Strategic Deception of Rising States From China: Peaceful Rise and Border Order

Abstract

China's policy of peaceful rise emphasizes the dual commitment to peace and rise. However, as China rises on the global stage, it may unavoidably encounter disputes with neighboring countries, which requires China to handle these disputes adeptly to align with its principles of peaceful rise. To effectively manage such disputes, as observed in incidents like the 2012 Huangyan Island standoff with the Philippines and the 2017 Doklam standoff with India, China employs “strategic deception” to address these issues non-militarily and prevent further escalation. This strategic deception includes employing strategic ambiguity, inducement, and limited coercion toward relevant countries, ultimately transforming disputes into nonviolent and peaceful change and fostering a border order conducive to its rise while ensuring peace. Research on “strategic deception” holds significant theoretical importance as an unconventional strategic study, providing valuable insights into China's approach to managing regional stability and security during its rise.

La política de crecimiento pacífico de China enfatiza el doble compromiso con la paz y el crecimiento. Sin embargo, a medida que China crece en el escenario mundial, es inevitable que surjan disputas con los países vecinos, lo que requiere que China maneje estas disputas con habilidad para poder alinearse con sus principios en materia de crecimiento pacífico. Con el fin de gestionar eficazmente este tipo de disputas, y tal como se ha observado en incidentes como el enfrentamiento de 2012 en la isla de Huangyan con Filipinas y el enfrentamiento de Doklam con India en 2017, China emplea el «engaño estratégico» con el objetivo de poder abordar estos problemas de forma no militar y evitar una mayor escalada. Este engaño estratégico incluye el uso de la ambigüedad estratégica, la inducción y la coerción limitada hacia los países relevantes, transformando, en última instancia, estas disputas en un cambio pacífico y no violento y fomentando un orden fronterizo que conduzca al crecimiento de China al tiempo que garantiza la paz. La investigación en materia del «engaño estratégico» tiene una importancia teórica significativa como estudio estratégico no convencional, ya que proporciona información valiosa sobre el enfoque de China para gestionar la estabilidad y la seguridad regionales durante su ascenso.

La politique de développement pacifique de la Chine souligne son double engagement en faveur de la paix et de la croissance. Cependant, alors qu'elle prend de l'importance sur la scène internationale, il est inévitable que des conflits avec les pays voisins surviennent. Aussi la Chine doit-elle se montrer adroite pour les gérer conformément à ses principes de développement pacifique. En vue d'une résolution efficace de ces conflits, comme l'illustrent les incidents de l'affrontement du récif de Scarborough en 2012 avec les Philippines et l'affrontement avec l'Inde pour le Doklam en 2017, la Chine a recours à la « duperie stratégique » pour ne pas employer l'armée et éviter toute escalade. Cette duperie stratégique suppose l'utilisation de l'ambiguïté stratégique, de l'incitation et d'une dose restreinte de coercition à l'endroit des pays pertinents. Le but ultime est de transformer ces conflits en évolution pacifique et non violente et favoriser un ordre frontalier propice à son développement tout en garantissant la paix. La recherche sur la « duperie stratégique » revêt une importance théorique conséquente en tant qu’étude stratégique non conventionnelle. Elle nous apporte des renseignements précieux sur l'approche chinoise de la gestion de la stabilité régionale et de la sécurité pendant son essor.

Introduction

The theories of power transition and hegemonic stability in international relations emphasize the risks of conflict when a rising power undergoes a shift in global power and international order, suggesting that state rise might lead to instability (Organski & Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981). However, China's official stance on its rise has consistently emphasized a “peaceful” rise and development,¹ and data indicate that China is indeed rising peacefully (Xiang et al. 2015). Nonetheless, China has experienced disputes with neighboring countries in its border regions in the twenty-first century. For example, there have been disputes with India and the Philippines over border issues in the Tibetan and South China Sea regions, respectively (there are also similar situations in the Taiwan Strait, although they differ from the previous two cases). This raises the question of whether there is a contradiction between China's advocacy for a peaceful rise and its disputes over border order with neighboring countries, leading to inconsistency in its words and actions. More importantly, these disputes affect the so-called state of peace. For China to rise peacefully, it must prevent these related disputes and conflicts from escalating. Therefore, how does China prevent territorial and maritime conflicts from escalating? This becomes the central research question of this study.

This article aims to review contemporary China's strategic choices and broader research on rising states' grand strategic choices to address this research puzzle. It proposes the concept and theoretical mechanism of “strategic deception of rising states,” to describe how China simultaneously fulfills the conditions of “peaceful” and “rising,” reconciling the disputes arising from changes in the border order during its rise. This study examines China's apparent inconsistency between its rhetoric and actions, arguing that despite surface-level contradictions, China's behavior aligns with its peaceful rise narrative when viewed through the lens of strategic deception.² Subsequently, the article will use the case of China's disputes with India and the Philippines over border issues to validate the mechanism of China's strategic deception for rise. In this article, strategic deception refers to the actions taken by state actors to exploit and induce strategic miscalculations by their opponents to achieve national strategic objectives, including border order and geopolitical advantages. It is a strategic method aimed at avoiding direct military conflict. The author contends that through strategic deception for rise, China alters and consolidates border order. China prevents territorial and maritime conflicts from escalating through strategic deception, achieving both rise and peaceful change, thereby ensuring that disputes do not escalate into wars. The theoretical explanation of strategic deception reconciles the inconsistency between China's rhetoric and behavior. However, despite this, the international community still expresses concerns about China's ambitions and its behavior in altering the order. It should be noted that the concept of strategic deception for rise in this article does not carry a negative or positive connotation; it may be present in the strategies of any rising country and can be an essential means for peaceful change.

