Ryōiki o Koenai Minshushugi—Chihō Seiji ni okeru Kyōsō to Min’i (Fragmented Democracies: Competition and Legitimacy in Japanese Local Politics)

In Japan, the legally defined districts of local governments often do not coincide with urban areas that have undergone socioeconomic agglomeration. In Fragmented Democracies, Sunahara Yosuke insists that the political institutions of Japanese local governments may impede intergovernmental cooperation, diminish urban vitality, and exacerbate conflict within and among local governments.

Sunahara argues that co-operation between local governments is more challenging in a centralized country or when politicians appeal to only a limited subset of supporters with specific interests. In Japan, local government officials, including governors, mayors, and assembly members, are elected directly by constituencies at various times. Furthermore, assembly members are elected through a single non-transferable vote (SNTV). Consequently, it is exceedingly difficult for all actors within the Japanese local governments to reach a consensus.

Additionally, as local governments are primarily responsible for implementing almost all types of policy, a governor or mayor, who does not align with, or belong to any political party, is less inclined to adopt a collective, long-term perspective, and is often reluctant to collaborate with other leaders. Moreover, the Japanese national government, which has an authoritative position over local governments, provides them with subsidies individually but does not play any role in coordinating their interests. Consequently, local governments are more likely to compete than collaborate. In summary, the lack of developed political parties at the local level, coupled with the actions of politicians seeking to advance particular interests, impedes the capacity of local governments to cultivate long-term collaborative relationships, thereby engendering a tendency toward fragmented decision-making.

The chapters in this book are organized as follows: Chapters 2–4 focus on city development. Chapter 2 illustrates how a city serving as the prefectural capital is governed by two regional development authorities: the prefecture and the city. The former is responsible for pursuing a more expansive regional development strategy, whereas the latter focuses on fostering growth within the existing urban area. Consequently, the prefecture focuses outside the urban area, thereby making it difficult for residents to distinguish between the urban and non-urban areas.

Chapter 3 illustrates how municipal mergers have impeded the growth of formerly prosperous ports. Since they are not prefectural capitals, Hakodate and Shimonoseki had no choice but to rely on their own resources to develop their ports. However, after incorporating neighboring districts, they invested considerable effort in developing the newly merged region, which ultimately led to the decline of the ports.

In Chapter 4, the author uses international data to verify the hypothesis that many municipalities have had a negative impact on population growth in major cities. In addition, Sunahara notes that Japanese metropolitan areas with a limited number of municipalities include a significant proportion of rural areas, excluding them from the benefits of urban growth.

Chapters 5–7 address the topic of referenda. After 1990, both the national and local governments in Japan encountered challenges in providing subsidies to all stakeholders. Sunahara suggests that referenda in Japan serve two distinct functions: vetoing a local government’s plan and authorizing a local government’s decision.

Chapter 5 employs an experimental approach to examine the factors that contribute to the legitimization function through a referendum. By focusing on the issue, turnout, percentage of the majority, and initiator, Sunahara identifies the circumstances under which residents might agree with local assembly decisions. The results of the vignette experiments demonstrate that when assembly members are required to decide on behalf of the local government, residents tend to view the outcome of the referendum as a legitimate representation of their collective will. However, when the referendum concerns matters of personal or emotional significance to members, it is less probable to serve as a means of authorizing the decision. The results of this chapter suggest that a referendum does not always lead to the integration of the wills of residents. Instead, it can contribute to the emergence of disparate decision-making processes.

Chapter 6 focuses on the Great Municipal Mergers of the Heisei period. Sunahara classifies referenda as those during the establishment of a merger council, the approval or rejection of a municipal merger, and combinations of municipal mergers. He analyzes the relationship between these types of referenda, voting results, and merger outcomes. His analyses demonstrate that certain referenda for the establishment of a merger council politicized the merger process itself, thereby impeding consensus among residents. Additionally, he finds that some referenda that rejected municipal mergers effectively served as a veto by residents.

Chapter 7 describes how the Osaka Restoration Party (Ōsaka Ishin-no Kai) came to be recognized as the pre-eminent representative of the unified Osaka region, despite its failure to secure victory in the referenda pertaining to the Osaka Metropolitan Plan (Ōsaka-to Kōsō). Prior to Hashimoto Toru’s advent, the decisions of the mayor and prefectural governor in Osaka frequently opposed each other. Hashimoto’s efforts to organize the Osaka Restoration Party and win a majority in both prefectural and city assemblies effectively addressed the issue of fragmented decision-making in Osaka. However, this success ultimately created an unfavorable outcome for the party in the referenda concerning the Osaka Metropolitan Plan, which proposed dividing Osaka City into several special wards. The referenda served as a means of veto by the residents rather than as means of overcoming the fragmentation of decision-making.

