Structure of naval officer corps in modern Japan: formation through education and examinations

Abstract

For Japan, a latecomer maritime nation, establishing a navy and training its officers were both necessary and obvious tasks. This study examines the structure of the naval officer corps as a professional group by analysing the processes of selection, education, and assignment. European officer corps were traditionally expected to be composed of individuals from the ‘officer-capable class’. By contrast, the Japanese navy, from its inception, prioritized ability over ascribed status. Officer candidates, therefore, underwent rigorous entrance examinations, and at the Naval Academy, cadets faced competitive testing. In the early years of the navy, class rank at graduation held little significance; however, since the 1900s, it began to strongly influence officers’ careers. Furthermore, factors such as graduation from the Naval War College also played a significant role in assignments. Academic achievement and educational background came to be interpreted as indicators of officers’ competence and professionalism, leading to the establishment of internal rankings within groups. Thus, the naval officer corps became an intricate and unstable structure, comprising both military ranks and an additional hierarchy: that of academic careerism. The ‘best officers’—those with higher graduation ranks from the academy and the college degree—who lacked awareness of the officer corps’ underlying instability, planned the Hawaii Operation and constituted the highest leadership during the Pacific War.

1. Introduction

Japan, following its forced opening to trade, was compelled into a confrontation with the Western powers. The Choshu and Satsuma domains, which had played leading roles in the Meiji Restoration, had prior experience with Western navies, including the Royal Navy, and keenly recognized Japan’s overwhelming disadvantage in military power. Its geographical reality as an island nation caused its new leaders to consider the establishment and expansion of a modern navy as a self-evident policy.

The trajectory of the Imperial Japanese Navy, characterized by its triumphs in the naval battles of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, and culminating in its ultimate defeat in the Pacific War, mirrored the very rise, and decline of modern Japan. This paper examines the structure of the naval officer corps, by analysing officer selection, education, and assignment. In addition, I discuss naval officers’ professionalism.

Dore (1976: 72) argued that academic qualifications are considered more important in later-developing countries, and school education tends to focus on examinations. Japan likewise swiftly institutionalized its education system, prioritizing talent selection and training, and the navy was no exception to this pattern. Evans (1978) directs our attention to Yamamoto Gonbei, who was already influential in the navy around 1890, as an illustration of the transition in naval personnel policies. Seeking to designate the steadily growing number of officers trained in ‘the new knowledge’ as the ‘backbone of the navy’, Yamamoto moved from treating personnel affairs with regional favouritism to prioritizing the acquisition of professional expertise transmitted through modern education (Evans 1978: 187–190). Schencking (2005) considered the navy to be ‘a symbolic representation of the rise of modern Japan in the Meiji Period (1868–1912)’ (Schencking 2005: 9), exemplified by officer selection and educational system formation from its formative to early stages. He observed that, during modern Japan’s rise, the entrance exams for the Naval Academy expanded the recruitment base for officer candidates, and with this, ‘the navy offered young Japanese an avenue to foreign learning and world experience’ (Schencking 2005: 23).

These important research findings delineate the outlines of officer selection and training in its formative stages, particularly in the late 19th century. However, there has been insufficient scholarly attention directed to the officer corps as a whole. The absence of a comprehensive analysis from a long-term perspective has resulted in inadequate understanding of the intricate dynamics of their selection and educational systems, as well as the correlations between these systems and career assignments. Furthermore, while the graduation certificate from the Naval War College (Kaigun Daigakkō) gained significance from a certain point onwards, its graduates have not been subjected to rigorous analysis. Consequently, no empirical elucidation has yet been attained regarding the impact of education and examinations on the formation of the officer corps.

Similar criticisms can be applied to the works of Yamaguchi (2000) and Kumagai (1994). Yamaguchi (2000: 73) focuses on the promotion patterns of naval officers at the rear admiral or higher rank, emphasizing that ‘in the navy, non-graduates were not discriminated against or treated unfavourably compared to their Naval War College graduate counterparts’. Additionally, Kumagai (1994: 265), analysing the progression of officer rankings following their commissioning, notes that the navy did not assign importance to the credentials of Naval War College graduates. He argues that ‘after the Washington Naval Treaty, the graduation rankings from the Naval Academy as a whole became more highly regarded’.

However, these studies tend to focus narrowly on a limited subset of officers, without providing a comprehensive approach to understanding the officer corps. Moreover, they fail to adopt a framework for analysing the two groups of college graduates and non-college graduates, instead mainly concentrating on individual cases and examining whether specific officers held a diploma from the college. Furthermore, there has been a marked lack of interest in the structure of post assignments. Thus, despite the absence of empirical findings, the significance of Naval War College graduates has been consistently underestimated, leading to an unclear portrayal of the officer corps.

In Europe, military organizations established their structures centuries before professionalization. By contrast, in Latin America, organization and professionalization occurred simultaneously, increasing the probability of discord between social classes (Nun 1986: 65). Japan initiated its officer training with an emphasis on education and ‘new knowledge’ concurrently with the creation of the navy. Examining this educational and selection process provides the backdrop to certain conflicts arising in the progression of modern Japan. This investigation will contribute valuable insights into the ‘friction’ experienced by latecomers in the context of military professionalization, regardless of whether it parallels the South American case.

This paper analyses all officers who graduated from the Naval Academy over an extended period, specifically spanning from the 1870s to the mid-1930s and includes numerous lesser-known officers. Utilizing various historical sources, such as official documents,¹ rosters, and the government gazette,² I compiled data on entrance examinations, class rank at graduation, and post-graduation careers of each graduate. From these data, I first identify the selection of cadets to elucidate the openness of academy admissions. Second, I organize trends in cadets’ education, in particular with regard to the academy’s curriculum, and examine their academic performance. Third, I clarify post-graduation assignments by examining the effectiveness of the college’s graduation certificate. These perspectives inform our view of the professional characteristics of the officer corps.

2. Selection of naval cadets

2.1. Social changes and merit-based system

The over 260-year rule of the Edo Shogunate ended with the Meiji Restoration, and in January 1868, a new government was established. In the following year, on 18 September, the government established the Naval Training Institute (Kaigun Sōrenjo) in Tsukiji, Tokyo, to train naval officers. The new leaders also requested that each domain send students to the institute by 25 November, with large domains sending five students, middle-sized domains sending four, and small ones sending three. This first step was fraught with challenges. On 20 November, the Wakayama domain requested an extension, and the Kagoshima, Fukuoka, Kumamoto, Saga, and Tottori domains did not contact the government even after the 28 November deadline (Hyōbushō 1869). Although individuals from Kagoshima and Saga later became significant for the modern Japanese navy, their domains acted slowly at this time. Only five students arrived by the specified deadline (Sawa 1942: 102). Regardless, in January 1870, the Naval Training Institute commenced its courses with forty-six students (Hyōbushō 1870). Those targeted as naval officers were those who had a few years earlier belonged to the samurai class.

In November 1870, the institute evolved into the Naval Academy, initially termed the Kaigun Heigakuryō. In September 1876, it was renamed the Kaigun Heigakkō, which remained the official name until its closure. The Naval Academy Regulations, consisting of 102 articles, were enacted in January 1871. Among these, two articles that referred to qualifications for admission are particularly noteworthy. The first stipulated that, regardless of domain, prefecture, or social status, individuals aged fifteen years and older who had entered the academy and completed the coursework would be admitted as naval officers. The second detailed the entrance examination requirements (Kaigunshō 1941: 559–560). The government selected outstanding young individuals using entrance examinations, irrespective of social status, or background, shifting away from class-based recruiting.