Peaceful rise may be a form of messaging from the Chinese Communist regime, but China indeed seeks to prevent conflict escalation for both practical and reputational reasons. More importantly, China makes its message of peaceful rise more persuasive by preventing border disputes from escalating, which also serves its strategic goals of rising.³

Literature Review

The literature review primarily focuses on contemporary China's strategic approach, including shifts in its strategic policies, manifestations of peaceful rise, and broader research on the grand strategies of rising countries. The goal is to seek an explanation for the apparent contradiction between China's peaceful rise and its border disputes.

China's Strategic Policy Transformation

The contemporary strategic transformation and policies of China can be traced through several key periods. Baijia Zhang explores five periods starting from the Opium War, examining China's diplomatic changes with a focus on international environmental shifts, domestic political reforms, and the evolution of Chinese diplomacy. Post-1978 China is described as “changing itself and accommodating the trend (Zhang 2002).” Tengchi Chang further divides the post-1978 strategic transition into three diplomatic types: “International System Balancer,” “International Community Responsible Stakeholder,” and “International Status Challenger.” He marks 2002 as a turning point, suggesting that China began transforming into a “Responsible Challenger,” moving towards becoming a major player in the global order (Chang 2011). Avery Goldstein identifies a more assertive phase of China's rejuvenation strategy after 2013 (Goldstein 2020). Moreover, Xuetong Yan highlights the significant change in China's attitude, particularly during the 2021 US–China Alaska Summit, where Yang Jiechi's statements assert that the United States “has no qualification” and “the Chinese people will not accept this (Yan 2021).”⁴

The strategic transformation and policies primarily revolve around China's rise and its attempts to reshape the international order. Yinhong Shi (2015) notes that Xi Jinping's era of strategy focuses on strategic military and economic aspects, including military competition in the South China Sea, East China Sea, Western Pacific, and with the United States. China also uses quasi-military forces to confront Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines to secure more strategic space without necessarily challenging the existing international order comprehensively but with some regional challenges. These regional challenges might be seen as China's temporary testing of the regional order. On a global scale, Yongjin Zhang (2015) believes that China's rise poses a challenge to the US-led liberal global order. Avery Goldstein (2020) contends that Xi Jinping's assertive strategy, including reform, translates China's rhetoric into actions aimed at promoting international order reforms that align with China's rise.

Considering these key periods and China's strategic policy transitions, the manifestation of China's “peaceful” image is not always evident.

The Manifestation of Peaceful Rise

China's peaceful rise can be observed in various aspects during its process of rising, including economic development and conflict management. According to Zhen Han and Thazha Varkey Paul (2020), China's “peaceful rise” grand strategy from 1990 to 2010 aimed at achieving global power status through economic tools. Taylor Fravel (2005) proposed the concept of “restraint and diversionary peace,” suggesting that China has not transformed into territorial revisionism or displayed new ambitions, resolving territorial disputes through compromise. Jun Xiang and others (2015) introduced metrics such as military threat, military display, and use of force, which indicate that China continued to pursue a peaceful rise even after 2008.

China's peaceful rise is also evident in its emphasis on peace and its measures to promote it. Yongjin Zhang (2015) argued that China's peaceful rise strategy is characterized by its emphasis on legitimacy, which plays a central role in shaping China's peaceful rise concept. Robert Zoellick listed China's peaceful measures, such as engaging in the governance of the international system under the United States despite being former adversaries, and thus mitigating dangerous behavior.⁵

However, despite the use of various indicators and China's emphasis on peace policies, the research on China's peaceful rise has yet to fully explain some conflicts in the region.

Broad Strategies of Rising States: Handling Foreign Relations

China's rise strategy can be examined within the broader context of rising power studies. Rising power studies mainly focus on three aspects (Shifrinson 2021): first, exploring the rise paths of specific rising countries (Goldstein 2005; Schake 2017); second, researching the trends of rising countries challenging the existing “international order (Schweller & Pu 2011; Ward 2017; Goddard 2018)”; and third, examining the relationships between rising powers and other major powers to understand their rise strategies (Mearsheimer 2010.; Paul 2016; Edelstein 2017; Shifrinson 2018, 2020; Yoder 2019). For this research, the primary focus is on examining the rise path of China.

In rising power studies, the rise path of rising nations can be summarized as strategic caution. For instance, Kori Schake's (2017) research emphasizes that a significant part of the United States' rise relied on a cautious yet expansionist strategy. Similarly, Immanuel Geiss (1976) showed that Germany's pre-World War I rise depended on a strategic caution in dealing with other major powers. China has also adopted a parallel strategy, accepting international security norms while cautiously waiting for the right moment (Goldstein 2005). In general, rising states tend to be cautious and seek to minimize confrontation before a decisive shift in power distribution occurs (Copeland 2000; Ripsman and Levy 2012).

Therefore, the rise path of rising states can be described as being strategically cautious to reduce confrontation and waiting for the opportune moment when power distribution undergoes a decisive change. China's rise path should also align with these two elements.

Summary: Conflict and Peace in the Rise Path

In conclusion, the existing literature on contemporary China's strategic policy changes highlights that conflicts may arise during the process of policy transformation but does not specifically emphasize China's peaceful rise. On the other hand, research on China's peaceful rise demonstrates its manifestations in peaceful development but does not address why conflicts with other countries still occur during this process. Additionally, broader studies on rising nation strategies emphasize cautious expansion, but they do not provide detailed explanations of how this rise path undergoes specific changes, leading to either peaceful or conflictual outcomes. Therefore, there is a need for a comprehensive rise mechanism that can explain both China's peaceful rise and the contradictions resulting in conflicts during the rise process.

