transactionalist approach to Philippine foreign policy” described by his “obsession with short-term wins,” hence the reason for prioritizing benefits from a quick policy shift towards non-traditional partners such as China (113). Ultimately, populism informs foreign policy shifts as leaders bolster domestic support by politicizing foreign policy preferences as either anti-elite or people-centric (Destradi et al. 2022). Likewise, a particular rejection of westernization and the increasing influence of international organizations in domestic policy-making often leads to the rise of populist leaders (Krastev & Holmes 2019)

Yet contrary to the logic of populist foreign policy, Duterte's open antagonism towards the US remains a curious case given a clear public preference towards a more assertive position against China (Yeo & Gloria 2023). Efforts to reconsider this anti-American position at the latter part of Duterte's tenure didn't translate to any substantial tempering of his positive praises towards China. While Duterte is often considered a populist leader in the same league as Turkey's Recep Erdoğan, Brazil's Jair Bolsonaro, or even the United States’ Donald Trump, Duterte's persistent embrace of China defies the populist logic of opportunism and catering to domestic support. Furthermore, his frequent embrace of a “defeatist” stance (Rabena 2018; Gloria 2021), evident in his candid acknowledgment of the country's military weakness vis-à-vis China's resolve in protecting its interests, contrasts sharply with the more proactive and assertive rhetoric of contemporary populists (Arısan 2022). This is where studies emphasizing the importance of Duterte's individual leadership, including his rhetoric, proves crucial in an effort to unpack narratives or thought structures that inform his overall biases.

Problematizing Duterte's rhetoric has been central in efforts to understand Philippine foreign policy at the leadership level. It has been noted, for instance, how Duterte's unique rhetoric serves the populist function of effectively consolidating power through a more salient depiction of “us versus them” (Velasco and Song 2023). De Chavez and Pacheco (2020), for instance, observes that Duterte's “confrontational posture,” apparent in his rhetoric, is crucial in “positioning himself as defending the sovereign nation” and preserving an “act of anti-colonial defiance” against the West (272). Thus, Duterte's words are important in preserving his populist appeal that easily resonates with the Filipino public (Encinas-Franco 2022). In addition to these interpretations underscoring populist tendencies, others suggest deeper manifestations of perceived inequalities that animate Duterte's thinking and rhetoric towards global affairs. Julio Teehankee (2016), for instance, notes that the “rise of Duterte repudiates the reformist-versus-populist dichotomy that characterized post-Marcos politics by reviving the nationalist narrative” against the taken-for-granted legacies of US imperialism in the Philippines (83). In essence, crafted narratives such as Duterte's anti-US nationalism and the so-called pivot to China draw from a specific personal understanding of the nation's history, which then fuels present biases and preferences. Similarly, Michael Magcamit (2021) points to often neglected “emotional beliefs” as drivers for Duterte's overall foreign policy thinking (06). From this point of view, Duterte's “anti-status quo” foreign policy preferences, or what Magcamit (2020) calls the “Duterte Method…are significantly shaped by unit-level factors such as the leaders’ perceptions” (422). Duterte's outlier example in the history of Philippine foreign policy provides an interesting case on how personal emotions aid in the construction of these relevant perceptions that guide foreign policy choices. And unpacking this phenomenon depends on the serious study of foreign policy rhetoric and the salient discourses that arise from them. As Lacatus and colleagues (2023) succinctly puts it, problematizing populist dynamics must “involve studying the language, rhetoric, and discursive performance of populist leaders” in congruence with the wider social contexts that allow for their reproduction and ultimately, salience and dominance (06).

This article joins these attempts in unpacking deeper meanings behind Duterte's distinct rhetoric and language by introducing strategic victimhood as a framework for analyzing Duterte's foreign policy discourse. This framework posits that Duterte has employed a discourse of victimhood in justifying his foreign policy decisions, emphasizing perceived injustices, insecurities, and connections in the country's relationships with the two major powers. This article's discursive approach complements existing rationalist interpretations by focusing on the relevant contexts and specific discourses as the Philippines adjusted its position vis-à-vis the major powers. Put differently, this article seeks to understand the specific discourses through which the Philippines pursued its foreign policy shifts under Rodrigo Duterte's leadership. Indeed, existing rationalist interpretations can convincingly explain specific changes in Philippine foreign policy behavior (e.g., shelving the arbitral award, threatening the US–Philippine alliance), highlighting the security-maximizing logic of small and medium powers as they adjust alignment strategies in response to uncertainties stemming from shifting regional power dynamics. But with a discursive approach emphasizing the presence of an internalized victimhood within Duterte's foreign policy logic, one can see how perceived powerlessness, historical injustices, and personal affinities provide the deeper contours of the country's foreign policy shift. By going beyond the usual logic of security maximization, the discursive approach forwarded in this article seeks to provide a deeper appreciation of Philippine foreign policy. Likewise, its emphasis on victimhood can also provide clarifications on how Duterte's China embrace aligns with his populist leadership, despite the unpopularity of this policy direction in the Philippines.