A nationwide announcement was made in 1871, specifying that examinations for officer candidates would be held in August of that year (Hyōbushō 1871). This marked the commencement of a new recruitment system for naval officer cadets, with greater emphasis on physical and academic examinations. Access to admissions opportunities was generally influenced by tuition and examination subjects. Although the eligibility criteria were expanded, if the fees were high or if the examination was concentrated on subjects familiar to the samurai class culture, recruitment would be restricted to specific social classes.

First, the Naval Academy Regulations mandated an annual payment of tuition from admission until the final academic year. However, in February 1871, new regulations regarding tuition were promulgated, stating that ‘tuition fees are not required, and from the day of admission, of course clothing, along with all necessary study materials, will be provided’ (Kaigunshō 1941: 678–679). This policy continued until the academy’s closure in 1945.

Before the policy became completely entrenched, a few exceptions were seen. In May 1873, a quota was established for candidates willing to self-finance (Kaigunshō 1941: 682). The number of applicants was minimal. In 1876, the self-financed quota was set at twenty, but only five applicants were accepted. To fill the quota, eight government-funded candidates were accepted. The Naval Academy enrolled forty-six government-sponsored and five self-financed cadets (Kaigun Heigakkō 1876a, 1876b). The self-funding system was abolished in 1879 (Kaigunshō 1941: 594).

In 1882, a special preparatory course was instituted at the Naval Academy specifically for two distinct groups: the sons of deceased naval officers and those whose fathers or brothers were active duty officers or warrant officers. The admission eligibility was conferred exclusively upon them, with the former entering as government-funded cadets and the latter as self-funded (Kaigun Heigakkō 1882a). In 1886, however, the navy decided to discontinue this course (Kaigun Heigakkō 1919a: 387).³ Thus, by the latter half of the 1880s, a fair system had been established for selecting successful candidates among all applicants without exception through examinations, thereby ensuring all cadets trained at government expense.

Second, focusing on the written portion of the entrance examination, the subjects in 1876 comprised Japanese and Chinese classics, English, as well as mathematics, including algebra and geometry (Kaigun Heigakkō 1876c). During the Edo period, the dominant warrior class placed the highest emphasis on proficiency in Chinese classics, and the required proficiency increased with social status (Dore 1984: 87). While the classics were paramount, the emerging disciplines of English, mathematics and natural science did not have a similar status. Yamakawa Kenjirō, who later became chancellor of Tokyo Imperial University, recollected the atmosphere at his alma mater, the Aizu domain school in the 1860s, where ‘those who pursued mathematics were not readily accepted as comrades within the warrior class’ (Ko Yamakawa Danshaku Kinenkai 1937: 96).

Although the warrior class had once ‘held an almost complete monopoly over knowledge and education’ (Tsuchiya 1936: 197), the entrance examination at the Naval Academy did not show favouritism towards them. The number of examination subjects expanded over time, culminating in 1907, when all applicants were examined in Japanese, Chinese classics, English, mathematics, geography and topography, history, physics, chemistry, and drawing (Gazette 14 January 1907). It should be noted that the physical examination was the initial hurdle, and only those who passed it could undertake the examinations of the above subjects.⁴

2.2. Expanding candidate pool: not family background, but merit

As the navy sought to become open to a greater number of young aspirants, cadet selection increasingly prioritized the individual’s capabilities. A naval officer was a desirable profession for descendants of samurai, but they now competed with children of farmers and artisans. Suzuki Kantarō, for instance, convinced that ‘Given the nationwide public announcement of recruitment, as long as one possesses robust physical fitness and academic competence, success will be achievable’ (Suzuki 2013: 24), decided to take the entrance examination in 1886. Duke Shimazu Tadashige, son of the Satsuma domain lord, received this encouragement from Yamamoto Gonbei in 1904: ‘Duke, your primary goal is to pass the competitive examination to enrol in the Naval Academy, which means dedicating yourself to your studies and surpassing many others’ (Shimazu Shuppankai 1978: 461).

The introduction of a more open selection process led to the end of the samurai monopoly on the officer’s profession. Table 1 presents the composition of the zokuseki, or social statuses, of academy entrants. They fall into three main groups: ‘nobility’ (kazoku), representing aristocratic lineages that were once nobility or daimyo, ‘warrior class’ (shizoku), representing the former samurai class, and ‘commoners’ (heimin), including farmers, artisans, and merchants. In 1874, most academy entrants were from the warrior class and commoners constituted only 7.4 per cent of the total. The top graduate of the Class of 1879, Yamauchi Masuji, was a commoner, and all fifteen other graduates were from the warrior class (Ōta 1942: 26). However, by the turn of the century, commoners had surpassed the warrior class in numbers. This trend persisted and, by 1926, commoners comprised 80 per cent of all entrants. This change was precisely caused by the diminishing influence of social origin, as Admiral Yamagata Masakuni wrote: ‘Even if a navy minister’s son aspires to become a cadet at the Naval Academy, there is no favouritism. He takes the same entrance exams as aspirants from rural areas’ (Yamagata 1966: 142).

Taniguchi Naomi, ‘due to a humble family background during his youth, could not afford formal education and thus pursued self-study to gain entry to the Naval Academy’ (Gagyū 1917: 89). Both of Nomura Kichisaburō’s brothers only completed primary school and one apprenticed as a craftsman, another in a shop (Kiba 1961: 36). The family of Takagi Sōkichi, an entrant from 1912, was plagued by poverty and his father’s alcoholism, which prevented him from reaching middle school. He embarked on self-study through correspondence courses and worked while attending night school in preparation for the entrance examination (Takagi 1995: 18). Yamagishi Kazuo, experiencing similar hardships, overcame the challenges to join the cadets in 1937, and then graduated at the top of the class three years and four months later (Toyoda 1981: 14).

Narratives emphasizing the importance of individual ability over family background permeated society nationwide, leading to a surge of applicants flocking to the navy. Table 2 illustrates the competitive landscape surrounding the three major institutions of higher education targeted by modern Japanese youth: the Naval Academy, the Military Academy, and high schools. The Naval Academy’s notably low acceptance rate stood out, underscoring the high level of competition for admission. Relative to the French Naval Academy in 1928, with an admittance rate of 29.6 per cent (Anonymous 1929: 36), and to the Dartmouth entrance exam, with 43.9 per cent in 1939 (Romans 2012: 120), it is evident that the race for admission to Japan’s Naval Academy was exceptionally fierce, both within the domestic context and from an international perspective.

The emotions of the young candidates who undertook this battle were intense. In a letter to his mentor just before the 1898 entrance examination, Sakuma Tsutomu declared his resolution: ‘If I cannot prevail in this competition, I will be too ashamed to face my parents, siblings, mentor, or old friends again’ (Norimoto 1944: 100). Okuyama Masaichi, who diligently immersed himself in his studies, wrote in his diary, ‘The hardships experienced during the entrance exam preparation are no less significant than any other form of suffering’ (Okuyama 1979: 48). He succeeded amid the 3.1 per cent acceptance rate of 1930. Additionally, Toyoda Jō, a successful candidate in 1937, characterized the entrance competition as ‘a holy war requiring the devotion of one’s entire being, encompassing one’s mental and physical strength’ (Toyoda 1980: 319).