Theoretical Construction: Strategic Deception in China's Peaceful Rise

During China's claimed peaceful rise, the country faces several territorial and maritime disputes, which inevitably affect its so-called peaceful rise. How should China skillfully handle these disputes and prevent conflict escalation to serve its goal of peaceful rise? Researchers need to consider China's strategies and methods. To explore China's grand strategy during its rise and identify the relevant strategic tools, this article introduces the concept of “strategic deception” and constructs a theoretical framework around it. The purpose is to complement existing research on China's grand strategy during its rise. This article argues that, regardless of which party provokes a border dispute, China uses strategic deception to defuse the conflicts, prevent escalation, and simultaneously alter and stabilize border order, achieving peaceful transitions and gaining increased power to a certain extent.

Theoretical Origin of Strategic Deception

Strategic deception has received limited attention in past research and is primarily explained from the perspective of strategic cognition. Michael Pillsbury introduced the concept of “Strategic Deception Program” early on, asserting that the struggle between China and the United States relies not on traditional methods but on the pervasive use of disguise and deception during the conflict.⁶ Further enriching the concept, Changkun Hou (2021) described strategic deception as a “national behavior that indirectly exploits misperceptions, induces strategic mistakes in the opponent, and thereby reshapes the international order through indirect systemic effects.” In detail, strategic deception incorporates three key elements: the art of deception from Sun Tzu's The Art of War, Robert Jervis' theory of misperception, and Robert Jervis' theory of systemic effects.

Firstly, The Art of Deception from Sun Tzu's The Art of War emphasizes non-direct, non-straightforward confrontation, focusing on concealment and disguise while waiting for favorable opportunities. Secondly, Robert Jervis' theory of misperception, based on his work “Perception and Misperception in International Politics,” explains the mechanisms of perception, including cognitive consistency (based on self-knowledge, leading to self-assurance), evoked sets (past understandings), and historical baggage (historical experiences). The key to perception and misperception lies in the interpretation of signals. A state actor can induce misperception in the opponent to serve its own purposes (Jervis 2017). Thirdly, Robert Jervis' theory of systemic effects emphasizes the study of signal transmission within a system. Units or elements in the system are interconnected, giving the system and its parts their unique characteristics (Jervis 1998, 125–77).

In summary, it is an indirect system effect (Jervis 1998) that the state actor reversely uses the misperception (Jervis 2017) to induce the other to make strategic mistakes, thus reshaping the international order. The assumption of misperception is that under uncertain conditions, it is easy for a state to exaggerate or diminish the opponent's hostility, produce the misperception, and create conflicts with the other one. Reverse using misperception means that the state deliberately makes the other actor fall into the misperception and then adjusts and readjusts the misperception. In this entire international relations system, in the process of readjusting perceptions, the “negative feedback” has been formed (Jervis 1998), which makes the other country afraid to act rashly (Johnson 2020), so that the international order has been changed.

The Stages of Strategy Deception

In the stage of strategic ambiguity, the actor mainly makes their commitment fussy, using the bargain mechanism and randomization (Schelling 1981), for instance, and the manipulation of risk through strategic ambiguity or uncertainty (Schelling 2008) in order to induce the cognitive closure (Lebow 2020) and cognitive consistency (Jervis 2017) of the other actor.

In the stage of strategic induction, the opponent has an “evoked set” (Jervis 2017) based on the actor's strategic ambiguity and is induced to a conflict-theory model of decision making (Janis and Mann 1977) or the bargaining range model (Fearon 1995), then the opponent will generate the brinkmanship crises (Lebow 2020).

In the stage of strategic coercion, the actor will coerce the opponent into reassessing and changing their attitude (Jervis 2017), thus reshaping the international norms (Vinjamuri 2018).

For China, the strategic purpose of using strategy deception of rising states during its rise is to achieve its rise, and its strategic means include deception. Therefore, in this study to describe China's rising strategy deception, it is necessary to identify cases that align with the three stages of strategic deception and use them to explain the research questions. China's strategic deception reconciles the contradiction between China's verbal expression of peaceful rise and its engagement in disputes with other countries. On one hand, from the perspective of peaceful change, these disputes are indeed non-warfare, low-conflict situations that fulfill the “peaceful” condition. On the other hand, after resolving these disputes, China can achieve the desired changes and stabilize the border order, creating an environment conducive to its rise, fulfilling the “rise” condition. China strategically employs strategic deception during its rise, allowing it to proclaim peaceful rise while engaging in international disputes. Through strategic deception, China can resolve existing or potential disputes, achieve peaceful transformation, change the order, and, at the same time, accomplish its rise. As shown in Figure 1, the stages of strategic deception are conceptualized, with detailed case illustrations provided in Table 1.

Strategic Deception in Resolving Border Disputes: The Cases of Huangyan Island (2012) and Doklam (2017)

This case study focuses on two specific incidents in China's border regions, namely the Huangyan Island dispute with the Philippines in 2012 and the Doklam standoff with India in 2017. It aims to demonstrate how China strategically employed strategy deception of rising states to address these border issues and disputes, leading to the transformation and stabilization of the border order, creating an environment conducive to its peaceful rise.