Victimhood As Framework: Internalizing Injustices and Insecurities

Victimhood, or assuming a victim identity, is a socially and politically constructed status rooted in real or perceived suffering, trauma, and wrongdoing that is internalized and narrated in pursuit of strategic objectives (Lerner & O'Loughlin 2023; Vanermaas-Peeler et al. 2024). As Adam Lerner (2020) pointed out, the “abstraction of underlying trauma” or injustices attaches important meanings to these experiences as they contribute to the creation of a “salient sense of national identity” (69). Similarly, a victim identity is inherently relational, as it necessitates the presence of other salient categories—such as perceived or potential “perpetrators,” “rescuers,” and those viewed as “moral or immoral agents”—that collectively shape the abstraction of victimhood (Vanermaas-Peeler et al. 2024, 188). In Nils Christie's (1986)definition of the ideal victim, he states that “ideal victims need and create ideal offenders,” making these social categories “interdependent” and “co-constitutive” (25).

Beyond personal victimhood, embracing this identity has also been widely recognized as a crucial element of nation-building, underscoring its relevance in understanding state behavior. Zheng Wang (2012), in his comprehensive study of China's historical memory and its connection to foreign policy-making, observed that adopting a victim identity helps “delineate appropriate functions for the state to perform,” shaping unique perceptions of the current international order. Political elites, equipped with communicative resources, can readily cultivate a sense of collective victimhood by merging personal experiences of suffering with national humiliation. Examining this dynamic in Turkey's populist discourse under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Omar Al-Ghazzi (2021) highlights how the Turkish president adopted a “narrative form of historical victimhood” that “blurs the lines between himself as a leader, the Turkish state, [and] nation” to “establish the equivalence between support of his leadership [and] Turkish nationalism” (55). Indeed, victimhood or the self-allocation of a victim status can go beyond the individual, as it can be continuously “narrated into national identity” through the emphasis of collective national trauma (Lerner 2020, 71). And with the embrace of a victim identity comes the construction of salient “victim-perpetrator relationships,” often employed by populist leaders to “sustain their underdog illusion” in service of their political agendas (Meijen & Vermeersch 2023, 01; Homolar & Löfflmann 2021, 01). Indeed, while victimhood typically signifies powerlessness and weakness, assuming this status demands significant discursive power, as it ultimately translates to a competition for narrating stories of self and others rooted in real or perceived “injustices” and “insecurities” (Meijen & Vermeersch 2023, 13; Campbell 1998, 189)

It is therefore important to understand how states and their leaders construct and pursue victimhood and how this could influence foreign policy behavior. Since victimhood tends to underscore relative weakness and vulnerability, which may be difficult to reconcile with the active agency required for policy-making, pursuing victimhood is often limited to justifying broad preferences for general political actions. Jens Meijen and Peter Vermeersch (2023) elaborate that vindictive policies stemming from the performance of victimhood “are often simplistic and vague, implying more of an abstract “sense” of policy than actual policy itself” (13). While stopping short of identifying direct policy and behavioral outcomes, the literature on victimhood emphasizes how this identity and discourse are strategically employed to achieve three objectives: justifying policy preferences, simplifying complex narratives of suffering, and constructing a positive self-identity through moral high-grounding.

The first two objectives are interconnected, as promoting simplified narratives through self-victimization creates a “legitimacy reservoir” that enables the propagation of power through seemingly well-justified means (Jacoby 2015, 517). In the study of pervasive victimhood narratives in eastern Europe, Jessie Barton Hronešová (2022) highlights how political elites conveniently emphasize historical “maltreatment/humiliation by the politically defined West” to “justify policies and silence opposition…[that] cuts through the mnemonic “noise” of complex histories” (2–3). Indeed, amplifying sources of threat and insecurities is a common political objective when invoking victimhood, as it directs popular attention toward a distinguishable enemy, offering a convenient way to simplify complex issues (Noor et al. 2012; Terzyan 2018; Hronešová 2022). Likewise, positioning oneself as a victim justifies preferred policy U-turns and allows positive representations of certain actors taken for granted in prior discourses (Noor et al. 2012; Terzyan 2018; Meijen & Vermeersch 2023). In his study of Armenia's own discourse of victimhood, Aram Terzyan (2018) notes that the “enemy images” promoted against Turkey and Azerbaijan “provided a fertile ground for treating Russia as a savior” (160). Indeed, a victim identity, while it is able to introduce simplistic narratives of “us versus them” and “victim versus perpetrator,” also tends to exaggerate the perceived threat posed by certain out-groups, which is then used to “justify and garner support for…retaliatory violent strategies” (Noor et al. 2012, 359).

In addition to justifying certain policy choices, a victim identity also allows for positive representation through moral high-grounding. Embracing this passive identity as an unwilling target of suffering essentially masks aggressive tendencies or perceived incompetence to make them more tolerable (Al-Ghazzi 2021; Hronešová 2022; Vanermaas-Peeler et al. 2024). Kurt Gray and Daniel Wagner (2011), citing their own experiment on social psychology argues, that it is better to be a victim than a hero if the objective is to escape blame because “victims are typecast as moral patients and are therefore relatively incapable of earning blame for their misdeeds” (518–19). Hronešová (2022) finds related evidence at the state level as she points to an extensive use of victimhood narratives in Eastern Europe by those “who want to claim a sense of moral superiority in order to exonerate themselves from potential wrongdoing” (06). A discourse of victimhood thus promotes a sense of entitlement on the part of a victimized agent as well as moral hierarchies where values attached to them are deemed desirable (Zitek et al. 2010; McNeill et al. 2017; Hronešová & Kreiss 2024).