Some individuals who later rose to leadership in the navy were failures at first. For instance, three future naval admirals did not easily secure cadet positions. Murakami Kakuichi was unsuccessful in the 1879 entrance examination (Hatano 1933: 9). Yamamoto Eisuke, the nephew of Yamamoto Gonbei, a prominent figure in the Navy Ministry, failed in 1895 (Yamamoto 1957: 86). Shimada Shigetarō succeeded at his second attempt in 1901 (Suikōkai 2010a: 53). Terai Yoshimori, a military attaché in the USA at the outbreak of the Japan–US war, only overcame the entrance exams on his third attempt, in 1923 (Terai 2013: 20–25). Additionally, Tanaka Kunishige, who later became an army general, was rejected by the Naval Academy in 1889 (Kaigun Heigakkō 1889).

2.3. Officer corps unlinked from class culture

The Naval Academy and the Military Academy provided officer training, and it was not uncommon for candidates to apply to both. As noted earlier, Tanaka Kunishige did not pass the entrance examination at the Naval Academy and was subsequently recruited as an army cadet, and there might have been cases in reverse of his situation. Indeed, not a few highly qualified applicants were invited to enrol in both academies; the choices made by such candidates warrant further inquiry.

Between 1909 and 1911, 107 candidates cleared the entrance requirements for both academies, of whom ninety-five enrolled in the Naval Academy (Takeishi 2005: 59). Ugaki Matome, known as the ‘Last Kamikaze’ (Hoyt 1993), entered the Naval Academy in 1909, ranking ninth in the entrance examination, as well as securing twelfth place at another academy (Gazette 16 July 1909; 24 August 1909). In 1919, there were sixty-six successful candidates for both academies, and sixty opted for the Naval Academy (Takeishi 2005: 63). Yamamoto Chikao, who later became a key figure in the planning of naval operations during the Pacific War, achieved the top rank in the entrance examinations for both academies in 1915 (Gazette 14 August 1915; 23 August 1915). This trend persisted; in 1930, ten candidates were accepted into both academies, and seven chose the Naval Academy (Gazette 20 February 1930; 28 February 1930). Seki Yukio, who led the first Kamikaze Special Attack Unit, also passed both academies’ exams in 1938 (Mori 1986: 58). This coincidence in the stories of the first and last kamikazes is intriguing. Additionally, Nishina Sekio, who advocated for the deployment of the kaiten, the human torpedo, and perished in action as a crew member of this weapon, also received acceptance notifications from both academies in 1939 (Maeda 1989: 168).

A significant number of candidates passed both examinations, indicating an overlap in their fundamental frameworks. While the admissions criteria were not identical, both the navy and the army placed emphasis on academic achievement tests, which were grounded in the curriculum taught in middle schools nationwide, as well as on physical evaluations. While each officer corps had their own distinct cultures, these did not reflect those of any particular social class; rather, they were shaped by officers who underwent a rigorous and equitable selection and training process. This allowed individuals from diverse family backgrounds to readily assimilate into the corps’ culture after graduation. Among the 120 members of the Class of 1926, thirteen had naval officers as fathers or brothers, and nine had family ties to the army (Kaigunshō 1926a). In 1937, of 305 prospective entrants, forty were linked naval families, and thirty-two had connections to the army (Anonymous 1937: 132–133). The fact that several with army-affiliated family backgrounds aspired to join the navy suggests few insurmountable cultural barriers between the two. The same was true with other groups. For instance, 50 per cent of the Class of 1929 had agricultural backgrounds (Kumagai 1980: 103). Cecil Bullock, a British national who taught English at the academy for three years in the 1930s, noted the following with some surprise.

The new entries, therefore, are truly representative cross-section of the Japanese people as a whole. The last group of entries I saw had amongst their number an able seaman and Imperial Princes, cousins of the Emperor. This representative character of the cadet body is really very impressive. (Bullock 1942: 8)

In European countries, especially Germany, the prevailing notion was that officer candidates should primarily come from the ‘officer-capable class’ consisting of the offspring of mid- to high-level officials, professors, the nobility, current or former officers, and the like (Muth 2011: 85). However, in Japan, as soon as the former samurai class launched their modern navy, they allowed entry of officers from all social classes.⁵ The warrior class relinquished privileges and intentionally hindered the formation of any ‘officer-capable class’.

3. Education at the naval academy

3.1. Training new-style officers: curriculum and regulations

As the number of nonsamurai class boys taking the entrance exams grew, competition intensified, and the gates of the Naval Academy were opened only to a select few candidates. Most of those who managed to overcome the hurdles were confident in their intellectual abilities. The academy focused on developing them into professionalized naval officers.

The Naval Academy Regulations of 1871 showed an initial five-year phase for cadets encompassing fundamental subjects, including English, Chinese classics, algebra, and geometry, along with navigation, artillery, steam engineering, shipbuilding, and medicine. In the following three-year period, constituting the second stage, the level of difficulty was significantly heightened in English, mathematics, navigation, and artillery, and also incorporated military law (Kaigun Heigakkō 1919a: 42–44). This was a period of trial and error in constructing the modern navy, and the young academy likely could not rigorously adhere to these regulations. However, government policy prioritizing modern Western scholarship over traditional samurai culture was clear and never wavered thereafter.

In 1886, as the framework for officer training approached completion, the duration of the programme was set to three years, and a systematic curriculum was developed. First- and second-year cadets were to learn about four fields: foundational subjects, mathematics and navigation, operations, and artillery. In the third year, the curriculum expanded to include torpedoes. The first-year course required cadets to master both foundational subjects and the basics of military subjects, with the latter becoming increasingly specialized and practical as their academic years progressed. The academy’s report indicated that ‘the content of each subject may vary in quantity or be at a more advanced level, depending on the classes’ progress’ (Kaigunshō 1887: 220–223), which implied the ongoing elevation of educational standards.

In 1903, the first-year fundamental subjects at the academy were English, physics, chemistry, and mathematics. The second year encompassed English, physics, and mathematics, and in the third year, English and dynamics. Military curriculum in the first year included artillery, operations, and machinery, and the following year, they expanded to artillery, operations, torpedoes, navigation, and machinery. These five military subjects remained constant in the final year. Each academic year featured twenty-eight instructional hours weekly, with military subjects accounting for eight hours (28.6 per cent), thirteen hours (46.4 per cent), and eighteen hours (64.3 per cent), respectively (Kaigun Heigakkō 1903a). The curriculum structure remained relatively unchanged, and even in 1929, when the academy transitioned to four academic years,⁶ the proportion of the subjects was 27.7 per cent in the first year and 66.7 per cent in the final year (Kaigunshō 1929a).

The academy’s training process underwent two major changes over the decades. First, the course duration was dramatically condensed from eight to three years. Second, educational standards saw notable advancements. Taking mathematics as an example, in 1871, plane geometry, which had been slated for study after the initial five-year stage, was a first-year subject by 1886. Furthermore, calculus, not part of the curriculum in either of these years, had already been incorporated into it by 1903. These developments can be attributed to the circumstances surrounding pre-admission. Specifically, the nationwide spread of secondary schools rendered the Naval Academy’s secondary education function redundant, shifting its focus to higher education. Furthermore, the intense competition for admission led to a cohort of incoming cadets possessing enhanced academic qualifications, thereby facilitating an improvement in educational standards.