The two cases, the 2012 Huangyan Island standoff with the Philippines and the 2017 Doklam standoff with India, were selected as they represent critical instances where China employed strategic deception to manage disputes and avoid escalation. These cases were chosen not only for their significance in illustrating the peaceful rise mechanism but also because they offer valuable insights into China's broader strategic behavior. According to Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett (2005), typical cases are appropriate for testing and refining theoretical frameworks as they exemplify the phenomenon of interest and allow for detailed analysis within a controlled context. Moreover, the selection aligns with John Gerring's (2007) rationale that “typical cases” can illuminate broader patterns and contribute to understanding the general dynamics at play.

The 2012 Huangyan Island Standoff Between China and the Philippines

The 2012 Huangyan Island standoff between China and the Philippines is as follows: On April 8, 2012, a Philippine Navy surveillance plane spotted eight Chinese fishing vessels anchored in the waters of the shoal. BRP Gregorio del Pilar was sent on the same day by the Philippine Navy to survey the vicinity of the shoal and confirmed the presence of the fishing vessels and their ongoing activities. On April 10, 2012, BRP Gregorio del Pilar came to inspect the catch of the fishing vessels. The Filipino inspection team claimed that they discovered illegally collected corals, giant clams, and live sharks inside the first vessel boarded by the team. BRP Gregorio del Pilar reported that they attempted to arrest the Chinese fishermen but were blocked by Chinese maritime surveillance ships, China Marine Surveillance 75 (Zhongguo Haijian 75) and China Marine Surveillance 84 (Zhongguo Haijian 84). Since then, tensions have continued between the two countries (Santos 2012). On June 18, 2012, due to the impact of typhoon weather, Philippine vessels completely withdrew from Huangyan Island, but a large number of Chinese vessels remained in the area, with Chinese government vessels still patrolling nearby waters. The Philippines accused China of not adhering to the agreement to withdraw the vessels (The Philippine Star 2016). In response, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hong Lei, questioned the basis of the alleged commitment and urged the Philippines to be more constructive in their actions to promote bilateral relations. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs also stated that its maritime search and rescue center responded to requests from Chinese fishing authorities and fishermen and dispatched the vessel “Nanhaijiu 115” to provide necessary assistance to the fishermen navigating stormy weather. China asserted its continued jurisdiction and vigilance over Huangyan Island's waters. According to the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, by July 2012, China had set up barriers at the entrance to Huangyan Island (Keating 2012). Subsequently, on January 21, 2013, the Philippine Foreign Minister acknowledged that China had effectively controlled Huangyan Island, and Philippine vessels were unable to re-enter the area (Malaya Business Insight 2013).

Firstly, in terms of strategic ambiguity, China's previous approach to incidents involving Huangyan Island was primarily based on concession and symbolism, without making any explicit strategic commitments regarding the island. The Philippines did not know whether China would take a strong stance on this issue. In the 1950s, Huangyan Island was under the de facto control of the US and the Philippines. On March 31, 1990, China placed sovereignty markers on Huangyan Island. Since 1997, the Philippines asserted its sovereignty over the South China Sea based on “international law” and “actual occupation.” On April 30 of the same year, the Philippine Navy surrounded two Chinese maritime surveillance ships engaged in radio activities, and after destroying China's sovereignty markers on Huangyan Island, the Philippine Navy lowered rubber boats carrying soldiers onto the reef, planting the Philippine flag on the Third Thomas Shoal. On May 3, after a three-day standoff, the Chinese maritime surveillance ships voluntarily withdrew, granting the Philippines control over Huangyan Island. The first Huangyan Island standoff ended in victory for the Philippines. Afterward, Chinese fishermen in the vicinity of Huangyan Island faced arrests, detentions, and even shootings by the Philippine Navy. In 2009, the People's Republic of China deployed its largest fishery patrol vessel to the Xisha Islands, declaring sovereignty over the South China Sea islands. However, Huangyan Island is approximately 340 nautical miles away from the nearest Xisha Island, with the escort's symbolic significance outweighing its practical effect. Due to subjective or objective reasons at the time, China failed to protect its fishermen and their related rights and interests or effectively exercise actual control over Huangyan Island, leaving the Philippines with a perception of China's strategic ambiguity and avoidance, leading them to believe that China would not take a strong stance on the Huangyan Island issue.

Secondly, in terms of strategic inducement, at the beginning of the Huangyan Island standoff, China still did not make any strategic commitments, and the Philippines, based on their past perception of China, arrested Chinese fishing vessels, leading to the confrontation between China and the Philippines. On April 8, 2012, a Philippine navy reconnaissance aircraft spotted eight Chinese fishing vessels in the waters near Huangyan Island. The next day, the Philippine Navy's flagship, BRP Gregorio del Pilar, sailed from Palawan to Huangyan Island. More Hainanese fishing vessels entered the lagoon of Huangyan Island on subsequent days. On April 10, in the morning, the Philippine BRP Gregorio del Pilar reached the waters of Huangyan Island, and a small boat was dispatched to arrest the twelve Chinese fishing vessels in the lagoon. The team then boarded the first fishing vessel and attempted to arrest the Chinese fishermen, presenting pre-printed multilingual documents demanding the fishermen admit to “invading the Philippines.” Around noon, Chinese maritime surveillance ships, China Marine Surveillance 75 and 84, arrived in response to the Philippines' plan to apprehend Chinese fishermen, providing assistance to the trapped fishermen upon request. At around 12:30 p.m., the Philippine Navy withdrew its ships and returned to their patrol vessel, starting a standoff with the Chinese maritime surveillance ships. Later, China Fishery Administration vessel, China Yuzheng 303, received a distress signal and immediately set off from Meiji Reef, approximately 300 nautical miles away, to protect the fishermen. On April 13, at around 12 p.m., China's maritime surveillance ships 75 and six fishing vessels left Huangyan Island. China Fishery Administration vessel, China Yuzheng 303, and four fishing vessels left the area in the afternoon around 7 p.m., while China's maritime surveillance ship 84 remained stationed. China's official media, the People's Daily, published an article titled “Resolving South China Sea Issues Cannot Rely Solely on Compromise,” stating that in the face of other countries' “incremental actions” in the South China Sea, China could not be weak. On April 16, the “Balikatan 2012” joint military exercise between the US and the Philippines began, with 4,500 US soldiers and 2,300 Philippine soldiers participating. The exercise took place in the waters of the South China Sea, where the confrontation between China and the Philippines occurred. During this period, China and the Philippines engaged in a series of diplomatic and military standoffs. The Philippines was induced into the standoff and may have believed that the outcome would be the same as before, with China's concession and the Philippines' victory, leading to a misjudgment and lowered alertness by the Philippines.