With these strategic objectives in mind, the construction of victimhood primarily operates through rhetoric and language, as those in power advance narratives aligned with an internalized sense of victimhood. As McNeill and colleagues (2017) assert, “the act of claiming victimhood is a rhetorical act,” which therefore underscores the need to ground and observe victimhood as a discursive phenomenon reflected in the rhetoric of those in power (170). This also explains why subsequent studies that problematize victimhood as a discourse in the study of foreign policy behavior have adopted frameworks that underscore the importance of elite, dominant, and hegemonic narratives (Meredith 2009; Terzyan 2018; Al-Ghazzi 2021). In this sense, it is valid to think of strategic victimhood employed by states, as a “communicative strategy” of claiming positive moral status “in contests over power and legitimacy” (Hronešová and Kreiss 2024, 717). And when identifying discursive or narrative manifestations of victimhood, key attributes include perceived weakness or vulnerability and a sense of non-responsibility or passive agency (Schwöbel-Patel 2018; Meredith 2009). Looking at traces of these attributes within dominant political discourses has proven to be a productive approache for uncovering the performance of victimhood in the conduct of foreign policy.

Indeed, rather than seeking direct translations to foreign policy behavior, victimhood highlights the importance of rhetoric, which, when articulated by relevant actors, can serve as a foundation for concrete policy changes or as a framework for debating relevant issues. Beyond policy, these “novel strategic ontologies [can] exert subtle productive power over dominant understandings of the international system,” adding a layer to the current understanding of how populist leaders shape their foreign policies and how status quo arrangements can be destabilized by constructed identities rooted in evolving elite perspectives (Barnett and Duval 2005).

Methodology and Data

Discourse, as conceptualized in this research, is consistent with Jennifer Milliken's (1999) definition, referring to it as “structures of signification” employed to “construct social realities” for itself and its intended audience (229). Since victimhood is understood here as a status or a state identity strategically pursued and constructed by populist leaders like Rodrigo Duterte, discourse analysis proves to be an appropriate analytical approach since such “social representations can be understood in discursive terms” (McKinlay et al. 1993, 148). There is indeed a fundamental connection between discourse and national identities (Benwell & Stokoe 2006; Reisigl & Wodak 2009). Furthermore, the objective of categorization and self-other distinction, as victimhood implies, could be easily detected through an analysis of salient discourses and the social representations they reflect. Van Dijk (2001) notes that these social representations are “particularized in mental models expressed in text and talk” where it is through such discourses that “socially shared attitudes, ideologies, and fundamental norms and values” are shared and promoted by powerful social actors (114).

This article employs critical discourse analysis (CDA) as its guiding framework, based on the key assumption that language can reveal underlying power relations. Language serves as a medium of social force, legitimizing perceived assumptions and relationships about how the world should operate. (Wodak 2001). CDA also assumes that focusing on elite-level discourses can uncover taken-for-granted ideological perspectives that reflect their vision of the social world and its composition (Reisigl and Wodak 2009). And consistent with the goal of uncovering salient themes that point to the presence of victimhood within dominant discourses, predicate analysis was conducted across a sample of key texts. Predicate analysis refers to uncovering the discursive strategy of “labelling social actors (using) evaluative attributions of negative or positive traits,” or descriptors that are consistently attached to the relevant actors in question (Wodak 2001, 73). Jennifer Milliken (2001) elaborates on the usefulness of this constructivist methodology as applied in IR given its focus on the “language practices of predication” in light of the objective to “analyze the social construction of space and of geopolitical reasoning” surrounding common relevant IR subjects (204). And consistent with the research objective of unpacking Duterte's justification of his foreign policy preferences and biases, the relevant subjects identified for predicate analysis are China, the United States, and the Philippines.

Predicate analysis is conducted throughout a sample of foreign policy-related speeches delivered by President Duterte from June 2016 to June 2022 .In selecting speeches for analysis, this study aligns with qualitative inquiry's emphasis on achieving “in-depth understanding rather than empirical generalizations,” consistent with the research objective of unpacking Duterte's victimhood discourse (Patton 2002, 273). Therefore, purposeful sampling was conducted using a selection criteria that ensured only limited yet relevant and information-rich speeches were included in the analysis (Schrier 2018, 88). First, candidate documents were sourced from a publicly available repository, the website of the Presidential Communications Office (PCO). Second, candidate documents were limited to speeches that discuss foreign policy issues related to China and/or the United States, and these were identified by searching for keywords pertaining to the relevant actors in question (United States, China, and the Philippines) combined with a careful reading of these documents. Third, to account for variations in the distribution of these speeches across Duterte's six-year term and to ensure representativeness over this period, only one relevant foreign policy speech was selected per month, yielding 72 unique speech documents¹. Not only does this ensure a sample set that is easy to handle, but it also captures potential variations in ideas over time, avoiding the risk of over-representing repetitive ideas from similar speeches tied to specific events. Lastly, consistent with the objective of prioritizing a few yet information-rich sources, priority was given to highly circulated and publicized speeches (Crouch and Mckenzie 2006). Hence his six State of the Nation Addresses, state visit speeches, speeches delivered to the UN General Assembly, and other important addresses delivered in multilateral fora were automatically included in the sample. The succeeding sections below discuss the findings of the predicate analysis conducted throughout the selected sample of documents.