The requirement to pass both a physical and academic examinations for admission enhanced the quality of cadets, enabling the academy to consistently produce officers. In November 1870, at a time when fierce competition for admission had not yet emerged, forty-three cadets entered the Naval Academy. Of these, eleven were selected for overseas studies and departed the following February. Among the remaining cadets, twenty-seven left during their enrolment due to illness, voluntary withdrawal, death, or other reasons, leaving only five cadets, including Yamamoto Gonbei, who successfully graduated (Kaigun Heigakkō 1919a: 7–8, 69–70; Kaigun Giseikai 2003). The academy had regulations for expulsions from its inception, expelling cadets for poor academic performance, health issues, or lack of character. While these regulations underwent occasional minor amendments, the fundamental stance remained in place until the closure of this institution in 1945.

As noted, less than 12 per cent of the 1870 admissions graduated. However, as selection processes became more refined and educational systems were implemented, this situation improved. Table 3 shows that, from the 1880s onwards, graduation rates within the stipulated timeframe consistently remained around 90 per cent, exceeding 90 per cent when graduates with retention were included. The navy swiftly put its officer training programme on track with remarkable speed.

Thus, although the group of graduates from the academy expanded steadily, the 1880s still saw a significant faction of nongraduate officers—those lacking modern education—remaining a considerable presence, particularly among mid-level and higher ranks. They prided themselves on being ‘seasoned warriors’, referring to their combat feats during the Meiji Restoration, and placed greater value on their personal experiences than on modern military education. Their sense of identity aligned more with that of samurai than military officers.

The Navy Ministry sought to implement cutbacks in older officers and, in 1886, enacted the Regulations for the Academic Examinations of Naval Officers. These examinations were primarily administered to naval lieutenants and were pivotal in determining their eligibility for promotion. The content included military sciences, such as navigation and torpedo tactics, as well as proficiency in foreign languages (Kaigunshō 1939: 807–814). Officers without a modern educational background found these standards exceptionally challenging, and failure to meet them resulted in retirement. Kimura Kōkichi, a new-era officer who graduated from the Naval Academy in 1882, reflected on this situation with some sympathy.

A profound ‘shock’ was brought about within the navy, and emotionally, it was a pitiful situation. The older-style officers had resigned themselves to their fate in advance, but... suddenly, all hope for the future vanished... When I imagine myself in their position, I could not bring myself to rejoice at the arrival of this era of academy graduates. (Kimura 1933: 78)

Public opinion was also sceptical of them. In the 1890s, the mass media criticized them as follows:

Many naval officers who have not received the new education or were dispatched by various domains occupy positions above the rank of naval lieutenant. The majority of them hail from the Satsuma domain, with their numbers representing at least one-sixth of the naval lieutenant ranks and one-third of the officers, ranging from naval lieutenant commanders to captains. They are mostly devoid of academic knowledge and are incapable of performing their duties. (Anonymous 1892: 18)

In 1893, Yamamoto Gonbei, already influential in the Navy Ministry, identified officers regarded as suitable for retirement. He added the names to the list if he deemed their retirement necessary for the navy: these included senior colleagues from his hometown who had attained the rank of rear admiral or higher through years of military service, as well as those with whom he was personally close. Conversely, he retained capable officers in active service, even his critics. He submitted a list of ninety-seven names to Navy Minister Saigō Tsugumichi, including eight at the rank of rear admiral or higher and eighty-nine at the rank of naval captain or lower.

The minister asked, ‘Is there any concern about retiring such a large number of officers, and would it potentially affect personnel allocation during contingencies, or in other words, emergencies? What are your thoughts on this matter?’ Yamamoto responded confidently, ‘We have observed a growing number of officers who have received the new education; therefore, even with the downsizing, we will have an ample supply of officers suitable for frontline deployment during emergencies’. The minister approved the list (Kaigunshō Daijin Kanbō, 1966: 72).

Officers educated in the new system, particularly graduates of the Naval Academy, played a significant role in the Sino-Japanese War. Their presence at the core of the navy rapidly increased, and they became the dominant group. Furthermore, the Regulations for the Academic Examinations of Naval Officers introduced in 1886, which encompassed the promotion examination system, were abolished in 1896 (Kaigunshō 1939: 807), signifying a complete transition away from old-style officers and an enhanced importance and expectation of the academy education.

3.2. Shift from filtering to graduating

Undoubtedly, while the promise of an officer’s position upon graduation was a motivation, the academy recognized the need for other mechanisms to compel cadets to concentrate on their studies. The 1871 Naval Academy Regulations specified that cadets who failed both the March and August promotion examinations were subject to expulsion (Kaigun Heigakkō 1919a: 34). In August 1872, sixteen cadets were expelled for poor performance (Kaigun Heigakkō 1919a: 102). This fundamental policy remained unchanged. In the 1893 Naval Academy Bylaws, a provision explicitly asserting the expulsion of ‘cadets with poor examination results and no prospect of graduation’ (Kaigunshō 1941: 572) was codified and persisted until the academy’s closure.

In December 1903, two cadets, who had entered the academy alongside Yamamoto Isoroku in 1901, were expelled on the grounds of ‘failing the end-of-year examinations, exhibiting inferior personal qualities, and possessing meagre potential to be future officers’. The officers responsible for these two cadets provided harsh evaluations: one cadet was described as ‘indolent and lacking enthusiasm for studying’, while the other was noted to have ‘led an idle lifestyle and displayed no enterprise’ (Kaigun Heigakkō 1903b). In November 1917, the academy ejected two entrants from the previous year with poor examination results and no prospect of graduation (Kaigun Heigakkō 1919b: 517). In November 1929, four cadets in their second year were deemed to have ‘no prospect of graduating from the academy’s education programme’, and their status was revoked. A record regarding one cadet noted, ‘Due to consistently poor performances, we made every effort to encourage him and provided guidance from beginning to end, yet there has been no noticeable improvement’. Similar assessments were made for the other three cadets as well (Kaigun Heigakkō 1929).

However, aside from the formative years, not all cadets failing to meet the standards were strictly expelled. Rather, the Naval Academy attempted measures to restrain underperforming cadets and often gave them second chances. The 1884 Rules of the Naval Academy prescribed the administration of monthly ‘minor examinations’ and explicitly noted that poor performance on these examinations would entail prohibition from leaving campus on days off, replaced with a requirement to engage in self-study (Kaigunshō 1885). An enrolee for that year, Iwamura Toshitake, recalled being ‘completely inept at mathematics, leading to restrictions on going out’, but he ‘managed to graduate with lower grades without failing’ (Iwamura 1922: 3).

In 1901, of 194 second-year cadets, five failed the year-end examinations, but only one was expelled. The remaining four were permitted to repeat the year on the grounds that, ‘although they failed, they showed diligence in their studies day by day, had some degree of determination to overcome challenges, and were aiming for graduation’ (Kaigun Heigakkō 1901). In the same year, of 205 first-year cadets, sixteen failed, but only two were expelled, and the remaining fourteen, for similar reasons, were granted permission to repeat a year (Kaigun Heigakkō 1901). Of these eighteen cadets who repeated a year, fourteen graduated a year later than their peers. In 1930, two cadets, deemed ‘not academically satisfactory but with a prospect of graduating’ (Kaigunshō 1930) were unable to advance to the next grade, but both eventually graduated. One of the two was Nonaka Gorō, later a courageous pilot.