Thirdly, in terms of strategic coercion, the Philippines, based on their perception of China, mistakenly believed that China would withdraw during the standoff. However, China did not back down and ultimately gained actual control of Huangyan Island, forcing the Philippines to concede. After entering the standoff, China did not retreat or withdraw as it had done in the past. The confrontation between China and the Philippines' law enforcement vessels in the South China Sea near Huangyan Island lasted for four weeks, and the situation became increasingly tense. Japan's Defense Ministry even reported that a large fleet of the People's Liberation Army was heading south, although the destination was unclear. On May 15, China unilaterally announced a fishing moratorium in the relevant waters of the South China Sea while continuing patrols and expelling Philippine fishing boats near Huangyan Island. On May 16, the Chinese Navy's amphibious fleet conducted military exercises in the Western Pacific near the northern part of the Philippines' Luzon Island. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that from May 16, 12:00 pm, most of the South China Sea would enter a two-and-a-half-month summer fishing moratorium, and Huangyan Island's waters were also within the scope of this moratorium. During this period, China's fishery administration and maritime law enforcement vessels would continue their patrols and law enforcement activities. The Chinese side reiterated its commitment to resolving the current situation around Huangyan Island through diplomatic consultations (People's Republic of China 2012). On June 3, the Philippine government vessels finally withdrew from the lagoon of Huangyan Island after being stranded there for over a month. China's two government vessels then cleared the scene and left the lagoon on June 5, continuing their duties in the waters near Huangyan Island. On June 18, due to the impact of typhoon weather, all Philippine vessels left Huangyan Island, but many Chinese vessels remained, and government vessels continued to stay in the waters near Huangyan Island. The Philippines accused China of not withdrawing as agreed, but the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Hong Lei, responded to reporters, saying that the so-called commitment by China to withdraw vessels from Huangyan Island was unfounded. China hoped that the Philippines would restrain its words and deeds and do more to promote the development of bilateral relations. On January 21, 2013, the Philippine Foreign Minister admitted that China had effectively controlled Huangyan Island, and Philippine vessels could not approach it. China demonstrated strength and determination in this incident, and the Philippines would subsequently reassess China's determination and have a new understanding of China's resolve in the South China Sea. China successfully gained actual control of Huangyan Island, and the Philippines eventually conceded during the standoff. This allowed China to establish and stabilize the boundary order in the region.

Regarding changing and stabilizing the boundary order, the confrontation between China and the Philippines did not escalate into intense conflict or war, and a non-warfare model of peaceful transformation was achieved. China effectively changed and stabilized the boundary order, meeting the condition of “peace.” Additionally, by maintaining sovereignty and expanding strategic space after gaining control of Huangyan Island, China created an environment conducive to its rise and development.

The 2017 Doklam Standoff Between China and India

In 2017, during the Doklam standoff between China and India, the situation was as follows. On June 1, 2017, China requested India to dismantle two bunkers near the Sikkim segment of the China–India border, but India refused. As a result, on June 6, the Chinese People's Liberation Army sent two bulldozers to remove the bunkers (Su 2017). On June 16, a Chinese construction team began building a road in the Doklam area. On June 18, about 270 Indian soldiers and two bulldozers crossed the Sikkim segment of the China–India border and advanced about 3 kilometers into the construction site, resulting in an unarmed standoff with the Chinese PLA. This became the most significant bilateral event in the 55 years since the 1962 China–India border war (Barry et al. 2017). On August 28, 2017, both China and India ended the standoff, but they did not publicly disclose the specific conditions each side accepted. On the same day, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying stated in a routine press conference that India had withdrawn all personnel and equipment that crossed the border to the Indian side at 2:30 pm that day. She also mentioned that China's border defense forces would continue to patrol and station in the Doklam area (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2017a). After the standoff ended, China had built a large-scale training base in the Doklam area capable of accommodating thousands of personnel. They constructed various fortifications and other facilities and expanded the road leading to Doklam.