In the concluding chapter, Sunahara insists that the fragmentation of decision-making at the local government level does not yield optimal outcomes and may impede urban growth through competition among governments, including those at different levels, because of constrained resources. He asserts that municipal mergers and referenda in Japan do not integrate decision-making processes. To address this fragmentation, he emphasizes the importance of political parties that resonate with voters beyond the borders of local governments and the development of political institutions that can cultivate them into robust organizations.

The following paragraphs offer an evaluation of the book. The most intriguing aspect of this study is its emphasis on the significance of political parties, rather than on institutional reform within the local system. Sunahara insists that “political parties are the very entities that can be responsible to public opinion across space and time, because the decision remains as an organization even if an individual politician resigns” (210). The assertion that institutional modifications of the local government structure are ineffective in addressing the issue of fragmented decision-making is thought-provoking and compelling.

For example, in Chapter 3, Sunahara argues that municipal mergers are not a panacea for solving dispersed decision-making; rather, they intensify competition within the municipality and hinder city growth. At the end of Chapter 4, he suggests that introducing a special self-governing city (Tokubetsu Jichi-shi) with greater autonomy than ordinance-designated cities (Seirei Shitei Toshi) could hinder the reconciliation of fragmented decision-making among local governments within metropolitan areas.

His analysis of the Osaka Metropolitan Plan indicates that modifying the electoral system from the perspective of party interests may result in the loss of public trust, as the electoral system should serve as a foundation for fair and competitive political party engagement.

In the latter part of this book, Sunahara argues that the current referendum system requires restructuring because it is used “instrumentally” by political leaders and emphasizes only the temporary will of the people in a particular local government, resulting in divisive decision-making. If a referendum implies a veto toward the decisions of the governor/mayor and assembly members, it is necessary to strengthen political parties that enjoy stable support from voters as organizations and to create a system wherein the mayor and the city assembly can make “stable” decisions. He argues that this would facilitate a consensus satisfying most of the residents and the assembly.

This book is of great value because it focuses on political parties and institutions associated with local autonomy. Rather than engaging in hasty discussions of institutional change, it thoughtfully considers the establishment of a system that will function as a long-term, comprehensive decision-making system.

However, three questions require further elaboration. First, how should small municipalities be treated? Leaving them as they are would be inefficient and undesirable. However, Sunahara argues that municipal mergers have not consistently produced the desired results, and that further population growth would prevent municipalities from functioning as familiar decision-making bodies for residents. While the vertical/horizontal distribution of administrative functions among local governments may not have been the primary focus of this book, it would have been beneficial to hear the author’s views on this matter. In other words, it would have been helpful if we could gain a clearer understanding of the ideal profile for small municipalities under “the flexible collaboration between local governments” (207).

The second question concerns the status of referenda. Sunahara argues that referenda have been used “instrumentally and tactically” rather than as a means to legitimize assembly decisions (Chapters 5 and 7). This raises the question of whether local referenda represent a comprehensive embodiment of democratic principles or merely supplement the decisions of assemblies. If the former is accepted, local referenda are regarded as a means of embodying local self-governance. Conversely, if representative democracy is considered more important, the latter position will be adopted. Which of these two positions does he support? This matter is crucial for ascertaining his stance, as it possesses the potential to alter the nature of the election and assembly for the residents.

The third question is closely related to the preceding one. Sunahara assumes that a distinction should be made between routine decision-making, wherein interparty competition is evident, and decision-making that should be conducted in a bipartisan manner (206). Therefore, it would have been beneficial to distinguish between them, providing specific examples. Moreover, if the dual representation system is to be conceptualized as an institutional arrangement wherein the governor/mayor and the assembly are in conflict with one another, then “stable” bipartisan decision-making might be inconsistent with this view. Therefore, in the latter decision-making pattern, it might be difficult to imagine how the relationship between political parties and that between the governor/mayor and the prefecture/city assembly would proceed.

Although I have raised several questions about this book, they do not diminish its value. I sincerely hope that this book will be widely read and discussed by diverse audiences.