Once, the naval cadets had been trained through a rigorous elimination process. However, the system transitioned to more careful, supportive training. The navy came to believe in the potential of new entrants and sought to enhance it to the fullest extent possible.

3.3. Competition-inducing system: significance of class rank at graduation

In order to foster diligence among cadets, the Naval Academy not only imposed penalties, such as repeating a year or expulsion, on those exhibiting poor academic performance but also placed considerable emphasis on a system devised to perpetuate continuous competition in exam rankings among cadets within the same grade. The 1871 Regulations of the Naval Academy explicitly stated, ‘Rank order is… determined by superiority or inferiority in examinations’ (Kaigun Heigakkō 1919a: 33). The 1893 Regulations stipulated that the class rank, the scores for each subject, and the conduct rating were to be written down in the academic records for year-end examinations and graduation tests; however, it was specified that ‘the conduct rating is not related to the ranking’ (Kaigunshō 1941: 626), as academic performance was considered the primary determinant. Furthermore, the principal was required to ‘annotate the academic records, attach the vice-principal’s observation report, and submit them to the Navy Minister’ (Kaigunshō 1941: 626). The 1920 Regulations similarly stipulated that ‘performance reviews are based on examination results’ (Kaigunshō 1941: 637).

Cadets were aware of their own rankings, as well as those of their classmates’ and other grades. A Class of 1916 cadet recalled, ‘The end-of-year examination results were printed and prominently displayed on the bulletin board within the student hall’ (Minato 1983: 23), and another 1928 graduate reminisced about ‘the results chart posted in the central corridor’ (Kusumi 1987: 42).

Cadets could easily ascertain ‘who was superior and inferior to themselves’ because seating was arranged according to academic ranking in the classroom (Yamazaki 1977: 16) and in the self-study rooms (Yoshida 1984: 24). Cadets were constantly shown their relative position, heightening their competitive spirit. Hori Teikichi reflects, ‘At the Naval Academy… due to the belief that academic performance during cadet years would largely determine one’s destiny, competition in grades was encouraged, and students were compelled to study rigorously’ (Oitakenritsu Sentetsu Siryōkan 2017: 187). His classmate Yamamoto Isoroku sent the following letter to his brother in September 1903, while at the academy.

Of course, I believe that exams do not truly represent a person’s superiority or inferiority (though that may sound like making excuses); however, within the academy, from the principal down to the general personnel, they give excessive importance on exams, and it is regrettable that even missing one point is enough to have one treated like a fool, so, I was determined to achieve a score of at least 90 ‘percent’ in this semester’s exams. As I mentioned last winter, I had put a lot of effort into preparing for the second-semester exams. As a result, I was able to get ninety something per cent in the second semester. (Sorimachi 1964: 75–76)

Even thirty years later, the competition surrounding the examinations remained unchanged, and a certain cadet recorded their determination to pass the end-of-year exams in a diary entry dated January 1932.

In November of this year, it is imperative to secure definitely the top position or, at the very least, a rank within the top five. Many people consider grades relatively insignificant. In truth, they may not warrant such excessive emphasis. However, looking ahead to life after graduation, when grades assume a pivotal role, it is challenging to negate their significance outright. Furthermore, we, the 130 classmates, stand out as the cream of the crop, selected from a pool of over 9,000 candidates. Emerging as the top-ranked individual within this group appears undeniably worth the pursuit for any man. (Okuyama 1979: 75–76)

Certainly, while some cadets may have diligently pursued their studies to showcase their abilities and the fruits of their efforts, the intent to expand their future possibilities was likely shared by the majority. Nakazawa Tasuku, who had a career as the Chief of the Personnel Bureau at the Navy Ministry, reflects as follows.

One’s academic performance upon graduation from the Naval Academy ruled their advancement or assignments for a lifetime; therefore, those who graduated with mid-range or lower ranks often ended up underutilised, and many of them, I think, were unable to fully utilise their capabilities throughout their lives. (Nakazawa Tasuku Kankōkai 1979: 229)

Nakamura Teiji, the top graduate of 1939, who later rose to the highest ranks in the post-war Maritime Self-Defense Force, wrote, ‘It is said that there was a tendency that the academic performance at the Naval Academy was on par with the work performance in the 25 years after graduation’ (Nakamura 1988: 9).

Table 4 shows the correlation between class rank at graduation, adjusted to percentages, and military rank approximately two decades after graduation from the academy, clearly illustrating a strengthening trend in this relationship, particularly among more recent graduating cohorts.⁷ For the Classes of 1884 and 1886, graduation rank had a relatively weak influence. Of the forty-nine naval captains in 1907, only four (8.2 per cent) graduated in the top 10 per cent, accounting for less than 10 per cent, while the lower 60 per cent, with twenty-six (53.1 per cent), represented over half. However, in the Classes of 1906 and 1907, fifteen (39.5 per cent) of the thirty-eight naval captains in 1928 graduated in the top 10 per cent; in contrast, just four (10.5 per cent) came from the lower 60 per cent. Moreover, in the Classes of 1914 and 1915, among the thirty-seven naval captains in 1937, only three (9.4 per cent) graduated in the bottom 60 per cent, indicating a further reduction in the likelihood of the lower group attaining such a rank. The impact of class rank on promotion gradually grew increasingly significant.⁸

Even after the navy ceased to exist, many former officers could not escape their class rank-based mindset. In 1948, Yokoyama Ichiro, the leader of the Second Section in the Second Demobilization Department, found himself a subordinate of an academy classmate with a lower class rank at graduation. He wrote, ‘Ordinarily, one would have resigned in anger, slamming the resignation letter on the table, but… convincing myself that it was a self-sacrifice needed for the closure of the Imperial Navy, I endured and continued to serve there’ (Yokoyama 1980: 227). Additionally, in the 1980s, an octogenarian retired officer hesitated to attend when invited to a regular gathering of retired officers. He cited his lower graduating rank, believing that this would make him treated lightly by others (Todaka 2017: 354). For academy graduates, class rank at graduation was an influence through their lifetimes.

4. Educational stratification and its impact on career advancement

4.1. Competition for the Naval War College

The highest educational institution for the navy was the Naval War College, where academy graduates around the age of thirty, having gained practical service experience as naval officers and having passed the entrance examination, underwent more specialized education. As Ikeda (1981: 176) noted, ‘the navy’s tradition of not particularly favouring college graduates’, it is generally believed that graduation rank from the Naval Academy had a greater influence on promotion than the college educational background.⁹ However, despite this view being somewhat impressionistic and subjective, it seems to have been almost an accepted notion. In the following analysis, we examine trends in admission to the college and postgraduation situations based on official documents and other sources.

In August 1888, the Naval War College was established as ‘an institution providing advanced academic education to naval officers’ (Kaigunshō 1941: 514). While the wording may have changed slightly depending on the period, the concept was maintained until the closure of the college. In 1897, the college introduced a new course to ‘teach advanced military studies and other academic subjects in order to nurture the foundation of core staff or senior commanders’ (Kaigunshō 1941: 517). This was known as the ‘two-year “A” (or “kō” in Japanese) course for midcareer officers’ (Evans and Peattie 1997: 68). Those who completed this course would acquire the prestigious academic qualification of the Naval War College graduate.