Firstly, in the stage of strategic ambiguity, China's response to the China–India border issue was not as sensitive as during the Doklam standoff. During the China–India war, China only responded with counterattacks when India launched large-scale offensives. Therefore, China's “last obvious opportunity” or red line set before the Doklam standoff was not clear during the initial phase, and China's stance at this time was still relatively ambiguous. After China's victory in the Tibet suppression in 1959, the Chinese government rejected India's territorial claims, and subsequently India implemented the “Forward Policy,” which encroached on Chinese territory. In August and October 1959, the Indian military provoked the Longju and Kongka Pass incidents on the eastern and western sectors of the China–India border, resulting in the deaths and injuries of multiple Chinese border troops. From 1961, the Indian army established 43 military posts in Chinese territory in the western sector of the China–India border. On September 21, 1962, the Indian 7th Brigade's 9th Battalion attacked a Chinese outpost (the 7th platoon of the 3rd Company, 2nd Regiment, Tibet Military District) with more than ten artillery shells, resulting in the death of five PLA border soldiers. On September 22, 1962, the People's Daily published an editorial titled “What Can Be Tolerated and What Cannot Be Tolerated,” warning the Indian government to immediately withdraw its troops from the border; otherwise, China would use force (People's Daily 1962). After this warning, the China–India border war occurred: On October 12, 1962, Nehru declared in New Delhi that the Indian government would “deal with China with military force (Maxwell 1999).” On October 17 and 18, the Indian army conducted intense artillery shelling against Chinese border troops on the eastern and western sectors of the border, sparking large-scale armed conflicts. On October 17, the Central Military Commission issued the “Operational Order to Annihilate the Invading Indian Army.” On October 18, the Central Military Commission issued another directive: “This anti-Indian operation is related to our country's dignity and military prestige. We must strive to achieve victory in the first battle. We can only win, not lose.” The war was fought in the eastern and western sectors of the China–India border, starting on October 20, 1962, and ending mostly on November 21, 1962. On November 21, 1962, the Chinese government announced a unilateral ceasefire, withdrawal, and establishment of civil administration inspection stations. If India learned from this historical experience, during subsequent standoffs, such as the Doklam standoff, India might think that China would only counterattack if India launched large-scale offensives and China issued severe related editorials. Moreover, the intensity of the conflict between China and India in the Doklam standoff was far less severe than the 1962 China–India war. Therefore, India still had room to continue expanding its influence in the Doklam standoff, but its perception of this space was ambiguous. China had the potential to counterattack, but it could also continue to exercise restraint.

Secondly, in the strategic induction phase, China did not initially display an exceptionally assertive attitude, and India's actions were based on their past perception of China. When the Chinese engineering team began constructing a road in the Doklam area, the Indian military crossed the Sikkim segment of the China–India border, leading to the Doklam standoff. On June 1, 2017, China demanded that India dismantle two bunkers near the Sikkim segment of the China–India border, but India refused. As a result, on June 6, the Chinese People's Liberation Army sent two bulldozers to remove the bunkers. On June 16, the Chinese construction team started building the road in Doklam. On June 18, about 270 Indian soldiers and two bulldozers crossed the Sikkim segment of the China–India border and advanced about 3 kilometers into the construction site, resulting in an unarmed standoff with the Chinese PLA. In mid-July, the standoff between China and India escalated, and China Central Television (CCTV) revealed that a certain Chinese mountain brigade conducted live-fire exercises in Tibet. However, the troops involved in the standoff from both sides exercised restraint and did not use weapons, and the leaders of both countries did not make public statements. During this period, China and India engaged in a series of diplomatic and military confrontations. India was induced into the standoff and may have thought that the situation was not as severe as the 1962 China–India war and China would continue the standoff for a certain period. Based on this judgment, India may have lowered its alertness.

Thirdly, in the strategic coercion stage, India, based on past experiences, believed that the standoff between China and India would last longer, but China's statements quickly turned harsh, and the situation of the standoff became urgent. Starting in August, the official statements from Chinese government agencies and state media became increasingly assertive and urgent. On August 2, 2017, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a position article titled “The Facts and China's Position Concerning the Indian Border Troops' Crossing of the China–India Boundary in the Sikkim Sector,” clarifying China's position (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2017b). Subsequently, from August 3 to the early morning of August 4, the PLA Daily, Xinhua News Agency, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of National Defense, the Chinese Embassy in India, and the People's Daily continuously issued strongly worded reports and speeches within 24 hours. The PLA Daily published a comment titled “China's Territorial Sovereignty Must Not Be Violated” and stated, “The Chinese people cherish peace, and we will not engage in aggression or expansion, but we have the confidence to overcome all aggression (Jun 2017).” On the morning of August 5, the PLA Daily published another comment titled “Do Not Underestimate Our Determination to Safeguard Territory and Sovereignty,” warning the Indian authorities that “if they continue to reject China's goodwill, misinterpret China's restraint, and go down the wrong path, it will seriously damage regional peace and stability and lead to more serious consequences (PLA Daily 2017).” On August 15, in the Pangong Lake region on the western sector of the China–India border, the border defense forces of both sides had a physical confrontation, resulting in injuries to personnel on both sides (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2017c). On August 28, 2017, both China and India ended the standoff. On the same day, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying stated in a routine press conference that India had withdrawn all personnel and equipment that crossed the border to the Indian side at 2:30 pm that day. She also mentioned that China's border defense forces would continue to patrol and station in the Doklam area (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2017a). India's Ministry of External Affairs issued a statement saying that both China and India communicated diplomatically and agreed to quickly withdraw personnel from the Doklam standoff area (Bagchi 2017). The Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that India had withdrawn personnel and equipment from the standoff site and “will continue to exercise sovereignty rights according to historical conventions.” On August 29, the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that they would comprehensively consider factors such as weather and make construction plans in the Doklam area based on actual conditions. After the standoff, China had built a large-scale training base in the Doklam area capable of accommodating thousands of personnel. They constructed various fortifications and other facilities and expanded the road leading to Doklam. China exhibited determination and strength in this event, which India did not anticipate would manifest so quickly. Realizing their previous misjudgment of the Doklam standoff, India withdrew, and China was able to establish and stabilize its boundary order in the region.