Differentiating the Major Powers

As outlined earlier, this article aims to clarify how former president Rodrigo Duterte justified his foreign policy preferences and biases concerning the two most consequential major powers for the Philippines: China and the United States. Findings reveal that Duterte's overall foreign policy rhetoric reflects an embrace of victimhood, portraying a relevant “other,” i.e., United States, in a negative light in order to justify leaning closer to an unconventional partner, i.e., China, to secure much-needed benefits. Specifically, victimhood materialized through three distinct dualisms or relational distinctions that make up Duterte's predications of the two major powers. These victimhood dualisms refer to discourses of (1) injustices, (2) insecurities, and (3) connections. These pairings are uniquely grouped based on similarities in logic rooted in the strategic invocation of victimhood. They summarize the core oppositions between China and the US as perceived and described by Rodrigo Duterte. Table 1 below summarizes the distribution of coded segments across these dualisms.

Thematic coding of the 72 foreign policy speeches yielded 1229 coded segments or excerpts, which is the main unit of analysis for conducting the subsequent predicate analysis for this research. These excerpts are primarily delivered in the local Filipino language, predominantly in Tagalog, with occasional instances in Bisaya, as the speeches were intended for a broader national audience. When speaking in English, Duterte frequently code-switches to Filipino or a mixture of Tagalog and English (Taglish), often deviating from his prepared script to use more impactful language that further elaborates on the logic behind his foreign policy positions. Indeed, his more candid foreign policy ideas, often picked up by the press, come from rhetoric and “tricksterisms” that are easily relatable to the president's intended audiences (Rafael 2022, 84).

President Duterte has also spent more time talking about the United States than China, which is consistent with this article's assumption about the centrality of victimhood in Duterte's foreign policy logic by focusing on a perceived perpetrator. Consistent with the idea that “historical victimhood glues together eclectic populist claims,” historical suffering under American rule informs much of Duterte's embrace of victimhood (Al-Ghazzi 2021, 57). As Hronešová and Kreiss (2024) observes, strategic victimhood draws from “usable pasts…that connect history with the present through stories of past hardships” which makes certain stories of exploitation more relatable than others (5). Another reason why American oppression resonates more with Duterte's embrace of victimhood is his aversion to the concept of universal human rights. As Vicente Rafael observes, for Duterte, human rights are merely an “abstract imposition by the West,” which he views as “essentially amount[ing] to a form of imperialism: the West dictating to the non-West the norms of proper conduct” (Rafael 2022, 57). As shown in table 1, 771 of the coded segments (62.73 percent) are exclusively attributed to the United States as a relevant actor, while 458 segments (37.23 percent) are related to China. Details on the discourses of victimhood through the salient relational distinctions or dualisms are explained below.

Injustices: A Hypocritical US and a Sincere China

The Injustices Dualism in Duterte's foreign policy rhetoric highlights how the former president consistently justified his personal bias toward China by emphasizing victimhood rooted in perceived historical injustices committed by the United States against the Philippines. Victimhood under the US is employed strategically to craft a narrative that highlights China's sincerity toward the Philippines in a positive light. This aligns with the theoretical framework of victimhood in interpreting foreign policy choices, where political elites strategically use a discourse of victimhood to pursue deeper political motivations. As shown in table 1, the majority of the coded segments in the analysis (658, 54 percent) belong under this dualism. Therefore, it can be said that Duterte's foreign policy rhetoric has heavily relied on a discourse of victimhood that highlights the injustices committed by the United States in order to logically defend its position of presenting China as the sincere partner the Philippines must align with. Indeed, this is an important reason why Washington's historical abuses resonated more deeply, as they provided the needed justification for Duterte's pivot to Beijing.

The story of the Balangiga bells in Samar province serves as the most prominent representation of a victimized Philippines under an unjust colonizer. As Duterte (2017a) emphasized during his 2017 State of the Nation Address, “Krag against bolo…those bells are reminders of the gallantry and heroism of our forebears who resisted the American colonizers,” underscoring the significant moment in US–Philippine history to his Filipino audience. But why was this story suddenly brought up, especially when previous administrations rarely invoked it to inspire nationalism? In the SONA speech, the story was strategically introduced immediately after noting the “easing of tensions on the West Philippine Sea” as a result of his administration's policy of “cultivat[ing] warmer relations with China” (ibid). Indeed, this discourse of victimhood, rooted in US injustices, runs deeply through Duterte's foreign policy narrative, providing justification for his foreign policy choices throughout his six-year term. Even in the latter part of his presidency, Duterte (2021a) continues to admit, “when I deal with them, I give them the cold-shoulder simply because of the past and our history…and until now, it's hard to get a hold of their president (translated).” By invoking the country's colonial past, Duterte rationalizes his preference for dramatic shifts in foreign policy, such as reconsidering the Visiting Forces Agreement, as reflected in this context.