The eligibility for entrance, initially limited to naval lieutenants, was expanded in 1907 to include naval lieutenant commanders (Kaigunshō 1941: 524). The entrance examination, typically attempted by officers in their early thirties, consisted of two stages: the first stage involved a written test and submission of essays, and those who passed this stage advanced to the final selection, an oral examination. The written test was conducted individually within their respective fleets and districts to which the applicants belonged, whereas the oral examination brought qualified candidates from the preliminary stage together at the college and the Navy Ministry in Tokyo.

In a letter of August 1925 to his wife, Yanagimoto Ryūsaku, who commenced his studies at the college in December of that year, reported that approximately 300–400 candidates had applied for the first stage (Chūdo 1967: 64). Competition for admission was certainly intense, but this estimate may be exaggerated. The initial selection was conducted at individual duty stations, not at a central location, making it impossible for him to know the accurate number of applicants.

In 1899, seven officers out of twenty-four applicants enrolled in the Naval War College; two of the seventeen who did not pass reattempted and succeeded in the following years (Kaigunshō 1899a, 1899b). In 1929, of 154 applicants, only forty passed the first stage, resulting in a final enrolment of twenty, yielding a remarkably low enrolment rate of 13 per cent (Kaigunshō 1929b). While data for other periods are fragmentary, we can still gain insight into the competition. In 1909, only twenty-two candidates advanced to the final selection, leading to thirteen successful applicants; among the nine who did not pass, merely one gained admission in the subsequent years (Kaigunshō 1909). In 1936, there were forty final candidates, yielding twenty-four enrolees. The following year, only one officer succeeded after reattempting the examination, while the remaining fifteen continued their naval service until retirement without a college education (Kaigunshō 1936). The initial exam posed a significant challenge, and even those who cleared this hurdle faced a 40 per cent failure rate in the final selection, with very few succeeding upon reattempting.

In the 1920s, Abe Kōsō, who attempted the entrance exams three times and failed each time at final selection, felt deeply disheartened and even mentioned to his family the possibility of resigning from the navy (Kimura 1975: 53). Around the same time, Ōmori Sentarō, who also sat for the exams multiple times without success, noted, ‘I felt deeply disappointed and disheartened, and even considered resigning from the navy’ (Suikōkai 2010a: 564). Numerous officers aspired to attend the college, and intense competition gave rise to many profoundly discouraged officers. In contrast, a handful of officers, namely the college graduates, experienced the positive impact of their educational qualifications on their professional careers.

Table 5 indicates how many officers in each group of graduates and nongraduates of the Naval War College attained the rank of rear admiral or higher, with ‘Class rank’ representing graduation rank from the Naval Academy adjusted to a percentage. This table illustrates, first, the greater tendency of individuals with higher class ranks to graduate from college, with approximately 80%–90% of its graduates having left the academy in the top 40 per cent of their class. Second, a significant and evident difference is observed between graduates of the college, of whom around 80 per cent reached a flag officer rank, and nongraduates, ranging from 9.2 per cent to 26.0 per cent. Third, even for lower class ranking at the academy, graduation from the college increased the likelihood of promotion to rear admiral or higher relative to non-graduates with higher academy rankings. Finally, among nongraduates of the college, as their class rank at the academy declined, so did their rate of flag officer production. Within this group, class rank had a notable influence on advancement.

In essence, graduating from college reduced the influence of the class rank at the academy. In 1899, Admiral Suetsugu Nobumasa, who graduated from the academy fiftieth out of 113, was noted as ‘having absolutely surpassed his bright classmates’ (Hirata 1933:99) due to his college graduation. Similarly, Yonai Mitsumasa, the last Navy Minister, sixty-eigth out of 125 in 1901, also held a college degree.

4.2. Assignment of posts

As the Naval War College solidified its role as an educational institution, two distinct groups came into existence in the officer corps: graduates and nongraduates of the college. On average, roughly 16 per cent of the academy graduates were in the former group (Sanematsu 1993: 118), while the remainder were among the latter. In line with the college’s educational principles, these select few were regarded as potential ‘core staff or senior commanders’.

‘Core staff’ included officers serving at the Navy Ministry (Kaigunshō), the highest administrative body, and on the Navy General Staff (Gunreibu),¹⁰ the supreme authority for planning and operations. These two institutions were known as the Red Bricks (aka renga). Table 6 shows the academic careers of officers at heads of section or higher positions in the Red Bricks, and indicates the characteristics of the group with strong influence within the naval nerve centre.

In the 1910s, key positions in both institutions were still predominantly held by non-college graduates. The college produced only twenty-four graduates from 1898 to 1906, a minimal number, and these graduation credentials had yet to acquire significant prestige. As the 1920s unfolded, however, the graduates gradually occupied leadership roles in both institutions; by the 1930s, they almost monopolized them. Behind this transformation, from 1907 to 1915, the number of new graduates increased to 121 and between 1916 and 1924 to 211 (Hata 2005). As the quantity of the alumni expanded, their diplomas from the college became prerequisites for service in the central bodies of the navy. Yomiuri Shimbun (1917) characterized the college entrance examination as ‘a crucial checkpoint determining the future of young officers, so it is conducted with great strictness’.

Focusing on the executive roles within the Navy General Staff, in 1913, three of the four department chiefs were naval captains, with the exception of Satō Tetsutarō, a rear admiral. This contrasted starkly with the chiefs in the Navy Ministry, all of whom were rear admirals or higher (Table 6). As this suggests, the navy was under a system with the Navy Ministry in a superior role, prompting the Navy General Staff to seek a more equal relationship from the mid-1910s (Nomura 1980: 52). In the mid-1920s, emerging opinion advocated the transfer of power to shuffle personnel from the Navy Ministry to the Navy General Staff in anticipation of the potential appointment of a civilian as the Navy Minister (Tokyo Asahi Shimbun 1927). That plan itself did not materialize, but Navy General Staff succeeded in expanding its authority in 1933. This led to an accelerated sense of self-righteousness in the Navy General Staff, making its confrontation with the Navy Ministry more conspicuous. Consequently, achieving harmony and shared understanding between the two became increasingly challenging.

Throughout this process, some notable transformations are evident. First, around 1920, it was commonplace for rear admirals to be department chiefs in the Navy General Staff, and officers in those roles who were neither graduates of the Naval War College nor rear admirals became rare. The chiefs of the First Department, the most crucial one, were all college graduates, numbering sixteen from December 1920 until the department was abolished; four of the sixteen were valedictorians, and one was a salutatorian. In the Bureau of Naval Affairs, the leading division of the Navy Ministry, all fourteen but one of the chiefs were graduates, with four being valedictorians and four salutatorians (Hata 2005).

Second, by approximately 1930, both organizations solidified their personnel policies to prioritize the First Section of the First Department in the Navy General Staff¹¹ and the First Section of the Bureau of Naval Affairs in the Navy Ministry; this was reinforced in following years.¹²Table 7 suggests that these two sections strove to appoint officers having graduated with highest honours from ‘the highly competitive Naval Staff College’ (Prange 1981: 39) as heads of their sections, as if seeking a balance.

The Navy General Staff, which aspired to become an organization equivalent to the Navy Ministry, now evolved into an assembly of distinguished officers. In July 1932, nineteen out of twenty-seven officers in the Navy Ministry were graduates from the Naval War College, with one valedictorian and one salutatorian, as well as two valedictorians from the Naval Academy. In the Navy General Staff, of thirty-nine officers, twenty-nine were graduates from the college, including three valedictorians, and two valedictorians from the academy (Naikaku Insatsukyoku 1932; Hata 2005).