In terms of changing and stabilizing the border order, China and India did not engage in intense conflicts or wars. Instead, they adopted a non-warfare mode of peaceful transformation, which satisfied the conditions for “peace.” Through this peaceful approach, China successfully changed and stabilized the border order. In the context of creating an environment for its rise, China, after gaining actual control of the Doklam area, safeguarded its sovereignty and expanded its strategic extended space. This move has been beneficial for China's rise and development.

Summary

The stages of strategic deception (strategic ambiguity, strategic inducement, and strategic coercion) are mapped onto the events of the Huangyan Island and Doklam standoffs, as shown in the figure below.

In the Sino-Philippine Huangyan Island standoff and the Sino-Indian Doklam standoff, China demonstrated a strategic behavior of a rising power through strategic deception. This strategic deception involves three steps: strategic ambiguity, strategic inducement, and strategic coercion. China employed strategic deception to achieve its strategic objectives of changing and stabilizing border order and creating an environment for its rise. It was both a peaceful transformation and a part of China's rise, meeting the conditions of “peace” and “rising.” In comparison, China's path to rise has been strategic, emphasizing its long-standing commitment to morality and legitimacy. It has not resorted to direct violence like typical powerful nations that begin with military aggression or coercion. China's approach is not based on non-peaceful aggression; instead, it adheres to peaceful means in its rise.

The reason for selecting these two cases has been explained at the beginning of this section—because they are typical examples. Related disputes before and after these events are not as typical or did not unfold as completely as the selected cases. For instance, the pre-2012 China–Philippines Huangyan Island dispute did not result in a clear change in border order, and the second half of the strategic deception process was not observable. In some cases, only the first half, such as diplomatic protests, could be seen. Similarly, the 2013 China–India Depsang standoff was more of a prelude to the Doklam standoff, with both sides withdrawing without a change in border order. In some cases, like the 2023 China–Philippines Huangyan Island dispute, only the latter part of strategic deception can be observed, where China repeatedly blocked or repelled the Philippines from entering the Huangyan Island waters.⁷

Of course, there are similar cases, such as the China–South Korea Ieodo (Suyan Rock) dispute, the China–Japan Diaoyu Islands dispute, the South China Sea Exclusive Economic Zone disputes, the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone dispute, and the Taiwan Strait sovereignty claims. While these cases have not yet shown a complete strategic deception pattern, they do indicate a trend of strategic deception with potential future applications. For instance, China's actual control over parts of the South China Sea, the establishment of the Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea, and military exercises pushing closer to Taiwan while breaking the “median line” in the Taiwan Strait all suggest this trend. Except for Ieodo, which is administered by South Korea, and the Diaoyu Islands being in a contested, unoccupied state, these multiple cases suggest that the strategic deception model has a certain degree of explanatory power and applicability for the future.

The relevant alternative explanation might emphasize that this is simply China's realist path of power expansion. However, in response to such alternative explanations, two key points should be considered: First, regarding overt military expansion; second, regarding transparent diplomatic negotiations. In practice, China has neither engaged in overt military expansion nor fully relied on transparent diplomatic negotiations, as the former would likely escalate conflict and the latter would make it difficult for China to achieve its strategic goals. Therefore, China's approach is not entirely reliant on forceful means or transparent diplomacy, nor is it following a traditional realist path. China has also restrained from short-term power expansion. Thus, viewing China's actions purely through a realist lens is limited and carries significant uncertainty in its explanatory power, making it difficult to predict strategically. This article's value lies in partially theorizing such behavior by supplementing the traditional realist perspective with China's specific behavioral patterns, which I define as strategic deception in this study.

Conclusion

China's behavior appears contradictory on the surface, as it claims to pursue a “peaceful rise” while engaging in disputes with neighboring countries. How does China prevent territorial and maritime conflicts from escalating? To address this puzzle, this study reviewed China's strategic transformation, its manifestation of peaceful rise, and the broader strategic research on how rising powers should handle foreign relations. However, these studies have not provided a satisfactory answer or explanation. This research introduced the concept of strategic deception, drawing from Sun Tzu's Art of War and Robert Jervis's strategic thoughts, to construct a new theoretical framework and perspective. From this viewpoint, China may have employed strategic deception, employing strategic ambiguity, strategic inducement, and strategic coercion in its disputes with other countries. By doing so, China managed to avoid escalating these disputes into wars, transforming them into nonviolent and peaceful transformations while creating a strategic environment to facilitate its rise.

Although the term “peaceful rise” has been adjusted in the Xi Jinping era, its core principles remain integral to China's foreign policy. Xi Jinping's diplomatic thought continues the foundation of peaceful development and, through new expressions such as the concept of building a community with a shared future for mankind, emphasizes the peaceful development path based on mutual respect and win-win cooperation. Therefore, while the terminology of peaceful rise has evolved, its essence and direction continue to be a part of China's foreign policy.

Strategic deception often comes with ethical controversy, especially when it is perceived as violating principles of transparency and honesty. Deception is often associated with fraud or dishonesty, which can harm a country's international reputation and trust. It may also lead to broader international criticism, suggesting that it undermines a rules-based international order. However, despite the ethical concerns, strategic deception can be an effective tool in non-violent strategy to avoid greater conflict. From this perspective, strategic deception serves as a means to reduce the occurrence of direct conflict. At the same time, it helps states avoid the high costs and unpredictability of direct confrontation, thus safeguarding peace while consolidating their own interests. In balancing the maintenance of peace with the achievement of strategic goals, strategic deception offers a more flexible option.