In the case of China, Duterte consistently portrayed the country as sincere, often highlighting its perceived generous material aid to the Philippines, especially during crises. For instance, during the pandemic, he recounted personally asking President Xi Jinping for help: “I called and I said, Mr. president, I would like to ask for your help, and he said, it's okay we will help you. And he never told us to forget about the Scarborough Shoal issue to get the vaccines that we need” (Duterte 2021b). Similarly, recalling the siege of Marawi city in 2017, Duterte (2017b) acknowledged China's sincerity, noting that “Beijing expressed willingness to unconditionally help the Philippines.” These claims are often framed in contrast to Western criticisms of the country's human rights record, which are tied to much-needed military assistance. Indeed, Duterte frequently emphasized his “debt of gratitude” for China's sincerity, often contextualizing it with a perceived Western hypocrisy based on unfounded American criticisms and value judgments toward his domestic policies (Duterte 2018a; 2019a). This results in a discourse of victimhood, contrasting descriptions of injustices by the two major powers, which Duterte ultimately employs to justify his revisionist foreign policy tendencies.

Insecurities: An Unreliable Ally and a Strong Neighbor

The insecurities Dualism represents a discourse of victimhood that underscores a perceived helplessness and defeatist position for the Philippines within the context of great power competition. This dualism portrays the country as facing challenges from two fronts: the failure of the US alliance to provide adequate military support and the reality of a powerful China determined to secure its interests by any means. Indeed, the prominence of this dualism (526 coded segments, 42.8 percent) reflects internalized victimhood based on perceived vulnerabilities connected to the two major powers. First, it highlights the Philippines’ vulnerability due to Duterte's negative perceptions of alliance credibility with the US. Second, it acknowledges a formidable China challenge, reflecting victimhood based on power insecurities with the neighbor he has trusted. In this sense, his portrayal of China as both a savior and a threat coexists within his discourse of victimhood. Recognizing insecurities frames the issues through a balance of power logic, complementing the normative value perceptions emphasized under the Injustices Dualism.

“America cannot help us”—Duterte's (2016a) mistrust towards the country's longstanding treaty ally was evident from the early days of his presidency. During his first state visit to China, he described the US as unprepared for any potential military confrontation with China, providing the Philippines enough reason to decouple. This narrative of an unreliable ally persisted during the 2017 Marawi Siege, when Duterte personally sought US military assistance, only to be denied because he is “a violator of human rights” (Duterte 2019a). As Duterte claimed, “It was because of the Americans—they created the reason for me to go to China.” The clearest example of Duterte's view of the US as an unreliable ally, however, lies in his interpretation of its role during the Scarborough shoal standoff. In this incident, China gained de facto control after the Philippines withdrew its vessels under a US-brokered deal (Gita-Carlos 2021). Recounting this defeat a decade later, Duterte (2021c) lamented, “why is it when we needed the Americans during that time, not a single American ship went to aid our Coast Guard, what did they do for us?… In so many instances, they are all talk when they say that we stand by you (translation).” Indeed, Duterte frequently referenced instances of American absence, both past and recent, to portray the US as an unreliable ally and the Philippines as the sorry victim. This narrative was further bolstered by his fears of alliance entrapment, as he asserted that the Philippines was “targeted because the Americans are here” inviting trouble in the region (Duterte 2022a; 2019b).

This defeatist characteristic of Duterte's foreign policy also stems from dominant narratives painting China as a serious and formidable threat. Early in his term, Duterte (2017c) recounted a personal conversation with Xi Jinping, in which the Chinese president firmly warned, “if you force the issue, we will go to war.” This story has become a staple of Duterte's foreign policy rhetoric, promoting a discourse of victimhood rooted in power insecurities (Duterte 2021d; 2022b). He often cited this warning to emphasize the risks of negotiating with China based on the arbitral victory. In many instances, dramatized hypothetical scenarios of Chinese military attacks on Philippine territory are also invoked—“before you can take off, the missile of China would be there in about five or 10 minutes”—to illustrate the deeply asymmetrical power balance between the two nations (Duterte 2021d; 2019d; 2019c; 2018a). This narrative frames appeasement of China as the only logical choice. Duterte strategically employed a discourse of victimhood to justify bold shifts in foreign policy allegiances, shaped by articulated power-based insecurities—an unreliable ally reluctant to provide crucial support and a dominant neighbor capable of overwhelming Filipino assertiveness.