Similar shifts taking place in the relationship between the central organization, the Navy General Staff, and the forward-deployed force, the Combined Fleet (Rengō Kantai). Since the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan and the Allied forces had been engaged in fierce battles across the Pacific. As Chief of Staff of the Seventeenth Army, Miyazaki Shūichi participated in the Guadalcanal Campaign. In March 1943, shortly after the retreat from Guadalcanal to Bougainville Island, he wrote the following, drawing on his comprehensive observations and reflections on the battle: ‘There are even voices suggesting that the influence of the Combined Fleet Headquarters surpasses that of the Navy General Staff. Consequently, operational guidance across all fronts tended to be shaped and directed by the self-righteous intentions of the Combined Fleet’ (Gunjishigakkai 2003: 386). Miyazaki, a senior army officer, recognized that the difficulties in Army–Navy cooperation on the ground were attributed to the arrogant and reckless attitude of the Combined Fleet Headquarters, which significantly lacked harmony with the naval central command.

Regarding this internal disunity, Terasaki Takaji, a staff officer in the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, criticized that, on the one hand, naval operations were ‘completely pulled along by the Combined Fleet, dragged to Midway, and to some extent to Guadalcanal’. On the other hand, he likewise lamented that ‘the central command engaged in incoherent, utterly inconsistent operations and war leadership, so much so that it was unclear what was being done, leading to an end of the war marked by near-total retreat’ (Todaka 2016b: 85).

Table 8 illustrates the valedictorians and salutatorians from the Naval Academy and the Naval War College among the members of the Navy General Staff, the First Section and the staff officers of the Combined Fleet Headquarters,¹³ highlighting a significant reduction in the disparity of ‘excellent’ officers between the First Section and the Combined Fleet as the latter progressed towards radicalization. In 1937, only Fushiminomiya and Inoguchi Toshihira were not graduates of the college, with the former being of royal lineage and having graduated from the Naval War College in Germany. Consequently, the Combined Fleet still failed to fill all its staff positions with college graduates, and outstanding officers remained limited. However, by 1942, there was an increase in brilliance among the Combined Fleet officers, with a composition comparable to that of the First Section, exemplified by Toibana Kurio, who had been the valedictorian of both the academy and the college. Regarding Toibana from the Naval Academy Class of 1923, Nakajima Chikataka from the Class of 1926 stated, ‘Staff Toibana, while not particularly striking in appearance, was an exceptional talent unmatched in several classes before and after’ (Nakajima 1997: 138). Similarly, Genda Minoru, the Class of 1924, also held this impression (Genda 1996: 38).

The self-righteous military actions of the Combined Fleet were not only influenced by the character and determination of Yamamoto Isoroku, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet (Rengō Kantai Shireichōkan), but also by its heightened presence with respect to the central command, which resulted from the growing number of talented officers in the headquarters. Dohi Kazuo reflects, ‘At the onset of the war, the Combined Fleet staff comprised the outstanding officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy’ (Todaka 2011: 239), although in 1942 when he was himself serving at the headquarters as a staff officer, the staff members became even more excellent. The decline in the functionality of frontline units and central divisions to coordinate and adjust operations can be attributed, in part, to such changes. Sanagi Sadamu, who was responsible for operational planning in the First Section, the core of the Navy General Staff during the Pacific War, acknowledged that despite differing opinions between the Navy General Staff and the Combined Fleet, there was rarely any discussion between the two organizations. Reflecting on this, he remarked, ‘I consider it extremely unfortunate regarding the operational leadership of the Imperial Japanese Navy’ (Todaka 2016a: 92–93).

4.3. Superiority complex and overconfidence

Thus far, this paper examined the relationships among organizations. Next, examining elite behaviour, I seek to highlight the instability of discipline and order in the navy immediately before the outbreak of the Pacific War and in the final stage of the war.

In December 1940, one year before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the navy established several cross-organizational committees intended to consider drafting a unified direction of war planning and execution. Among these, the First Committee (Daiichi Iinkai), responsible for discussing and recommending policy, was particularly significant. This committee comprised four naval captains: Takada Toshitane, Head of the First Section of the Bureau of Naval Affairs; Ishikawa Shingo, Head of the Second Section of the Bureau of Naval Affairs; Tomioka Sadatoshi, Head of the First Section of the Navy General Staff; and Ōno Takeji, War Guidance Office Chief. Additionally, although they were not official members, four naval commanders—Kami Shigenori, Shiba Katsuo, Fujii Shigeru, and Onoda Sutejirō—were given supporting roles under the captains (Sugimoto 1982: 196). They were all graduates from the Naval War College, with Tomioka and Kami being valedictorians, and Takada and Fujii were salutatorians. The evaluation of the First Committee was as follows:

The activities of the First Committee were particularly noteworthy…All four were young, energetic officers, determined that their views should predominate in navy policymaking. Before long, every major policy had its origins in the First Committee. Indeed, top naval Leaders eventually came to ask whether documents awaiting their approval had been approved by the First Committee; those which had were accepted without question. (Morley 1980: 281–282)

After the war, Takada remarked, ‘Chief of the Navy General Staff Nagano once said on a certain occasion, “Section heads are the most well-studied, while chiefs of departments seem too busy to have the time and energy to study. I will adopt the opinions of the section heads”’. Additionally, he stated that the upper echelon of the navy would verify whether documents from the central office had passed through the First Committee, and if they had been approved by it, they would be authorized (NHK Special Shuzaihan 2011: 106). His recollection suggests that the top-ranking officials placed greater emphasis on the opinions of section heads, namely, those of the First Committee than on the opinions of department chiefs. Furthermore, this implies that the department chiefs exhibited a somewhat reserved attitude towards their subordinates. At the time, Sanagi Sadamu, who was serving in the First Section of the Navy General Staff, noted that the First Committee, ‘composed of elites among elites, tended towards exclusivity’. Moreover, he testified that Chief Nagano ‘began to markedly advocate assertive opinions following the submission of this document by the First Committee’ (Todaka 2017: 644).

‘This document by the First Committee’ refers to the ‘Recommended Attitude of the Imperial Navy Under the Current Situation’, which incorporated opinions such as the need to promptly proceed with military deployment to Thailand and French Indochina, along with the necessity for the navy to decide on the use of force if the USA, Britain, and the Netherlands were to impose an oil embargo (Bōeichō Bōeikenshūsho Senshishitsu 1974a: 75). Nakao (2001: 76) considers that while the navy did not necessarily decide on war based on this document, ultimately, it was compelled to act in accordance with the scenario, which resulted in war with the USA. The author of this document, Takada, left the following irresponsible words in 1961: ‘I did not anticipate that the United States would be so angry about the occupation of Southern French Indochina. ... The members of the First Committee did not foresee such significant American fury’ (NHK Special Shuzaihan 2011: 106). Torisu Kennosuke, one of the last college graduates of 1944, severely denounced this document post-war as ‘ignorant of the enemy, ignorant of oneself, and self-righteous’, positioning it as a symbol emblematic of what the navy should self-critically reflect upon (NHK Special Shuzaihan 2011: 90).

In another case, in April 1945, as the prospect of defeat loomed large, the navy deployed the Second Fleet, led by the flagship Yamato, to fight in the Battle of Okinawa. Kami Shigenori, a senior staff officer of the Combined Fleet, who strongly advocated for and planned this operation, did so without consulting his superior, Kusaka Ryūnosuke, Chief of Staff. In his absence, Kami obtained approval from Toyoda Soemu, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet. When Kami later sought Kusaka’s opinion, the latter responded with great indignation, stating, ‘It’s meaningless to ask the opinion of the Chief of Staff after the fact. Once a decision is made, there’s nothing more to be done’ (Kusaka 2021: 411–412).