The primary difference between rising and established powers in their use of strategic deception lies in their strategic goals and motivations, stemming from their respective positions and stages in the international power structure. Rising powers often use strategic deception to enhance their own strength and avoid direct confrontation with more powerful opponents, whereas established powers tend to use it to weaken rising powers and delay or prevent their own decline.

Rising powers, such as China, are in the process of ascending within the international order. To achieve a peaceful rise, they are more likely to employ strategic deception to conceal their true intentions, avoiding direct confrontation with established powers while securing favorable geopolitical and economic conditions. For example, when handling border disputes, China has used tactics such as “strategic ambiguity” and “phased strategic inducement” to avoid large-scale conflict through unclear diplomatic and military actions while gradually consolidating its control over disputed territories. This strategy helps China expand its influence without triggering widespread international opposition, allowing it to gain time and space during its rise.

In contrast, established powers such as the United States use strategic deception primarily to maintain their hegemonic position and weaken rising powers. This approach often involves a facade of peace, claiming to protect international order and security, while its hidden objective is to preserve its dominance in global affairs. For instance, in responding to China's rise, the United States uses strategic deception by leveraging tensions in regions such as the Taiwan Strait and Ukraine to slow China's development while reinforcing its hegemonic legitimacy in NATO regions, thereby delaying its relative decline. Through such strategies, the United States not only maintains its leadership in the international system but also secures its safety and advantage when facing challenges from rising powers.⁸

Moreover, the theory of strategic deception might also explain other patterns of China's behavior in its peaceful rise, such as the 2022 military exercises around Taiwan triggered by Nancy Pelosi's visit. Similar to the previous cases, China managed to divert attention to the question of whether it would shoot down Pelosi's plane and trigger a war before her visit. After Pelosi's visit, mainland China conducted military exercises around Taiwan, normalizing the crossing of the median line in the Taiwan Strait, which further expanded its strategic space in the region. Although conditions in these cases differ, such as the issue of sovereignty between mainland China and Taiwan, and the current lack of full actual control in the Taiwan Strait region for mainland China, they still share some similarities with the strategic deception concept. For instance, China focused international attention on one aspect (whether China would shoot down the plane and trigger a war) while concentrating its efforts on another aspect (normalizing crossing the median line in the Taiwan Strait).

In theoretical terms, the concept of strategic deception of rising states complements strategic research, and further studies on hegemonic and declining power strategic deception are anticipated. In practical terms, understanding the rising state, especially China, and its current strategic behavior and future trends can be better achieved through the lens of strategic deception. Although China's strategic deception is relatively benevolent, avoiding conflicts from escalating into large-scale wars and facilitating peaceful changes, China must also consider the potential discontent and vigilance it might cause among relevant countries during its peaceful rise. Building good relations with its neighbors, emphasizing its long-standing commitment to morality and legitimacy, remains essential.

According to this article's analysis, strategic deception is a key tool used by China in handling border disputes. It aims to resolve disputes through non-military means and prevent conflicts from escalating into war, ensuring China's strategic goal of peaceful rise. This strategy has broad implications for regional stability and international norms. First, through strategic deception, China avoids the escalation of border disputes with its neighbors into large-scale military conflicts, creating a border order favorable to its rise. However, this may also heighten the vigilance and distrust of relevant countries. Following incidents such as the Huangyan Island and Doklam standoffs, countries like the Philippines and India may believe that China will continue to expand its influence through similar tactics. Additionally, China's strategic deception may be seen as a challenge to existing international rules, particularly in the South China Sea and the Sino-Indian border areas. By blurring the lines of rules or indirectly altering the order, China has raised concerns within the international community about its long-term intentions. While these disputes have not escalated into full-blown conflicts, in the long term, neighboring countries may respond to China's actions by strengthening military alliances or seeking support from major powers.

To ensure regional peace and stability, countries can respond by enhancing cooperation and dialogue to pursue non-confrontational solutions to disputes. First, increasing transparency and communication will help reduce miscalculations, particularly those stemming from strategic ambiguity. Relevant countries should strengthen intelligence sharing and communication channels to better understand each other's positions. Second, within the framework of international rules, countries may enhance collaboration through multilateral platforms to promote the establishment of more transparent and fair dispute resolution mechanisms, ensuring that they do not face isolation when addressing actions by major powers. Additionally, continued diplomatic dialogue allows parties to discuss disputed issues openly, promoting peaceful resolutions. Through these measures, countries can effectively respond to the new challenges posed by strategic deception while collectively maintaining long-term peace and prosperity in the region.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Author Biography

Changkun Hou is a Ph.D Candidate at Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University. His research interests include Tianxiaism, strategic deception, and China studies. [email protected].

Changkun Hou is also an Associate Researcher at the Taiwan International Strategic Society. His research focuses on Tianxiaism, the Taiwan issue, and strategic deception. He has authored the monograph Empirical Studies of Tianxia: From the Spring and Autumn Period to the Contemporary Era. He has received several awards from organizations, including the National Doctoral Forum on International Relations, the China International Relations Society (Beijing and Taipei), and the National Model United Nations Conference in New York. He has delivered keynote speeches at universities, such as National Taiwan University and Nanjing University, and has been interviewed by media outlets, such as People's Political Consultative Daily, Financial Times, China Daily, etc.

Footnotes

References