Connections: A Traditional Partner and a Close Relative

This relational distinction based on connections refers to predications that highlight the respective benign historical relationships the Philippines enjoys with the two major powers. While emphasis on these connections does not portray the Philippines as a victim, the presence of this dualism (45 coded segments, 3.66 percent) reflects a shift in Duterte's passive rhetoric as he confronts resistance to his embrace of victimhood. Stressing benign connections helped temper strong voices of internal opposition against his victimhood discourse. Despite the prominent discourse portraying the United States as a hypocritical major power (injustices) and an unreliable ally (insecurities), there were notable moments when Duterte acknowledged the benefits of the alliance and the longstanding partnership between the two countries. For instance, he frequently highlighted the enduring relationship between the two nations’ militaries, admitting that “my military is really pro-American…[and] they are attuned to the American way” (Duterte 2018b; 2018c; 2020a). And when talking to the military, Duterte would “assure” them that he “understands” why “they [would] always lean towards the Americans” (Duterte 2020a). As commander-in-chief, he recognized the need to acknowledge this reality within the military, particularly given his decision to embrace a victim identity for the country, which stands in contrast to the armed forces’ mandate. Therefore, acknowledging “shared history” and “common values” with the “Other” that Duterte (2019e  ; 2018d) has consistently antagonized represents minimal yet discernible changes in Duterte's embrace of victimhood, which coexist with enduring narratives emphasizing “injustices” and “insecurities” in his appreciation of Philippine foreign relations. These relatively benign discourses of US–Philippine relations help mitigate the consequences of overdependence on victimhood discourses.

At the expense of promoting stereotypes about the Chinese and the Chinese diaspora in the Philippines, Duterte (2019a; 2017d; 2017e) emphasized positive traits such as generosity and a perceived inherent business acumen to underscore the merits of prioritizing economic diplomacy with China. Likewise, he frequently underscored the innate cultural similarities between China and the Philippines as close neighbors to promote regional peace. “We are friends and close neighbors, our destinies are tied to each other,” Duterte declared during the 2016 ASEAN-China Special Summit (2016b). From this perspective, close relatives are naturally inclined to cooperate and easily understand one another, distinguishing them from the “arrogant” and “discourteous Westerners.” By identifying closely with a perceived Sinic in-group, Duterte's discourse of victimhood effectively differentiates the Philippines from its Western ally.

Predicating the Philippines

This section examines how the Philippines has been described or predicated within Duterte's foreign policy narratives. Consistent with internalizing a victimhood discourse, strategic victimhood manifests in Duterte's “claim [to] a sense of moral superiority in order to exonerate [oneself] from potential wrongdoing” as well as to serve as “moral basis for redress, retaliation, and revenge” on behalf of a victimized Philippines (Hronešová 2022, 448). In essence, presenting oneself as a victim possesses both passive and active elements as the self is portrayed in moral, peace-loving terms justified in taking resistance against an oppressive Other. In the context of Duterte's foreign policy discourse, this duality manifests in two prominent thematic predications: a “peaceful Philippines” and a “resisting Philippines.” Table 2 below shows the distributions of the coded segments related to the Philippines across these two themes.

Peaceful Philippines

Duterte has consistently emphasized a commitment to neutrality and war-aversion through his embrace of the concept of an independent foreign policy for the Philippines. While this concept is already enshrined in the Philippine constitution, Duterte invokes it anew to justify the positions he takes vis-à-vis major powers. As he stated, “we shall continue to assert and pursue an independent foreign policy, our long-term national development and national security goals come first” (2017a). He has consistently claimed that the Philippines prefers to side with everybody, claiming that he is “a friend of the US, and a friend of China” (2019a; 2021a). And with respect to territorial disputes with the latter, Duterte has been firm in stating that the issue “cannot be solved by force” and that the Philippines “do not want any trouble with them, especially a war” since “peaceful resolution of disputes according to international law” rests on stability in the region (2021b; 2018a).

The country's passive nature also manifests in discourses of the Philippines being restricted by previous policies and unfortunate balance of power contexts. Similar to the previous dualism stressing insecurities, Duterte (2019a; 2019e) insists that the country has been a victim of previous policies of alignment or “blind attachment to bygone views and assumptions” which lead to “failures to grasp change and seize new opportunities” that preserve peace and prosperity in the region. Likewise, neutrality and appeasement are justified as logical policies by narrating the perceived failure of the previous administration to challenge China's incursion under ripe contexts (Duterte 2017c; 2019d). Being peaceful and passive is therefore not only justified from a moral perspective of asserting much-needed neutrality but also from unfortunate path dependencies emanating from the choices of his predecessors.

Resisting Philippines

This is not to say, however, that Duterte has purely abandoned a proactive discourse for the sake of promoting victimhood rooted in the morality of preferring peace over conflict. His vivid anti-western discourse has been consistently articulated to justify a preference for a reversal of previous alignment choices. For instance, it is common for Duterte to boast about rejecting official invitations to visit the US as his own way of registering defiance (2022c; 2020a; 2016a). It is common for Duterte to portray the Philippines as finally standing up against the United States and the West, signifying change that is long overdue. “We are tired of the misguided and self-serving crusades of the few; it is time that they are challenged,” as he articulated during the 2019 Valdai Forum in Russia. Ultimately, a resisting Philippines that shows proactiveness in agency still connects with a discourse of victimhood strategically employed to justify dramatic changes in foreign policy.

Being consistent with the position of asserting the country's lawful rights in the West Philippine Sea is another strand of resistance that Duterte has consistently invoked in his foreign policy speeches, particularly toward the end of his administration. “There are things which are not really subject to a compromise… I have the interest of my country to protect” as he asserted in one of his nightly broadcasts during the pandemic (Duterte 2021b). He had consistently narrated how there were numerous instances where he brought up the possibility of conflict with his counterpart: “nobody goes there without our permission, you go there to do something, it's going to be war” (Duterte 2018e). Much like promoting the discourse of a “traditional ally” with the US, this narrative of resisting China represents discernible changes that are necessary to temper his consistent internalization of victimhood. Predicating the Philippines as a resisting party that still recognizes the merits of the arbitral award also served to cushion the administration from potential fallbacks arising from overdependence on a discourse of victimhood.