As noted, Kami graduated from the Naval War College as a valedictorian and likewise was the top graduate of the Naval Gunnery School. Consequently, he was highly regarded, the ‘number one man in the gunnery community’ (Todaka 2017: 234). From a military historical perspective, Hata (2016: 91) argues as follows:

In the military community, advocating for aggressive and hardline stances was generally advantageous—a tendency that became especially pronounced during the tempestuous period following the Manchurian Incident. This inclination, when combined with the confidence and validation of a valedictorian from the Naval War College, resulted in an even more formidable position. … Rumours that no one could rival him if Kami spoke grew rapidly and forcefully took hold.

In the navy, an atmosphere existed in which assertions by college graduates, particularly valedictorians and salutatorians, even if they left lingering doubts or appeared peculiar, were less likely to face criticism or opposition. Kami likely harboured no intention to belittle Kusaka,¹⁴ his superior; however, he may have anticipated that his own opinions and actions would be tolerated. In this way, at crucial junctures, the officer corps often demonstrated a diminished resistance to disrupting the order and command structure constituting the military organization. This can be considered a negative consequence resulting from the completion of the educational system for naval officers.

An analysis of the relationship between the Naval War College and senior commanders is also essential. From 1930 until the end of the war, a total of 165 officers were appointed as commanders-in-chief of fleets. In actual numbers, seventy-eight individuals filled these positions, among whom sixty-eight (87 per cent) were college graduates. Of these sixty-eight, thirty-seven had experience as commanders-in-chief of different fleets, and only one non-college graduate out of ten reached this career milestone (Hata 2005). The fact that all promotions to the rank of admiral after 1928 were exclusively conferred upon college graduates signifies that they had already established themselves as a significant presence of both quantitative and qualitative importance in the upper echelons of the navy. Despite the increase in the posts of commanders-in-chief due to military expansion from the 1930s onwards, there were very limited prospects for non-graduates.

For junior officers who were not yet senior commanders as well, possessing a diploma from the Naval War College held significant importance. Kusaka Jinichi candidly confessed that upon his graduation in 1921, he suddenly felt a sense of arrogance, as if he viewed himself as great (Suikōkai 2010a: 378). Torisu Kennosuke, a graduate of 1944, also reflected critically on his height of hubris in having believed that ‘we, as the Naval War College graduates, are the most capable, and those who did not graduate from the college are incompetent and should defer to us’ (Todaka 2018: 501).

In a milieu characterized by graduates of the college occupying high-ranking roles, a notable personnel transfer occurred in August 1943. Kurita Takeo, who had previously failed his college entrance examination, was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the Second Fleet, an esteemed position. He considered himself ‘lacking in academic abilities’ (Kojima 1967:145–146), and his appointment took many by surprise, including himself.

Prior to this appointment, when he was Commander of the First Mine Squadron, his subordinates and staff officers Suekuni Masao and Nagai Sumitaka, both graduates, often performed their duties without consulting him. The commander did not respond to this behaviour. Suekuni, fifteen years younger than Kurita, recalled: ‘The commander had no college education, and with his subordinates being graduates, he felt inferior’ (Todaka 2009: 67). This implies that subordinates with the college diploma might harbour a sense of superiority over their superiors who did not have these credentials.

Regarding the various decisions made by Kurita, Commander-in-Chief of the Second Fleet during the 1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf, scepticism and criticism have been directed at him, both at the time and in the post-war period. Okumiya Masatake and Mayuzumi Haruo have somewhat sympathetically noted that his lack of the college degree and absence of experience in key positions within the Navy Ministry and Navy General Staff may have led to undue criticism (Okumiya 2001: 308; Todaka 2011: 312–313).

For officers such as Suekuni, Okumiya, and Mayuzumi, the dynamics between college graduates and nongraduates were as described above. As the officer education system became more firmly established, the officer corps’ consciousness, in which the former group felt a sense of superiority over the latter and, in some cases, placed the blame for failure on those considered less qualified, was gradually being nurtured.

5. Conclusion

The navy emphasized two main systems in the selection and training of officers: the educational system and the merit-based system. As the former developed, the latter became more thorough, and examination competition became a major concern for cadets and then for officers. Initially, the graduation rank at the academy and the completion certificate from the college had relatively little significance; however, their influence gradually increased over officers’ career trajectories, with a strong impact on promotions and position allocations.

In the Royal Navy, which the Imperial Japanese Navy took as a model, the desire for upper-class officers led to a homogenization of the officer corps, solidarity among its members, and ultimately, professionalization (Teitler 1977: 132). By contrast, the Japanese Navy prioritized assessed ability over social background, employing rigorous examination-based selection. Officers were drawn from various social classes. Cadets who passed the entrance competition developed esprit de corps, forged through their shared experience of undergoing demanding training. They formed a homogeneous group in terms of intelligence and physical aptitude. The emphasis on various examinations, beginning with the entrance examination, significantly diminished the influence of their social backgrounds; however, these examination results came to be interpreted as indicators of an officer’s ability and professionalism, leading to the hierarchical stratification of members within the officer corps.

The Japanese Navy, as a latecomer, pursued the acquisition of Western technology and knowledge as a means of establishment and enhancement, which consequently led to the parallel progression of officer professionalization and the academic merit-based system. The completion of this grading system occurred around 1930, when graduates of the Naval War College began to form a cohesive group, and officers recognized it as a natural progression. As a result of these two parallel developments, professionalism took on a hierarchical structure. For instance, officers graduating from the college with distinction were considered to demonstrate greater professionalism. Thus, the strong sense of superiority and self-glorification among these ‘excellent officers’ became a contributing factor to conflicts among organizations within the navy, as well as to the self-righteousness observed in specific departments. In addition, some superiors adopted a reserved attitude toward outstanding, college-educated subordinates, which led to a new issue of instability in command and control.

The progress of academic merit-based professionalization and the bureaucratization of organizational structures proceeded concurrently. The naval officer corps established itself as a complex and unstable composition, encompassing both military ranks and an additional hierarchy: that of academic careerism. This may be seen as a kind of fate for a late-developing nation, where education and examinations were emphasized.

While it may be somewhat repetitive to state, officers were acutely sensitive to their own standing positions relative to other officers. Moreover, the more distinguished an officer, the more likely they were to exhibit a tendency to demonstrate the superiority of their assigned department over others. In essence, from their time as cadets, their own thoughts and consciousness remained confined within the narrow framework of the navy. Takada Toshitane, an elite among elites, candidly confessed that he had a greater interest in securing the budget for his own department than in considering the nation’s future. Their modes of thought were notably deficient in a national perspective, let alone a global one. Intentionally or not, they were self-interested in safeguarding their organizations rather than fulfilling their primary duty of national defence. Their structure of consciousness was just ‘Navy-being, nation-not being’ (NHK Special Shuzaihan 2011: 109).

The ‘best and brightest’ officers, lacking both awareness of the officer corps’ underlying instability and a firm sense of responsibility for the fate of the nation, strategically planned the Hawaii Operation and constituted the leadership during the Pacific War.

FUNDING

This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP23K02206.

References

Footnotes