Victimhood Discourse and Foreign Policy Changes

But does Duterte's embrace of a victimhood discourse translate to concrete policy changes? Ultimately, Duterte's internalized victimhood—characterized by the three dualisms of Injustices, Insecurities, and Connections, along with his self-description of a Peaceful yet Resisting Philippines—served to justify and rationalize his preferred foreign policy outcomes. Broadly, this entailed leaning closer to China at the expense of the US–Philippine alliance. While some would argue that Duterte only introduced limited changes to Philippine foreign policy, his discourse of victimhood nonetheless fostered a favorable climate for this unexpected pivot. Moreover, these ambitious yet limited changes laid the groundwork for profound recalibrations under the current leadership of Marcos Jr., potentially reshaping dominant discourses on the implications of cultivating relations with the two major powers. In this way, strategically employing victimhood not only justified populist tendencies but also introduced salient discursive frameworks from which the Philippines can continue to debate its agency amid intensifying great power competition.

Duterte's Foreign Policy Preferences

Short of establishing direct causality, there are instances where Duterte's discourse of victimhood might have influenced foreign policy. As Michael Magcamit and Aries Arugay (2024) argue, Duterte's victimhood narratives were integral to his “performative populism,” which “laid the groundwork for the actual adoption of extraordinary measures crucial to his envisioned anti-establishment foreign policy” (1889). Through his narratives, Duterte's “populist securitization,” or his distinctive framing of the major powers’ roles and engagements with the Philippines, demonstrated the “potential to aid state leaders in rethinking and redirecting” the country's foreign relations (ibid. 1895).

For instance, Duterte's aversion to asserting the merits of the landmark Hague ruling on the South China Sea stems from his view of a “Sincere” China, willing to bilaterally negotiate while providing much-needed socioeconomic support, and an “Unreliable” United States, repeatedly failing to offer tangible assistance during critical moments. Indeed, references to the dualisms of perceived “Injustices” and “Insecurities” align with the administration's dismissal of the ruling. In one of his televised pandemic addresses, Duterte called the ruling “just a piece of paper” fit for a “wastebasket” (Duterte 2021c). He reinforced this by emphasizing the country's “debt of gratitude” to China for COVID-19 vaccine aid while downplaying any potential U.S. support if the Philippines pursued the arbitral award (ibid). Indeed, despite his earlier affirmation of the ruling at the UN General Assembly in 2020, Duterte's candid remarks reflected a victimhood discourse that ultimately shaped the policy to shelve the award in favor of fostering better relations with China.

In addition to downplaying the Hague ruling, Duterte's victimhood rhetoric revealed a clear intent to distance the country from the United States, resulting in “the most challenging period in the US–Philippine alliance since the 1992 base closures” (Winger and Amador 2022). Again, his aversion to the US alliance stemmed from a victimhood narrative rooted in perceived injustices, differences in values, and a deep affinity with the country's colonial past. Duterte claimed the United States “practically drove me into the waiting arms of the Chinese government,” pointing to U.S. lawmakers’ frequent criticism of him as a “violator of human rights” (Duterte 2019a). His apprehension toward the United States influenced official policy, exemplified by his status as the only recent Philippine president to forgo an official visit, breaking a tradition of diplomatic engagement. As Duterte declared during his final State of the Nation Address, “I have not visited America and I do not have any intention of visiting” (Duterte 2021d).

In the end, Duterte's victimhood discourse ultimately shaped a foreign policy climate that questioned American credibility while placing trust in the country's most consequential neighbor, despite the latter's threat to national security. As illustrated, reframing foreign policy through the lens of victimhood had significant implications for decision-making on territorial sovereignty (e.g., shelving the arbitral award), international security (e.g., antagonizing the US–Philippine alliance), and bilateral diplomacy (e.g., prioritizing Chinese engagement). These shifts first emerged through Duterte's vivid speech acts, which allowed him to “frame certain issues as security threats” or otherwise, thereby “contributing to world-making…that stimulate specific actions” (Magcamit and Arugay 2024, 1884).

Philippine Foreign Policy Beyond Duterte

Duterte's victimhood discourse also laid a foundation for Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s administration to pursue its own anti-establishment foreign policy. In contrast to Duterte's defeatist rhetoric or “quiet diplomacy” regarding the Philippines’ rights in the West Philippine Sea, Marcos Jr. has adopted “assertive transparency” by openly confronting and publicizing China's maneuvers in the disputed waters (Robles 2024). Regardless of its effectiveness, the preference for and widespread support of Marcos’ “transparency initiative” stems directly from Duterte's internalized victimhood. As Raymond Powell and Benjamin Goirigolzarri (2023) note, Duterte's decision to ignore the arbitration ruling created a “period of relative quiet [and] indifference,” leaving a nation “restless and agitated over the administration's reluctance to take a stand for the nation's rights” (9–10).

This shift also influenced Philippine politics, as the Marcos administration's historic electoral victory was secured through an alliance with the Dutertes, with Sara Duterte serving as vice president. However, their differing “foreign policy has nonetheless served as a vector for political competition,” ultimately unraveling the Marcos-Duterte alliance (Storey 2024).

Lastly, the country's victimhood discourse in foreign policy provides a compelling framework for continuously debating Philippine agency in international relations, even amid the renewed vitality of the US–Philippine alliance. For instance, the notion of an “independent foreign policy,” frequently emphasized by both the Duterte and Marcos administrations, stems from the understanding that the country's colonial past inevitably shapes its foreign policy direction, despite differing interpretations and priorities. Duterte's strategic use of victimhood reintroduced the country's colonial experience into discussions on foreign relations. As Arugay et al. (2024) describe, “Duterte's anti-Americanism became a lightning rod for historic grievances,” fueling the belief that “US-Philippine relations will never be the same again” (15). Many argue that Duterte's pivot to China was “an anti-imperialist move” rather than simply “a strategic replacement of one imperialist power with another” (Rafael 2022, 24). Indeed, advocating for an “independent foreign policy”—in any form—inevitably engages with the lingering sense of victimhood in the country's foreign relations, a discourse that Duterte has strategically employed.

Concluding Remarks

By way of conclusion, this section elaborates how victimhood, as an analytical framework in this article's discourse analyses, contributes new insights into Duterte's unique populist approach to foreign relations and its potential to enhance theory. While Duterte's rhetoric may be dismissed as irrelevant within materialist frameworks focused on alignment strategies (i.e., balancing, bandwagoning, or hedging), this article demonstrates that victimhood complements these perspectives by emphasizing the specific contexts and narratives used to justify foreign policy changes.

For instance, Duterte's discourse contrasting a “hypocritical US” with a “sincere China” provides critical context for the Philippines’ sudden pivot to China. While mainstream rationalist interpretations view Duterte's recalibration as a passive response to shifting power dynamics, his repeated references to American hypocrisy, historical injustices under Western colonialism, and his admiration for China's success story cannot be fully explained by security-maximization logic. These victimhood discourses, actively employed in his daily interactions with Filipinos, highlight his agency in shaping Philippine foreign policy. The Philippines’ enthusiasm for China under Duterte appears exaggerated and disproportionate to Beijing's actual material advantages vis-à-vis Washington, especially within the context of the longstanding US–Philippine alliance, when evaluated purely on material cost-benefit grounds.

Related to the previous point, rationalist interpretations often attribute China's growing influence to America's regional decline. However, this focus on the relative capacities of major powers fails to explain why populist leaders invoke historical narratives of Western colonial oppression to justify realignment strategies, especially in Duterte's Philippines, where public opinion overwhelmingly supports American presence. As this article has shown, Duterte's strategy of invoking these “usable pasts” is shaped by his personal experiences of American arrogance and his awareness of their historical oppression of Filipinos, aligning with his authoritarian policies criticized by the United States. Introducing strategic victimhood as a framework offers a deeper understanding of why Washington's past atrocities resonated more with Duterte than Beijing's assertiveness in the West Philippine Sea. Victimhood helps synthesize Duterte's eclectic populist tendencies—his authoritarian anti-drug campaign, pivot to China, and early attacks on traditional political elites—all rooted in the “Injustices” and “Insecurities” that define his rhetoric.

Lastly, Duterte's unique populist discourse is effectively explained through the framework of victimhood. Like his populist peers, Duterte often employed defiant and assertive rhetoric against the West. However, he uniquely complemented this stance with a narrative of a defeated Philippines facing a looming China challenge to justify his policy preferences. This unapologetic admission of the country's collective vulnerability as a primary logic of Philippine foreign policy represents a distinct form of populist discourse attributed to Duterte. The Philippines under his leadership illustrates how perceived vulnerabilities, dependencies, passivity, and morality—core elements of victimhood—can be internalized and narrated into a coherent discourse rationalizing foreign policy. Future studies on populist foreign policy could explore specific variants of victimhood—emphasizing vulnerabilities, historical and contemporary abuses, or their strategic combination—and their potential implications for great power competition.

Duterte's attempt to reshape the country's foreign policy through victimhood discourses will likely influence the narratives future Filipino presidents adopt. His defeatist stance in the West Philippine Sea stemmed from his perception of the Aquino administration's foreign policy failures. Likewise, President Marcos Jr. easily justified a balancing approach against China by framing Duterte's foreign policy pivot as unproductive for the Philippines. The path-dependent nature of foreign policy highlights the importance for democratic leaders—who seek to differentiate their legacies—to focus on strategically deployed discourses that shape their visions for the country. It also underscores the need for foreign policy leaders to remain mindful of the narratives they promote in pursuit of perceived national interests.

Author Biography

Enrico V. Gloria is a Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at Tsinghua University, and an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines Diliman. His research focuses on the discursive analysis of China's foreign policy and its relations with neighboring states, particularly the Philippines. His work has been published in The Pacific Review, Journal of Contemporary China, Asian Politics & Policy, and other academic outlets.

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References